BOOK
GRAHAM

THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

TRANSLATED FROM THE TEXT OF F. HULTSCH

BY

EVELYN S. SHUCKBURGH, M.A.

LATE FELLOW OF EMMANUEL COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE

IN TWO VOLUMES

VOL. II

London

MACMILLAN AND CO.

AND NEW YORK

1889

All rights reserved

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2026

https://archive.org/details/historiesofpolyb0002evel

CONTENTS

	PAGES
BOOKS X TO XXXIX	1–541
SMALLER FRAGMENTS	542–559
APPENDICES	560–568
INDEX	569–615

THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

BOOK X

THE HANNIBALIAN WAR—THE RECOVERY OF TARENTUM

1. The distance from the strait and town of Rhegium to Tarentum is more than two thousand stades; and that portion of the shore of Italy is entirely destitute of harbours, except those of Tarentum: I mean the coast facing the Sicilian sea, and verging towards Greece, which contains the most populous barbarian tribes as well as the most famous of the Greek cities. For the Bruttii, Lucani, some portions of the Daunii, the Cabalii, and several others, occupy this quarter of Italy. So again this coast is lined by the Greek cities of Rhegium, Caulon, Locri, Croton, Metapontum, and Thurii: so that voyagers from Sicily or from Greece to any one of these cities are compelled to drop anchor in the harbours of Tarentum; and the exchange and commerce with all who occupy this coast of Italy take place in this city. One may judge of the excellence of its situation from the prosperity attained by the people of Croton; who, though only possessing roadsteads suitable for the summer, and enjoying therefore but a short season of mercantile activity, still have acquired great wealth, entirely owing, it seems, to the favourable situation of their town and harbour, which yet cannot be compared with those of Tarentum. For, even at this day, Tarentum is in a most convenient position in respect to the harbours of the Adriatic, and was formerly still more so. Since, from the

B.C. 209, Coss. Q. Fabius Maximus V. Q. Fulvius Flaccus IV.

Iapygian promontory as far as Sipontum, every one coming from the other side and dropping anchor at Italy always crossed to Tarentum, and used that city for his mercantile transactions as an emporium; for the town of Brundisium had not yet been founded in these times.[1] Therefore Fabius regarded the recovery of it as of great importance, and, omitting everything else, turned his whole thoughts to this. . . .

PUBLIUS CORNELIUS SCIPIO AFRICANUS IN SPAIN, B.C. 210-206

2. Being about to narrate the exploits of Publius Scipio in Iberia, and in fact all the achievements in his life, I think it necessary to direct my readers' attention, to begin with, to his moral and mental qualities. For as he is perhaps the most illustrious man of any born before the present generation, everybody seeks to know what kind of man he was, and what advantages from natural ability or experience he enjoyed, to account for a career so crowded with brilliant achievement; and yet is compelled to remain in the dark, or to entertain false opinions, because those who write about him have not kept to the truth. The soundness of this assertion will be rendered evident in the course of my narrative to all who are capable of estimating the noblest and most gallant of his exploits. Now all other writers represent him as a man favoured by fortune, who succeeded in his undertakings contrary to rational expectation, and by the mere force of circumstances. They consider apparently such men to be, so to speak, more god-like and worthy of admiration, than those who act in every case by calculation. They do not seem to be aware of the distinction between credit for good fortune and credit for good conduct in the case of such men; and that the former may be assigned to any one however commonplace, while the latter belongs to those alone who act from prudent calculation and clear intelligence: and it is these last whom we should look upon as the most god-like and god-beloved.

A common mistake as to Scipio's character.

Now it seems to me that in his character and views

[1] The port of Brundisium was known long before. See Herod. 4, 99. The Romans colonised the town in B.C. 244. See Livy, epit. 19.

Publius was very like Lycurgus the legislator of the Lacedaemonians. For we must not suppose that it was from superstition that Lycurgus continually consulted the Pythian priestess in the establishment of the Lacedaemonian constitution; nor that Publius depended on dreams and ominous words for his success in securing empire for his country. But as both saw that the majority of mankind cannot be got to accept contentedly what is new and strange, nor to face dangers with courage, without some hope of divine favour,—Lycurgus, by always supporting his own schemes by an oracular response from the Pythia, secured better acceptation and credit for his ideas; and Publius, by always in like manner instilling into the minds of the vulgar an opinion of his acting on some divine suggestion in the formation of his designs, caused those under his command to confront dangerous services with greater courage and cheerfulness. But that he invariably acted on calculation and with foresight, and that the successful issue of his plans was always in harmony with rational expectation, will be evident by what I am about to relate.

Scipio's use of religion compared with that of Lycurgus.

3. For that he was beneficent and high-minded is acknowledged; but that he was acute, sober-minded, and earnest in pursuit of his aims, no one will admit, except those who have lived with him, and contemplated his character, so to speak, in broad daylight. Of such Gaius Laelius was one. He took part in everything he did or said from boyhood to the day of his death; and he it was who convinced me of this truth: because what he said appeared to me to be likely in in itself, and in harmony with the achievements of that great man. He told me that the first brilliant exploit of Publius was when his father fought the cavalry engagement with Hannibal near the Padus. He was then, as it seems, eighteen years old and on his first campaign. His father had given him a squadron of picked cavalry for his protection; but when in the course of the battle he saw his father surrounded by the enemy, with only two or three horsemen near him, and dangerously wounded, he first tried to cheer on his own squadron to go to his father's assistance, but when he found

Scipio's first exploit, B.C. 218.

them considerably cowed by the numbers of the enemy surrounding them, he appears to have plunged by himself with reckless courage into the midst of the enemy: whereupon, his comrades being forced to charge also, the enemy were everawed and divided their ranks to let them pass; and Publius the elder, being thus unexpectedly saved, was the first to address his son as his preserver in the hearing of the whole army.[1] Having gained an acknowledged reputation for bravery by this exploit, he ever afterwards freely exposed himself to every sort of personal danger, whenever his country rested its hope of safety on him. And this is not the conduct of a general who trusts to luck, but of one who has a clear head.

4. Subsequently, when his elder brother Lucius was a candidate for the Aedileship, which is about the most honourable office open to a "young" man at Rome: it being the custom for two patricians to be appointed, and there being many candidates, for some time he did not venture to stand for the same office as his brother. But as the day of election drew near, judging from the demeanour of the people that his brother would easily obtain the office, and observing that his own popularity with the multitude was very great, he made up his mind that the only hope of his brother's success was that they should combine their candidatures. He therefore resolved to act as follows: His mother was going round to the temples and sacrificing to the gods in behalf of his brother, and was altogether in a state of eager expectation as to the result. She was the only parent whose wishes he had to consult; for his father was then on his voyage to Iberia, having been appointed to command in the war there. He therefore said to her that he had seen the same dream twice: for he thought that he was coming home from the Forum after being elected Aedile with his brother, and that she met them at the door and threw her arms round them and kissed them. His mother with true womanly feeling exclaimed, "Oh, that I might see that day!" He replied, "Do you wish us to try"? Upon her assenting, under the idea that he would not venture, but was only jesting on the spur of the moment (for of course he was quite a young man), he

Elected aedile, end of B.C. 217.

[1] See on 3, 66.

begged her to prepare him at once a white toga, such as it is the custom for candidates for office to wear.

5. His mother thought no more about it: but Publius, having obtained a white toga, went to the Forum before his mother was awake. His boldness, as well as his previous popularity, secured him a brilliant reception from the people; and when he advanced to the spot assigned for candidates, and took his place by the side of his brother, the people not only invested him with the office, but his brother also for his sake; and both brothers returned home Aediles designate. The news having been suddenly brought to their mother, she rushed in the utmost delight to meet them at the door, and kissed the young men in an ecstasy of joy. Accordingly Publius was believed by all who had heard previously about his dream to have held commune with the gods, not merely in his sleep, but rather in a waking vision, and by day. But in point of fact there was no dream at all: Scipio was kind, open-handed, and courteous, and by these means had conciliated the favour of the multitude. But by a dexterous use of the occasion, both with the people and his mother, he obtained his purpose, and moreover got the reputation of acting under divine inspiration. For those persons, who, from dulness or want of experience, or idleness, can never take a clear view of the occasions or causes or connexion of events, are apt to give the gods and chance the credit for what is really effected by sagacity and far-seeing calculation. I have thought it worth while to say thus much, that my readers may not be misled by unfounded gossip to pass over this great man's finest and most splendid qualities, I mean his wealth of resource and untiring diligence; which will become still more apparent when we come to recount his actual achievements.

6. Such was the man who now assembled the soldiers and exhorted them not to be dismayed by the disaster which had befallen them. "For," said he, "Romans have never been beaten by Carthaginians in a trial of valour. It was the result of treachery on the part of the Celtiberians, and of rashness, the two commanders getting cut off from each other owing to their trust in the alliance of these men. But now

Speech of Publius Scipio to the soldiers in Spain, B.C. 210.

these two disadvantages are on the side of the enemy: for they are encamped at a wide distance from each other; and by their tyrannical conduct to their allies have alienated them all, and made them hostile to themselves. The consequence is that some of them are already sending messages to us; while the rest, as soon as they dare, and see that we have crossed the river, will gladly join us; not so much because they have any affection for us, as because they are eager to punish the outrages of the Carthaginians. Most important of all is the fact that the enemy are at variance with each other, and will refuse to fight against us in a body, and by thus engaging in detail will be more easily dealt with by us." Looking to these facts, therefore, he bade them cross the river with confidence, and undertook that he and the other officers would see to the next step to be taken. With these words he left his colleague, Marcus Silanus, with five hundred horse to guard the ford, and to protect the allies on the north of the river, while he himself began taking his army across, without revealing his design to any one. As a matter of fact he had resolved to do nothing of what he gave out publicly, and had made up his mind to make a rapid attack upon the town called Iberian Carthage. This may be looked upon as the first and strongest proof of the judgment which I lately passed upon him. He was now only in his twenty-seventh year: and yet he, in the first place, undertook to accomplish what the magnitude of the previous disasters had made the world look upon as completely hopeless; and, in the second place, having undertaken it, he left on one side the plain and obvious course, and conceived and carried out a plan which was a surprise to the enemy himself. This could only be the result of the closest calculation.

Scipio crosses the Ebro, and swoops down upon New Carthage.

7. The fact is that he had made minute inquiries, before leaving Rome, both about the treason of the Celtiberians, and the separation of the two Roman armies; and had inferred that his father's disaster was entirely attributable to these. He had not therefore shared the popular terror of the Carthaginians, nor allowed himself to be overcome by the general panic.

Scipio's careful inquiries as to the state of things in Spain.

And when he subsequently heard that the allies of Rome north of the Ebro were remaining loyal, while the Carthaginian commanders were quarrelling with each other, and maltreating the natives subject to them, he began to feel very cheerful about his expedition, not from a blind confidence in Fortune, but from deliberate calculation. Accordingly, when he arrived in Iberia, he learnt, by questioning everybody and making inquiries about the enemy from every one, that the forces of the Carthaginians were divided into three. Mago, he was informed, was lingering west of the pillars of Hercules among the Conii; Hasdrubal, the son of Gesco, in Lusitania, near the mouth of the Tagus; while the other Hasdrubal was besieging a certain city of the Caspetani; and none of the three were less than ten days' march from the New Town. Now he calculated that, if he decided to give the enemy battle, it would be risking too much to do so against all three at once, because his predecessors had been beaten, and because the enemy would vastly out-number him; if, on the other hand, he were to march rapidly to engage one of the three, and should then find himself surrounded—which might happen by the one attacked retreating, and the others coming up to his relief,—he dreaded a disaster like that of his uncle Gnaeus and his father Publius.

8. He therefore rejected that idea altogether: but being informed that New Carthage was the most important source of supplies to the enemy and of damage to the Romans in the present war, he had taken the trouble to make minute inquiries about it during the winter from those who were well informed. He learnt that it was nearly the only town in Iberia which possessed a harbour suitable for a fleet and naval force; that it lay very conveniently for the Carthaginians to make the sea passage from Libya; that they in fact had the bulk of their money and war material in it, as well as their hostages from the whole of Iberia; that, most important of all, the number of fighting men garrisoning the citadel only amounted to a thousand,—because no one would ever suppose that, while the Carthaginians commanded nearly the whole of Iberia, any one would conceive the idea of assaulting this

He determines to attempt New Carthage.

town; that the other inhabitants were exceedingly numerous, but all consisted of craftsmen, mechanics, and fisher-folk, as far as possible removed from any knowledge of warfare. All this he regarded as being fatal to the town, in case of the sudden appearance of an enemy. Nor did he moreover fail to acquaint himself with the topography of New Carthage, or the nature of its defences, or the lie of the lagoon: but by means of certain fishermen who had worked there he had ascertained that the lagoon was quite shallow and fordable at most points; and that, generally speaking, the water ebbed every day towards evening sufficiently to secure this. These considerations convinced him that, if he could accomplish his purpose, he would not only damage his opponents, but gain a considerable advantage for himself; and that, if on the other hand he failed in effecting it, he would yet be able to secure the safety of his men owing to his command of the sea, provided he had once made his camp secure,—and this was easy, because of the wide dispersion of the enemy's forces. He had therefore, during his residence in winter quarters, devoted himself to preparing for this operation to the exclusion of every other: and in spite of the magnitude of the idea which he had conceived, and in spite of his youth, he concealed it from all except Gaius Laelius, until he had himself decided to reveal it.

9. But although historians agree in attributing these calculations to him; yet, when they come to narrate their issue, they somehow or another attribute the success obtained not to the man and his foresight, but to the gods and to Fortune, and that, in spite of all probability, and the evidence of those who lived with him; and in spite of the fact that Publius himself in a letter addressed to Philip has distinctly set forth that it was upon the deliberate calculations, which I have just set forth, that he undertook the Iberian campaign generally, and the assault upon New Carthage in particular.

Gaius Laelius proceeds to New Carthage with the fleet,

However that may be, at the time specified he gave secret instructions to Gaius Laelius, who was in command of the fleet, and who, as I have said, was the only man in the secret, to sail to this town; while he himself marched his army at a rapid

pace in the same direction. His force consisted of twenty-five thousand infantry and two thousand five hundred cavalry; and arriving at New Carthage on the seventh day he pitched his camp on the north of the town;[1] defended its rear by a double trench and rampart stretching from sea to sea,[2] while on the side facing the town he made absolutely no defences, for the nature of the ground made him sufficiently secure. Scipio by land. B.C. 209.

But as I am now about to describe the assault and capture of the town, I think I must explain to my readers the lie of the surrounding country, and the position of the town itself.

10. It stands about half-way down the coast of Iberia in a gulf which faces south-west, running about twenty stades inland, and about ten stades broad at its entrance. The whole gulf is made a harbour by the fact that an island[3] lies at its mouth and thus makes the entrance channels on each side of it exceedingly narrow. It breaks the force of the waves also, and the whole gulf has thus smooth water, except when south-west winds setting down the two channels raise a surf: with all other winds it is perfectly calm, from being so nearly landlocked. In the recess of the gulf a mountain juts out in the form of a chersonese, and it is on this mountain that the city stands, surrounded by the sea on the east and south, and on the west by a lagoon extending so far northward that the remaining space to the sea on the other side, to connect it with the continent, is not more than two stades. The city itself has a deep depression in its centre, presenting on its south side a level approach from the sea; while the rest of it is hemmed in by hills, two of them mountainous and rough, three others much lower, but rocky and difficult of ascent; the largest of which lies on the east of the town run- Description of New Carthage.

[1] Dr. Arnold declares it "all but an impossibility that an army should have marched the distance (not less than 325 Roman miles) in a week." Livy (26, 42) accepts the statement without question.

[2] Mr. Strachan-Davidson explains this to mean from the sea to the lake, as Scipio's lines would not have extended right round the lake to the other sea.

[3] Escombrera (Σκομβραρία). I must refer my readers to Mr. Strachan-Davidson's appendix on *The Site of the Spanish Carthage* for a discussion of these details. See above 2, 13; Livy, 26, 42.

ning out into the sea, on which stands a temple of Asclepius. Exactly opposite this lies the western mountain in a closely-corresponding position, on which a palace had been erected at great cost, which it is said was built by Hasdrubal when he was aiming at establishing royal power. The remaining three lesser elevations bound it on the north, of which the westernmost is called the hill of Hephaestus, the next to it that of Aletes,—who is believed to have attained divine honours from having been the discoverer of the silver mines,—and the third is called the hill of Cronus. The lagoon has been connected with the adjoining sea artificially for the sake of the maritime folk; and over the channel thus cut between it and the sea a bridge has been built, for beasts of burden and carts to bring in provisions from the country.

11. Such is the nature of this city's situation. The side of the Roman camp which faced the city therefore was secured, without any artificial means, by the lagoon and the sea. The neck of land lying between these two, and connecting the city with the continent, Scipio did not fence off with a stockade, although it abutted on the middle of his camp,—either for the sake of making an impression upon the enemy, or by way of suiting the arrangement to his own design,—that he might have nothing to hamper the free egress and return of his troops to and from the camp. The circuit of the city wall was not more than twenty stades formerly,—though I am aware that it has been stated at forty stades; but this is false, as I know from personal inspection and not from mere report,—and in our day it has been still farther contracted.

Scipio discloses his intention of assaulting New Carthage.

The fleet arrived to the hour, and Publius then thought it time to summon a meeting of his men and to encourage them to the undertaking by the use of the same arguments by which he had convinced himself, and which I have just now detailed. He pointed out to them that the plan was practicable; and briefly summing up the blow which their success would be to their enemies, and the advantage it would be to themselves, he ended by promising crowns of gold to those who first mounted the walls, and the usual rewards to those who

displayed conspicuous gallantry. And finally he declared that "Poseidon had appeared to him in his sleep, and originally suggested his plan to him; and had promised to give him such signal aid in the actual hour of battle that his assistance should be made manifest to all." The skilful mixture in this speech of accurate calculation with promises of gold crowns, and a reference to Divine Providence, created a great impression and enthusiasm in the minds of the young soldiers.

12. Next morning he stationed ships supplied with missiles of every sort, all along the seaboard, under the command of Gaius Laelius; and having told off two thousand of his strongest men to accompany the ladder-carriers, he begun the assault about the third hour. The commandant of the town, Mago, divided his garrison of a thousand men into two companies; half he left upon the citadel, and the rest he stationed upon the eastern hill. Of the other inhabitants he accoutred about two thousand of the strongest men with such arms as there were in the city, and stationed them at the gate leading to the isthmus and the enemy's camp: the rest he ordered to assist to the best of their power at all points in the wall. As soon as the bugles of Publius sounded the moment of the assault, Mago caused those whom he had armed to sally from the gate, feeling confident that he should create a panic among the assailants and entirely baffle their design. These men vigorously attacked those of the Roman army who were drawn up opposite the isthmus, and a sharp engagement took place accompanied by loud cries of encouragement on both sides: the Romans in the camp cheering on their men, and the people in the city theirs. But the contest was an unequal one in the respect of the facility of bringing up reserves. The Carthaginians had all to come out by one gate, and had nearly two stades to march before they got on the ground; whereas the Romans had their supports close at hand and able to come out over a wide area; for Publius had purposely stationed his men close to the camp in order to induce the enemy to come out as far as possible: being quite aware that if he succeeded in destroying these, who were so to speak the sharp edge of the urban

The assault.

A sally of the defenders

population, universal consternation would be the result, and no more of those in the town would have the courage to come out of the gate. The contest however for a certain time was undecided, for it was between picked men on both sides; but finally the Carthaginians were overpowered by the superior weight of their opponents, owing to the constant reinforcements from the camp, and turned to flight. A large number of them fell in the actual engagement, and during the retreat; but the greater number were trampled to death by each other as they crowded through the gate. The city people were thrown into such a panic by these events, that even those who were guarding the walls fled. The Romans very nearly succeeded in forcing their way in through the gates with the fugitives; and of course fixed their scaling-ladders against the wall in perfect security.

repulsed.

13. Meanwhile Publius, though throwing himself heartily into the struggle, yet took all possible precautions to protect his life. He had three men with him carrying large shields, which they held in such a position as to completely protect him from the side of the wall; and accordingly he went along the lines, or mounted on elevated ground, and contributed greatly to the success of the day. For he was enabled to see all that was going on, and at the same time, by being himself in view of all, inspired great zeal in the hearts of the combatants. The result was that nothing was omitted which could contribute to the success of the battle; but any help he saw to be at any moment required was rapidly and thoroughly supplied.

But though the leaders of the escalade had begun mounting the walls with great spirit, they found the operation accompanied by some danger: not so much from the number of the defenders, as from the height of the walls. The defenders accordingly plucked up courage considerably when they saw the distress of the assailants: for some of the ladders were breaking under the weight of the numbers which, owing to their length, were on them at the same time; while on others the first to mount turned giddy owing to their great height, and without requiring much resistance from the defenders threw themselves from

Difficulties of the escalade.

the ladders: and when beams, or anything of that sort, were hurled upon them from the battlements, they were swept off *en masse* and fell to the ground. In spite however of these difficulties nothing could check the zeal and fury of the Roman attack; but as the first fell their place was always taken at once by the next in order. And now, as the day was far advanced, and the soldiers were worn out with fatigue, Scipio sounded a recall for the assaulting party.

14. The men in the town were accordingly in high spirits at having, as they thought, repulsed the assault. But Scipio, who was conscious that the time was now approaching for the ebb of the lagoon, had five hundred men stationed ready by its edge with ladders; and meanwhile massed some fresh soldiers upon the gate and isthmus, and, after urging them to undertake the work, furnished them with a larger number of ladders than before: so that the wall was almost covered with men scaling it. When the signal for attack was sounded, and the men placed their ladders against the wall, and began ascending at every point, the excitement and consternation inside the walls was extreme; for when they thought themselves released from the threatened danger, they saw it beginning all over again by another assault. Besides, their missiles were beginning to fall short; and the number of men they had lost greatly disheartened them. Still, though they were in great distress, they continued the defence as well as they could.

Towards evening Scipio renews the assault on the gate, to distract attention from his attack by way of the lagoon.

Just when the struggle at the ladders was at its hottest the ebb of the tide began. The water began gradually to leave the edges of the lagoon, and the current ran with such violence, and in such a mass through its channel into the adjoining sea, that to those who were unprepared for the sight it appeared incredible. Being provided with guides, Scipio at once ordered his men, who had been stationed ready for this service, to step in and to fear nothing. His was a nature especially fitted to inspire courage and sympathy with his own feelings. So now the men at once obeyed him, and when the army saw them racing each other across the marsh, it

Scipio crosses the lagoon and gets his men upon the wall.

could not but suppose that the movement was a kind of heaven-sent inspiration. This reminded them of the reference Scipio had made to Poseidon, and the promises contained in his harangue: and their enthusiasm rose to such a height that they locked their shields above their heads, and, charging up to the gate, they began trying to hew their way through the panels of the doors with their axes and hatchets.

Meanwhile the party which had crossed the marsh had approached the wall. They found the battlements unguarded: and therefore, not only fixed their ladders against the wall, but actually mounted and took it without striking a blow; for the attention of the garrison was distracted to other points, especially to the isthmus and the gate leading to it, and they never expected that the enemy were likely to attack on the side of the lagoon: besides, and above all, there was such disorderly shouting, and such a scene of confusion within the wall, that they could neither hear nor see to any purpose.

The city entered and given up to the sword.

15. As soon as they found themselves in possession of the wall, the Romans began making their way along the top of it, hurling off such of the enemy as they met, the nature of their arms being especially suited for an operation of that sort. But when they arrived at the gate they descended and began cutting through the bolts, while those without began forcing their way in, and those who were mounting the walls in the direction of the isthmus, beginning by this time to get the better of their opponents, were getting a footing on the battlements. Thus the walls were finally in possession of the enemy: and the troops, which entered by the gate, carried the eastern hill and drove off the garrison occupying it.

When Scipio thought that a sufficient number of troops had entered the town, he gave leave to the larger number of them to attack those in it, according to the Roman custom, with directions to kill everything they met, and to spare nothing; and not to begin looting until they got the order to do so. The object of this is, I suppose, to strike terror. Accordingly, one may often see in towns captured by the Romans, not only human beings who have been put to the sword, but even dogs cloven down the middle, and the limbs

of other animals hewn off. On this occasion the amount of such slaughter was exceedingly great, because of the numbers included in the city.

Scipio himself with about a thousand men now pressed on towards the citadel. When he arrived there, Mago at first thought of resistance; but afterwards, when he was satisfied that the city was completely in the power of the enemy, he sent to demand a promise of his life, and then surrendered. This being concluded, the signal was given to stop the slaughter: whereupon the soldiers left off slaying, and turned to plunder. When night fell those of the soldiers to whom this duty had been assigned remained in the camp, while Scipio with his thousand men bivouacked in the citadel; and summoning the rest from the dwelling-houses by means of the Tribunes, he ordered them to collect all their booty into the market-place by maniples, and to take up their quarters for the night by these several heaps. He then summoned the light-armed from the camp, and stationed them upon the eastern hill.

Mago surrenders the citadel.

Sack of the city.

Thus did the Romans become masters of Carthage in Iberia.

16. Next morning the baggage of those who had served in the Carthaginian ranks, as well as the property of the city-folk and the craftsmen, having been collected together in the market-place, the Tribunes divided it according to the Roman custom among their several legions. Now the Roman method of procedure in the capture of cities is the following: Sometimes certain soldiers taken from each maniple are told off for this duty, their numbers depending on the size of the city; sometimes maniples are told off in turn for it: but there are never more than half the whole number assigned to the work. The rest remain in their own ranks in reserve, sometimes outside, at others inside the city, for taking such precautions as may be from time to time necessary. Sometimes, though rarely, four legions are massed together; but generally speaking the whole force is divided into two legions of Romans and two of allies. This being settled, all who are

The Roman customs in the distribution of booty.

told off for plundering carry all they get, each to his own legion; and when this booty has been sold, the Tribunes distribute the proceeds among all equally, including not only those who were thus held in reserve, but even those who were guarding the tents, or were invalided, or had been sent away anywhere on any service. But I have spoken fully before, when discussing the Roman constitution, on the subject of the distribution of booty, showing how no one is excluded from a share in it, in accordance with the oath which all take upon first joining the camp. I may now add that the arrangement whereby the Roman army is thus divided, half being engaged in gathering booty and half remaining drawn up in reserve, precludes all danger of a general catastrophe arising from personal rivalry in greed. For as both parties feel absolute confidence in the fair dealing of each in respect to the booty,—the reserves no less than the plunderers,—no one leaves the ranks, which has been the most frequent cause of disaster in the case of other armies.

See 6, 33.

17. For, as the majority of mankind encounter miseries and embrace dangers for the sake of gain, it is plain that when such opportunity is presented to them as this, the men in the reserve or in the camp would be with difficulty induced to abstain from taking advantage of it; because the usual idea is that everything belongs to the man who actually takes it: and though a general or king may be careful to order all booty to be brought into the common stock, yet everybody considers that what he can conceal is his own. The result is that, while the ruck of the army cannot be prevented from eagerly devoting themselves to plunder, they often run the risk of a complete overthrow: and it has often in fact happened that after a successful movement, such as the carrying of an entrenched camp or the capture of a city, the victorious army has, from no other cause but this, been not only ejected but even utterly defeated. Therefore there is nothing about which leaders ought to exercise more care or foresight, than that, on such an occasion, all may have an absolutely equal prospect of sharing in the booty.

Thus on the present occasion, while the Tribunes were busied in the distribution of the spoil; the Roman com-

mander caused the prisoners, who numbered little short of ten thousand, to be assembled; and having first ordered them to be divided into two groups, one containing the citizens and their wives and children, the other the craftsmen, he exhorted the first of these to be loyal to the Romans, and to remember the favour which they were now receiving, and allowed them all to depart to their own houses. With tears of joy at this unexpected preservation, they bowed in reverence to Scipio and dispersed. He then told the craftsmen that they were for the present public slaves of Rome, but that, if they showed themselves loyal and zealous in their several crafts, he promised them their freedom, as soon as the war with the Carthaginians had been brought to a successful issue. He then bade them go get their names enrolled in the office of the Quaestor, and appointed a Roman overseer for every thirty of them, their whole number being about two thousand. From the remaining captives he selected the strongest, those who were in the prime of youth and physical vigour, and assigned them to serve on board ship: and having thus increased the number of his naval allies by one half, he manned the ships taken from the enemy as well as his own; so that the number of men on board each vessel were now little short of double what it was before. For the captured ships numbered eighteen, his original fleet thirty-five. These men he also promised their freedom, if they showed themselves loyal and zealous, as soon as they had conquered the Carthaginians. By this treatment of the captives he inspired the citizens with warm feelings of loyalty and fidelity, and the handicraftsmen with great readiness to serve, from the hope held out to them of recovering their freedom.

Scipio's treatment of the prisoners. The citizens are dismissed to their homes.

The skilled slaves are promised their freedom at the end of the war.

Some are drafted into the navy.

18. He next took Mago and the Carthaginians with him separately, consisting of one member of the Council of ancients and fifteen of the Senate.[1] These he put under the charge of Gaius Laelius, with orders that he should take due care of them. He next

Mago is entrusted to Laelius.

[1] This seems to be the distinction between the words γερουσιά and

summoned the hostages, who numbered more than three hundred. Such of them as were children he called to him one by one, and stroking their heads told them not to be afraid, for in a few days they would see their parents. The others also he exhorted to be of good cheer, and to write word to their relations in their several cities, first, that they were safe and well; and, secondly, that the Romans were minded to restore them all unharmed to their homes, if only their relations adopted the Roman alliance. With these words, having already selected from the spoils such articles as were fitting for his purpose, he presented each with what was suitable to their sex and age: the girls with ear-rings and bracelets, the young men with daggers and swords. Among the captive women was the wife of Mandonius, brother of Andobalus king of the Ilergētes. This woman fell at his feet and besought him with tears to protect their honour better than the Carthaginians had done. Touched by her distress Scipio asked her in what respect she and the other women were left unprovided. She was a lady of advanced years and of a certain majestic dignity of appearance: and upon her meeting his question by perfect silence, he summoned the men who had been appointed to take charge of the women; and when they reported that they had supplied them with all necessaries in abundance, and when the woman again clasped his knees and repeated the same request, Scipio felt still more embarrassed; and, conceiving the idea that their guardians had neglected them, and were now making a false report, he bade the women fear nothing, for that he would appoint different men to see to their interests, and secure that they were not left in want of anything. Then after a brief hesitation the woman said, "You mistake my meaning, General, if you think that we are asking you for food." Scipio then at length began to understand what she wished to convey; and seeing under his eyes the youthful beauty of the daughters of Andobalus, and of many of the other nobles, he could not

The hostages.

The women.

σύγκλητος. Cp. 36, 4. The latter is the word used by Polybius for the Roman Senate: for the nature of the first see Bosworth Smith, *Carthage and he Carthaginians*, p. 27. It was usually called "The Hundred." Mommsen (*Hist. of Rome*, vol. ii. p. 15) seems to doubt the existence of the larger council: its authority at any rate had been superseded by the oligarchical gerusia.

refrain from tears, while the aged lady indicated in a few words the danger in which they were. He showed at once that he understood her words: and taking her by the hand, he bade her and the others also be of good cheer, for that he would watch over them as he would over his own sisters and daughters, and would accordingly put men in charge of them on whom he could rely.

19. His next business was to pay over to the Quaestors such public money of the Carthaginians as had been captured. It amounted to more than six hundred talents, so that when this was added to the four hundred which he had brought with him from Rome, he found himself in possession of more than one thousand talents.

The money.

It was on this occasion that some young Romans fell in with a girl surpassing all the other women in bloom and beauty; and seeing that Scipio was fond of the society of women, they brought her to him, and, placing her before him, said that they desired to present the damsel to him. He was struck with admiration for her beauty, and replied that, if he had been in a private position, he could have received no present that would have given him greater pleasure; but as general it was the last in the world which he could receive. He meant to convey, I presume, by this ambiguous answer that, in hours of rest and idleness, such things are the most delightful enjoyments and pastimes for young men; whereas in times of activity they are hindrances physically and mentally. However that may be, he thanked the young men; but called the girl's father, and handing her over at once to him, told him to bestow her in marriage on whichever of the citizens he chose. By this display of continence and self-control he gained the warm respect of his men.

Scipio's continence.

Having made these arrangements, and handed over the rest of the captives to the Tribunes, he despatched Gaius Laelius on board a quinquereme to Rome, with the Carthaginian prisoners and the noblest of the others, to announce at home what had taken place. For as the prevailing feeling at Rome was one of despair of success in Iberia, he felt certain that on this news their spirits

Laelius sent to Rome with the news. B.C. 209.

would revive, and that they would make much more strenuous efforts to support him.

Preparations for an advance.

20. Scipio himself stayed a certain time in New Carthage and assiduously practised his fleet; and drew up the following scheme for his military Tribunes for training their men. The first day he ordered the men to go at the double for thirty stades in their full arms; and on the second all of them to rub down, clean, and thoroughly examine their whole equipments; on the third to rest and do nothing; on the fourth to have a sham fight, some with wooden swords covered with leather and with a button at the end, others with javelins also buttoned at the end; on the fifth the same march at the double as on the first. That there might be no lack of weapons for the practises, or for the real fighting, he took the greatest pains with the handicraftsmen. He had, as I have already stated, appointed overseers over them in regular divisions to secure that this was done; but he also personally inspected them every day, and saw that they were severally supplied with what was necessary. Thus while the legions were practising and training in the vicinity of the town, and the fleet manœuvring and rowing in the sea, and the city people sharpening weapons or forging arms or working in wood, every one in short busily employed in making armour, the whole place must have presented the appearance of what Xenophon called "a workshop of war." When he thought all these works were sufficiently advanced for the requirements of the service, he secured the town by posting garrisons and repairing the walls, and got both his army and navy on the move, directing his advance upon Tarraco, and taking the hostages with him. . . .

Xen. *Hellen.* 3, 4, 17: *Aegsil.* 1, 26.

PHILOPOEMEN OF MEGALOPOLIS

Euryleon Achaean Strategus, B.C. 210-209.

21. Euryleon, the Strategus of the Achaeans, was a man of timid character, and quite unsuited for service in the field.

But as my history has now arrived at a point at which the achievements of Philopoemen begin, I think it only

proper that, as I have attempted to describe the habits and characters of the other men of eminence with whom we have had to deal, I should do the same for him. It is strangely inconsistent in historians to record in elaborate detail the founding of cities, stating when and how and by whom they were established, and even the circumstances and difficulties which accompanied the transaction, and yet to pass over in complete silence the characteristics and aims of the men by whom the whole thing was done, though these in fact are the points of the greatest value. For as one feels more roused to emulation and imitation by men that have life, than by buildings that have none, it is natural that the history of the former should have a greater educational value. If I had not therefore already composed a separate account of him, clearly setting forth who he was, his origin, and his policy as a young man, it would have been necessary to have given an account now of each of these particulars. But since I have done this in a work in three books, unconnected with my present history, detailing the circumstances of his childhood and his most famous achievements, it is clear that in my present narrative my proper course will be to remove anything like details from my account of his youthful characteristics and aims; while I am careful to *add* details to the story of the achievements of his manhood, which in that treatise were only stated summarily. I shall thus preserve the proper features of both works. The former being in the nature of a panegyric demanded an account of his actions, put briefly and in a style deliberately intended to enhance their merits; my present work, which is history, and therefore absolutely uncommitted to praise or blame, requires only a true statement, which puts the facts clearly, and traces the policy which dictated the several actions.

22. Philopoemen, then, to begin with, was of good birth, descended from one of the noblest families in Arcadia. He was also educated under that most distinguished Mantinean, Cleander, who had been his father's friend before, and happened at that time to be in exile. When he came to man's estate he attached himself to Ecdemus and Demophanes, who were by birth natives of Megalopolis, but who having been exiled by the

Birth, parentage, and education of Philopoemen, b. B.C. 252.

tyrant, and having associated with the philosopher Arcesilaus during their exile, not only set their own country free by entering into an intrigue against Aristodemus the tyrant, but also helped in conjunction with Aratus to put down Nicocles, the tyrant of Sicyon. On another occasion also, on the invitation of the people of Cyrene, they stood forward as their champions and preserved their freedom for them. Such were the men with whom he passed his early life; and he at once began to show a superiority to his contemporaries, by his power of enduring hardships in hunting, and by his acts of daring in war. He was moreover careful in his manner of life, and moderate in the outward show which he maintained; for he had imbibed from these men the conviction, that it was impossible for a man to take the lead in public business with honour who neglected his own private affairs; nor again to abstain from embezzling public money if he lived beyond his private income.

Elected Hipparch, B.C. 210. Cp. Plut. *Phil.* 7, συχνὸς χρόνυς after the battle of Sallasia, B.C. 222.

Being then appointed Hipparch by the Achaean league at this time, and finding the squadrons in a state of utter demoralisation, and the men thoroughly dispirited, he not only restored them to a better state than they were, but in a short time made them even superior to the enemy's cavalry, by bringing them all to adopt habits of real training and genuine emulation. The fact is that most of those who hold this office of Hipparch, either, from being without any genius themselves for cavalry tactics, do not venture to enforce necessary orders upon others; or, because they are aiming at being elected Strategus, try all through their year of office to attach the young men to themselves and to secure their favour in the coming election: and accordingly never administer necessary reprimands, which are the salvation of the public interests, but hush up all transgressions, and, for the sake of gaining an insignificant popularity, do great damage to those who trust them. Sometimes again, commanders, though neither feeble nor corrupt, do more damage to the soldiers by intemperate zeal than the negligent ones, and this is still oftener the case with regard to the cavalry. . . .

23. Now the movements which he undertook to teach the

horsemen as being universally applicable to cavalry warfare were these. In the first place each separate horse was to be practised in wheeling first to the left and then to the right, and also to face right-about; and in the next place they were to be taught to wheel in squadrons, face-about, and by a treble movement to face-about right-turn. Next they were to learn to throw out flying columns of single or double companies at full speed from both wings or from the centre; and then to pull up and fall in again into troops, or squadrons, or regiments: next to deploy into line on both wings, either by filling up the intervals in the line or by a lateral movement on the rear. Simply to form an oblique line, he said, required no practice, for it was exactly the same order as that taken up on a march. After this they were to practice charging the enemy and retreating by every kind of movement, until they were able to advance at an alarming pace; provided only that they kept together, both line and column, and preserved the proper intervals between the squadrons: for nothing is more dangerous and unserviceable than cavalry that have broken up their squadrons, and attempt to engage in this state.

The cavalry tactics of Philopoemen, B.C. 210-209.[1]

After giving these instructions both to the people and their magistrates, he went on a round of inspection through the towns, and inquired, first, whether the men obeyed the words of command; and, secondly, whether the officers in the several towns knew how to give them clearly and properly: for he held that the first thing requisite was technical knowledge on the part of the commanders of each company.

24. When he had thus made the proper preliminary preparations, he mustered the cavalry from the various cities into one place, and set about perfecting their evolutions under his own command, and personally directed the whole drill. He did not ride in front of the army, as generals nowadays do, from the notion that this is the proper position for

[1] This and the following chapter were formerly assigned to the description of Scipio's proceedings in Spain and followed, ch. 20. Hultsch, however, seems right in placing them thus, and assigning them to the account of the tactics of Philopoemen.

a commander. For what can be less scientific or more dangerous than for a commander to be seen by all his men, and yet not to see one of them? In such manœuvres a Hipparch should not make a display not of mere military dignity, but of the skill and ability of an officer, appearing at one time in the front, at another on the rear, and at another in the centre. This is what he did, riding along the lines, and personally seeing to all the men, giving them directions when they were at a loss what to do, and correcting at once every mistake that was being made. Such mistakes, however, were trifling and rare, owing to the previous care bestowed on every individual and company. Demetrius of Phalerum has, as far as words go, given expression to the same idea: "As in the case of building, if you lay each single brick rightly, and if proper care is taken in placing each successive course, all will be well; so in an army, accuracy in the arrangement of each soldier and each company makes the whole strong. . . ."

A fragment of a speech of some Macedonian orator as to the Aetolians making an alliance with Rome.

25. "The case is just like that of the disposition of the various kinds of troops on the field of battle. The light-armed and most active men bear the brunt of the danger, are the first to be engaged and the first to perish, while the phalanx and the heavy-armed generally carry off the glory. So in this case, the Aetolians, and such of the Peloponnesians as are in alliance with them, are put in the post of danger; while the Romans, like the phalanx, remain in reserve. And if the former meet with disaster and perish, the Romans will retire unharmed from the struggle; while if they are victorious, which Heaven forbid! the Romans will get not only them but the rest of the Greeks also into their power. . . ."[1]

Alliance between Aetolians and Rome against Philip, negotiated by Scopas and Dorimachus, B.C. 211. See Livy, 26, 24.

[1] On the margin of one MS. the following is written, which may be a sentence from the same speech, or a comment of the Epitomator: "A confederacy with democratic institutions always stands in need of external support, owing to the fickleness of the multitude."

PHILIP V.

26. After finishing the celebration of the Nemean games, King Philip of Macedon returned to Argos and laid aside his crown and purple robe, with the view of making a display of democratic equality and good nature. But the more democratic the dress which he wore, the more absolute and royal were the privileges which he claimed. He was not now content with seducing unmarried women, or even with intriguing with married women, but assumed the right of sending authoritatively for any woman whose appearance struck him; and offered violence to those who did not at once obey, by leading a band of revellers to their houses; and, summoning their sons or their husbands, he trumped up false pretexts for menacing them. In fact his conduct was exceedingly outrageous and lawless. But though this abuse of his privileges as a guest was exceedingly annoying to many of the Achaeans, and especially to the orderly part of them, the wars that threatened them on every side compelled them to show a patience under it uncongenial to their character. . . .

King Philip's conduct at Argos after presiding at the Nemean games, B.C. 208. See Livy, 27, 30, 31.

None of his predecessors had better qualifications for sovereignty, or more important defects, than this same Philip. And it appears to me that the good qualities were innate, while the defects grew upon him as he advanced in years, as happens to some horses as they grow old. Such remarks I do not, following some other historians, confine to prefaces; but when the course of my narrative suggests it, I state my opinion of kings and eminent men, thinking that most convenient for writer and reader alike. . . .

War between Antiochus the Great (III.) and Arsaces III., King of the Parthians. B.C. 212-205. *See above*, 8, 25.

27. In regard to extent of territory Media is the most considerable of the kingdoms in Asia, as also in respect of

the number and excellent qualities of its men, and not less so of its horses. For, in fact, it supplies nearly all Asia with these animals, the royal studs being entrusted to the Medes because of the rich pastures in their country.[1] To protect it from the neighbouring barbarians a ring of Greek cities was built round it by the orders of Alexander. The chief exception to this is Ecbatana, which stands on the north of Media, in the district of Asia bordering on the Maeotis and Euxine. It was originally the royal city of the Medes, and vastly superior to the other cities in wealth and the splendour of its buildings. It is situated on the skirts of Mount Orontes, and is without walls, though containing an artificially formed citadel fortified to an astonishing strength. Beneath this stands the palace, which it is in some degree difficult to describe in detail, or to pass over in complete silence. To those authors whose aim is to produce astonishment, and who are accustomed to deal in exaggeration and picturesque writing, this city offers the best possible subject; but to those who, like myself, are cautious when approaching descriptions which go beyond ordinary notions, it presents much difficulty and embarrassment. However, as regards size, the palace covers ground the circuit of which is nearly seven stades; and by the costliness of the structure in its several parts it testifies to the wealth of its original builders: for all its woodwork being cedar or cypress not a single plank was left uncovered; beams and fretwork in the ceilings, and columns in the arcades and peristyle, were overlaid with plates of silver or gold, while all the tiles were of silver. Most of these had been stripped off during the invasion of Alexander and the Macedonians, and the rest in the reigns of Antigonus and Seleucus Nicanor. However, even at the time of Antiochus's arrival, the temple of Aena[2] still had its columns covered with gold, and a considerable number of silver tiles had been piled up in it, and some few gold bricks and a good many silver ones were still remaining. It was

Description of Media, and of the palace at Ecbatana.

[1] See 5, 44.

[2] This goddess is variously called Anaitis (Plut. *Artax.* 27) and Nanea (2 Macc. 1, 13). And is identified by Plutarch with Artemis, and by others with Aphrodite.

from these that the coinage bearing the king's impress was collected and struck, amounting to little less than four thousand talents. . . .

28. Arsaces expected that Antiochus would come as far as this district (of Media), but that he would not venture to proceed across the adjoining desert with so large a force, if for no other reason, yet from the scarcity of water. For in this tract of country there is no water appearing on the surface, though there are many subterranean channels which have well-shafts sunk to them, at spots in the desert unknown to persons unacquainted with the district. A true account of these channels has been preserved among the natives to the effect that, during the Persian ascendency, they granted the enjoyment of the profits of the land to the inhabitants of some of the waterless districts for five generations, on condition of their bringing fresh water in; and that, there being many large streams flowing down Mount Taurus, these people at infinite toil and expense constructed these underground channels through a long tract of country, in such a way, that the very people who now use the water are ignorant of the sources from which the channels are originally supplied.

The nature of the desert between Media and Parthia.

When, however, Arsaces saw that Antiochus was determined to attempt to cross the desert, he endeavoured at once to choke up and spoil the wells. But King Antiochus, upon this being reported to him, despatched Nicomedes with a thousand horse; who found that Arsaces had retired with his main army, but came upon some of his cavalry in the act of choking up the shafts which went down into the underground channels. They promptly attacked these men, and, having routed and forced them to fly, returned back again to Antiochus. The king, having thus accomplished the journey across the desert, arrived before the city Hecatompylos, which is situated in the centre of Parthia, and derives its name from the fact that the roads which lead to all the surrounding districts converge there.

Antiochus prepares to cross it: Arsaces orders the wells to be choked.

Antiochus arrives at Hecatompylos.

29. Having rested his army at this place, and having convinced himself that, had Arsaces been able to give him

battle, he would not have abandoned his own country, nor have sought a ground more favourable to his own army for fighting him than the district round Hecatompylos; he concluded that, since he had done so, it stood to reason that he had entirely changed his mind. He therefore decided to advance into Hyrcania. But having arrived at Tagae, he learnt from the natives that the country he had to cross, until he reached the ridges of Mount Labus sloping down into Hyrcania, was exceedingly rough and difficult, and that large numbers of barbarians were stationed at the narrowest points. He therefore resolved to divide his light-armed troops into companies, and distribute their officers among them, giving them directions as to the route they were severally to take. He did the same with the pioneers, whose business it was to make the positions occupied by the light-armed possible of approach for the phalanx and beasts of burden. Having made these arrangements, he entrusted the first division to Diogenes, strengthening him with bowmen and slingers and some mountaineers skilled in throwing javelines and stones, and who, without keeping any regular order, were always ready to skirmish at a moment's notice, and in any direction, and rendered the most effective assistance at the narrow passes. Next to these he ordered a company of about two thousand Cretans armed with shields to advance, under the command of Polyxenidas of Rhodes. The rear was to be brought up by companies armed with breastplate and shield, and commanded by Nicomedes of Cos, and Nicolaus the Aetolian.

Antiochus determines to follow Arsaces into Hyrcania.

30. But as they advanced, the ruggedness of the ground and the narrowness of the passes were found to far exceed the king's expectations. The length of the ascent was altogether about three hundred stades; and a great part had to be made up the bed of a winter torrent of great depth, into which numerous rocks and trees had been hurled by natural causes from the overhanging precipices, and made a passage up it difficult, to say nothing of the obstacles which the barbarians had helped to construct expressly to impede them. These latter had felled a large number of trees and piled up heaps of huge rocks; and had

The ascent of Mount Labus.

besides occupied all along the gully the high points, which were at once convenient for attack and capable of covering themselves; so that, if it had not been for one glaring error on their part, Antiochus would have found the attempt beyond his powers, and would have desisted from it. The error was this. They assumed that the whole army would be obliged to march the entire way up the gully, and they accordingly occupied the points of vantage. But they did not perceive this fact, that, though the phalanx and the baggage could not possibly go by any other route than the one they supposed, there was yet nothing to make it impossible for the light-armed and active troops to accomplish the ascent of the bare rocks. Consequently, as soon as Diogenes had come upon the first outpost of the enemy, he and his men began climbing out of the gully, and the affair at once took a different aspect. For no sooner had they come to close quarters, than, acting on the suggestion of the moment, Diogenes avoided the engagement by ascending the mountains that flanked the enemy's position, and so got above him; and by pouring down volleys of darts and stones he seriously harassed the barbarians. Their most deadly weapons however proved to be the slings, which could carry a great distance; and when by these means they had dislodged the first outpost and occupied their position, an opportunity was secured for the pioneers to clear the way and level it, without being exposed to danger. Owing to the number of hands the work went on rapidly; and meanwhile the slingers, bowmen, and javelin-men advanced in skirmishing order along the higher ground, every now and then reforming and seizing on strong points of vantage; while the men with shields formed a reserve, marching in order and at a regular pace along the side of the gully itself. The barbarians thereupon abandoned their positions, and, ascending the mountain, mustered in full force on the summit.

31. Thus Antiochus effected this ascent without loss, but slowly and painfully, for it was not until the eighth day that his army made the summit of Labus. The barbarians being mustered there, and resolved to dispute his passage, a severe engagement took place, in which the barbarians were eventually dislodged, and

The battle on the summit of Mount Labus.

by the following manœuvre. As long as they were engaged face to face with the phalanx, they kept well together and fought desperately; but before daybreak the light-armed troops had made a wide circuit, and seized some high ground on the rear of the enemy, and as soon as the barbarians perceived this they fled in a panic. King Antiochus exerted himself actively to prevent a pursuit, and caused a recall to be sounded, because he wished his men to make the descent into Hyrcania, without scattering, and in close order. He accomplished his object: reached Tambrax, an unwalled city of great size and containing a royal palace, and there encamped. Most of the natives fled from the battle-field, and its immediate neighbourhood, into a city called Sirynx, which was not far from Tambrax, and from its secure and convenient situation was considered as the capital of Hyrcania. Antiochus therefore determined to carry this town by assault; and having accordingly advanced thither, and pitched his camp under its walls, he commenced the assault. The operation consisted chiefly of mining under pent-houses. For the city was defended by three trenches, thirty cubits broad and fifteen deep, with a double vallum on the edge of each; and behind these there was a strong wall. Frequent struggles took place at the works, in which neither side were strong enough to carry off their killed and wounded: for these hand-to-hand battles took place, not above ground only, but underground also in the mines. However, owing to the numbers employed and the activity of the king, it was not long before the trenches were choked up and the walls were undermined and fell. Upon this the barbarians, giving up all as lost, put to death such Greeks as were in the town; and having plundered all that was most worth taking, made off under cover of night. When the king saw this, he despatched Hyperbasus with the mercenaries; upon whose approach the barbarians threw down their booty and fled back again into the city; and when they found the peltasts pouring in energetically through the breach in the walls they gave up in despair and surrendered.

He reaches Tambrax.

Capture of Sirynx.

THE HANNIBALIAN WAR

32. The Consuls, wishing to reconnoitre the slope of the hill towards the enemy's camp, ordered their main force to remain in position; while they themselves with two troops of cavalry, their lictors, and about thirty velites advanced to make the reconnaisance. Now some Numidians, who were accustomed to lie in ambush for those who came on skirmishes, or any other services from the Roman camp, happened, as it chanced, to have ensconced themselves at the foot of the hill. Being informed by their look-out man that a body of men was coming over the brow of the hill above them, they rose from their place of concealment, ascended the hill by a side road, and got between the Consuls and their camp. At the very first charge they killed Claudius and some others, and having wounded the rest, forced them to fly in different directions down the sides of the hill. Though the men in camp saw what was happening they were unable to come to the relief of their endangered comrades; for while they were still shouting out to get ready, and before they had recovered from the first shock of their surprise, while some were putting the bridles on their horses and others donning their armour, the affair was all over. The son of Claudius, though wounded, narrowly escaped with his life.

B.C. 208. Coss. M. Claudius Marcellus, T. Quinctius Crispinus. The two Consuls were encamped within three miles of each other, between Venusia and Bantia, Hannibal had been at Lacinium in Bruttii, but had advanced into Apulia. Livy, 27, 25-27.

Death of the Consul M. Claudius Marcellus.

Thus fell Marcus Marcellus from an act of incautiousness unworthy of a general. I am continually compelled in the course of my history to draw the attention of my readers to occurrences of this sort; for I perceive that it is this, more than anything else connected with the science of tactics, that ruins commanders. And yet the blunder is a very obvious one. For what is the use of a commander or general, who has not learnt that the leader ought to keep as far as possible aloof from those minor operations, in which the whole fortune of the campaign is not involved? Or of one who does not know that,

even if circumstances should at times force them to engage in such subordinate movements, the commanders-in-chief should not expose themselves to danger until a large number of their company have fallen? For, as the proverb has it, the experiment should be made "on the worthless Carian"[1] not on the general. For to say "I shouldn't have thought it,"—"Who would have expected it?" seems to me the clearest proof of strategical incompetence and dulness.

Fiat experimentum in corpore vili.

33. And so, though Hannibal's claims to be reckoned a great general are manifold, there is none more conspicuous than this, that though engaged for a great length of time in an enemy's country, and though he experienced a great variety of fortune, he again and again inflicted a disaster on his opponents in minor encounters, but never suffered one himself, in spite of the number and severity of the contests which he conducted: and the reason, we may suppose was, that he took great care of his personal safety. And very properly so: for if the leader escapes uninjured and safe, though a decisive defeat may have been sustained, fortune offers many opportunities for retrieving disasters; but if he has fallen, the pilot as it were of the ship, even should fortune give the victory to the army, no real advantage is gained; because all the hopes of the soldiers depend upon their leaders. So much for those who fall into such errors from foolish vanity, childish parade, ignorance, or contempt. For it is ever one or the other of these that is at the bottom of such disasters. . . .

An incident in the attempt of Hannibal to enter Salapia, under cover of a letter sealed by the ring of the dead Consul Marcus. Livy, 27, 28.

They suddenly let down the portcullis, which they had raised somewhat by pulleys, and thus closed up the gateway. Then they took the men and crucified them before the walls. . . .

[1] This proverb perhaps arose from the frequent employment of the non-Hellenic Carians as mercenaries. Cp. Plato, *Laches*, 187 B; *Euthydemus*, 285 B; Euripides, *Cyclops*, 654.

SCIPIO IN SPAIN

34. In Iberia Publius Scipio took up his winter quarters at Tarraco, as I have already stated; and secured the fidelity and affection of the Iberians, to begin with, by the restoration of the hostages to their respective families. He found a voluntary supporter of his measures in the person of Edeco, the prince of the Edetani; who no sooner heard that New Carthage had been taken, and that Scipio had got his wife and children into his hands, than, concluding that the Iberians would change sides, he resolved to take the lead in the movement: conceiving that, by acting thus, he would best be able to get back his wife and children, and at the same time have the credit of joining the Romans by deliberate choice, and not under compulsion. And so it turned out. For as soon as the armies were dismissed to their winter quarters, he came to Tarraco, accompanied by his kinsfolk and friends; and there being admitted to an interview with Scipio, he said that "he thanked the gods heartily that he was the first of the native princes to come to him; for whereas the others were still sending ambassadors to the Carthaginians and looking to them for support,—even while stretching out their hands to the Romans,—he was come there to offer not only himself, but his friends and kinsfolk also, to the protection of Rome. If therefore he should have the honour to be regarded by him as a friend and ally, he would be able to render him important service both in the present and the future. For as soon as the Iberians saw that he had been admitted to Scipio's friendship, and had obtained what he asked, they would all come in with a similar object, hoping to have their relatives restored, and to enjoy the alliance of Rome. Their affection being secured for the future by receiving such a mark of honour and benevolence, he would have in them sincere and ready coadjutors in all his future undertakings. He therefore asked to have his wife and children restored to him, and to be allowed to return home an acknowledged friend of Rome; in order that he might have a reasonable pretext

Winter of B.C. 209-208. See *supra*. ch. 20. The adhesion of Edeco, prince of the Edetani.

for showing, to the best of his power, his own and his friends' affection for Scipio himself and for the Roman cause."

Edeco is followed by other tribes. B.C. 209-8.

35. When Edeco had finished his speech, Scipio, who had been ready to gratify him from the first, and took the same view as to the policy of the proceeding, delivered him his wife and children, and granted the friendship which he asked. More than this, his subtle intellect made an extraordinary impression on the Iberian in the course of the interview; and having held out splendid hopes to all his companions for the future, he allowed him to return to his own country. This affair having rapidly got wind, all the tribes living north of the Ebro, such as had not done so before, joined the Romans with one consent.

Thus so far everything was going well with Scipio. After the departure of these people, he broke up his naval force, seeing that there was nothing to resist him at sea; and selecting the best of the crews, he distributed them among the maniples, and thus augmented his land forces.

Andobales and Mandonius abandon Hasdrubal.

But Andobales and Mandonius, the most powerful princes of the day in Iberia, and believed to be the most sincerely devoted to the Carthaginians, had long been secretly discontented and on the look-out for an opportunity: ever since Hasdrubal, under a pretence of having a doubt of their loyalty, had demanded a large sum of money, and their wives and daughters as hostages, as I have already narrated.[1] And thinking that a convenient opportunity had now come, they got together their own forces, and, quitting the Carthaginian camp under cover of night, occupied a position sufficiently strong to secure their safety. Upon this, most of the other Iberians also abandoned Hasdrubal: having long been annoyed at the overbearing conduct of the Carthaginians, and now seizing the first opportunity to manifest their feelings.

36. This has often happened to people before. For though, as I have many times remarked, success in a campaign and victory over one's enemies are great things, it requires much greater skill and caution to use such successes well. Accord-

[1] See 9, 11.

ingly, you will find that those who have gained victories are many times more numerous than those who have made good use of them. The Carthaginians at this crisis are an instance in point. After conquering the Roman armies, and slaying both the generals, Publius and Gnaeus Scipio, imagining that Iberia was their own without dispute, they began treating the natives tyrannically; and accordingly found enemies in their subjects instead of allies and friends. And they were quite rightly served, for imagining that the conduct necessary for keeping power was something different from that necessary for obtaining it; and for failing to understand that they keep empire best, who best maintain the same principles in virtue of which they gained it. And yet it is obvious enough, and has been again and again demonstrated, that men gain power by beneficent actions, and by holding out hopes of advantage to those with whom they are dealing; but that, as soon as they have got what they wanted, and begin to act wickedly and rule despotically, it is but natural that, as their rulers have changed, the feelings of the subjects should change too. So it was with the Carthaginians.

37. Surrounded by such difficulties Hasdrubal was agitated by many conflicting emotions and anxieties. He was vexed by the desertion of Andobales; vexed by the opposition and feud between himself and the other commanders; and greatly alarmed as to the arrival of Scipio, expecting that he would immediately bring his forces to attack him. Perceiving therefore that he was being abandoned by the Iberians, and that they were joining the Romans with one accord, he decided upon the following plan of action. He resolved that he must collect the best force he could, and give the enemy battle: if fortune declared in his favour he could then consider his next step in safety, but if the battle turned out unfavourably for him, he would retreat with those that survived into Gaul; and collecting from that country as many of the natives as he could, would go to Italy, and take his share in the same fortune as his brother Hannibal.

While Hasdrubal was arriving at this resolution, Publius Scipio was rejoined by Gaius Laelius; and, being informed by him of the orders of the Senate, he Early in B.C. 208, Scipio moves

southward to attack Hasdrubal in the valley of the Baetis. Livy, 27, 18-19.

collected his forces from their winter quarters and began his advance: the Iberians joining him on the march with great promptness and hearty enthusiasm. Andobales had long been in communication with Scipio: and, on the latter approaching the district in which he was entrenched, he left his camp with his friends and came to Scipio. In this interview he entered upon a defence of himself in regard to his former friendship with the Carthaginians, and spoke of the services he had done them, and the fidelity which he had shown to them. He then went on to narrate the injustice and tyranny which he had experienced at their hands; and demanded that Scipio himself should be the judge of his pleas. If he were shown to be making ungrounded complaints against the Carthaginians, he might justly conclude him incapable of keeping faith with the Romans either: but if, on a review of these numerous acts of injustice he were proved to have had no other course than to desert the Carthaginians, Scipio might confidently expect that, if he now elected to join the Romans, he would be firm in his loyalty to them.

Andobales joins Scipio.

38. Andobales added many more arguments before finishing his speech; and when he had done, Scipio answered by saying that "he quite believed what he had said; and that he had the strongest reason for knowing about the insolent conduct of the Carthaginians, both from their treatment of the other Iberians, and conspicuously from their licentious behaviour to their wives and daughters, whom he had found occupying the position, not of hostages, but of captives and slaves; and to whom he had preserved such inviolable honour as could scarcely have been equalled by their very fathers themselves." And upon Andobales and his companions acknowledging that they were quite aware of this, and falling at his feet and calling him king, all present expressed approval. Whereupon Scipio with emotion bade them "fear nothing, for they would experience nothing but kindness at the hands of the Romans." He at once handed over his daughters to Andobales; and next day made the treaty with him, the chief provision of which was that he should follow the Roman commanders and obey their

commands. This being settled, he returned to his camp; brought over his army to Scipio; and, having joined camps with the Romans, advanced with them against Hasdrubal.

Now the Carthaginian general was encamped at Baecula, in the district of Castulo, not far from the silver mines. But when he learnt the approach of the Romans, he shifted his quarters; and his rear being secured by a river, and having a stretch of tableland in front of his entrenchment of sufficient extent for his troops to manœuvre, and bounded by a steep descent sufficiently deep for security, he stayed quietly in position: always taking care to post pickets on the brow of the descent. As soon as he came within distance, Scipio was eager to give him battle, but was baffled by the strength of the enemy's position. After waiting two days, however, he became anxious, lest by the arrival of Mago and Hasdrubal, son of Gesco, he should find himself surrounded by hostile forces: he therefore determined to venture on an attack and make trial of the enemy.

Hasdrubal changes his position to one of superior strength.

Scipio arrives.

39. His whole army having been got ready for battle, he confined the main body within his camp, but sent out the velites and some picked men of the infantry with orders to assault the brow of the hill and attack the enemy's pickets. His orders were carried out with great spirit. At first the Carthaginian commander watched what was happening without stirring: but when he saw that, owing to the fury of the Roman attack, his men were being hard pressed, he led out his army and drew them up along the brow of the hill, trusting to the strength of the position. Meanwhile Scipio despatched all his light-armed troops with orders to support the advanced guard: and the rest of his army being ready for action, he took half of them under his own command, and going round the brow of the hill to the enemy's left, began assaulting the Carthaginians; while he entrusted the other half to Laelius, with orders to make a similar attack on the right of the enemy. While this was going on, Hasdrubal was still engaged in getting his troops out of camp: for hitherto he had been waiting, because he trusted in the strength of the position, and felt confident that

Scipio successfully assaults Hasdrubal's position.

the enemy would never venture to attempt it. The attack, therefore, took him by surprise, before he was able to get his men on to the ground. As the Romans were now assaulting the two wings of the position which the enemy had not yet occupied, they not only mounted the brow of the hill in safety, but actually advanced to the attack while their opponents were still in all the confusion and bustle of falling in. Accordingly they killed some of them on their exposed flank; while others, who were actually in the act of falling in, they forced to turn and flee. Seeing his army giving way and retreating, Hasdrubal reverted to his preconceived plan; and determining not to stake his all upon this one desperate hazard, he secured his money and his elephants, collected as many of his flying soldiers as he could, and commenced a retreat towards the Tagus, with a view of reaching the passes of the Pyrenees and the Gauls in that neighbourhood.

Hasdrubal retreats, and makes for the Pyrenees.

Scipio did not think it advisable to pursue Hasdrubal at once, for fear of being attacked by the other Carthaginian generals; but he gave up the enemy's camp to his men to pillage.

40. Next morning he collected the prisoners, amounting to ten thousand foot and more than two thousand horse, and busied himself in making arrangements about them. All the Iberians of that district, who were in alliance at that time with the Carthaginians, came in and submitted to the Roman obedience, and in addressing Scipio called him "king." The first to do this and to bow the knee before him had been Edeco, and the next Andobales. On these occasions Scipio had passed the word over without remark; but after the battle, when all alike addressed him by that title, his attention was drawn to it; and he therefore summoned the Iberians to a meeting, and told them that "he quite wished to be called a man of royal liberality by them all, and to be so in the truest sense, but that he had no wish to be a 'king,' nor to be called one by any one; they should address him as general."

Scipio's self-restraint.

Even at this early period of his career, an observer might have remarked the loftiness of Scipio's character. He was

still quite young. His good fortune had been so persistent, that all who came under his rule were led naturally to think and speak of him as a king. Yet he did not lose his self-control; but deprecated this popular impulse and this show of dignity. But this same loftiness of character was still more admirable in the closing scenes of his life, when, in addition to his achievements in Iberia, he crushed the Carthaginians; reduced the largest and fairest districts of Libya, from the Altars of Philaenus to the Pillars of Hercules, under the power of his country; conquered Asia and the kings of Syria; made the best and largest part of the world subject to Rome; and in doing so had numerous opportunities of acquiring regal sway, in whatever parts of the world suited his purpose or wish. For such achievements were enough to have kindled pride, not merely in any human breast, but even, if I may say so without irreverence, in that of a god. But Scipio's greatness of soul was so superior to the common standard of mankind, that he again and again rejected what Fortune had put within his grasp, that prize beyond which men's boldest prayers do not go—the power of a king: and he steadily preferred his country and his duty to that royalty, which men gaze at with such admiration and envy.

Scipio occupies the position evacuated by the Carthaginians.

Scipio next proceeded to select from the captives the native Iberians, and all these he dismissed to their homes without ransom; and bidding Andobales select three hundred of the horses, he distributed the remainder among those who had none. For the rest, he at once occupied the entrenchment of the Carthaginians, owing to its excellent situation; and there he remained himself, waiting to see the movements of the other Carthaginian generals; while he detached a body of men to the passes of the Pyrenees to keep a look-out for Hasdrubal. After this, as it was getting late in the season, he retired with his army to Tarraco being bent on wintering there. . . .

Winter of B.C. 208-207.

AFFAIRS IN GREECE

41. The Aetolians had recently become greatly encouraged by the arrival of the Romans and King Attalus: and accordingly began menacing every one, and threatening all with an attack by land, while Attalus and Publius Sulpicius did the same by sea. Wherefore Achaean legates arrived at the court of King Philip entreating his help: for it was not the Aetolians alone of whom they were standing in dread, but Machanidas also, as he was encamped with his army on the frontier of Argos. The Boeotians also, in fear of the enemy's fleet, were demanding a leader and help from the king. Most urgent of all, however, were the Euboeans in their entreaties to him to take some precaution against the enemy. A similar appeal was being made by the Acarnanians; and there was an embassy even from the Epirotes. News had arrived that both Scerdilaidas and Pleuratus were leading out their armies: and, over and above this, that the Thracian tribes on the frontier of Macedonia, especially the Maedi, were planning to invade Macedonia, if the king were induced to stir from his realm however short a distance. Moreover the Aetolians were already securing the pass of Thermopylae with trenches and stockades and a formidable garrison, satisfied that they would thus shut out Philip, and entirely prevent him from coming to the assistance of his allies south of the pass. It appears to me that a crisis of this sort is well worth the observation and attention of my readers; for it affords a trial and test of the vigour of the leader affected. As in the hunting-field the wild animals never show their full courage and strength until surrounded and brought to bay,—so it is with leaders. And no more conspicuous instance could be found than this of Philip. He dismissed the various embassies, promising each that he would do his best: and then devoted his attention to the war which surrounded him on all sides, watching to see in what direction, and against which enemy, he had best direct his first attack.

King Philip undertakes to aid the Achaean league, and other Greek states, against a threatened attack of the Aetolians in alliance with Rome, B.C. 208. Cp. Livy, 27, 30. See above Bk. 9, ch. 28-42.

42. Just then intelligence reached him that Attalus had crossed the sea and, dropping anchor at Peparethos, had occupied the island. He therefore despatched a body of men to the islanders to garrison their city; and at the same time despatched Polyphontes with an adequate force into Phocis and Boeotia; and Menippus, with a thousand peltasts and five hundred Agrianes to Chalcis and the rest of Euboea; while he himself advanced to Scotusa, and sent word at the same time to the Macedonians to meet him at that town. But when he learnt that Attalus had sailed into the port of Nicaea, and that the leaders of the Aetolians were collecting at Heraclea, with the purpose of holding a conference together on the immediate steps to be taken, he started with his army from Scotusa, eager to hurry thither and break up their meeting. He arrived too late to interrupt the conference: but he destroyed or carried off the corn belonging to the people along the Aenianian gulf, and then returned. After this he left his army in Scotusa once more; and, with the light-armed troops and the royal guard, went to Demetrias, and there remained, waiting to see what the enemy would attempt. To secure that he should be kept perfectly acquainted with all their movements, he sent messengers to the Peparethii, and to his troops in Phocis and Euboea, and ordered them to telegraph to him everything which happened, by means of fire signals directed to Mount Tisaeum, which is a mountain of Thessaly conveniently situated for commanding a view of those places.

43. The method of signalling by fire, which is of the highest utility in the operations of war, has never before been clearly expounded; and I think I shall be doing a service if I do not pass it over, but give an account of it adequate to its importance. Now that opportuneness is of the utmost moment in all undertakings, and pre-eminently so in those of war, no one doubts; and of all the things which contribute to enable us to hit the proper time nothing is more efficacious than fire signals. For they convey intelligence sometimes of what has just happened, sometimes of what is actually going on; and by paying proper attention to them one can get this information at three or four days' journey off, and even more: so that it continually happens that the help

Fire signals.

required may be unexpectedly given, thanks to a message conveyed by fire signals. Now, formerly, as the art of signalling by fire was confined to a single method, it proved in very many cases unserviceable to those employing it. For as it was necessary to employ certain definite signals which had been agreed upon, and as possible occurrences are unlimited, the greater number of them were beyond the competence of the fire signals to convey. To take the present instance: it was possible by means of the signals agreed upon to send the information that a fleet had arrived at Oreus or Peparethos or Chalcis; but it was impossible to express that "certain citizens had gone over to the enemy," or "were betraying the town," or that "a massacre had taken place," or any of those things which often occur, but which cannot be all anticipated. Yet it is precisely the unexpected occurrences which demand instant consideration and succour. All such things then were naturally beyond the competence of fire signalling, inasmuch as it was impossible to adopt an arbitrary sign for things which it was impossible to anticipate.

The improvement introduced by Aeneas Tactitus.

44. Aeneas, therefore, the writer of the treatise on tactics, wished to correct this defect, and did in fact make some improvement; but his invention still fell very far short of what was wanted, as the following passage from his treatise will show.[1] "Let those who wish," he says, "to communicate any matter of pressing importance to each other by fire-signals prepare two earthenware vessels of exactly equal size both as to diameter and depth. Let the depth be three cubits, the diameter one. Then prepare corks of a little shorter diameter than that of the vessels: and in the middle of these corks fix rods divided into equal portions of three fingers' breadth, and let each of these portions be marked with a clearly distinguishable line: and in each let there be written one of the most obvious and universal of those events which occur in war; for instance in the first 'cavalry have entered the country,' in the second 'hoplites,' in the third 'light-armed,' in the next

[1] This passage does not occur in the extant treatise of Aeneas; but is apparently referred to (ch. 7, § 4) as being contained in a preparatory treatise (παρασκευαστικὴ βίβλος).

'infantry and cavalry,' in another 'ships,' in another 'corn,' and so on, until all the portions have written on them the events which may reasonably be expected to occur in the particular war. Then carefully pierce both the vessels in such a way that the taps shall be exactly equal and carry off the same amount of water. Fill the vessels with water and lay the corks with their rods upon its surface, and set both taps running together. This being done, it is evident that if there is perfect equality in every respect between them, both corks will sink exactly in proportion as the water runs away, and both rods will disappear to the same extent into the vessels. When they have been tested, and the rate of the discharge of water has been found to be exactly equal in both, then the vessels should be taken respectively to the two places from which the two parties intend to watch for fire signals. As soon as any one of those eventualities which are inscribed upon the rods takes place, raise a lighted torch, and wait until the signal is answered by a torch from the others: this being raised, both parties are to set the taps running together. When the cork and rod on the signalling side has sunk low enough to bring the ring containing the words which give the desired information on a level with the rim of the vessel, a torch is to be raised again. Those on the receiving side are then at once to stop the tap, and to look at the words in the ring of the rod which is on a level with the rim of their vessel. This will be the same as that on the signalling side, assuming everything to be done at the same speed on both sides."

45. Now this method, though introducing a certain improvement in the system of fire signalling, is still wanting in definiteness: for it is evident that it is neither possible to anticipate, or, if you could anticipate, to write upon the rod every possible thing that may happen: and therefore, when anything unexpected in the chapter of accidents does occur, it is plainly impossible to communicate it by this method. Besides, even such statements as are written on the rods are quite indefinite; for the number of cavalry or infantry that have come, or the particular point in the territory which they have entered, the number of ships, or the amount of corn, cannot be expressed. For

The drawbacks to this method.

what cannot be known before it happens cannot have an arrangement made for expressing it. And this is the important point. For how is one to take proper measures for relief without knowing the number or direction of the enemy? Or how can the party to be relieved feel confidence or the reverse, or indeed have any conception at all of the situation, if it does not know how many ships or how much corn have been despatched by the allies?

The improved method of Cleoxenus and Democlitus.

But the last method which was hit upon by Cleoxenus and Democlitus, and further elaborated by myself, is above all things definite, and made capable of indicating clearly whatever is needed at the moment; but in its working it requires attention and more than ordinarily close observation. It is as follows: Divide the alphabet into five groups of five letters each (of course the last group will be one letter short, but this will not interfere with the working of the system). The parties about to signal to each other must then prepare five tablets each, on which the several groups of letters must be written. They must then agree that the party signalling shall first raise two torches, and wait until the other raises two also. The object of this is to let each other know that they are attending. These torches having been lowered, the signalling party raises first torches on the left to indicate which of the tablets he means: for instance, one if he means the first, two if he means the second, and so on. He next raises torches on the right showing in a similar manner by their number which of the letters in the tablet he wishes to indicate to the recipient.

46. This matter being agreed upon, the two parties must go to their respective points of observation; and each must have, to begin with, a stenoscope with two funnels, to enable him to distinguish through one the right, through the other the left position of the signaller opposite him. Near this stenoscope the tablets must be fixed, and both points, to the right and to the left, must be defended by a fence ten feet long and about the height of a man, in order to make it clear on which side the torches are raised, and to hide them entirely when they are lowered. These preparations completed on both sides, when a man wishes, for instance, to send the

message "Some of our soldiers to the number of a hundred have deserted to the enemy,"—the first thing to do is to select words that may give the same information with the fewest letters, for instance, "A hundred Cretans have deserted," for thus the number of letters is diminished by more than a half and the same information is given. This sentence having been written on a tablet will be transmitted by five signals thus: The first letter is κ, this comes in the second group of letters and therefore on the second tablet; the signaller therefore must raise two torches on the left to show the recipient that he must look at the second tablet; then he will raise five on the right, because κ is the fifth letter in the group,[1] which the recipient must thereupon write on his tablet. Then the signaller must raise four torches on the left, for ρ is in that group, and two on the right, because it is the second in the fourth group, and the recipient will write ρ on his tablet: and so on for the other letters.

47. Now everything that happens can be definitely imparted by means of this invention; but the number of torches employed is large, because each letter has to be indicated by two series of them: still, if proper preparations are made, the thing can be adequately carried out. But whichever method is employed, those who use it must practise beforehand, in order that when the actual occasion for putting it in use arises they may be able to give each other the information without any hitch. For there are plenty of instances to show what a wide difference there is between the way an operation is carried out by men who hear of it for the first time, and by men who have become habituated to it. Many things which were considered not only difficult, but impossible at first, are, after an interval of time and practice, performed with the greatest ease. I could give many illustrations of the truth of this remark, but the clearest may be found in the art of reading. Put side by side

[1] The grouping of these letters will be as follows:—

	1	2	3	4	5
1	α	ζ	λ	π	ϕ
2	β	η	μ	ρ	χ
3	γ	θ	ν	σ	ψ
4	δ	ι	ξ	τ	ω
5	ϵ	κ	o	υ	

a man who has never learnt his letters, though otherwise acute, and a child who has acquired the habit, and give the latter a book, and bid him read it: the former will clearly not be induced to believe that the reader has first to attend to the look of each of the letters, secondly to their sound-value, and thirdly to their combinations with others, each of which operation requires a certain time. Therefore when he sees the boy, without a pause for thought, reading off seven or five lines at a breath, he will not easily be induced to believe that he has not read the book before; and certainly not, if he is able also to observe the appropriate enunciation, the proper separations of the words, and the correct use of the rough and smooth breathings. The moral is, not to give up any useful accomplishment on account of its apparent difficulties, but to persevere till it becomes a matter of habit, which is the way mankind have obtained all good things. And especially is this right when the matters in question are such as are often of decisive importance to our safety.

I was led to say this much in connexion with my former assertion that "all the arts had made such progress in our age that most of them were reduced in a manner to exact sciences." And therefore this too is a point in which history properly written is of the highest utility. . . .

ANTIOCHUS IN PARTHIA, B.C. 209-5. See ch. 31.

The entrance of the Nomad Scythians into Hyrcania.

48. The Apasiacae live between the rivers Oxus and Tanais, the former of which falls into the Hyrcanian Sea, the latter into the Palus Maeotis.[1] Both are large enough to be navigable; and it seems surprising how the Nomads managed to come by land into Hyrcania along with their horses. Two accounts are given of this affair, one of them probable, the other very surprising yet not impossible. The Oxus rises in the Caucasus, and being much augmented by tributaries in Bactria, it rushes through the level plain with a violent and turbid stream. When it reaches the desert it dashes its

[1] Polybius confuses the Tanais (Don) with another Tanais or Iaxartes flowing into the south-east part of the Caspian.

stream against some precipitous rocks with a force raised to such tremendous proportions by the mass of its waters, and the declivity down which it has descended, that it leaps from the rocks to the plain below leaving an interval of more than a stade between the rock and its falls. It is through this space that they say the Apasiacae went on foot with their horses into Hyrcania, under the fall, and keeping close to the rock. The other account is more probable on the face of it. It is said that, as the basin of the river has extensive flats into which it descends with violence, the force of the stream makes hollows in them, and opens chasms into which the water descends deep below the surface, and so is carried on for a short way, and then reappears : and that the barbarians, being well acquainted with the facts, make their way on horseback, over the space thus left dry, into Hyrcania. . . .

Battle on the river Arius between Antiochus and the Bactrians.

49. News being brought that Euthydemus[1] with his force was at Tapuria, and that a body of ten thousand horsemen were keeping guard at the passage of the river Arius, he decided to abandon the siege and attack these last. The river was three days' march away. For two days therefore he marched at a moderate speed ; but on the third, after dinner, he gave orders for the rest of his army to start next day at daybreak ; while he himself, with the cavalry and light-armed troops and ten thousand peltasts, started in the night and pushed on at a great rate. For he was informed that the cavalry of the enemy kept guard by day on the bank of the river, but at night retired to a city more than twenty stades off. Having completed therefore the rest of the way under cover of night, the plains being excellent for riding, he got the greater part of his army across the river by daybreak, before the enemy came back. When their scouts told them what had happened, the horsemen of the Bactrians hastened to the rescue, and fell in with their opponents while on the march. Seeing that he must stand the first charge of the enemy, the king summoned the two thousand horsemen who were accustomed to fight round his own person; and issuing orders that the rest were to form their companies and squadrons, and take up their

[1] King of Bactria, see 11, 34.

usual order on the ground on which they already were, he advanced with the two thousand cavalry, and met the charge of the advanced guard of the Bactrians. In this engagement Antiochus is reputed to have shown the greatest gallantry of any of his men. There was heavy loss on both sides: the king's men conquered the first squadron, but when a second and a third charged, they began to be hard pressed and to suffer seriously. At that juncture, most of the cavalry being by this time on the ground, Panaetolus ordered a general advance; relieved the king and his squadrons; and, upon the Bactrians charging in loose order, forced them to turn and fly in confusion. They never drew rein before the charge of Panaetolus, until they rejoined Euthydemus, with a loss of more than half their number. The king's cavalry on the contrary retired, after killing large numbers and taking a great many prisoners, and bivouacked by the side of the river. In this action the king had a horse killed under him, and lost some of his teeth by a blow on the mouth; and his whole bearing obtained him a reputation for bravery of the highest description. After this battle Euthydemus retreated in dismay with his army to the city of Zariaspa in Bactria. . . .

BOOK XI

1. My reason for prefixing a table of contents to each book, rather than a preface, is not because I do not recognise the usefulness of a preface in arresting attention and rousing interest, and also giving facilities for finding any passage that is wanted, but because I find prefaces viewed, though from many inadequate reasons, with contempt and neglect. I therefore had recourse to a table of contents throughout my history, except the first six books, arranged according to Olympiads, as being as effective, or even more so, than a preface, and at the same time as less subject to the objection of being out of place, for it is closely connected with the subject-matter. In the first six books I wrote prefaces, because I thought a mere table of contents less suitable. . . .

After the battle at Baecula, Hasdrubal made good his passage over the Western Pyrenees, and thence through the Cevennes, B.C. 208. *In the spring of* B.C. 207 *he crossed the Alps and descended into Italy, crossed the Po, and besieged Placentia. Thence he sent a letter to his brother Hannibal announcing that he would march southward by Ariminum and meet him in Umbria. The letter fell into the hands of the Consul Nero, who was at Venusia, and who immediately made a forced march northward, joined his colleague at Sena, and the next day attacked Hasdrubal. See above,* 10; 39; *Livy,* 27, 39-49.

Much easier and shorter was Hasdrubal's journey into Italy. . . .[1]

Never at any other time had Rome been in a greater state of excitement and terrified expectation of the result. . . .[2]

[1] See Livy, 27, 39.

[2] Livy, 27, 44.

Battle of the Metaurus, B.C. 207. Coss. C. Claudius Nero, M. Livius Salinator II.

None of these arrangements satisfied Hasdrubal. But circumstances no longer admitted of delay. He saw the enemy drawn out in battle array and advancing; and he was obliged to get the Iberians and the Gauls who were serving with him into line. He therefore stationed his ten elephants on the front, increased the depth of his lines, and so had his whole army covering a somewhat small ground. He took up a position himself in the centre of the line, immediately behind the elephants, and commenced an advance upon the Roman left, with a full resolution that in this battle he must either conquer or die. Livius advanced to meet the enemy with proud confidence, and having come to close quarters with him was fighting with great gallantry. Meanwhile Claudius, who was stationed on the right wing, found himself unable to advance and outflank the enemy, owing to the rough ground in front of him, relying on which Hasdrubal had directed his advance upon the Roman left: and being embarrassed by his inability to strike a blow, he promptly decided what the circumstances pointed out as the tactics to pursue. He withdrew his men from the right wing, and marched them on the rear of the field of battle; and, after passing the left of the Roman line, fell upon the flank of the Carthaginians who were fighting near the elephants. Up to this point the victory had been doubtful; for both sides fought with desperation, the Romans believing that all would be over with them if they failed, and the Iberians and Carthaginians holding exactly the same conviction for themselves. Moreover the elephants were being of disservice to both sides alike; for finding themselves between two forces, and exposed to a cross-fire of javelins, they kept throwing both the Carthaginian and Roman lines into confusion. But as soon as Claudius fell upon the rear of the enemy the battle ceased to be equal: for the Iberians found themselves attacked on front and rear at once, which resulted in the greater part of them being cut down on the ground. Six of the elephants were killed with the men on them, four forced their way through the lines and were afterwards captured, having been abandoned by their Indian drivers.

2. Hasdrubal had behaved on this occasion, as throughout his whole life, like a brave man, and died fighting: and he deserves not to be passed over without remark. I have already stated that Hannibal was his brother, and on his departure to Italy entrusted the command in Iberia to him. I have also described his many contests with the Romans, and the many embarrassing difficulties with which he had to struggle, caused by the generals sent from Carthage to Iberia; and how in all these matters he had supported these vicissitudes and reverses in a noble spirit worthy of a son of Barcas. But I will now speak of his last contest, and explain why he seems to me pre-eminently to deserve respectful attention and imitation. Most generals and kings, when entering upon decisive battles, place before their eyes the glory and advantages to be obtained from victory, and frequently consider and contrive what use they will make of every success; but they do not go on to review the chances of failure, nor contemplate the plan to be adopted, or the action to be taken, in the case of reverse. Yet the former is obvious, the latter requires foresight. Therefore it is that most of them, though in many instances their soldiers have fought nobly, by their own folly and imprudence in this respect have added dishonour to defeat: have disgraced their previous achievements, and rendered themselves, during the remainder of their lives, objects of reproach and contempt. It is easy to see that many leaders make this fatal mistake, and that the difference between one man and another in these points is most signal; for history is full of such instances. Hasdrubal, on the contrary, as long as there was reasonable hope of being able to accomplish anything worthy of his former achievements, regarded his personal safety in battle as of the highest consequence; but when Fortune deprived him of all hopes for the future, and reduced him to the last extremities, though neglecting nothing either in his preparations or on the field that might secure him the victory, nevertheless considered how, in case of total overthrow, he might face his fate and suffer nothing unworthy of his past career.

Hasdrubal falls in the battle.

These remarks are meant for those engaged in active operations, that they may neither dash the hopes of those who

rely upon them by a heedless seeking of danger, nor by an unworthy clinging to life add disgrace and shame to the catastrophies which befall them.

3. Having won the victory, the Romans began pillaging the enemy's camp; and killed a number of the Celts, as they lay stupefied with drunkenness in their beds, like unresisting victims. Then they collected the rest of the booty, from which more than three hundred talents were paid into the treasury. Taking Carthaginians and Celts together, not less than ten thousand were killed, and about two thousand Romans. Some of the principal Carthaginians were taken prisoners, but the rest were put to the sword. When the report reached Rome, people at first could not believe it, from the intensity of their wish that it might be true; but when still more men arrived, not only stating the fact, but giving full details, then indeed the city was filled with overpowering joy; every temple-court was decked, and every shrine full of sacrificial cakes and victims: and, in a word, they were raised to such a pitch of hopefulness and confidence, that every one felt sure that Hannibal, formerly the object of their chief terror, could not after that stay even in Italy. . . .

A speech of the legate from Rhodes[1] *before an assembly of Aetolians at Heraclea in the autumn of* B.C. 207 (*see Livy*, 28, 7), *at the end of the summer campaign.*

4. "Facts I imagine, Aetolians, have made it clear to you that neither King Ptolemy nor the community of Rhodes, Byzantium, Chios, or Mitylene, regard a composition with you as unimportant. For this is not the first or the second time that we have introduced the subject of peace to your assembly; but ever since you entered upon the war we have beset you with entreaties, and have never desisted from warning you on this subject; because we saw that its immediate result would be the destruction of yourselves and of Macedonia, and because

[1] There is nothing to show positively that a Rhodian is the speaker: but Livy mentions envoys from Rhodes and Ptolemy this year. For the special attempts of the Rhodians to bring about a peace between Philip and the Aetolians, see 5, 24, 100.

we foresaw in the future danger to our own countries and to that of all other Greeks. For as, when a man has once set a fire alight, the result is no longer dependent upon his choice, but it spreads in whatever direction chance may direct, guided for the most part by the wind and the combustible nature of the material, and frequently attacks the first author of the conflagration himself: so too, war, when once it has been kindled by a nation, sometimes devours the first those who kindled it; and soon rushes along destroying everything that falls in its way, continually gathering fresh strength, and blown into greater heat by the folly of the people in its neighbourhood, as though by the wind. Wherefore, men of Aetolia, considering that we, as representatives of the whole body of the islanders and of the Greek inhabitants of Asia, are here to beseech you to put an end to war and to choose peace, because the matter affects us as well as you, show your wisdom by listening to us and yielding to our entreaties. For if you were carrying on a war which, though profitless (and most wars are that), was yet glorious from the motive which prompted it, and the reputation likely to accrue from it, you might be pardoned perhaps for a fixed determination to continue it; but if it is a war of the most signal infamy, which can bring you nothing but discredit and obloquy,—does not such an undertaking claim considerable hesitation on your part? We will speak our opinion frankly; and you, if you are wise, will give us a quiet hearing. For it is much better to hear a disagreeable truth now and thereby be preserved, than to listen to smooth things now, and soon afterwards to be ruined yourselves, and to ruin the rest of the Greeks with you.

5. "Put then before your eyes your own folly. You profess to be at war against Philip on behalf of the Greeks, that they may escape from servitude to him; but your war is really for the enslavement and ruin of Greece. That is the tale told by your treaty with Rome, which formerly existed only in written words, but is now seen in full operation. Heretofore, though mere written words, it was a disgrace to you: but now your execution of it has made that disgrace palpable to the eyes of all the world. Moreover, Philip merely lends his name and serves as a pretext for the war: he is not

exposed to any attack: it is against his allies,—the majority of the Peloponnesian states, Boeotia, Euboea, Phocis, Locris, Thessaly, Epirus,—that you have made this treaty, bargaining that their bodies and their goods shall belong to the Romans, their cities and their territory to the Aetolians. And though personally, if you took a city, you would not stoop to violate the freeborn, or to burn the buildings, because you look upon such conduct as cruel and barbarous; yet you have made a treaty by which you have handed over all other Greeks to the barbarians, to be exposed to the most shameful violence and lawlessness. And all this was hitherto kept a secret. But now the fate of the people of Oreus, and of the miserable Aeginetans, has betrayed you to every one,—Fortune having, as though of set purpose, suddenly brought your infatuation before the scenes.

Cp. 9, 39.

"So much for the origin of the war and its events up to now. But as to its result,—supposing everything to go to your wish,—what do you expect that to be? Will it not be the beginning of great miseries to all Greece?

6. "For I presume no one can fail to see that, if once the Romans get rid of the war in Italy,—and this is all but done, now that Hannibal has been confined to a narrow district in Bruttii,—they will direct their whole power upon Greece: professedly, indeed, in aid of the Boeotians against Philip, but really with the view of reducing it entirely under their own power. And if they design to treat it well when they have conquered it, theirs will be the honour and glory; and if badly, theirs too will be the plunder from the states they destroy, and the power over those which they allow to survive: while you will be calling upon the gods to witness your wrongs, when no god will be any longer willing, nor any man be able to help you. Now, perhaps, you ought to have foreseen all this from the first, for that would have been your best course. But since the future often escapes human foresight, now, at any rate, that you have seen by actual experience what has happened, it must be your duty to take better measures for the future. In any case we have omitted nothing which it becomes sincere friends to say or do. We have spoken our opinion about the future with absolute frankness; and you we

urge and entreat not to stand in the way of the freedom and safety of yourselves or of the rest of Greece."

This speaker having, as it seemed, made a considerable impression, he was followed by the ambassadors of Philip, who, without making a long speech, merely said that they were commissioned to do one of two things,—if the Aetolians chose peace, to accept it readily: if not, to call the gods and the ambassadors from Greece to witness that the Aetolians, and not Philip, ought to be held responsible for what happened thereafter, and so to depart. . . .

7. Philip loudly lamented his ill-fortune in having so narrowly missed getting Attalus into his hands. . . .

Attalus eludes Philip. Livy, 28, 7, 8, B.C. 207.

On his way to the lake Trichonis Philip arrived at Thermus, where there was a temple of Apollo; and there he once more defaced all the sacred buildings which he had spared on his former occupation of the town. In both instances it was an ill-advised indulgence of temper: for it is a mark of utter unreasonableness to commit an act of impiety against heaven in order to gratify one's wrath against man. . . .

Philip at Thermus. See 5, 6-18.

PHILOPOEMEN IN THE PELOPONNESE, B.C. 207

8. There are three methods followed by those who wish to arrive at an intelligent knowledge of tactics. The first is by the study of history, the second by the use of scientific treatises composed by specialists, the third by actual experience on the field. But of all three of these methods the Achaean commanders were equally ignorant. . . .

Defects of the Achaean officers.

A very general fault in the men was an unfortunate rivalry, engendered by the ostentation and bad taste of the others. They were very particular about their attendants and their dress; and there was a show of splendour in this, kept up by the majority beyond their means. But to their arms they paid no attention whatever. . . .

Most people, indeed, do not so much as attempt to imitate the real achievements of those who obtain success, but, while trying to reproduce their unimportant peculiarities, succeed only in displaying their own frivolity. . . .

Speech of Philopoemen urging reform.

9. "Brightness in the armour," he said, "contributes much to inspire dismay in the enemy; and care bestowed on having it made to fit properly is of great service in actual use. This will best be secured if you give to your arms the attention which you now bestow on your dress, and transfer to your dress the neglect which you now show of your arms. By thus acting, you will at once save your money, and be undoubtedly able to maintain the interests of your country. Therefore the man who is going to take part in manœuvres or a campaign ought, when putting on his greaves, to see that they are bright and well-fitting, much more than that his shoes and boots are; and when he takes up his shield and helmet, to take care that they are cleaner and more costly than his cloak and shirt: for when men take greater care of what is for show, than of what is for use, there can be no doubt of what will happen to them on the field. I beg you to consider that elaboration in dress is a woman's weakness, and a woman of no very high character either; but costliness and splendour in armour are the characteristics of brave men who are resolved on saving themselves and their country with glory."

The whole audience were so convinced by this speech and so much struck with the wisdom of the advice, that, immediately after leaving the council-chamber, they began pointing with scorn at the over-dressed dandies, and forced some of them to quit the market-place; and what is more, in future manœuvres and campaigns they kept a stricter watch on each other in these points.

Philopoemen's own example.

10. So true it is that a single word spoken by a man of credit is often sufficient not only to turn men from the worst courses, but even to incite them to the noblest. But when such a speaker can appeal to his own life as in harmony with his words, then indeed his exhortation carries a weight which nothing can exceed. And this was above all others the case

with Philopoemen. For in his dress and eating, as well as in all that concerned his bodily wants, he was plain and simple; in his manners to others without ceremony or pretence; and throughout his life he made it his chief aim to be absolutely sincere. Consequently a few unstudied words from him were sufficient to raise a firm conviction in the minds of his hearers; for as he could point to his own life as an example, they wanted little more to convince them. Thus it happened on several occasions, that the confidence he inspired, and the consciousness of his achievements, enabled him in a few words to overthrow long and, as his opponents thought, skilfully argued speeches.

So on this occasion, as soon as the council of the league separated, all returned to their cities deeply impressed both by the words and the man himself, and convinced that no harm could happen to them with him at their head. Immediately afterwards Philopoemen set out on a visitation of the cities, which he performed with great energy and speed. He then summoned a levy of citizens and began forming them into companies and drilling them; and at last, after eight months of this preparation and training, he mustered his forces at Mantinea, prepared to fight the tyrant Machanidas in behalf of the freedom of all the Peloponnesians.

War against Machanidas, tyrant of Sparta. B.C. 208-207.

11. Machanidas had now acquired great confidence, and looked upon the determination of the Achaeans as extremely favourable to his plans. As soon as he heard of their being in force at Mantinea, he duly harangued his Lacedaemonians at Tegea, and the very next morning at daybreak advanced upon Mantinea. He led the right wing of the phalanx himself; his mercenaries marched in two parallel columns on each side of his front; and behind them were carts carrying quantities of field artillery and bolts for the catapults. Meanwhile Philopoemen too had arranged his army in three divisions, and was leading them out of Mantinea, the Illyrians and the men with body armour by the gate leading to the temple of Poseidon, and with them all the rest of the foreign contingent and light-armed troops; by the next gate, toward the west,

Battle of Mantinea, B.C. 207.

The road to Tegea. See Paus. 8, 10 *sq.*

the phalanx; and by the next the Achaean cavalry. He sent his light-armed men forward to occupy the hill, which rises to a considerable height above the road called Xenis and the above-mentioned temple: he stationed the men with body armour next, resting on this hill to the south; next them the Illyrians; next them, in the same straight line, the phalanx, drawn up in companies, with an interval between each, along the ditch which runs towards the temple of Poseidon, right through the middle of the plain of Mantinea, until it touches the range of mountains that forms the boundary of the territory of the Elisphasii. Next to them, on the right wing, he stationed the Achaean cavalry, under the command of Aristaenetus of Dyme; while on the left wing he led the whole of the foreign contingent, drawn up in lines one behind the other.

12. As soon as the enemy were well in sight, Philopoemen went down the ranks of the phalanx, and addressed to them an exhortation which, though short, clearly pointed out to them the nature of the battle in which they were engaged. But most of what he said was rendered inaudible by the answering shouts of the troops. The affection and confidence of the men rose to such a pitch of enthusiasm and zeal that they seemed to be almost acting under a divine inspiration, as they cried out to him to lead them on and fear nothing. However he tried, when he could get the opportunity, to make this much clear to them, that the battle on the one side was to establish a shameful and ignominious servitude, on the other to vindicate an ever-memorable and glorious liberty.

The attack of Machanidas.

Machanidas at first looked as though he meant to attack the enemy's right wing in column; but when he got within moderate distance he deployed into line by the right, and by this extension movement made his right wing cover the same amount of ground as the left wing of the Achaeans, and fixed his catapults in front of the whole force at intervals. Philopoemen understood that the enemy's plan was, by pouring volleys from the catapults into his phalanx, to throw the ranks into confusion: he therefore gave him no time or interval of repose, but opened the

engagement by a vigorous charge of his Tarentines[1] close to the temple of Poseidon, where the ground was flat and suitable for cavalry. Whereupon Machanidas was constrained to follow suit by sending his Tarentines forward also.

The battle begun by light-cavalry charges.

13. At first the struggle was confined to these two forces, and was maintained with spirit. But the light-armed troops coming gradually to the support of such of them as were wavering, in a very short time the whole of the mercenaries on either side were engaged. They fought sometimes in close order, sometimes in pairs: and for a long time so entirely without decisive result, that the rest of the two armies, who were watching in which direction the cloud of dust inclined, could come to no conclusion, because both sides maintained for a long while exactly their original ground. But after a time the mercenaries of the tyrant began to get the better of the struggle, from their numbers, and the superiority in skill obtained by long practice. And this is the natural and usual result. The citizens of a democracy no doubt bring more enthusiasm to their battles than the subjects of a tyrant; but in the same proportion the mercenaries of sovereigns are naturally superior and more efficient than those of a democracy. For in the former case one side is fighting for liberty, the other for a condition of servitude; but in the case of mercenaries, those of the tyrant are encouraged by the certain prospect of reward, those of a democracy know that they must lose by victory: for as soon as a democracy has crushed its assailants, it no longer employs mercenaries to protect its liberties; while a tyranny requires more mercenaries in proportion as its field of ambition is extended: for as the persons injured by it are more numerous, those who plot against it are more numerous also; and the security of despots rests entirely on the loyalty and power of mercenaries.

Defeat of the Achaean right wing.

14. Thus it came about that the mercenaries in the army of Machanidas fought with such fury and violence, that even

[1] The "Tarentines" were horsemen armed with light skirmishing javelins. See 4, 77; 16, 18; and cp. Arrian, *Tact.* 4, § 5; 18, § 2. Livy, 35, 28; 37, 40.

the Illyrians and men with body armour, who formed the reserve supporting the mercenaries of the Achaean army, were unable to withstand their assault; but were all driven from their position, and fled in confusion towards the city of Mantinea, which was about seven stades distant.

And now there occurred an undoubted instance of what some doubt, namely, that the issues in war are for the most part decided by the skill or want of skill of the commanders. For though perhaps it is a great thing to be able to follow up a first success properly, it is a greater thing still that, when the first step has proved a failure, a man should retain his presence of mind, keep a good look-out for any error of judgment on the part of the victors, and avail himself of their mistakes. At any rate one often sees the side, which imagines itself to have obtained a clear victory, ultimately lose the day; while those who seemed at first to have failed recover themselves by presence of mind, and ultimately win an unexpected victory. Both happened on this occasion to the respective leaders.

Machanidas pursues the fugitives, and thus allows the Achaean hoplites to get between him and his quarters.

The whole of the Achaean mercenaries having been driven from their ground, and their left wing having been thoroughly broken up, Machanidas abandoned his original plan of winning the day by outflanking the enemy with some of his forces and charging their front with others, and did neither; but, quite losing his head, rushed forward heedlessly with all his mercenaries in pursuit of the fugitives, as though the panic was not in itself sufficient to drive those who had once given way up to the town gates.

15. Meanwhile the Achaean general was doing all he could to rally the mercenaries, addressing the officers by name, and urging them to stand; but when he saw that they were hopelessly beaten, he did not run away in a panic nor give up the battle in despair, but, withdrawing under cover of his phalanx, waited until the enemy had passed him in their pursuit, and left the ground on which the fighting had taken place empty, and then immediately gave the word to the front companies of the phalanx to wheel to the left, and advance at the double, without breaking their ranks. He thus swiftly occupied the ground abandoned by his mercenaries, and at once cut off the pursuers

from returning, and got on higher ground than the enemy's right wing. He exhorted the men to keep up their courage, and remain where they were, until he gave the word for a general advance; and he ordered Polybius of Megalopolis[1] to collect such of the Illyrians and body armour men and mercenaries as remained behind and had not taken part in the flight, and form a reserve on the flank of the phalanx, to keep a look-out against the return of the pursuers. Thereupon the Lacedaemonians, excited by the victory gained by the light-armed contingent, without waiting for the word of command, brought their sarissae to the charge and rushed upon the enemy. But when in the course of their advance they reached the edge of the dyke, being unable at that point to change their purpose and retreat when at such close quarters with the enemy, and partly because they did not consider the dyke a serious obstacle, as the slope down to it was very gradual, and it was entirely without water or underwood growing in it, they continued their advance through it without stopping to think.

The fight at the dyke.

16. The opportunity for attack which Philopoemen had long foreseen had now arrived. He at once ordered the phalanx to bring their sarissae to the charge and advance. The men obeyed with enthusiasm, and accompanied their charge with a ringing cheer. The ranks of the Lacedaemonians had been disorganised by the passage of the dyke, and as they ascended the opposite bank they found the enemy above them They lost courage and tried to fly; but the greater number of them were killed in the ditch itself, partly by the Achaeans, and partly by trampling on each other. Now this result was not unpremeditated or accidental, but strictly owing to the acuteness of the general. For Philopoemen originally took ground behind the dyke, not to avoid fighting, as some supposed, but from a very accurate and scientific calculation of strategical advantages. He reckoned either that Machanidas when he arrived would advance without thinking of the dyke, and that then his phalanx would get entangled, just as I have described their actually doing; or that if he advanced with a full apprehension of the difficulty

[1] See on 27, 4.

presented by the dyke, and then changing his mind and deciding to shrink from the attempt, were to retire in loose order and a long straggling column,[1] the victory would be his, without a general engagement, and the defeat his adversary's. For this has happened to many commanders, who having drawn up their men for battle, and then concluded that they were not strong enough to meet their opponents, either from the nature of the ground, the disparity of their numbers, or for other reasons, have drawn off in too long a line of march, and hoped in the course of the retreat to win a victory, or at least get safe away from the enemy, by means of their rear guard alone.

17. However, Philopoemen was not deceived in his prognostication of what would happen; for the Lacedaemonians were thoroughly routed. Seeing therefore that his phalanx was victorious and that he had gained a complete and brilliant success, he set himself vigorously to secure the only thing wanting to complete it, that is, to prevent the escape of Machanidas. Seeing therefore that, in the course of the pursuit, he was caught between the dyke and the town with his mercenaries, he waited for him to attempt a return. But when Machanidas saw that his army was in full retreat, with the enemy at their heels, he knew that he had advanced too far, and had lost his chance of victory: he therefore rallied the mercenaries that he had with him, and tried to form close order, and cut his way through the enemy, while they were still scattered and engaged in the pursuit. Some of his men, understanding his plan and seeing no other hope of safety, kept by him at first; but when they came upon the ground, and saw the Achaeans guarding the bridge over the dyke, they lost heart; and the whole company began falling away from him, each doing the best he could to preserve his own life. Thereupon the tyrant gave up all hope of making his way over the bridge; and rode along the edge of the dyke, trying with all his might to find a place which he could cross.

Machanidas, returning from the pursuit, is killed while trying to recross the dyke.

[1] The text is certainly corrupt here, and it is not clear what the general sense of the passage is beyond this,—that Philopoemen calculated on defeating the enemy, as he did, while struggling through the dyke: or on their exposing themselves to attack if they retreated from the dyke without crossing it.

18. Philopoemen recognised Machanidas by his purple cloak and the trappings of his horse. He at once left Anaxidamus, with orders to guard the bridge with vigilance, and give no quarter to any of the mercenaries; because they were the men on whom the despots of Sparta always depended for supporting their power. Then taking Polyaenus of Cyprus and Simias, who were attending on him at the time, he rode along the edge of the ditch opposite to that in which the tyrant and his attendants were; for Machanidas had still two men with him, Arexidamus and one of the mercenaries. As soon as Machanidas had found a spot in the dyke which could be crossed, he put spurs to his horse, and tried to force it to go on and get over. Then Philopoemen turned suddenly round upon him and dealt him a mortal wound with his spear, and a second with a stab from the spike at the butt end of it, and thus killed the tyrant in a hand-to-hand encounter. Those who were riding with him did the same to Arexidamus; but the third man seeing their fall gave up the idea of crossing the dyke and escaped. Simias immediately stripped the bodies of the two who had fallen, and with their armour carried off also the tyrant's head, and then hurried off to overtake the pursuing party; being eager to give the soldiers ocular evidence of the fall of the enemy's commander, that they might continue the pursuit of their opponents with all the more confidence and spirit right up to Tegea. And this in fact added so greatly to the spirit of the men that it contributed more than anything else to their carrying Tegea by assault, and pitching their camp next day on the Eurotas, undisputed masters of all the open country. For many years past they had been vainly trying to drive the enemy from their own borders, but now they were themselves devastating Laconia without resistance, without having lost any great number of their own men in the battle; while they had killed not less than four thousand Lacedaemonians, taken even more prisoners, and possessed themselves of all their baggage and arms. . . .

Death of Machanidas and capture of Tegea.

Achaeans in Laconia.

19. What profit is it to our readers to describe wars and

battles, the storming of cities and the enslavement of their inhabitants, if they are to know nothing of the causes which conduce to success and failure? The results of such operations merely touch the fancy: it is the tracing of the designs of the actors in such scenes that is really instructive; and above all it is the following in detail of each step that can educate the ideas of the student. . . .

ABILITY OF HANNIBAL. See Livy, 28, 12

Who could refrain from speaking in terms of admiration of this great man's strategic skill, courage, and ability, when one looks to the length of time during which he displayed those qualities; and realises to one's self the pitched battles, the skirmishes and sieges, the revolutions and counter-revolutions of states, the vicissitudes of fortune, and in fact the course of his design and its execution in its entirety? For sixteen continuous years Hannibal maintained the war with Rome in Italy, without once releasing his army from service in the field, but keeping those vast numbers under control, like a good pilot, without any sign of disaffection towards himself or towards each other, though he had troops in his service who, so far from being of the same tribe, were not even of the same race. He had Libyans, Iberians, Ligurians, Celts, Phoenicians, Italians, Greeks, who had naturally nothing in common with each other, neither laws, nor customs, nor language. Yet the skill of the commander was such, that these differences, so manifold and so wide, did not disturb the obedience to one word of command and to a single will. And yet circumstances were not by any means unvarying: for though the breeze of fortune often set strongly in his favour, it as often also blew in exactly the opposite direction. There is therefore good ground for admiring Hannibal's display of ability in campaign; and there can be no fear in saying that, if he had reserved his attack upon the Romans until he had first subdued other parts of the world, there is not one of his projects which would have eluded his grasp. As it was, he began with those whom he should have attacked last, and accordingly began and ended his career with them. . . .

B.C. 218-202.

SCIPIO IN SPAIN, AFTER THE BATTLE OF THE METAURUS

20. Hasdrubal having collected his forces from the various towns in which they had wintered, advanced to within a short distance of Ilipa and there encamped; forming his entrenchment at the foot of the mountains, with a plain in front of him well suited for a contest and battle. His infantry amounted to seventy thousand, his cavalry to four thousand, and his elephants to thirty-two. On his part, Scipio sent M. Junius Silanus to visit Colichas and take over from him the forces that had been prepared by him. These amounted to three thousand infantry and five hundred horse. The other allies he received personally in the course of his march up the country to his destination. When he approached Castalo and Baecula, and had there been joined by Marcus Junius and the troops from Colichas, he found himself in a position of great perplexity. For without their allies the Roman forces were not strong enough to risk a battle; yet to do so, in dependence upon the allies for his hopes of ultimate success, appeared to him to be dangerous and too venturesome. In spite however of his perplexity, he was obliged to yield to the force of circumstances so far as to employ the Iberians; but he resolved to do so only to make a show of numbers to the enemy, while he really fought the action with his own legions. With this purpose in his mind he got his whole army on the march, forty-five thousand infantry and three thousand cavalry; and when he had come within the view of the Carthaginians, he pitched his camp on some low hills exactly opposite the enemy.

Hasdrubal son of Gesco encamps near Ilipa (or Silpia) in Baetica, B.C. 206. Livy 28, 13-6.

Scipio advances into Baetica, and encamps close to the Carthaginian forces.

21. Mago thought that it would be an excellent moment to attack the Romans while actually engaged in making their camp; he therefore rode up to the entrenchment with the greater part of his own cavalry and Massanissa with the Numidians, persuaded that he should catch Scipio off his guard. Scipio had how-

Futile attack by Mago.

ever all along foreseen this, and had placed some cavalry equal in number to those of the Carthaginians under cover of some hills. Upon these making an unexpected charge, many of the enemy's horsemen at once took to flight at the startling appearance, and began to make off; while the rest closed with their opponents and fought with great gallantry. But the Carthaginians were disconcerted by the agility of some of the Roman horsemen in dismounting, and after a short resistance they retreated with considerable loss. The retreat was at first conducted in good order: but as the Romans pressed them hard, they broke up their squadrons, and fled for safety to their own camp. This affair gave the Romans better spirits for engaging in a pitched battle, and had the contrary effect on the Carthaginians. However, during the next few days they both drew out on the intervening plain; skirmished with their cavalry and light-armed troops; and, after thus trying each other's mettle, were resolved to bring the matter to the test of a general engagement.

22. On this occasion Scipio appears to have employed a two-fold stratagem. Hasdrubal had been accustomed to make his demonstrations in force somewhat late in the day, with the Libyans in his centre, and the elephants on either wing; while his own practice had been to make his counter-movements somewhat later still, with the Roman soldiers on his centre opposite the Libyans, and the Iberians on his two wings; but the day on which he resolved upon a general engagement, by reversing this arrangement, he greatly contributed to secure the victory for his own men, and succeeded in putting the enemy at a considerable disadvantage. For directly it was light he sent his aides with orders to the tribunes and men to arm, as soon as they had got their breakfasts, and parade outside the camp. The order was obeyed with alacrity because the men suspected what was going to take place. He then sent the cavalry and light-armed forward, with orders to advance close to the enemy's camp, and skirmish boldly up to it; while he himself marched out with the infantry, just as the sun was appearing above the horizon; and on reaching the middle of

Scipio resolves on a general engagement, and alters his disposition so as to make the battle depend upon the Italians rather than the Spaniards.

the plain, made his dispositions in the reverse order to his usual arrangement, placing the Iberians in the centre and the Roman legionaries on the two wings.

The sudden approach of the cavalry to their camp, and the simultaneous appearance of the rest of the army getting into order, left the Carthaginians barely time to get under arms. Hasdrubal was therefore obliged, without waiting for the men to get breakfast, or making any preparations, to despatch his cavalry and light-armed troops at once against the enemy's cavalry on the plain, and to get his infantry into order on some level ground not far from the skirts of the mountains, as was their custom. For a time the Romans remained quiet; but when the morning was getting on, and the engagement between the light-armed troops still continued undecided, because such of them as were forced from their ground retired on their own heavy infantry and then formed again for attack, Scipio at length thought that the time was come. He withdrew his skirmishers through the intervals of the maniples, and then distributed them equally between the two wings on rear of his line, first the velites and behind them the cavalry. He then advanced, at first in line direct; but when he was about a stade [1] from the enemy, he ordered the Iberians to continue the advance in the same order, while he commanded the maniples and squadrons on the right wing to turn outwards to the right, and those on the left wing to the left.

23. Scipio with the three leading squadrons of cavalry from the right wing, preceded by the usual number of velites and three maniples (a combination of troops which the Romans call a cohort), and Lucius Marcius and Marcus Junius with a similar force from the left wing, turned the one to the left the other to the right, and advanced at a great speed in column upon the enemy, the troops in succession forming up and following in column as they wheeled. When these troops were within a short distance of the enemy,—the Iberians in the line direct being still a considerable distance behind, because they were advancing at a deliberate pace,—they came into contact with the two wings of the enemy simultaneously, the Roman forces being in

1 Or, according to another reading "five stades." Livy, 28, 14, says *quingentos passus*.

column, according to Scipio's original plan. The movements subsequent to this, which resulted in the troops on the rear finding themselves in the same line as the troops in front, and engaged like them with the enemy, were exactly the converse of each other—taking the right and left wings in general, and the cavalry and infantry in particular. For the cavalry and velites on the right wing came into line on the right and tried to outflank the enemy, while the heavy infantry came into line on the left; but on the left wing the heavy infantry came into line by the right, the cavalry and velites by the left. The result of this movement was that, as far as the cavalry and light infantry were concerned, their right became their left. Scipio cared little for this, but was intent on something more important, namely, the outflanking of the enemy. For while a general ought to be quite alive to what is taking place, and rightly so, he ought to use whatever movements suit the circumstances.

The elephants.

24. When these troops were at close quarters the elephants were severely handled, being wounded and harassed on every side by the velites and cavalry, and did as much harm to their friends as to their foes; for they rushed about promiscuously and killed every one that fell in their way on either side alike. As to the infantry,—the Carthaginian wings began to be broken, but the centre occupied by the Libyans, and which was the best part of the army, was never engaged at all. It could not quit its ground to go to the support of the wings for fear of the attack of the Iberians, nor could it by maintaining its position do any actual fighting, because the enemy in front of it did not come to close quarters. However, for a certain time the two wings fought gallantly, because it was for them, as for the enemy, a struggle for life and death. But now the midday heat was become intense, and the Carthaginians began to feel faint, because the unusual time at which they had been forced to come on the field had prevented them from fortifying themselves with the proper food; while the Romans had the advantage in physical vigour as well as in cheerfulness, which was especially promoted by the fact that the prudence of their general had secured his best men being pitted against the weakest troops of the enemy.

Thus hard pressed Hasdrubal's centre began to retreat: at first step by step; but soon the ranks were broken, and the men rushed in confusion to the skirts of the mountain; and on the Romans pressing in pursuit with still greater violence, they began a headlong flight into their entrenchments. Had not Providence interfered to save them, they would promptly have been driven from their camp too; but a sudden storm gathered in the air, and a violent and prolonged torrent of rain descended, under which the Romans with difficulty effected a return to their own camp. . . .

The Romans in the mining district of Spain.

Many Romans lost their lives by the fire in trying to get the silver and gold which had been melted and fused. . . .

SCIPIO ON THE EXPULSION OF THE CARTHAGINIANS FROM SPAIN IN CONSEQUENCE OF THE ABOVE VICTORY

Scipio's idea of transferring the war to Africa.

When every one complimented Scipio after he had driven the Carthaginians from Iberia, and advised him straightway to take some rest and ease, as having put a period to the war, he answered that he "congratulated them on their sanguine hopes; for himself he was now more than ever revolving in his mind how to begin the war with Carthage. Up to that time the Carthaginians had waged war upon the Romans; but that now fortune put it in the power of the Romans to make war upon them. . . ."

SCIPIO'S VISIT TO SYPHAX, KING OF MASAESYLIANS.

See Livy, 28, 17, 18

Scipio's influence over Syphax.

In his conversation with Syphax, Scipio, who was eminently endowed by nature in this respect, conducted himself with so much kindness and tact, that Hasdrubal afterwards remarked to Syphax that "Scipio appeared more formidable to him in such an interview than in the field. . . ."

A MUTINY IN SPAIN

Scipio appeases a mutiny in the Roman camp, at Sucro. Livy, 28, 24. In the autumn of B.C. 206.

25. When a mutiny broke out among part of the troops in the Roman camp, Scipio, though he had now had a very adequate experience of the difficulties of administration, never felt himself more at a loss how to act or in greater embarrassment. And naturally so. For as in the case of the body, causes of mischief, such as cold, heat, fatigue, or wounds, may be avoided by precautions, or easily relieved when they occur; while those which arise from within the body itself, such as tumours or diseases, are difficult to foresee and difficult to relieve when they do exist, so it is, we must believe, with political and military administration. Against plots from without, and the attacks of enemies, the precautions to be taken and the measures for relief may readily be learned by those who pay the requisite attention; but to decide on the right method of resisting intestine factions, revolutions, and disturbances is difficult, and requires great tact and extreme acuteness; and, moreover, the observation of one maxim suitable in my opinion to all armies, states, and bodies alike, which is this: never in such cases to allow any lengthened idleness or repose, and least of all at a time of success and when provisions are abundant.

Being, then, as I have all along said, a man eminently careful, acute, and prompt, Scipio summoned a meeting of the military tribunes and proposed a solution of the existing troubles as follows. He said that "he must promise the soldiers the settlement of their pay; and, in order to create a belief in his promise, he must now take public steps to exact with all speed the contributions which had been already imposed upon the cities for the support of the whole army, with the distinct understanding that the object of that measure was the settlement of the pay: and these same tribunes should return to the army and urge and entreat the men to abandon their rebellious spirit, and come to him to receive their pay, either singly or, if they preferred it, in a body. And

when this was done he would consider, as circumstances arose, what measures it was necessary to take."

26. With this suggestion in their minds these officers deliberated on the means of raising money; and having communicated their decisions to Scipio, he said that he would now consult them on the next necessary step. They accordingly resolved that they would name a day on which all were to appear; and that then they would pardon the general body of the men, but severely punish the instigators of the mutiny, who were as many as thirty-five. The day having arrived, and the mutineers having appeared to make terms and receive their pay, Scipio gave secret instructions to the tribunes, who had been sent on the mission to them, to meet them; and, each of them selecting five of the ringleaders, to greet them with politeness and invite them, if possible, to their own tent, or, if they could not do that, to dinner or some such entertainment. But to the troops with him he sent round orders to have provisions for a considerable period ready in three days' time, because they were to march against the deserter Andobales under Marcus Silanus. When they heard this the mutineers were much emboldened, because they imagined that they would have everything in their own hands, as the other troops would be gone by the time they joined the general.

The mutiny suppressed and the ringleaders executed at New Carthage.

27. Upon the approach of the mutineers, Scipio gave orders to his army to march out the next morning at daybreak with their baggage. But he instructed the tribunes and praefects that, as soon as they met the mutineers, they should order their men to put down their baggage, and keep them under arms at the city gate; and then, placing a detachment at each of the gates, take good care that none of the mutineers should leave the city. The officers who had been sent to meet the men fell in with them on their arrival, and took the ringleaders with every appearance of civility to their own tents, in accordance with the arrangement that had been made. At the same time orders had been given to them to arrest the thirty-five immediately after dinner, and to keep them in fetters: without allowing any one in the tent to go out, except the

messenger who was to inform the general from each of them that this had been accomplished.

The tribunes having done as they were ordered, at daybreak next morning, seeing that the new arrivals were collected in the market-place, the general gave the signal for the assembly of the army. The signal was as usual promptly obeyed by all, for they were curious to see how the general would demean himself in their presence, and what he would say to them about the business in hand. As soon as they were come together, Scipio sent word to the tribunes to bring their soldiers under arms, and station them round the assembled men. He then came forward himself. His first appearance caused an immediate change of feeling. The soldiers supposed that he was still unwell, and when they suddenly saw him, contrary to all expectations, with all the appearance of full health and strength, they were struck with terror.

Scipio's speech to the mutineers.

28. He began his speech by saying that he wondered what their grievances were, or what they looked for forward that induced them to mutiny. For that there were three motives only on which men usually venture to rebel against their country and their commanders,—discontent and anger with their officers; dissatisfaction with their present position; or, lastly, hopes of something better and more glorious. "Now, I ask you," he continued, "which of these can you allege? It is with me, I presume, that you are dissatisfied, because I did not pay you your wages. But this cannot be laid to my charge; for while I was in office your pay was never short. The fault then may lie with Rome that the accumulated arrears have not been settled. Which was your proper course then in that case? To have brought forward your complaint thus, as rebels and enemies to the country that nurtured you, or to have come personally to me and stated your case, and to have begged your friends to support and help you? The latter would have been the better plan in my opinion. In those who serve others for pay it is sometimes pardonable to revolt against their paymasters; but in the case of those who are fighting for themselves, for their own wives and children, it can in no circumstances be conceded. It is just as though, on

the plea of being wronged in money matters by his own father, a man were to come in arms to slay him from whom he received his own life. Or perhaps you may allege that I imposed greater hardships and dangers on you than on the others, and gave the rest more than their share of profits and booty. But you can neither venture to say this, nor, if you did venture, could you prove it. What then is your grievance against me at this moment, I should like to ask, that you have mutinied? I believe that not one of you will be able to express or even conceive it.

29. "Nor again can it have been any dissatisfaction with the position of affairs. For when was any prosperity greater? When has Rome won more victories, when have her arms had brighter prospects than now? But perhaps some faint-heart will say that our enemies have more numerous advantages, fairer and more certain prospects than ourselves. Which, pray, of these enemies? Is it Andobales and Mandonius? But which of you is ignorant of the fact that these men first betrayed the Carthaginians and joined us, and now once more, in defiance of their oaths and pledges, have come forward as our opponents? It is a fine thing surely to become the enemies of your country in reliance on such men as these! Nor again had you any prospect of becoming masters of Iberia by your own prowess: for you would not have been strong enough, even in conjunction with Andobales, to meet us in the field, to say nothing of doing so without such aid. I should like then to ask,—what was it in which you trusted? Surely not in the skill and valour of the leaders whom you have now elected, or in the fasces and axes which were borne in front of them,—men of whom I will not deign to say even another word. All this, my men, is absolutely futile; nor will you be able to allege even the smallest just complaint against me or your country. Wherefore I will undertake your defence to Rome and myself, by putting forward a plea which all the world will acknowledge to hold good. And it is that, *a crowd is ever easily misled and easily induced to any error.* Therefore it is that crowds are like the sea, which in its own nature is safe and quiet; but, when winds fall violently upon it, assumes the character of the blasts which

lash it into fury: thus a multitude also is ever found to be what its leaders and counsellors are. Acting on this consideration, I and all my fellow-officers hereby offer you pardon and amnesty for the past: but to the guilty authors of the mutiny we are resolved to show no mercy, but to punish them as their misconduct to their country and to ourselves deserves."

30. Just as he said these words, the soldiers, who were posted under arms round the assembly, clashed their swords against their shields; and at the same instant the ringleaders of the mutiny were brought in, stripped and in chains. But such terror was inspired in the men by the threatening aspect of the surrounding troops, and by the dreadful spectacle before them, that, while the ringleaders were being scourged and beheaded, they neither changed countenance nor uttered a sound, but remained all staring open-mouthed and terrified at what was going on. So the ringleaders of the mischief were scourged and dragged off through the crowd dead; but the rest of the men accepted with one consent the offer of an amnesty from the general and officers; and then voluntarily came forward, one by one, to take an oath to the tribunes that they would obey the orders of their commanders and remain loyal to Rome.

Execution of the ringleaders.

Having thus crushed what might have been the beginning of serious danger, Scipio restored his troops to their former good disposition. . . .

Scipio at New Carthage has heard of hostile movements on the part of Andobales north of the Ebro, B.C. 206. *See Livy*, 28, 31-34

31. Scipio at once summoned a meeting of the soldiers in New Carthage, and addressed them on the subject of the audacious proceedings of Andobales, and his treachery to them; and by dwelling at great length on these topics he inspired the men with a very great eagerness to attack these princes. He then proceeded to enumerate the battles they had already fought against the Iberians and Carthaginians combined, the Carthaginians act-

Scipio's address to his soldiers.

ing as leaders in the campaigns. "Seeing," he added, "that you always beat them, it does not now become you to fear defeat in a war against Iberians by themselves, and led by Andobales. I will not therefore even accept any Iberian of them all as a partner in the struggle, but I will undertake the campaign by the unassisted services of my Roman soldiers: in order to make it plain to all that it was not, as some assert, by the aid of Iberians that we defeated the Carthaginians and drove them from Iberia; but that it was by Roman valour and your own gallantry that we have conquered Carthaginian and Celtiberian combined. Let nothing therefore disturb your confidence in each other: but, if you have ever done it before, approach this undertaking with courage undismayed. For securing the victory I will with God's help make every necessary provision." This speech filled the troops with such zeal and confidence, that they presented all the appearance of men whose enemies are in full view, and who are on the very point of closing with them.

32. Scipio then dismissed the assembly, but on the next day got his troops on the march, and having reached the Ebro in ten days and crossed it, on the fourth day after that pitched his camp near that of the enemy, with a valley between his own and the enemy's lines. Next day he turned some cattle that had accompanied his army into this valley, after giving Caius Laelius instructions to have the cavalry ready, and some of the tribunes to prepare the velites. The Iberians having at once made an onslaught upon the cattle, he despatched some of the velites against them. These two forces became engaged, and reinforcements being sent to either party from time to time, a severe infantry skirmishing took place in the valley. The proper moment for attack being now come, Caius Laelius, having the cavalry prepared as directed, charged the skirmishers of the enemy, getting between them and the high ground, so that the greater number of them were scattered about the valley and killed by the cavalry. This event roused the barbarians to a furious desire to engage, that they might not appear to be entirely reduced to despair

Scipio marches to the Ebro, crosses it, and in fourteen days is in the presence of the enemy.

A skirmish.

by their previous defeat; and accordingly by daybreak next day they drew out their whole army for battle. Scipio was quite ready to give them battle; but when he saw that the Iberians had come down into the valley in an imprudent manner, and were stationing, not only their cavalry, but their infantry also on the level ground, he waited for a time, because he wished as many of the enemy as possible to take up a position like that. He felt confidence in his cavalry, and still more in his infantry; because, in such deliberate and hand-to-hand battles as this, his men were vastly superior to the Iberians both in themselves and in their arms.

Decisive victory of Scipio.

33. When he thought the right time had come he drew out [the velites][1] to oppose those of the enemy who occupied the foot of the hills; while against those who had descended into the valley he led his main force from the camp in four cohorts, and attacked the infantry. Caius Laelius at the same time made a détour with the cavalry by the hills, which stretched from the camp to the valley, and charged the enemy's horse on the rear; and so kept them occupied with fighting him. The enemy's infantry therefore, being thus deprived of the support of the cavalry, on which they had relied in descending into the valley, were distressed and overmatched in the battle; while their cavalry was in much the same plight: for, being surprised on ground of insufficient extent, they fell into confusion, and lost more men by hurting each other than by the hands of the enemy; for their own infantry was pressing upon their flank, and the enemy's infantry on their front, while his cavalry were attacking on their rear. The battle having taken this course, the result was that nearly all those who had descended into the valley lost their lives; while those who had been stationed on the foot of the hills managed to escape. These last were the light-armed troops, and formed about a third of the whole army: with whom Andobales himself contrived to make good his escape to a certain stronghold of great security. . . .

[1] The text is imperfect.

By further operations in this year, B.C. 206, *Scipio had compelled Mago to abandon Spain: and towards the winter the Roman army went into winter-quarters at Tarraco.*

Having thus put a finishing stroke to his campaigns in Iberia, Scipio arrived at Tarraco in high spirits, bringing with him the materials of a brilliant triumph for himself, and a glorious victory for his country. But being anxious to arrive in Rome before the consular elections, he arranged for the government of Iberia,[1] and, having put the army into the hands of Junius Silanus and L. Marcius, embarked with Caius Laelius and his other friends for Rome. . . .

Scipio returns to Rome in the autumn of B.C. 206.

ANTIOCHUS IN BACTRIA. See 10, 48, 49

34. Euthydemus was himself a Magnesian, and he answered the envoy by saying that "Antiochus was acting unjustly in trying to expel him from his kingdom. He was not himself a revolted subject, but had destroyed the descendant of some who had been such, and so had obtained the kingdom of Bactria." After adding more arguments to the same effect, he urged Teleas to act as a sincere mediator of peace, by urging Antiochus not to grudge him the royal title and dignity, "for if he did not yield to this demand, neither of them would be safe: seeing that great hords of Nomads were close at hand, who were a danger to both; and that if they admitted them into the country, it would certainly be utterly barbarised." With these words he sent Teleas back to Antiochus. The king had long been looking about for some means of ending the controversy; and when he was informed by Teleas of what Euthydemus had said, he readily admitted these pleas for a pacification. And after several journeys of Teleas to and fro between the two, Euthydemus at last sent his son Demetrius to confirm the

The answer of Euthydemus (a Magnesian), king of Bactria, to Teleas, the envoy of Antiochus.

[1] Handing it over to L. Lentulus and L. Manlius Acidinus, Livy, 28, 38.

terms of the treaty. Antiochus received the young prince; and judging from his appearance, conversation, and the dignity of his manners that he was worthy of royal power, he first promised to give him one of his own daughters, and secondly conceded the royal title to his father. And having on the other points caused a written treaty to be drawn up, and the terms of the treaty to be confirmed on oath, he marched away; after liberally provisioning his troops, and accepting the elephants belonging to Euthydemus. He crossed the Caucasus[1] and descended into India; renewed his friendship with Sophagasenus the king of the Indians; received more elephants, until he had a hundred and fifty altogether; and having once more provisioned his troops, set out again personally with his army: leaving Androsthenes of Cyzicus the duty of taking home the treasure which this king had agreed to hand over to him. Having traversed Arachosia and crossed the river Enymanthus, he came through Drangene to Carmania; and, as it was now winter, he put his men into winter quarters there. This was the extreme limit of the march of Antiochus into the interior: in which he not only reduced the up-country Satraps to obedience to his authority, but also the coast cities, and the princes on this side Taurus; and, in a word, consolidated his kingdom by overawing all his subjects with the exhibition of his boldness and energy. For this campaign convinced the Europeans as well as the Asiatics that he was worthy of royal power. . . .

Antiochus continues his march into the interior of Asia.

B.C. 212-205

[1] That is the *Caucasus Indicus* or Paropamisus: mod. Hindú Kúsh.

BOOK XII

CRITICISM OF TIMAEUS

1. Byzacia is near the Syrtes; it has a circumference of two thousand stades, and is circular in shape. . . .

Hippo, Singa, Tabraca, are cities in Libya. Chalkeia, however, is not, as Demosthenes ignorantly states, the name of a city, but means only a "bronze-factory." . . .

2. The lotus is not a large tree; but it is rough and thorny, and has a green leaf, like the rhamnus (black or white thorn), a little longer and broader. The fruit is like white myrtle-berries when they are come to perfection; but, as it grows, it becomes purple in colour, and in size about equal to round olives, and has a very small stone. When it is ripe they gather it: and some of it they pound up with groats of spelt, and store in vessels for their slaves; and the rest they also preserve for the free inhabitants, after taking out the stones, and use it for food. It tastes like a fig or a date, but is superior to them in aroma. A wine is made of it also by steeping it in water and crushing it, sweet and pleasant to the taste, like good mead; and they drink it without mixing it with water. It will not keep, however, more than ten days, and they therefore only make it in small quantities as they want it. Vinegar also is made out of it. . . .

The lotus. See Herodotus, 2, 92.

3. The excellence of the soil of Libya must excite our

admiration. But one would feel inclined to say of Timaeus, not merely that he had never studied the country, but that he was childish and entirely unintelligent in his notions; completely enslaved to those old traditional stories of Libya being wholly sandy, parched, and barren. The same too holds good about its animals. The supply of horses, oxen, sheep, and goats in it is beyond anything to be found in any other part of the world; because many of the tribes in Libya do not use cultivated crops, but live on and with their flocks and herds. Again what writer has failed to mention the vast number and strength of its elephants, lions, and panthers, or the beauty of its buffalos, or the size of its ostriches? Of these not one is to be found in Europe, while Libya is full of them. But Timaeus, by passing them over without a word, gives, as though purposely, an impression exactly the reverse of the truth.

Misstatements of Timaeus about Libya,

And just in the same random way in which he has spoken about Libya, he has also done about the island called Cyrnus. For, when mentioning it in his second book, he says that wild goats, sheep, wild oxen, stags, hares, wolves, and some other animals are plentiful in it; and that the inhabitants employ themselves in hunting them, and in fact spend most of their time in that pursuit. Whereas in this island there are not only no wild goats or wild oxen, but not even hare, wolf, or stag, or any animal of the sort, except some foxes, rabbits, and wild sheep. The rabbit indeed at a distance looks like a small hare; but when taken in the hand, it is found to be widely different both in appearance and in the taste of its flesh; and it also lives generally underground.

and Corsica,

4. The idea, however, of all the animals in the island being wild, has arisen in the following way: The caretakers cannot keep up with their animals, owing to the thick woods and rocky broken nature of the country; but, whenever they wish to collect them, they stand on some convenient spots and call the beasts together by the sound of a trumpet; and all of them flock without fail to their own trumpets. Now, when ships arrive at the coast, and the sailors see goats or cattle grazing without

the reason of his mistake.

any one with them, and thereupon try to catch them, the animals will not let them come near them, because they are not used to them, but will scamper off. But as soon as the keeper sees the men disembarking and sounds his trumpet, they all set off running at full speed and collect round the trumpet. This gives the appearance of wildness; and Timaeus, who made only careless and perfunctory inquiries, committed himself to a random statement.

Swine-keeping in Italy.

Now this obedience to the sound of a trumpet is nothing astonishing. For in Italy the swineherds manage the feeding of their pigs in the same way. They do not follow close behind the beasts, as in Greece, but keep some distance in front of them, sounding their horn every now and then; and the animals follow behind and run together at the sound. Indeed, the complete familiarity which the animals show with the particular horn to which they belong seems at first astonishing and almost incredible. For owing to the populousness and wealth of the country, the droves of swine in Italy are exceedingly large, especially along the sea coast of the Tuscans and Gauls: for one sow will bring up a thousand pigs, or sometimes even more. They therefore drive them out from their night styes to feed, according to their litters and ages. Whence, if several droves are taken to the same place, they cannot preserve these distinction of litters; but they of course get mixed up with each other, both as they are being driven out, and as they feed, and as they are being brought home. Accordingly the device of the horn-blowing has been invented to separate them, when they have got mixed up together, without labour or trouble. For as they feed, one swineherd goes in one direction sounding his horn, and another in another: and thus the animals sort themselves of their own accord, and follow their own horns with such eagerness that it is impossible by any means to stop or hinder them. But in Greece, when the swine get mixed up in the oak forests in their search for the mast, the swineherd who has most assistants and the best help at his disposal, when collecting his own animals, drives off his neighbour's also. Sometimes too a thief lies in wait, and drives them off without the swineherd knowing how he lost

them ; because the beasts straggle a long way from their drivers, in their eagerness to find acorns, when they are just beginning to fall. . . .

False criticisms of Timaeus on Theopompus and Ephorus.

4. (*a*) It is difficult to pardon such errors in Timaeus, considering how severe he is in criticising the slips of others. For instance he finds fault with Theopompus for stating that Dionysius sailed from Sicily to Corinth in a merchant vessel, whereas he really arrived in a ship of war. And again he falsely charges Ephorus with contradicting himself, on the ground that he asserts that Dionysius the Elder ascended the throne at the age of twenty-three, reigned forty-two years, and died at sixty-three. Now no one would say, I think, that this was a blunder of the historian, but clearly one of the transcriber. For either Ephorus must be more foolish than Coroebus and Margites, if he were unable to calculate that forty-two added to twenty-three make sixty-five ; or, if that is incredible in the case of a man like Ephorus, it must be a mere mistake of the transcriber, and the carping and malevolent criticism of Timaeus must be rejected.

His false account of the October horse.

(*b*) Again, in his history of Pyrrhus, he says that the Romans still keep up the memory of the fall of Troy by shooting to death with javelins a war-horse on a certain fixed day, because the capture of Troy was accomplished by means of the "Wooden Horse." This is quite childish. On this principle, all non-Hellenic nations must be put down as descendants of the Trojans ; for nearly all of them, or at any rate the majority, when about to commence a war or a serious battle with an enemy, first kill and sacrifice a horse. In making this sort of ill-founded deduction, Timaeus seems to me to show not only want of knowledge, but, what is worse, a trick of misapplying knowledge. For, because the Romans sacrifice a horse, he immediately concludes that they do it because Troy was taken by means of a horse.

(*c*) These instances clearly show how worthless his account of Libya, Sardinia, and, above all, of Italy is ; and that, speak-

ing generally, he has entirely neglected the most important element in historical investigation, namely, the making personal inquiries. For as historical events take place in many different localities, and as it is impossible for the same man to be in several places at the same time, and also impossible for him to see with his own eyes all places in the world and observe their peculiarities, the only resource left is to ask questions of as many people as possible; and to believe those who are worthy of credit; and to show critical sagacity in judging of their reports.

The reason of his mistakes a want of care in making inquiries.

(*d*) And though Timaeus makes great professions on this head, he appears to me to be very far from arriving at the truth. Indeed, so far from making accurate investigations of the truth through other people, he does not tell us anything trustworthy even of events of which he has been an eye-witness, or of places he has personally visited. This will be made evident, if we can convict him of being ignorant, even in his account of Sicily, of the facts which he brings forward. For it will require very little further proof of his inaccuracy, if he can be shown to be ill-informed and misled about the localities in which he was born and bred, and that too the most famous of them. Now he asserts that the fountain Arethusa at Syracuse has its source in the Peloponnese, from the river Alpheus, which flows through Arcadia and Olympia. For that this river sinks into the earth, and, after being carried for four thousand stades under the Sicilian Sea, comes to the surface again in Syracuse; and that this was proved from the fact that on a certain occasion a storm of rain having come on during the Olympic festival, and the river having flooded the sacred enclosure, a quantity of dung from the animals used for sacrifice at the festival was thrown up by the fountain Arethusa; as well as a certain gold cup, which was picked up and recognised as being one of the ornaments used at the festival. . . .

Nor is he to be trusted even in matters that fell under his own observation.

Arethusa.

5. I happened to have visited the city of the Locrians on

several occasions, and to have been the means of doing them important services. For it was I that secured their exemption from the service in Iberia and Dalmatia, which, in accordance with the treaty, they were bound to supply to the Romans. And being released thereby from considerable hardship, danger, and expense, they rewarded me with every mark of honour and kindness. I have therefore reason to speak well of the Locrians rather than the reverse. Still I do not shrink from saying and writing that the account of their colonisation given by Aristotle is truer than that of Timaeus. For I know for certain that the inhabitants themselves acknowledge that the report of Aristotle, and not of Timaeus, is the one which they have received from their ancestors. And they give the following proofs of this. In the first place, they stated that every ancestral distinction existing among them is traced by the female not the male side.[1] For instance, those are reckoned noble among them who belong to "the hundred families"; and these "hundred families" are those which were marked out by the Locrians, before embarking upon their colonisation, as those from which they were in accordance with the oracle to select the virgins to be sent to Ilium. Further, that some of these women joined the colony: and that it is their descendants who are now reckoned noble, and called "the men of the hundred families." Again, the following account of the "cup-bearing" priestess had been received traditionally by them. When they ejected the Sicels who occupied this part of Italy, finding that it was a custom among them for the processions at their sacrifices to be led by a boy of the most illustrious and high-born family obtainable, and not having any ancestral custom of their own on the subject, they adopted this one, with no other improvement than that of substituting a girl for one of their boys as cup-bearer, because nobility with them went by the female line.

The traditions of the colonisation of Locri Epizephyrii agree with the account in Aristotle, rather than with that of Timaeus.

6. And as to a treaty, none ever existed, or was said to have existed, between them and the Locrians in Greece; but they all knew by tradition of one with the Sicels: of which they give the follow-

The trick of the Locrians.

[1] Cp. a similar custom of the Lycians, Herod. 1, 173.

ing account. When they first appeared, and found the Sicels occupying the district in which they are themselves now dwelling, these natives were in terror of them, and admitted them through fear into the country; and the newcomers made a sworn agreement with them that "they would be friendly and share the country with them, as long as they stood upon the ground they then stood upon, and kept heads upon their shoulders." But, while the oaths were being taken, they say that the Locrians put earth inside the soles of their shoes, and heads of garlic concealed on their shoulders, before they swore; and that then they shook the earth out of their shoes, and threw the heads of garlic off their shoulders, and soon afterwards expelled the Sicels from the country. This is the story current at Locri. . . .

By an extraordinary oversight Timaeus of Tauromenium commits himself to the statement that it was not customary with the Greeks to possess slaves.[1] . . .

These considerations would lead us to trust Aristotle rather than Timaeus. His next statement is still more strange. For to suppose, with Timaeus, that it was unlikely that men, who had been the slaves of the allies of the Lacedaemonians, would continue the kindly feelings and adopt the friendships of their late masters is foolish. For when they have had the good fortune to recover their freedom, and a certain time has elapsed, men, who have been slaves, not only endeavour to adopt the friendships of their late masters, but also their ties of hospitality and blood: in fact, their aim is to keep them up even more than the ties of nature, for the express purpose of thereby wiping out the remembrance of their former degradation and humble position; because they wish to pose as the descendants of their masters rather than as their freedmen. And this is what in all probability happened in the case of the Locrians. They had removed to a great distance from all who knew their secret; the lapse of time favoured their pretensions; and they were not therefore so foolish as to maintain any customs likely to revive the memory of their own degradation,

Locri Epizephyrii colonised by certain slaves who had obtained their freedom, and by some free born women.

[1] He may have been referring to pre-homeric times, cp. Herod. 6, 137, *οὐ γὰρ εἶναι τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον σφίσι κω οὐδὲ τοῖσι ἄλλοισι Ἕλλησι οἰκέτας.*

rather than such as would contribute to conceal it. Therefore they very naturally called their city by the name of that from which the women came; and claimed a relationship with those women: and, moreover, renewed the friendships which were ancestral to the families of the women.

The Locrians then were naturally friends of Sparta and enemies of Athens.

And this also indicates that there is no sign of Aristotle being wrong in saying that the Athenians ravaged their territory. For it being quite natural, as I have shown, that the men who started from Locri and landed in Italy, if they were slaves ten times over, should adopt friendly relations with Sparta, it becomes also natural that the Athenians should be rendered hostile to them, not so much from regard to their origin as to their policy.

The reason of the women of Locris (in Greece) leaving their homes with the slaves.

It is not, again, likely that the Lacedaemonians should themselves send their young men home from the camp for the sake of begetting children, and should refuse to allow the Locrians to do the same. Two things in such a statement are not only improbable but untrue. In the first place, they were not likely to have prevented the Locrians doing so, when they did the same themselves, for that would be wholly inconsistent: nor were the Locrians, in obedience to orders from them, likely to have adopted a custom like theirs. (For in Sparta it is a traditional law, and a matter of common custom, for three or four men to have one wife, and even more if they are brothers; and when a man has begotten enough children, it is quite proper and usual for him to sell his wife to one of his friends.) The fact is, that though the Locrians, not being bound by the same oath as the Lacedaemonians, that they would not return home till they had taken Messene, had a fair pretext for not taking part in the common expedition; yet, by returning home only one by one, and at rare intervals, they gave their wives an opportunity of becoming familiar with the slaves instead of their original husbands, and still more so the unmarried women. And this was the reason of the migration. . . .

7. Timaeus makes many untrue statements; and he appears

to have done so, not from ignorance, but because his view was distorted by party spirit. When once he has made up his mind to blame or praise, he forgets everything else and outsteps all bounds of propriety. So much for the nature of Aristotle's account of Locri, and the grounds on which it rested. But this naturally leads me to speak of Timaeus and his work as a whole, and generally of what is the duty of a man who undertakes to write history. Now I think that I have made it clear from what I have said, first, that both of them were writing conjecturally; and, secondly, that the balance of probability was on the side of Aristotle. It is in fact impossible in such matters to be positive and definite. But let us even admit that Timaeus gives the more probable account. Are the maintainers of the less probable theory, therefore, to be called by every possible term of abuse and obloquy, and all but be put on trial for their lives? Certainly not. Those who make untrue statements in their books from ignorance ought, I maintain, to be forgiven and corrected in a kindly spirit: it is only those who do so from deliberate intention that ought to be attacked without mercy.

Timaeus and Aristotle.

8. It must then either be shown that Aristotle's account of Locri was prompted by partiality, corruption, or personal enmity; or, if no one ventures to say that, then it must be acknowledged that those who display such personal animosity and bitterness to others, as Timaeus does to Aristotle, are wrong and ill advised.

The epithets which he applies to him are "audacious," "unprincipled," "rash"; and besides, he says that he "has audaciously slandered Locri by affirming that the colony was formed by runaway slaves, adulterers, and man-catchers." Further, he asserts that Aristotle made this statement, "in order that men might believe him to have been one of Alexander's generals, and to have lately conquered the Persians at the Cilician Gates in a pitched battle by his own ability; and not to be a mere pedantic sophist, universally unpopular, who had a short time before shut up that admirable doctor's shop." Again, he says that he "pushed his way into every palace and tent:" and that he was "a glutton and a gourmand, who thought

The vulgar abuse of Timaeus.

B.C. 333.

only of gratifying his appetite." Now it seems to me that such language as this would be intolerable in an impudent vagabond bandying abuse in a law court; but an impartial recorder of public affairs, and a genuine historian, would not think such things to himself, much less venture to put them in writing.

9. Let us now, then, examine the method of Timaeus, and compare his account of this colony, that we may learn which of the two better deserves such vituperation. He says in the same book: "I am not now proceeding on conjecture, but have investigated the truth in the course of a personal visit to the Locrians in Greece. The Locrians first of all showed me a written treaty which began with the words, 'as parents to children.' There are also existing decrees securing mutual rights of citizenship to both. In fine, when they were told of Aristotle's account of the colony, they were astonished at the audacity of that writer. I then crossed to the Italian Locri and found that the laws and customs there accorded with the theory of a colony of free men, not with the licentiousness of slaves. For among them there are penalties assigned to man-catchers, adulterers, and run-away slaves. And this would not have been the case if they were conscious of having been such themselves."

Timaeus's account of his investigations in the history of the colony of Locri.

10. Now the first point one would be inclined to raise is, as to what Locrians he visited and questioned on these subjects. If it had been the case that the Locrians in Greece all lived in one city, as those in Italy do, this question would perhaps have been unnecessary, and everything would have been plain. But as there are two clans of Locrians, we may ask, Which of the two did he visit? What cities of the one or the other? In whose hands did he find the treaty? Yet we all know, I suppose, that this is a speciality of Timaeus's, and that it is in this that he has surpassed all other historians, and rests his chief claim to credit,—I mean his parade of accuracy in studying chronology and ancient monuments, and his care in that department of research. Therefore we may well wonder how he came to omit telling us the name of the city in which he found the treaty, the place in which it was inscribed, or the magistrates

Criticism of the above statement of Timaeus.

who showed him the inscription, and with whom he conversed: to prevent all cavil, and, by defining the place and city, to enable those who doubted to ascertain the truth. By omitting these details he shows that he was conscious of having told a deliberate falsehood. For that Timaeus, if he really had obtained such proofs, would not have let them slip, but would have fastened upon them with both hands, as the saying is, is proved by the following considerations. Would a writer who tried to establish his credit on that of Echecrates,—he mentioning him by name as the person with whom he had conversed, and from whom he had obtained his facts about the Italian Locri,—taking the trouble to add, by way of showing that he had been told them by no ordinary person, that this man's father had formerly been entrusted with an embassy by Dionysius,—would such a writer have remained silent about it if he had really got hold of a public record or an ancient tablet?

Timaeus and the Olympic registers.

11. This is the man forsooth who drew out a comparative list of the Ephors and the kings of Sparta from the earliest times; as well as one comparing the Archons at Athens and priestesses in Argos with the list of Olympic victors, and thereby convicted those cities of being in error about those records, because there was a discrepancy of three months between them! This again is the man who discovered the engraved tablets in the inner shrines, and the records of the guest-friendships on the door-posts of the temples. And we cannot believe that such a man could have been ignorant of anything of this sort that existed, or would have omitted to mention it if he had found it. Nor can he on any ground expect pardon, if he has told an untruth about it: for, as he has shown himself a bitter and uncompromising critic of others, he must naturally look for equally uncompromising attacks from them.

Being then clearly convicted of falsehood in these points, he goes to the Italian Locri: and, first of all, says that the two Locrian peoples had a similar constitution and the same ties of amity, and that Aristotle and Theophrastus have maligned the city. Now I am fully aware that in going into minute particulars and proofs on this point I shall be forced

to digress from the course of my history. It was for that reason however that I postponed my criticism of Timaeus to a single section of my work, that I might not be forced again and again to omit other necessary matter. . . .

Timaeus condemned out of his own mouth.

12. Timaeus says that the greatest fault in history is want of truth; and he accordingly advises all, whom he may have convicted of making false statements in their writings, to find some other name for their books, and to call them anything they like except history. . . .

For example, in the case of a carpenter's rule, though it may be too short or too narrow for your purpose, yet if it have the essential feature of a rule, that of straightness, you may still call it a rule; but if it has not this quality, and deviates from the straight line, you may call it anything you like except a rule. "On the same principle," says he, "historical writings may fail in style or treatment or other details; yet if they hold fast to truth, such books may claim the title of history, but if they swerve from that, they ought no longer to be called history." Well, I quite agree that in such writings truth should be the first consideration: and, in fact, somewhere in the course of my work I have said "that as in a living body, when the eyes are out, the whole is rendered useless, so if you take truth from history what is left is but an idle tale." I said again, however, that "there were two sorts of falsehoods, the ignorant and the intentional; and the former deserved indulgence, the latter uncompromising severity." . . . These points being agreed upon—the wide difference between the ignorant and intentional lie, and the kindly correction due to the one and the unbending denunciation to the other—it will be found that it is to the latter charge that Timaeus more than any one lays himself open. And the proof of his character in this respect is clear. . . .

See 1, 14.

There is a proverbial expression for the breakers of an agree-

ment, "Locrians and a treaty." An explanation given of this, equally accepted by historians and the rest of the world, is that, at the time of the invasion of the Heracleidae, the Locrians agreed with the Peloponnesians that, if the Heracleidae did not enter by way of the isthmus, but crossed at Rhium, they would raise a war beacon, that they might have early intelligence and make provisions to oppose their entrance. The Locrians, however, did not do this, but, on the contrary, raised a beacon of peace; and therefore, when the Heracleidae arrived opposite Rhium, they crossed without resistance; while the Peloponnesians, having taken no precautions, found that they had allowed their enemies to enter their country, because they had been betrayed by the Locrians. . . .

The proverb Λοκροὶ τὰς συνθήκας.

Many remarks depreciatory of divination and dream interpretation may be found in his writings.[1] But writers who have introduced into their books a good deal of such foolish talk, so far from running down others, should think themselves fortunate if they escape attack themselves. And this is just the position in which Timaeus stands. He remarks that "Callisthenes was a mere sycophant for writing stuff of this sort; and acted in a manner utterly unworthy of his philosophy in giving heed to ravens and inspired women; and that he richly deserved the punishment which he met with at the hands of Alexander, for having corrupted the mind of that monarch as far as he could." On the other hand, he commends Demosthenes, and the other orators who flourished at that time, and says that "they were worthy of Greece for speaking against the divine honours given to Alexander; while this philosopher, for investing a mere mortal with the aegis and thunderbolt, justly met the fate which befel him from the hands of providence. . . ."

Timaeus's attitude towards the art of divination.

Callisthenes.

13. Timaeus asserts that Democharès was guilty of unnatural lust, and that his lips therefore were unfit to blow the sacred fire; and that in morals

Democharès.

[1] The text is very imperfect here.

he went beyond any stories told by Botrys and Philaenis and all other writers of indecent tales. Foul abuse and shameless accusations of this sort are not only what no man of cultivation would have uttered, they go beyond what you might expect from the lowest brothels. It is, however, to get credit for the foul and shameless accusations, which he is always bringing, that he has maligned this man: supporting his charge by dragging in an obscure comic poet. Now on what grounds do I conjecture the falsity of the accusation? Well, first, from the fact of the good birth and education of Democharés; for he was a nephew of Demosthenes. And in the second place, from the fact that he was thought worthy at Athens, not only of being a general, but of the other offices also; which he certainly would not have obtained, if he had got into such troubles as these. Therefore it seems to me that Timaeus is accusing the people of Athens more than Democharés, if it is the fact that they committed the interests of the country and their own lives to such a man. For if it had been true, the comic poet Archedicus would not have been the only one to have made this statement concerning Democharés, as Timaeus alleges: it would have been repeated by many of the partisans of Antipater, against whom he has spoken with great freedom, and said many things calculated to annoy, not only Antipater himself, but also his successors and friends. It would have been repeated also by many of his political opponents: and among them, by Demetrius of Phalerum, against whom Democharés has inveighed with extraordinary bitterness in his History, alleging that "his conduct as a prince, and the political measures on which he prided himself, were such as a petty tax-gatherer might be proud of; for he boasted that in his city things were abundant and cheap, and every one had plenty to live upon." And he tells another story of Demetrius, that "He was not ashamed to have a procession in the theatre led by an artificial snail, worked by some internal contrivance, and emitting slime as it crawled, and behind it a string of asses; meaning by this to indicate the slowness and stupidity of the Athenians, who had yielded to others the honour of defending Greece, and were tamely submissive to Cassander." Still, in spite of these taunts,

neither Demetrius nor any one else has ever brought such a charge against Democharés.

14. Relying therefore on the testimony of his own countrymen, as safer ground than the virulence of Timaeus, I feel no hesitation in declaring that the life of Democharés is not chargeable with such enormities. But even supposing that Democharés had ever so disgraced himself, what need was there for Timaeus to insert this passage in his History? Men of sense, when resolved to retaliate upon a personal enemy, think first, not of what he deserves, but of what it is becoming in them to do. So in the case of abusive language: the first consideration should be, not what our enemies deserve to be called, but what our self respect will allow us to call them. But if men measure everything by their own ill temper and jealousy, we are forced to be always suspicious of them, and to be ever on our guard against their exaggeration. Wherefore, in the present instance, we may fairly reject the stories to the discredit of Philochares told by Timaeus; for he has put himself out of the pale of indulgence or belief, by so obviously allowing his native virulence to carry him beyond all bounds of propriety in his invectives.

15. For my part I cannot feel satisfied with his abuse of Agathocles either, even admitting him to have been the worst of men. I refer to the passage at the end of his History in which he asserts that in his youth Agathocles was "a common stale, extravagantly addicted to every unnatural vice," and that "when he died, his wife in the course of her lamentations exclaimed 'Ah, what have I not done for you! what have you not done to me?'" To such language one can only repeat what has been already said in the case of Democharés, and express one's astonishment at such extravagant virulence. For that Agathocles must have had fine natural qualities is evident from the narrative of Timaeus itself. That a man who came as a runaway slave to Syracuse, from the potter's wheel and smoke and clay, at the early age of eighteen, should have within a short time advanced from that humble beginning to be master of all Sicily, and after being a terror to the Carthaginians, should have grown old in office and died in enjoyment of

Agathocles defended against the aspersions of Timaeus.

the royal title,—does not this prove that Agathocles had some great and admirable qualities, and many endowments and talents for administration? In view of these the historian ought not to have recounted to posterity only what served to discredit and defame this man, but those facts also which were to his honour. For that is the proper function of history. Blinded, however, by personal malignity, he has recorded for us with bitterness and exaggeration all his defects; while his eminent achievements he has passed over in entire silence: seeming not to be aware that in history such silence is as mendacious as misstatement. The part of his history, therefore, which was added by him for the gratification of his personal spite I have passed over, but not what was really germane to his subject. . . .

The laws of Zaleucus, and an incident in their working at Locri (for which he legislated, see Arist. *Pol.* 2, 12).

16. Two young men had a dispute about the ownership of a slave. This slave had been in the possession of one of them for a long time; but two days before, as he was going to the farm without his master, the other laid violent hands upon him and dragged him to his house. When the first young man heard of this, he came to the house, seized the slave, and taking him before the magistrate asserted his ownership and offered sureties. For the law of Zaleucus ordained that the party from whom the abduction was made should have possession of the property in dispute, pending the decision of the suit. But the other man in accordance with the same law, alleged that he was the party from whom the abduction had been made, for the slave had been brought before the magistrate from his house. The magistrates who were trying the case were in doubt, and calling in the Cosmopolis[1] referred the point to him. He interpreted the law as meaning that "the abduction was always from that party in whose possession the property in dispute had last been for a certain period unquestioned; but that if another abducted this property from a holder, and then the original holder repossessed himself of it from the abductor, this was not abduction in the

[1] For this title see on 22, 19. It is found in inscriptions in Thasos, Crete, and Cibyra. C. I. G. 2163, *c*; 2583; 4380, *b*.

sense of the law." The young man, who thus lost his case, was not satisfied, and alleged that such was not the intention of the legislator. Thereupon the Cosmopolis summoned him to discuss the interpretation in accordance with the law of Zaleucus; that is, to argue on the interpretation of the law with him before the court of the one thousand, and with a halter round the neck of each: whichever should be shown to be wrong in his interpretation was to lose his life in the sight of the thousand. But the young man asserted that the compact was not a fair one, for the Cosmopolis, who happened to be nearly ninety, had only two or three years of life left, while in all reasonable probability he had not yet lived half his life. By this adroit rejoinder the young man turned off the affair as a jest: but the magistrates adjudged the question of abduction in accordance with the interpretation of the Cosmopolis. . . .

A CRITICISM ON EPHORUS AND CALLISTHENES

17. That I may not be thought to detract wantonly from the credit of such great writers, I will mention one battle, which is at once one of the most famous ever fought, and not too remote in point of time; and at which, above everything else, Callisthenes was himself present. I mean the battle between Alexander and Darius in Cilicia. He says that "Alexander had already got through the pass called the Cilician Gates: and that Darius, availing himself of that by the Amanid Gates, made his way with his army into Cilicia; but on learning from the natives that Alexander was on his way into Syria, he followed him; and having arrived at the pass leading to the south, pitched his camp on the bank of the river Pinarus. The width of the ground from the foot of the mountain to the sea was not more than fourteen stades, through which this river ran diagonally. On first issuing from the mountains its banks were broken, but in its course through the level down to the sea it ran between precipitous and steep hills." Starting with this description of the ground, he goes on to say that "When Alexander's army faced about, and,

Callisthenes and the battle of Issus, B.C. 333.

retracing its steps, was approaching to attack them, Darius and his officers determined to draw up their whole phalanx on the ground occupied by his encampment, as it then was, and to defend his front by the river, which flowed right along his camp." But he afterwards says that Darius "stationed his cavalry close to the sea, his mercenaries next along the river, and his peltasts next resting on the mountains."

18. Now it is difficult to understand how he could have drawn up these troops in front of his phalanx, considering that the river ran immediately under the camp:[1] especially as their numbers were so great, amounting, on Callisthenes's own showing, to thirty thousand cavalry and thirty thousand mercenaries. Now it is easy to calculate how much ground such a force would require. At the most cavalry in a regular engagement is drawn up eight deep, and between each squadron a clear space must be left in the line to enable them to turn or face about. Therefore eight hundred will cover a stade of front; eight thousand, ten stades;[2] three thousand two hundred, four stades; and so eleven thousand two hundred would cover the whole of fourteen stades. If therefore he were to put his whole thirty thousand on the ground, he would have to mass his cavalry alone nearly three times the usual depth; and then what room is left for his large force of mercenaries? None, indeed, unless on the rear of the cavalry. But Callisthenes says this was not the case, but that these latter engaged the Macedonians first. We must therefore understand half the front, that nearest the sea, to have been occupied by the cavalry; the other half, that nearest the mountains, by the mercenaries. We may by these data easily calculate the depth of the cavalry, and the distance the river must have been from the camp to allow of it.

Again, he says that "on the approach of the enemy Darius himself, who was on the centre, ordered up the mercenaries from the wing." It is difficult to see what he means by this: for the point of junction of the mercenaries and the cavalry

[1] Both Curtius and Arrian seem to have found in their authorities that Darius crossed the Pinarus. Curt. 3, 8; Arrian, 2, 8.

[2] Reckoning the stade at 600 feet (Greek).

must have been at the centre. Where and how then, and to what point could Darius, who was himself actually among the mercenaries, be said to "order them up"?

Lastly, he says that "the cavalry on the right wing charged Alexander; and that his men stood the charge gallantly, and, making a counter charge, kept up an obstinate fight." But he quite forgets that there was a river between them, a river, too, of the nature that he had just himself described.[1]

19. His account of the movements of Alexander are equally vague. He says that "he crossed into Asia with forty thousand infantry and four thousand five hundred cavalry; but that when he was about to enter Cilicia he was joined by a reinforcement of five thousand infantry and eight hundred cavalry." From these numbers, if one were to make the liberal allowance of three thousand absentees from the infantry and three hundred from the cavalry on various services, there would still remain forty-two thousand infantry and five thousand cavalry. Starting with these numbers, he goes on to say "that Alexander heard of the entrance of Darius into Cilicia when he was a hundred stades away from him, having already marched through the pass:[2] that he therefore retraced his steps through the pass, his phalanx on the van, his cavalry next, and his baggage on the rear. But that as soon as he had debouched upon the open country, he gave general orders to form up into a phalanx, at first thirty-two deep; then sixteen; and lastly, when they were nearing the enemy, eight deep." Now this is a worse blunder than the last. A stade, allowing for the distances which must be kept on a march, and reckoning the depth at sixteen, admits of one thousand six hundred men, each man covering six feet. It is plain, therefore, that ten stades will admit of only sixteen thousand men, and twenty twice that number. Hence, when Alexander caused his men to form sixteen deep, he would have wanted a width of ground of twenty stades; and even then, the whole of the cavalry and ten thousand infantry would have been unaccounted for.

20. Again, he says that Alexander was marching in line

[1] See note to previous chapter.
[2] The Cilician gates.

when he was about forty stades from the enemy. A greater blunder it is difficult to conceive. For where could one find a ground, and especially in Cilicia, twenty stades broad by forty deep, for a phalanx armed with sarissae to march in line? It would not be easy to count all the impossibilities in the way of such an arrangement and such a movement. One that is mentioned by Callisthenes himself is sufficient to establish the point. For he remarks that the winter torrents which descend from the hills make so many gullies in the plain, that, in the course of the flight, the chief part of the Persians are said to have lost their lives in deep places of that kind. But, it may be urged, Alexander wished to be ready for battle as soon as the enemy were in sight. But what could be less ready than a phalanx in a disordered and straggling line? Is it not much easier to form up a phalanx from a proper column of route, than to bring a disordered and straggling line back into the same alignment, and get it into order of battle on a broken and woody ground? It was, therefore much better to march twice or four times the ordinary depth of a phalanx [1] in good order, for which sufficient ground could possibly be found. And it was easy to deploy his men quickly into the line of the phalanx, because he was able by means of scouts to ascertain the presence of the enemy in plenty of time. But in this case, beside other absurdities, while bringing his men in line across the level, he did not even (we are told) put the cavalry in front, but marched with them in the same alignment.

21. But the greatest blunder is still to come. "As soon as Alexander," he says, "was within distance of the enemy he caused his men to take up order eight deep," which would have necessitated ground forty stades wide for the length of the line; and even had they, to use the poet's expression, "laid shield to shield and on each other leaned," still ground twenty stades wide would have been wanted, while he himself says that it was less than fourteen. [We have also to deduct from these fourteen stades the space occupied by the two divisions of the cavalry, one on the left next the sea, the other on the right]; [2] and to allow for the fact that the whole force

[1] That is, sixteen or thirty-two deep. [2] The text here is in hopeless confusion.

was kept a considerable distance from the hills, to avoid being exposed to the enemy occupying the skirts of the mountains; for we know that Callisthenes represents the wing to have been facing these, at an angle with the centre. We are also leaving out of account the ten thousand foot, whom we showed to be too many according to his own calculation.

The upshot is that eleven stades at most is left for the whole length of the phalanx, even taking Callisthenes's own account, in which thirty-two thousand men standing shield to shield must necessarily be drawn up thirty deep; while he asserts that they fought eight deep. Such blunders admit of no defence: for the facts at once demonstrate the impossibility of the assertion. We have only to compare the space occupied by each man, the width of the whole ground, and the number of the men, to prove its falsity.

22. It would be tedious to mention all his other absurdities in connexion with this battle. I must be content with a very few. He says, for instance, that "Alexander took care in arranging his order of battle to be himself personally opposed to Darius; and that at first Darius was equally anxious to be opposite Alexander, but afterwards altered his mind." But he does not vouchsafe to tell us how these kings learnt at what part of their respective forces they were each posted, or to what point in his own line Darius re-transferred himself. Again, how could a phalanx mount to the edge of the river bank, when it was precipitous and covered with brushwood? Such a piece of bad generalship must not be attributed to Alexander, because he is acknowledged by all to have been a skilful strategist and to have studied the subject from childhood: we must rather attribute it to the historian's want of ability to descern between what is or is not practicable in such movements. So much for Ephorus and Callisthenes. . . .

23. Timaeus attacks Ephorus with great severity, though he is himself liable to two grave charges—bitterness in attacking others for faults of which he is himself guilty, and complete demoralisation, shown by the opinions which he expresses in his memoirs, and which he endeavours to implant in the minds of his readers. If we are to lay it down that Callisthenes deserved his death, what

Timaeus's over-estimate of Timoleon.

ought to happen to Timaeus? Surely there is much more reason for Providence to be wroth with him than with Callisthenes. The latter wished to deify Alexander; but Timaeus exalts Timoleon above the most venerable gods. The hero of Callisthenes, again, was a man by universal consent of a superhuman elevation of spirit; while Timoleon, far from having accomplished any action of first-rate importance, never even undertook one. The one expedition which he achieved in the course of his life took him no farther than from Corinth to Syracuse; and how paltry is such a distance when compared with the extent of the world! I presume that Timaeus believed that if Timoleon, by gaining glory in such a mere saucer of a place as Sicily, should be thought comparable to the most illustrious heroes, he too himself, as the historian of only Italy and Sicily, might properly be considered on a par with the writers of universal history. This will be sufficient defence of Aristotle, Theophrastus, Callisthenes, Ephorus, and Democharés against the attacks of Timaeus: and it is addressed to those who believe that this historian is impartial and truthful. . . .

The incapacity of Timaeus for forming a judgment.

24. We may fairly judge Timaeus on the principles which he has himself laid down. According to him, "poets and historians betray their own tastes by the incidents which they repeatedly record in their writings. Thus the poet[1] by his fondness for banqueting scenes shows that he is a glutton; and in the same way Aristotle, by frequently describing rich food in his writings, betrays his love of dainty living and his greediness." On the same principle he judges Dionysius the tyrant because he "was always very particular in the ornamentation of his dining-couches, and had hangings of exquisite make and variegated colours." If we apply this principle to Timaeus, we shall have abundant reason to think badly of him. In attacking others he shows great acuteness and boldness; when he comes to independent narrative he is full of dreams, miracles, incredible myths,—in a word, of miserable superstition and old wives' tales. The truth is that Timaeus is a proof

[1] Homer, who is generally spoken of as "the poet." We may remember Horace (*Ep.* 1, 19, 6) *Laudibus arguitur vini vinosus Homerus.*

of the fact, that at times, and in the case of many men, want of skill and want of judgment so completely destroy the value of their evidence, that though present at and eye-witnesses of the facts which they record, they might just as well have been absent or had no eyes. . . .

25. The story of the brazen bull is this. It was made by Phalaris at Agrigentum; and he used to force men to get into it, and then by way of punishment light a fire underneath. The metal becoming thus red hot, the man inside was roasted and scorched to death; and when he screamed in his agony, the sound from the machine was very like the bellowing of a bull. When the Carthaginians conquered Sicily this bull was removed from Agrigentum to Carthage. The trap door between the shoulders, through which the victims used to be let down, still remains; and no other reason for the construction of such a bull in Carthage can be discovered at all: yet Timaeus has undertaken to upset the common story, and to refute the declarations of poets and historians, by alleging that the bull at Carthage did not come from Agrigentum, and that no such figure ever existed there; and he has composed a lengthy treatise to prove this. . . .

The brazen bull of Phalaris.

GENERAL REMARKS ON TIMAEUS AS AN HISTORIAN

What epithet ought one to apply to Timaeus, and what word will properly characterise him? A man of his kind appears to me to deserve the very bitterest of the terms which he has applied to others. It has already been sufficiently proved that he is a carping, false and impudent writer; and from what remains to be said he will be shown to be unphilosophical, and, in short, utterly uninstructed. For towards the end of his twenty-first book, in the course of his "harangue of Timoleon," he remarks that "the whole sublunary world being divided into three parts —Asia, Libya, and Europe. . . ."[1] One could scarcely believe such a remark to have come, I don't say from Timaeus, but even from the proverbial Margites. . . .

[1] See 3, 37. The point seems to be that the remark was too commonplace to put into the mouth of a hero.

25. (*a*) The proverb tells us that one drop from the largest vessel is sufficient to show the whole contents. This is applicable to the present case. When one or two false statements have been discovered in a history, and they have been shown to be wilful, it is clear that nothing which such an historian may say can be regarded as certain or trustworthy. But in order to convince the more careful student, I must speak on his method and practice in regard to public speeches, military harangues, ambassador's orations, and all compositions of that class; which are, as it were, a compendium of events and an epitome of all history. Now that he has given these in his writings with entire disregard of truth, and that of set purpose, can any reader of Timaeus fail to be aware? He has not written down the words actually used, nor the real drift of these speeches; but imagining how they ought to have been expressed, he enumerates all the arguments used, and makes the words tally with the circumstances, like a school-boy declaiming on a set theme: as though his object were to display his own ability, not to give a report of what was in reality said. . . .

(*b*) The special province of history is, first, to ascertain what the actual words used were; and secondly, to learn why it was that a particular policy or argument failed or succeeded. For a bare statement of an occurrence is interesting indeed, but not instructive: but when this is supplemented by a statement of cause, the study of history becomes fruitful. For it is by applying analogies to our own circumstances that we get the means and basis for calculating the future; and for learning from the past when to act with caution, and when with greater boldness, in the present. The historian therefore who omits the words actually used, as well as all statement of the determining circumstances, and gives us instead conjectures and mere fancy compositions, destroys the special use of history. In this respect Timaeus is an eminent offender, for we all know that his books are full of such writing.

(*c*) But perhaps some one may raise the question as to how it comes about that, being the sort of writer that I am showing him to be, he has obtained acceptance and credit among certain people. The reason is that his work abounds with hostile criticism and invective against others: and he has been

judged, not by the positive merits of his own composition and his independent narrative, but by his skill in refuting his fellow historians; to which department he appears to me to have brought great diligence and an extraordinary natural aptitude. The case of the physicist Strato is almost precisely similar. As long as this man is endeavouring to descredit and refute the opinions of others, he is admirable: directly he brings forward anything of his own, or expounds any of his own doctrines, he at once seems to men of science to lose his faculties and become stupid and unintelligent. And for my part, I look upon this difference in writers as strictly analogous to the facts of everyday life. In this too it is easy to criticise our neighbours, but to be faultless ourselves is hard. One might almost say that those who are most ready at finding fault with others are most prone to errors in their own life.

(*d*) Besides these I may mention another error of Timaeus. Having stayed quietly at Athens for about fifty years, during which he devoted himself to the study of written history, he imagined that he was in possession of the most important means of writing it. To my mind this was a great mistake. History and the science of medicine are alike in this respect, that both may be divided broadly into three departments; and therefore those who study either must approach them in three ways. For instance the three departments of medicine are the rhetorical, the dietetic, and the surgical and pharmaceutical. [The second of these though important is discredited by some.][1] The first, which takes its rise from the school of Herophilus and Callimachus of Alexandria, does indeed rightly claim a certain position in medical science; but by its speciousness and liberal promises acquires so much reputation that those who are occupied with other branches of the art are supposed to be completely ignorant. But just bring one of these professors to an actual invalid: you will find that they are as completely wanting in the necessary skill as men who have never read a medical treatise. Nay, it has happened before now that certain persons, who had really nothing serious the matter with them, have been persuaded by their powerful arguments to commit themselves to their treatment, and have thereby endangered

[1] The text is again hopeless.

their lives: for they are like men trying to steer a ship out of a book. Still such men go from city to city with great *éclât*, and get the common people together to listen to them. But if, when this is done, they induce certain people to submit as a specimen to their practical treatment; they only succeed in reducing them to a state of extreme discomfort, and making them a laughing stock to the audience.[1] So completely does a persuasive address frequently get the advantage over practical experience. The third branch of the medical science, though it involves genuine skill in the treatment of the several cases, is not only rare in itself, but is also frequently cast into the shade, thanks to the folly of popular judgment, by volubility and impudence.

25. (*e*) In the same way the science of genuine history is threefold: first, the dealing with written documents and the arrangement of the material thus obtained; second, topography, the appearance of cities and localities, the description of rivers and harbours, and, speaking generally, the peculiar features of seas and countries and their relative distances; thirdly, political affairs. Now, as in the case of medicine, it is the last branch that many attach themselves to, owing to their preconceived opinions on the subject. And the majority of writers bring to the undertaking no spirit of fairness at all: nothing but dishonesty, impudence and unscrupulousness. Like vendors of drugs, their aim is to catch popular credit and favour, and to seize every opportunity of enriching themselves. About such writers it is not worth while to say more.

(*f*) But some of those who have the reputation of approaching history in a reasonable spirit are like the theoretical physicians. They spend all their time in libraries, and acquire generally all the learning which can be got from books, and then persuade themselves that they are adequately equipped for their task. . . . Yet in my opinion they are only partially qualified for the production of genuine history. To inspect ancient records indeed, with the view of ascertaining the notions entertained by the ancients of certain places, nations, polities

[1] The text is uncertain, and I am not at all sure of the meaning of *ἐπ' ὀνόματος*, cp. 25 *k*, 27. These public harangues of doctors to attract patients are noticed in Xenophon, *Memorab.* 4, 2, 5.

and events, and of understanding the several circumstances and contingencies experienced in former times, is useful; for the history of the past directs our attention in a proper spirit to the future, if a writer can be found to give a statement of facts as they really occurred. But to persuade one's self, as Timaeus does, that such ability in research is sufficient to enable a man to describe subsequent transactions with success is quite foolish. It is as though a man were to imagine that an inspection of the works of the old masters would enable him to become a painter and a master of the art himself.

This will be rendered still more evident from what I have now to say, particularly from certain passages in the history of Ephorus. This writer in his history of war seems to me to have had some idea of naval tactics, but to be quite unacquainted with fighting on shore. Accordingly, if one turns one's attention to the naval battles at Cyprus and Cnidus, in which the generals of the king were engaged against Evagoras of Salamis [1] and then against the Lacedaemonians, one will be struck with admiration of the historian, and will learn many useful lessons as to what to do in similar circumstances. But when he tells the story of the battle of Leuctra between the Thebans and Lacedaemonians, or again that of Mantinea between the same combatants, in which Epaminondas lost his life, if in these one examines attentively and in detail the arrangements and evolutions in the line of battle, the historian will appear quite ridiculous, and betray his entire ignorance and want of personal experience of such matters. The battle of Leuctra indeed was simple, and confined to one division of the forces engaged, and therefore does not make the writer's lack of knowledge so very glaring: but that of Mantinea was complicated and technical, and is accordingly unintelligible, and indeed completely inconceivable, to the historian. This will be rendered clear by first laying down a correct plan of the ground, and then measuring the extent of the movements as described by him. The same is the case with Theopompus, and above all with Timaeus, the subject of this book. These

Ephorus was fairly acquainted with naval, but not with military tactics.

B.C. 371.
B.C. 362.

[1] Tyrant of Salamis in Cyprus, B.C. 404-374. See Isocrates, *Orat.* x.

latter writers also can conceal their ignorance, so long as they deal with generalities; but directly they attempt minute and detailed description, they show that they are no better than Ephorus. . . .

25. (*g*) It is in fact as impossible to write well on the operations in a war, if a man has had no experience of actual service, as it is to write well on politics without having been engaged in political transactions and vicissitudes. And when history is written by the book-learned, without technical knowledge, and without clearness of detail, the work loses all its value. For if you take from history its element of practical instruction, what is left of it has nothing to attract and nothing to teach. Again, in the topography of cities and localities, when such men attempt to go into details, being entirely without personal knowledge, they must in a similar manner necessarily pass over many points of importance; while they waste words on many that are not worth the trouble. And this is what his failure to make personal inspection brings upon Timaeus. . . .

Timaeus's want of practical knowledge.

(*h*) In his thirty-fourth book Timaeus says that "he spent fifty continuous years at Athens as an alien, and never took part in any military service, or went to inspect the localities." Accordingly, when he comes upon any such matters in the course of his history, he shows much ignorance and makes many misstatements; and if he ever does come near the truth, he is like one of those animal-painters who draw from models of stuffed skins. Such artists sometimes preserve the correct outline, but the vivid look and life-like portraiture of the real animal, the chief charm of the painter's art, are quite wanting. This is just the case with Timaeus, and in fact with all who start with mere book-learning; there is nothing vivid in their presentment of events, for that can only come from the personal experience of the writers. And hence it is, that those who have gone through no such course of actual experience produce no genuine enthusiasm in the minds of their readers. Former historians showed their sense of the necessity of making professions to this effect in their writings. For when their subject was political, they were careful to state that the writer had of course been engaged in politics, and had had

experience in matters of the sort; or if the subject was military, that he had served a campaign and been actually engaged; and again, when the matter was one of everyday life, that he had brought up children and had been married; and so on in every department of life, which we may expect to find adequately treated by those writers alone who have had personal experience, and have accordingly made that branch of history their own. It is difficult perhaps for a man to have been actually and literally engaged in everything: but in the most important actions and most frequently occurring he must have been so.

(*i*) And that this is no impossibility, Homer is a convincing instance; for in him you may see this quality of personal knowledge frequently and conspicuously displayed. The upshot of all this is that the study of documents is only one of three elements in the preparation of an historian, and is only third in importance. And no clearer proof of this could be given than that furnished by the deliberative speeches, harangues of commanders, and orations of ambassadors as recorded by Timaeus. For the truth is, that the occasions are rare which admit of all possible arguments being set forth; as a rule, the circumstances of the case confine them to narrow limits. And of such speeches one sort are regarded with favour by men of our time, another by those of an earlier age; different styles again are popular with Aetolians, Peloponnesians, and Athenians. But to make digressions, in season and out of season, for the purpose of setting forth every possible speech that could be made, as Timaeus does by his trick of inventing words to suit every sort of occasion, is utterly misleading, pedantic, and worthy of a schoolboy essayist. And this practice has brought failure and discredit on many writers. Of course to select from time to time the proper and appropriate language is a necessary part of our art: but as there is no fixed rule to decide the quantity and quality of the words to be used on a particular occasion, great care and training is required if we are to instruct and not mislead our readers. The exact nature of the situation is difficult to communicate always; still it may be brought home to the mind by means of systematic demonstration, founded on personal and habitual

experience. The best way of securing that this should be realised is for historians, first, to state clearly the position, the aims, and the circumstances of those deliberating; and then, recording the real speeches made, to explain to us the causes which contributed to the success or failure of the several speakers. Thus we should obtain a true conception of the situation. and by exercising our judgment upon it, and drawing analogies from it, should be able to form a thoroughly sound opinion upon the circumstances of the hour. But I suppose that tracing causes is difficult, while stringing words together in books is easy. Few again have the faculty of speaking briefly to the point, and getting the necessary training for doing so; while to produce a long and futile composition is within most people's capacity and is common enough.

25. (*k*) To confirm the judgment I have expressed of Timaeus, on his wilful misstatements as well as his ignorance, I shall now quote certain short passages from his acknowledged works as specimens. . . . Of all the men who have exercised sovereignty in Sicily, since the elder Gelo, tradition tells us that the most able have been Hermocrates, Timoleon, and Pyrrhus of Epirus, who are the last persons in the world on whom to father pedantic and scholastic speeches. Now Timaeus tells us in his twenty-first book that on his arrival in Sicily Eurymedon urged the cities there to undertake the war against Syracuse; that subsequently the people of Gela becoming tired of the war, sent an embassy to Camarina to make a truce; that upon the latter gladly welcoming the proposal, each state sent ambassadors to their respective allies begging them to despatch men of credit to Gela to deliberate on a pacification, and to secure the common interests. Upon the arrival of these deputies in Gela and the opening of the conference, he represents Hermocrates as speaking to the following effect: "He praised the people of Gela and Camarina first, for having made the truce; secondly, because they were the cause of the assembling of this peace congress; and thirdly because they had taken precautions to prevent the mass of the citizens from taking part in the discussion, and had secured that it should be confined to the leading men in the states, who

Timaeus on Sicilian history.

B.C. 413. Thucyd. 7, 42 *sqq.*

knew the difference between peace and war." Then after making two or three practical suggestions, Hermocrates is represented as expressing an opinion that "if they seriously consider the matter they will learn the profound difference between peace and war,"—although just before he had said that it was precisely this which moved his gratitude to the men of Gela, that "the discussion did not take place in the mass assembly, but in a congress of men who knew the difference between peace and war." This is an instance in which Timaeus not only fails to show the ability of an historian, but sinks below the level of a school theme. For, I presume, it will be universally admitted that what an audience requires is a demonstration of that about which they are in ignorance or uncertainty; but to exhaust one's ingenuity in finding arguments to prove what is known already is the most futile waste of time. But besides his cardinal mistake of directing the greater part of the speech to points which stood in need of no arguments at all, Timaeus also puts into the mouth of Hermocrates certain sentences of which one could scarcely believe that any commonplace youth would have been capable, much less the colleague of the Lacedaemonians in the battle of Aegospotami, and the sole conqueror of the Athenian armies and generals in Sicily.

B.C. 405. Hermocrates was not there. Xen. *Hellen.* I, I, 27-31.

26. For first he "thinks that he should remind the congress that in war sleepers are woke at dawn by bugles, in peace by cocks."[1] Then he says that "Hercules established the Olympic games and the sacred truce during them, as an exemplification of his own principles;" and that "he had injured all those persons against whom he waged war, under compulsion and in obedience to the order of another, but was never voluntarily the author of harm to any man."[2] Next he quotes the instance of Zeus in Homer as being displeased with Ares, and saying[3]—

> "Of all the gods that on Olympus dwell
> I hold thee most detested; for thy joy
> Is ever strife and war and battle."

And again the wisest of the heroes says[4]—

[1] For this proverb see Plutarch, *Nicias*, ch. 9. ἡδέως μεμνημένοι τοῦ εἰπόντος ὅτι τοὺς ἐν εἰρήνῃ καθεύδοντας οὐ σάλπιγγες ἀλλ' ἀλεκτρυόνες ἀφυπνίζουσι.
[2] *Ib.* ch. 25. [3] Homer, *Il.* 5, 890. [4] Homer, *Il.* 9, 63.

"He is a wretch, insensible and dead
To all the charities of social life,
Whose pleasure is in civil broil and war."

Then he goes on to allege that Euripides agrees with Homer in the lines[1]—

"O well of infinite riches!
O fairest of beings divine!
O Peace, how alas! thou delayest;
My heart for thy coming is fain.
I tremble lest age overtake me,
Ere thy beauty and grace I behold;
Ere the maidens shall sing in their dancing,
And revels be gladsome with flowers."

Next he remarks that "war is like disease, peace like health; for that the latter restores those that are sick, while in the former even the healthy perish. Moreover, in time of peace, the old are buried by the young as nature directs, while in war the case is reversed; and above all in war there is no security even as far as the city walls, while in peace it extends to the frontier of the territory"—and so on. I wonder what other arguments would have been employed by a youth who had just devoted himself to scholastic exercises and studies in history; and who wished, according to the rules of the art, to adapt his words to the supposed speakers? Just these I think which Timaeus represents Hermocrates as using.

Timoleon's victory over the Carthaginians, B.C. 344.

(*a*) Again, in the same book, Timoleon is exhorting the Greeks to engage the Carthaginians;[2] and when they are on the very point of coming to close quarters with the enemy, who are many times superior to them in number, Timaeus represents him as saying, "Do not look to the numbers of the foe, but to their cowardice. For though Libya is fully settled and abounds in inhabitants, yet when we wish to express complete desolation we say 'more desolate than Libya,' not meaning to refer to its emptiness, but to the poor spirit of its inhabitants. And after all, who would be afraid of men who, when nature gives hands as the distinctive feature of man among all living creatures, carry

[1] Euripides, fr. [2] Battle of the Crimesus. See Plutarch, *Timol.* ch. 27.

them about all their life inside their tunics idle?[1] And more than all, who wear shirts under their inner tunics, that they may not even when they fall in battle show their nakedness to their enemies? . . ."

(*b*) When Gelo promised to help the Greeks with twenty thousand land forces and two hundred decked ships, if they would concede to him the chief command either by land or sea, they say that the congress of Greeks, sitting at Corinth, gave Gelo's envoys a most spirited answer. They urged Gelo to come to their aid with his forces, and observed that the logic of facts would give the command to the bravest. This is not the language of men depending for succour on the Syracusans, as a last resource; but of men who felt confidence in themselves, and challenged all comers to a rivalry of courage and for the crown of valour. In spite of this, Timaeus spends such a wealth of rhetoric and earnestness on these points, in his desire to exalt the importance of Sicily above all the rest of Greece, to represent its history as the most splendid and glorious of all the world, its men as the wisest of all who have been great in philosophy, and the Syracusans as the most consummate and divine of statesmen, that he could scarcely be surpassed by the cleverest schoolboy declaimers when undertaking to prove such paradoxes as that "Thersites was an excellent man," or "Penelope a bad wife," or other thesis of that description.

Gelo. See Herod. 7, 157-165, B.C. 481.

(*c*) However, the only effect of such extravagant exaggeration is to bring ridicule upon the men and the transactions which it is his intention to champion; while he himself incurs the same discredit as ill-trained disputants in the Academy; some of whom, in their desire to embarrass their opponents on all subjects, possible or impossible alike, carry their paradoxical and sophistical arguments to such a length as to dispute whether it is possible for people at Athens to smell eggs cooking at Ephesus: and to offer to maintain that, while they are discussing these points, they are lying on their couches at home and carrying on a second discussion on other subjects. This extravagance of paradox has brought the whole school

[1] He refers to the habit of Eastern nations thrusting their hands into long sleeves in the presence of their rulers. See Xenophon, *Hellen.* 2, 1, 8.

into such disrepute, that even reasonable discussions have lost credit with the world. And apart from their own futility, these persons have inspired our young men with so depraved a taste, that they pay no attention whatever to questions of ethics and politics, which bring benefit to those who study them; but spend their lives in pursuit of an empty reputation for useless and paradoxical verbiage.

(*d*) This is just the case with Timaeus and his imitators in history. Paradoxical and tenacious, he has dazzled the multitude by skill in words; and has forced attention to himself by a show of veracity, or has conciliated confidence by a pretence of producing proof of his assertions. The most conspicuous instances of his success in inspiring this confidence are those parts of his work which treat of colonies, founding of cities, and the relationships of nations. In these points he makes such a parade of minute accuracy, and inveighs so bitterly when refuting others, that people came to imagine that all other historians have been mere dreamers, and have spoken at random in describing the world; and that he is the only man who has made accurate investigations, and unravelled every history with intelligence.

(*e*) As a matter of fact, his books contain much that is sound, but also much that is false. Those, however, who have spent much time on his earlier books, in which the passages I have alluded to occur, when the confidence which they have fully given to his exaggerated professions is disturbed by some one pointing out that Timaeus is obnoxious to the same reproaches which he has brought with such bitterness against others (as, for instance, in the misstatements as to the Locrians, and other instances lately mentioned by me), become angry and obstinate in controversy, and difficult to convince. And that, I might almost say, is all the benefit which the most diligent students of his history get from their reading. While those who devote their attention to his speeches, and generally to the didactic part of his work, become pedantic, sophistical, and wholly insensible to truth, for reasons which I have already stated.

27. Moreover, when he comes to deal with facts in his history, we find a combination of all the faults which I have mentioned. The reason I will now proceed to state. It will

not, perhaps, to most people seem to his credit, and it is in truth the real source of his errors. For whereas he is thought to have possessed great and wide knowledge, a faculty for historical inquiry, and extraordinary industry in the execution of his work, in certain cases he appears to have been the most ignorant and indolent person that ever called himself an historian. And the following considerations will prove it. Nature has bestowed on us two instruments of inquiry and research, hearing and sight. Of these sight is, according to Heracleitus, by far the truer; for eyes are surer witnesses than ears. Cp. Herod. 1, 8. Hor. A. P. 180. And of these channels of learning Timaeus has chosen the pleasanter and the worse; for he entirely refrained from looking at things with his own eyes, and devoted himself to learning by hearsay. But even the ear may be instructed in two ways, reading and answers to personal inquiries: and in the latter of these he was very indolent, as I have already shown. The reason of his preference for the other it is easy to divine. Study of documents involves no danger or fatigue, if one only takes care to lodge in a city rich in such records, or to have a library in one's neighbourhood. You may then investigate any question while reclining on your couch, and compare the mistakes of former historians without any fatigue to yourself. But personal investigation demands great exertion and expense; though it is exceedingly advantageous, and in fact is the very corner-stone of history. This is evident from the writers of history themselves. Ephorus says, "if writers could only be present at the actual transactions, it would be far the best of all modes of learning." Theopompus says, "the best military historian is he who has been present at the greatest number of battles; the best speech maker is he who has been engaged in most political contests." The same might be said of the art of healing and of steering. Homer has spoken even more emphatically than these writers on this point. For when he wishes to describe what the man of light and leading should be, he introduces Odysseus in these words—

> "Tell me, oh Muse, the man of many shifts
> Who wandered far and wide."

and then goes on—

"And towns of many saw, and learnt their mind,
And suffered much in heart by land and sea."

and again [1]—

"Passing through wars of men and grievous waves."

28. It is such a man that the dignity of history appears to me to require. Plato says that "human affairs will not go well until either philosophers become kings or kings become philosophers." [2] So I should say that history will never be properly written, until either men of action undertake to write it (not as they do now, as a matter of secondary importance; but, with the conviction that it is their most necessary and honourable employment, shall devote themselves through life exclusively to it), or historians become convinced that practical experience is of the first importance for historical composition. Until that time arrives there will always be abundance of blunders in the writings of historians. Timaeus, however, quite disregarded all this. He spent his life in one place, of which he was not even a citizen; and thus deliberately renounced all active career either in war or politics, and all personal exertion in travel and inspection of localities: and yet, somehow or another, he has managed to obtain the reputation of a master in the art of history. To prove that I have not misrepresented him, it is easy to bring the evidence of Timaeus himself. In the preface to his sixth book he says that "some people suppose that more genius, industry, and preparation are required for rhetorical than for historical composition." And that "this opinion had been formerly advanced against Ephorus." Then because this writer had been unable to refute those who held it, he undertakes himself to draw a comparison between history and rhetorical compositions: a most unnecessary proceeding altogether. In the first place he misrepresents Ephorus. For in truth, admirable as Ephorus is throughout his whole work, in style, treatment, and argumentative acuteness, he is never more brilliant than in his digressions and statements of his personal views: in fact, whenever he is adding anything in the shape of a commentary or a

Historians must be practical men.

Timaeus on Ephorus.

[1] Homer, *Odyss.* 1, 1-4; 8, 183.
[2] *Republic*, v. 473 C. vi. 499 B.

note. And it so happens that his most elegant and convincing digression is on this very subject of a comparison between historians and speech-writers. But Timaeus is anxious not to be thought to follow Ephorus. Therefore, in addition to misrepresenting him and condemning the rest, he enters upon a long, confused, and in every way inferior, discussion of what had been already sufficiently handled by others; and expected that no one living would detect him.

(*a*) However, he wished to exalt history; and, in order to do so, he says that "history differs from rhetorical composition as much as real buildings differ from those represented in scene-paintings." And again, that "to collect the necessary materials for writing history is by itself more laborious than the whole process of producing rhetorical compositions." He mentions, for instance, the expense and labour which he underwent in collecting records from Assyria, and in studying the customs of the Ligures, Celts, and Iberians. But he exaggerates these so much, that he could not have himself expected to be believed. One would be glad to ask the historian which of the two he thinks is the more expensive and laborious,—to remain quietly at home and collect records and study the customs of Ligures and Celts, or to obtain personal experience of all the tribes possible, and see them with his own eyes? To ask questions about manœuvres on the field of battle and the sieges of cities and fights at sea from those who were present, or to take personal part in the dangers and vicissitudes of these operations as they occur? For my part I do not think that real buildings differ so much from those in stage-scenery, nor history from rhetorical compositions, as a narrative drawn from actual and personal experience differs from one derived from hearsay and the report of others. But Timaeus had no such experience: and he therefore naturally supposed that the part of an historian's labour which is the least important and lightest, that namely of collecting records and making inquiries from those who had knowledge of the several events, was in reality the most important and most difficult. And, indeed, in this particular department of research, men who have had no personal experience must necessarily fall into grave errors. For how is a

man, who has no knowledge of such things, to put the right questions as to manœuvering of troops, sieges of cities, and fights at sea? And how can he understand the details of what is told him? Indeed, the questioner is as important as the narrator for getting a clear story. For in the case of men who have had experience of real action, memory is a sufficient guide from point to point of a narrative: but a man who has had no such experience can neither put the right questions, nor understand what is happening before his eyes. Though he is on the spot, in fact, he is as good as absent. . . .

BOOK XIII

THE AETOLIANS

1. From the unbroken continuity of their wars, and the extravagance of their daily lives, the Aetolians became involved in debt, not only without others noticing it, but without being sensible of it themselves. Being therefore naturally disposed to a change in their constitution, they elected Dorimachus and Scopas to draw out a code of laws, because they saw that they were not only innovators by disposition, but were themselves deeply involved in private debt. These men accordingly were admitted to the office and drew up the laws. . . .

Straitened finances in Aetolia cause a revolution, B.C. 204.

When they produced them they were opposed by Alexander of Aetolia, who tried to show by many instances that innovation was a dangerous growth which could not be checked, and invariably ended by inflicting grave evils upon those who fostered it. He urged them therefore not to look solely to the exigencies of the hour, and the relief from their existing contracts, but to the future also. For it was a strange inconsistency to be ready to forfeit their very lives in war to preserve their children, and yet in their deliberations to be entirely careless of the future. . . .

2. Having failed to obtain the office, for the sake of which he had had the boldness to draw up these laws, Scopas turned his hopes to Alexandria, in the expectation of finding means there of restoring his broken fortunes, and satisfying to a fuller extent his grasping spirit. He little knew that it is impossible to assuage the ever-rising desires of the soul without correcting this passion by reason, any more than it is to stay or quench

Scopas goes to Egypt. See 16, 18-19; 18, 53.

the thirst of the dropsical body by supplying it with drink, without radically restoring its healthy condition. Scopas, indeed, is a conspicuous example of this truth; for though on his arrival at Alexandria, in addition to his military pay, which he possessed independently as commander-in-chief, the king assigned him ten minae a day, and one mina a day to those next him in rank, still he was not satisfied; but continued to demand more, until he disgusted his paymasters by his cupidity, and lost his life and his gold together.

PHILIP'S TREACHEROUS CONDUCT, B.C. 204

3. Philip now entered upon a course of treachery which no one would venture to say was worthy of a king; but which some would defend on the ground of its necessity in the conduct of public affairs, owing to the prevailing bad faith of the time. For the ancients, so far from using a fraudulent policy towards their friends, were scrupulous even as to using it to conquer their enemies; because they did not regard a success as either glorious or secure, which was not obtained by such a victory in the open field as served to break the confidence of their enemies. They therefore came to a mutual understanding not to use hidden weapons against each other, nor such as could be projected from a distance; and held the opinion that the only genuine decision was that arrived at by a battle fought at close quarters, foot to foot with the enemy. It was for this reason also that it was their custom mutually to proclaim their wars, and give notice of battles, naming time and place at which they meant to be in order of battle. But nowadays people say that it is the mark of an inferior general to perform any operation of war openly. Some slight trace, indeed, of the old-fashioned morality still lingers among the Romans; for they do proclaim their wars, and make sparing use of ambuscades, and fight their battles hand to hand and foot to foot. So much for the unnecessary amount of artifice which it is the fashion for commanders in our days to employ both in politics and war.

4. Philip gave Heracleides a kind of problem to work out, —how to circumvent and destroy the Rhodian fleet. At the

same time he sent envoys to Crete to excite and provoke them to go to war with the Rhodians. Heracleides, who was a born traitor, looked upon the commission as the very thing to suit his plans; and after revolving various methods in his mind, presently started and sailed to Rhodes. He was by origin a Tarentine, of a low family of mechanics, and he had many qualities which fitted him for bold and unscrupulous undertakings. His boyhood had been stained by notorious immorality; he had great acuteness and a retentive memory; in the presence of the vulgar no one could be more bullying and audacious; to those in high position no one more insinuating and servile. He had been originally banished from his native city from a suspicion of being engaged in an intrigue to hand over Tarentum to the Romans: not that he had any political influence, but being an architect, and employed in some repairs of the walls, he got possession of the keys of the gate on the landward side of the town. He thereupon fled for his life to the Romans. From them, being detected in making communications by letters and messages with Tarentum and Hannibal, he again fled for fear of consequences to Philip. With him he obtained so much credit and influence that he eventually was the most powerful element in the overthrow of that great monarchy.

Philip employs Heracleides of Tarentum.

5. The Prytanies of Rhodes were now distrustful of Philip, owing to his treacherous policy in Crete,[1] and they began to suspect that Heracleides was his agent. . . .

But Heracleides came before them and explained the reasons which had caused him to fly from Philip. . . .

The false pretences of Heracleides at Rhodes.

Philip was anxious above everything that the Rhodians should not discover his purpose in these transactions; whereby he succeeded in freeing Heracleides from suspicion. . . .

Nature, as it seems to me, has ordained that Truth should be a most mighty goddess among men, and has endowed her with extraordinary power. At least, I notice that though at times everything combines to

Magna est veritas.

[1] The Rhodians had proclaimed war against the Cretan pirates. Philip had secretly commissioned one of his agents, the Aetolian Dicaearchus, to aid the Cretans. Diodor. fr. xxviii.

crush her, and every kind of specious argument is on the side of falsehood, she somehow or another insinuates herself by her own intrinsic virtue into the souls of men. Sometimes she displays her power at once; and sometimes, though obscured for a length of time, she at last prevails and overpowers falsehood. Such was the case with Heracleides when he came from king Philip to Rhodes.[1] . . .

Damocles, who was sent with Pythio as a spy upon the Romans, was a person of ability, and possessed of many endowments fitting him for the conduct of affairs. . . .

NABIS, TYRANT OF SPARTA, B.C. 207-192

6. Nabis, tyrant of Sparta, being now in the third year of his reign, ventured upon no undertaking of importance, owing to the recent defeat of Machanidas by the Achaeans; but employed himself in laying the foundations of a long and grinding tyranny. He destroyed the last remains of the old Spartan nobles; drove into banishment all men eminent for wealth or ancestral glory; and distributed their property and wives among the chief men of those who remained, or among his own mercenary soldiers. These last were composed of murderers, housebreakers, footpads, and burglars. For this was, generally speaking, the class of men which he collected out of all parts of the world, whose own country was closed to them owing to their crimes and felonies. As he put himself forward as the patron and king of such wretches, and employed them as attendants and bodyguards, there is evidently no cause for surprise that his impious character and reign should have been long remembered. For, besides this, he was not content with driving the citizens into banishment, but took care no place should be secure, and no refuge safe for the exiles. Some he caused to be pursued and killed on the road, while others he dragged from their place of retreat and murdered. Finally, in the cities where they were living, he hired the houses next door to these banished men,

The character of Nabis's tyranny.

[1] Heracleides having gained credence at Rhodes by pretending to betray Philip's intrigue with the Cretans, waited for an opportunity, and, setting fire to their arsenal, escaped in a boat. Polyaen. 5, 17, 2.

wherever they might be, by means of agents who were not suspected; and then sent Cretans into these houses, who made breaches in the party walls, and through them, or through such windows as already existed, shot down the exiles as they stood or lay down in their own houses; so that there was no place of retreat, and no moment of security for the unfortunate Lacedaemonians.

7. When he had by these means put the greater number of them out of the way, he next had constructed a kind of machine, if machine it may be called, which was the figure of a woman, clothed in costly garments, and made to resemble with extraordinary fidelity the wife of Nabis. Whenever then he summoned one of the citizens with a view of getting some money from him, he used first to employ a number of arguments politely expressed, pointing out the danger in which the city stood from the threatening attitude of the Achaeans, and explaining what a number of mercenaries he had to support for their security, and the expenses which fell upon him for the maintenance of the national religion and the needs of the State. If the listeners gave in he was satisfied; but if they ever refused to comply with his demand, he would say, "Perhaps I cannot persuade you, but I think this lady Apéga will succeed in doing so." Apéga was the name of his wife. Immediately on his saying these words, the figure I have described was brought in. As soon as the man offered his hand to the supposed lady to raise her from her seat, the figure threw its arms round him and began drawing him by degrees towards its breasts. Now its arms, hands, and breasts were full of iron spikes under its clothes. When the tyrant pressed his hands on the back of the figure, and then by means of the works dragged the man by degrees closer and closer to its breasts, he forced him under this torture to say anything. A good number of men who refused his demands he destroyed in this way.[1]

Nabis's wife.

8. The rest of his conduct was on a par with this beginning. He made common cause with the Cretan pirates, and kept temple-breakers, highway-robbers, and

The beginning of the war between

[1] The text of these last sentences is so corrupt that it is impossible to be sure of having rightly represented the meaning of Polybius.

Nabis and the Achaeans.

murderers all over the Peloponnese; and as he shared in the profits of their nefarious trades, he allowed them to use Sparta as their base of operations. Moreover, about this time some visitors from Boeotia, who happened to be staying at Lacedaemon, enticed one of his grooms to make off with them, taking a certain white horse which was considered the finest in the royal stud. They were pursued by a party sent by Nabis as far as Megalopolis, where the tyrants found the horse and groom, and took them off without any one interfering. But they then laid hands on the Boeotians, who at first demanded to be taken before the magistrate; but as no attention was paid to the demand, one of them shouted out "Help!" Upon a crowd of the people of the place collecting and protesting that the men should be taken before the magistrate, Nabis's party were obliged to let them go and retire. Nabis, however, had been long looking out for a ground of complaint and a reasonable pretext for a quarrel, and having seized on this one, he harried the cattle belonging to Proagoras and some others; which was a commencement of the war.[1] . . .

ANTIOCHUS IN ARABIA, B.C. 205-204

9. Labae, like Sabae, is a city of Chattenia, which is a territory of the Gerraei. . . . In other respects, Chattenia is a rugged country, but the wealth of the Gerraei who inhabit it has adorned it with villages and towers. It lies along the Arabian Sea, and Antiochus gave orders to spare it. . . .

In a letter to Antiochus the Gerraei demanded that he should not destroy what the gods had given them—perpetual peace and freedom; and this letter having been interpreted to him he granted the request. . . .

Their freedom having been confirmed to the Gerraei, they presented King Antiochus at once with five hundred talents of silver, one thousand of frankincense, and two hundred of oil of cinnamon, called stacte, all of them spices of the country on the Arabian Sea. He then sailed to the island of Tylos, and thence to Seleucia. . . .

[1] These raids on the territory of Megalopolis, however, did not lead to open war till B.C. 202. See 16, 16.

BOOK XIV

PREFACE

PERHAPS a *resumé* of events in each Olympiad may arrest the attention of my readers both by their number and importance, the transactions in every part of the world being brought under one view. However, I think the events of this Olympiad especially will do so; because in it the wars in Italy and Libya came to an end; and I cannot imagine any one not caring to inquire what sort of catastrophe and conclusion they had. For everybody, though extremely interested in details and particulars, naturally longs to be told the end of a story. I may add that it was in this period also that the kings gave the clearest indication of their character and policy. For what was only rumour in regard to them before was now become a matter of clear and universal knowledge, even to those who did not care to take part in public business. Therefore, as I wished to make my narrative worthy of its subject, I have not, as in former instances, included the history of two years in one book. . . .

144th Olympiad, B.C. 204-200.

Elected Consul for B.C. 205 (*see* 11, 33) *Scipio had Sicily assigned as his* provincia, *with leave to cross to Africa if necessary* (*Livy*, 28, 45). *He sent Laelius to Africa in* B.C. 205, *but remained himself in Sicily. Next spring* (B.C. 204) *he crossed to Africa with a year's additional imperium. In the course of this year he ravaged the Carthaginian territory and besieged Utica* (*Livy*, 29, 35), *and at the beginning of* B.C. 203 *his imperium was prolonged till he should have finished the war* (*id.* 30, 1).

1. While the Consuls were thus engaged,[1] Scipio in Libya

[1] Caepio was commanding in Bruttium, Servilius in Etruria and Liguria. Livy, 30, 1.

learnt during the winter that the Carthaginians were fitting out a fleet; he therefore devoted himself to similar preparations as well as to pressing on the siege of Utica. He did not, however, give up all hopes of Syphax; but as their forces were not far apart he kept sending messages to him, convinced that he would be able to detach him from the Carthaginians. He still cherished the belief that Syphax was getting tired of the girl[1] for whose sake he had joined the Carthaginians, and of his alliance with the Punic people generally; for the Numidians, he knew, were naturally quick to feel satiety, and constant neither to gods nor men. Scipio's mind, however, was distracted with various anxieties, and his prospects were far from seeming secure to him; for he shrank from an engagement in the open field on account of the enemy's great superiority in numbers. He therefore seized an opportunity which now presented itself. Some of his messengers to Syphax reported to him that the Carthaginians had constructed their huts in their winter camp of various kinds of wood and boughs without any earth; while the old army of the Numidians made theirs of reeds, and the reinforcements which were now coming in from the neighbouring townships constructed theirs of boughs only, some of them inside the trench and palisade, but the greater number outside. Scipio therefore made up his mind that the manner of attacking them, which would be most unexpected by the enemy and most successful for himself, would be by fire. He therefore turned his attention to organising such an attack. Now, in his communications with Scipio, Syphax was continually harping upon his proposal that the Carthaginians should evacuate Italy and the Romans Libya; and that the possessions held by either between these two countries should remain in *statu quo*. Hitherto Scipio had refused to listen to this suggestion, but he now gave Syphax a hint by the mouth of his messengers that the course he wished to see followed was not impossible. Greatly elated at this, Syphax became much bolder than before in his communications with Scipio;

B.C. 203. Cn. Servilius Caepio, C. Servilius Geminus Coss. Livy, 30, 1.

The proposal of Syphax.

[1] Sophanisba, the daughter of Hasdrubal son of Gesco. Livy, 29, 23; 30, 12, 15.

the numbers of the messengers sent backwards and forwards, and the frequency of their visits, were redoubled; and they sometimes even stayed several days in each other's camps without any thought of precaution. On these occasions Scipio always took care to send, with the envoys, some men of tried experience or of military knowledge, dressed up as slaves in rough and common clothes, that they might examine and investigate in security the approaches and entrances to both the entrenchments. For there were two camps, one that of Hasdrubal, containing thirty thousand infantry and three thousand cavalry; and another about ten stades distant from it of the Numidians, containing ten thousand cavalry and about fifty thousand infantry. The latter was the easier of approach, and its huts were well calculated for being set on fire, because, as I said before, the Numidians had not made theirs of timber and earth, but used simply reeds and thatch in their construction.

2. By the beginning of spring Scipio had completed the reconnaissances necessary for this attempt upon the enemy; and he began launching his ships, and getting the engines on them into working order, as though with the purpose of assaulting Utica by sea. With his land forces he once more occupied the high ground overlooking the town, and carefully fortified it and secured it by trenches. He wished the enemy to believe that he was doing this for the sake of carrying on the siege; but he really meant it as a cover for his men, who were to be engaged in the undertaking described above, to prevent the garrison sallying out, when the legions were separated from their lines, assaulting the palisade which was so near to them, and attacking the division left in charge of it. Whilst in the midst of these preparations, he sent to Syphax inquiring whether, "in case he agreed to his proposals, the Carthaginians would assent, and not say again that they would deliberate on the terms?" He ordered these legates at the same time not to return to him, until they had received an answer on these points. When the envoys arrived, the Numidian king was convinced that Scipio was on the point of concluding the agreement, partly from the fact that the ambassadors said that they would not go away until they got his answer, and partly

Spring of B.C. 203.

because of the anxiety expressed as to the disposition of the Carthaginians. He therefore sent immediately to Hasdrubal, stating the facts and urging him to accept the peace. Meanwhile he neglected all precautions himself, and allowed the Numidians, who were now joining, to pitch their tents where they were, outside the lines. Scipio in appearance acted in the same way, while in reality he was pushing on his preparations with the utmost care. When a message was returned from the Carthaginians bidding Syphax complete the treaty of peace, the Numidian king, in a state of great exaltation, communicated the news to the envoys; who immediately departed to their own camp to inform Scipio from the king of what had been done. As soon as he heard it, the Roman general at once sent fresh envoys to inform Syphax that Scipio was quite satisfied and was anxious for the peace; but that the members of his council differed from him, and held that they should remain as they were. The ambassadors duly arrived and informed the Numidians of this. Scipio sent this mission to avoid the appearance of a breach of truce, if he should perform any act of hostility while negotiations for peace were still going on between the parties. He considered that, by making this statement, he would be free to act in whatever way he chose without laying himself open to blame.

Scipio's ruse to deceive Syphax.

3. Syphax's annoyance at this message was great, in proportion to the hopes he had previously entertained of making the peace. He had an interview with Hasdrubal, and told him of the message he had received from the Romans; but though they deliberated long and earnestly as to what they ought to do, they neither had any idea or conjecture as to what was really going to happen. For they had no anticipation whatever as to the need of taking precautions, or of any danger threatening them, but were all eagerness and excitement to strike some blow, and thus provoke the enemy to descend into the level ground. Meanwhile Scipio allowed his army generally, by the preparations he was making and the orders he was issuing, to imagine that his aim was the capture of Utica; but summoning the most able and trusty Tribunes at noon, he im-

Scipio discloses his project.

parted to them his design, and ordered them to cause their men to get their supper early, and then to lead the legions outside the camp as soon as the buglers gave the usual signal by a simultaneous blast of their bugles. For it is a custom in the Roman army for the trumpeters and buglers to sound a call near the commander's tent at supper time, that the night pickets may then take up their proper positions. Scipio next summoned the spies whom he had sent at different times to reconnoitre the enemy's quarters, and carefully compared and studied the accounts they gave about the roads leading to the hostile camps and the entrances to them, employing Massanissa to criticise their words and assist him with his advice, because he was acquainted with the locality.

4. Everything being prepared for his expedition, Scipio left a sufficiently strong guard in the camp, and got the rest of the men on the march towards the end of the first watch, the enemy being about sixty stades distant. Arrived in the neighbourhood of the enemy, about the end of the third watch, he assigned to Gaius Laelius and Massanissa half his Roman soldiers and all his Numidians, with orders to attack the camp of Syphax, urging them to quit themselves like brave men and do nothing carelessly; with the clear understanding that, as the darkness hindered and prevented the use of the eyes, a night attack required all the more the assistance of a cool head and a firm heart. The rest of the army he took the command of in person, and led against Hasdrubal. He had calculated on not beginning his assault until Laelius's division had set fire to the enemy's huts; he therefore proceeded slowly. The latter meanwhile advanced in two divisions, which attacked the enemy simultaneously. The construction of the huts being as though purposely contrived to be susceptible of a conflagration, as I have already explained, as soon as the front rank men began to set light to them, the fire caught all the first row of huts fiercely, and soon got beyond all control, from the closeness of the huts to each other, and the amount of combustible material which they contained. Laelius remained in the rear as a reserve; but Massanissa, knowing the localities through which those who fled from the fire would be sure to retreat, stationed his

Destruction of the camp of Syphax by C. Laelius and Massanissa,

own soldiers at those spots. Not a single Numidian had any suspicion of the true state of the case, not even Syphax himself; but thinking that it was a mere accidental conflagration of the rampart, some of them started unsuspiciously out of bed, others sprang out of their tents in the midst of a carouse and with the cup actually at their lips. The result was that numbers of them got trampled to death by their own friends at the exits from the camp; many were caught by the flames and burnt to death; while all those who escaped the flame fell into the hands of the enemy, and were killed, without knowing what was happening to them or what they were doing.

and of Hasdrubal.

5. At the same time the Carthaginians, observing the proportions of the conflagration and the hugeness of the flame that was rising, imagined that the Numidian camp had been accidentally set on fire. Some of them therefore started at once to render assistance, and all the rest hurried outside their own camp unarmed, and stood there gazing in astonishment at the spectacle. Everything having thus succeeded to his best wishes, Scipio fell upon these men outside their camp, and either put them to the sword, or, driving them back into the camp, set fire to their huts. The disaster of the Punic army was thus very like that which had just befallen the Numidians, fire and sword in both cases combining to destroy them. Hasdrubal immediately gave up all idea of combating the fire, for he knew from the coincidence of the two that the fire in the Numidian camp was not accidental, as he had supposed, but had originated from some desperate design of the enemy. He therefore turned his attention to saving his own life, although there was now little hope left of doing so. For the fire was spreading rapidly and was catching everywhere; while the camp gangways were full of horses, beasts of burden, and men, some of them half dead and devoured by the fire, and others in a state of such frantic terror and mad excitement that they prevented any attempts at making a defence, and by the utter tumult and confusion which they created rendered all chance of escape hopeless. The case of Syphax was the same as that of Hasdrubal, as it was also that

of the other officers. The two former, however, did manage to escape, accompanied by a few horsemen: but all those myriads of men, horses, and beasts of burden, either met a miserable and pitiable death from the fire, or, if they escaped the violence of that, some of the men perished ignominiously at the hands of the enemy, cut down naked and defenceless, not only without their arms, but without so much as their clothes to cover them. The whole place was filled with yells of pain, confused cries, terror, and unspeakable din, mingled with a conflagration which spread rapidly and blazed with the utmost fierceness. It was the combination and suddenness of these horrors that made them so awful, any one of which by itself would have been sufficient to strike terror into the hearts of men. It is accordingly impossible for the imagination to exaggerate the dreadful scene, so completely did it surpass in horror everything hitherto recorded. Of all the brilliant achievements of Scipio this appears to me to have been the most brilliant and the most daring. . . .

6. When day broke, and he found the enemy either killed or in headlong flight, Scipio exhorted his Tribunes to activity, and at once started in pursuit. At first the Carthaginian general seemed inclined to stand his ground, though told of Scipio's approach, trusting in the strength of the town [of Anda]; but when he saw that the inhabitants were in a mutinous state, he shrank from meeting the attack of Scipio, and fled with the relics of his army, which consisted of as many as five hundred cavalry and about two thousand infantry. The inhabitants of the town thereupon submitted unconditionally to the Romans, and were spared by Scipio, who, however, gave up two neighbouring towns to the legions to plunder. This being done he returned to his original entrenchment. Baffled in the hopes which they had entertained of the course which the campaign would take, the Carthaginians were deeply depressed. They had expected to shut up the Romans on the promontory near Utica, which had been the site of their winter quarters, and besiege them there with their army and fleet both by sea and land. With this view all their preparations had been made; and when they

Hasdrubal at Anda, see Appian, 8, 24.

Dismay at Carthage.

saw, quite contrary to their calculations, that they were not only driven from the open country by the enemy, but were in hourly expectation of an attack upon themselves and their city, they became completely disheartened and panic-stricken. Their circumstances, however, admitted of no delay. They were compelled at once to take precautions and adopt some measures for the future. But the senate was filled with doubt and varied and confused suggestions. Some said that they ought to send for Hannibal and recall him from Italy, their one hope of safety being now centred in that general and his forces. Others were for an embassy to Scipio to obtain a truce and discuss with him the terms of a pacification and treaty.

The Senate, however, resolves to continue their resistance.

Others again were for keeping up their courage and collecting their forces, and sending a message to Syphax; who, they said, was at the neighbouring town of Abba, engaged in collecting the remnants of his army. This last suggestion was the one which ultimately prevailed. The Government of Carthage accordingly set about collecting troops, and sent a despatch to Syphax begging him to support them and abide by his original policy, as a general with an army would presently join him.

7. Meanwhile the Roman commander was pressing on the seige of Utica. But when he heard that Syphax was still in position, and that the Carthaginians were once more collecting an army, he led out his forces and pitched his camp close under the walls of Utica. At the same time he divided the booty among the soldiers. . . .[1] The merchants who purchased them from the soldiers went away with very profitable bargains; for the recent victory inspired the soldiers with high hopes of a successful conclusion of the campaign, and they therefore thought little of the spoils already obtained, and made no difficulties in selling them to the merchants.

Syphax is persuaded by Sophanisba to stand by the Carthaginians still.

The Numidian king and his friends were at first minded to continue their retreat to their own land. But while deliberating on this, certain Celtiberes, over four thousand in number, who had been hired as soldiers by the Carthaginians, arrived in the vicinity of Abba. Encouraged by this addi-

[1] Some words are lost from the text.

tional strength the Numidians stopped on their retreat. And when the young lady, who was daughter of Hasdrubal and wife of Syphax, added her earnest entreaties that he would remain and not abandon the Carthaginians at such a crisis, the Numidian king gave way and consented to her prayer. The approach of these Celtiberes did a great deal also to encourage the hopes of the Carthaginians: for instead of four thousand, it was reported at Carthage that they were ten thousand, and that their bravery and the excellency of their arms made them irresistible in the field. Excited by this rumour, and by the boastful talk which was current among the common people, the Carthaginians felt their resolution to once more take the field redoubled. And finally, within thirty days, they pitched a camp in conjunction with the Numidians and Celtiberes on what are called the Great Plains, with an army amounting to no less than thirty thousand.

The Carthaginians again take the field.

8. When news of these proceedings reached the Roman camp Scipio immediately determined to attack. Leaving orders, therefore, to the army and navy, which were besieging Utica, as to what they were to do, he started with all his army in light marching order. On the fifth day he reached the Great Plains, and during the first day after his arrival encamped on a piece of rising ground about thirty stades from the enemy. Next day he descended into the plain and drew up his army[1] at a distance of seven stades from the enemy, with his cavalry forming an advanced guard. After skirmishing attacks carried on by both sides during the next two days, on the fourth both armies were deliberately brought out into position and drawn up in order of battle. Scipio followed exactly the Roman system, stationing the maniples of hastati in the front, behind them the principes, and lastly the triarii in the rear. Of his cavalry he stationed the Italians on the right wing, the Numidians and Massanissa on the left. Syphax and Hasdrubal

The battle on the Great Plains. 24th June, B.C. 203.

[1] παρενέβαλλε, which Schweig. translates *castra locavit:* but though the word does sometimes bear that meaning, I cannot think that it does so here. Scipio seems to have retained his camp on the hill, only two and a half miles' distant, and to have come down into the plain to offer battle each of the three days. Hence the imperfect.

stationed the Celtiberes in the centre opposite the Roman cohorts, the Numidians on the left, and the Carthaginians on the right. At the very first charge the Numidians reeled before the Italian cavalry, and the Carthaginians before those under Massanissa; for their many previous defeats had completely demoralised them. But the Celtiberes fought gallantly, for they had no hope of saving themselves by flight, being entirely unacquainted with the country; nor any expectation of being spared if they were taken prisoners on account of their perfidy to Scipio: for they were regarded as having acted in defiance of justice and of their treaty in coming to aid the Carthaginians against the Romans, though they had never suffered any act of hostility at Scipio's hands during the campaigns in Iberia. When, however, the two wings gave way these men were surrounded by the principes and triarii, and cut to pieces on the field almost to a man. Thus perished the Celtiberes, who yet did very effective service to the Carthaginians, not only during the whole battle, but during the retreat also; for, if it had not been for the hindrance caused by them, the Romans would have pressed the fugitives closely, and very few of the enemy would have escaped. As it was, owing to the delay caused by these men, Syphax and his cavalry effected their retreat to his own kingdom in safety; while Hasdrubal with the survivors of his army did the same to Carthage.

The Roman wings are both victorious.

The Celtiberes, on the centre, are cut to pieces after a gallant resistance.

Syphax and Hasdrubal escape.

9. After making the necessary arrangements as to the booty and prisoners, Scipio summoned a council of war to consult as to what to do next. It was resolved that Scipio himself and one part of the army should stay in the country and visit the various towns; while Laelius and Massanissa, with the Numidians and the rest of the Roman legions, should pursue Syphax and give him no time to deliberate or make any preparations. This being settled the commanders separated; the two latter going with their division in pursuit of Syphax, Scipio on a round of the townships. Some of these were terrified into a voluntary submission to the Romans,

Scipio receives the submission of the country, while Laelius goes in pursuit of Syphax.

others he promptly took by assault. The whole country was ripe for a change, owing to the constant series of miseries and contributions, under which it had been groaning from the protracted wars in Iberia.

A panic at Carthage.

In Carthage meanwhile, where the panic had been great enough before, a still wilder state of excitement prevailed, after this second disaster, and the disappointment of the hopes of success which they had entertained. However, those of the counsellors who claimed the highest character for courage urged that they should go on board their ships and attack the besiegers of Utica, try to raise the blockade, and engage the enemy at sea, who were not in a forward state of preparation in that department; that they should recall Hannibal, and without delay test to the utmost this one more chance: for both these measures offered great and reasonable opportunities of securing their safety. Others declared that their circumstances no longer admitted of these measures: what they had to do was to fortify their town and prepare to stand a siege; for chance would give them many occasions of striking a successful blow if they only held together. At the same time they advised that they should deliberate on coming to terms and making a treaty, and see on what conditions and by what means they might extricate themselves from the danger. After a long debate, all these proposals were adopted together.

10. Upon this decision being come to, those who were to sail to Italy went straight from the council chamber to the sea, while the Navarch went to prepare the ships. The rest began to take measures for securing the city, and remained in constant consultation on the measures necessary for the purpose.

Meanwhile Scipio's camp was getting gorged with booty; for he found no one to resist him, and everybody yielded to his attacks. He therefore determined to despatch the greater part of the booty to his original camp; while he advanced with his army in light marching order to seize the entrenchment near Tunes, and pitched his camp within the view of the inhabitants of Carthage, thinking that this would do more than anything else to strike terror into their hearts and lower their courage.

The Carthaginians had in a few days manned and provisioned their ships, and were engaged in getting under sail and carrying out their plan of operations, when Scipio arrived at Tunes, and, the garrison flying at his approach, occupied the town, which is about a hundred stades from Carthage, of remarkable strength both natural and artificial, and visible from nearly every point of Carthage.

Scipio recalled to Utica by the fear of an attack upon his fleet.

Just as the Romans pitched their camp there, the Carthaginians were putting out to sea on board their ships to sail to Utica. Seeing the enemy thus putting out, and fearing some misfortune to his own fleet, Scipio was rendered exceedingly anxious, because no one there was prepared for such an attack, or had anything in readiness to meet the danger. He therefore broke up his camp and marched back in haste to support his men. There he found his decked ships thoroughly well fitted out for raising siege-engines and applying them to walls, and generally for all purposes of an assault upon a town, but not in the least in the trim for a sea-fight; while the enemy's fleet had been under process of rigging for this purpose the whole winter. He therefore gave up all idea of putting to sea to meet the enemy and accepting battle there; but anchoring his decked ships side by side he moored the transports round them, three or four deep; and then, taking down the masts and yard-arms, he lashed the vessels together firmly by means of these, keeping a space between each sufficient to enable the light craft to sail in and out. . . .

PTOLEMY PHILOPATOR, B.C. 222-205

11. Philo was a parasite of Agathocles, the son of Oenanthe, and the friend of king Philopator. . . .

The extraordinary influence of women of low character at Alexandria.

Many statues of Cleino, the girl who acted as cupbearer to Ptolemy Philadelphus, were set up at Alexandria, draped in a single tunic and holding a cup in the hands. And are not the most splendid houses there those which go by the names of Murtium, Mnesis, and Pothine? And yet Mnesis was a flute-girl, as was Pothine, and Murtium was a

public prostitute. And was not Agathocleia, the mistress of king Ptolemy Philopator, an influential personage,—she who was the ruin of the whole kingdom? . . .

12. The question may be asked, perhaps, why I have chosen to give a sketch of Egyptian history here, going back a considerable period; whereas, in the case of the rest of my history, I have recorded the events of each year in the several countries side by side? I have done so for the following reasons: Ptolemy Philopator, of whom I am now speaking, after the conclusion of the war for the possession of Coele-Syria,[1] abandoned all noble pursuits and gave himself up to the life of debauchery which I have just described. But late in life he was compelled by circumstances to engage in the war I have mentioned,[2] which, over and above the mutual cruelty and lawlessness with which it was conducted, witnessed neither pitched battle, sea fight, siege, or anything else worth recording. I thought, therefore, that it would be easier for me as a writer, and more intelligible to my readers, if I did not touch upon everything year by year as it occurred, or give a full account of transactions which were insignificant and undeserving of serious attention; but should once for all sum up and describe the character and policy of this king.

The feeble character of Ptolemy Philopator.

[1] The war with Antiochus, B.C. 218-217. See 5, 40, 58-71, 79-87.

[2] A civil war, apparently in a rebellion caused by his own feeble and vicious character. It seems to be that referred to in 5, 107.

BOOK XV

A slight success on the part of the Carthaginian fleet at Utica (14, 10) *had been more than outweighed by the capture of Syphax by Laelius* [*Livy*, 30, 11]. *Negotiations for peace followed, and an armistice, in the course of which occurred the incident referred to in the first extract of this book.*

1. The Carthaginians having seized the transports as prizes of war, and with them an extraordinary quantity of provisions, Scipio was extremely enraged, not so much at the loss of the provisions, as by the fact that the enemy had thereby obtained a vast supply of necessaries; and still more at the Carthaginians having violated the sworn articles of truce, and commenced the war afresh. He therefore at once selected Lucius Sergius, Lucius Baebius, and Lucius Fabius to go to Carthage, to remonstrate on what had taken place, and at the same time to announce that the Roman people had ratified the treaty; for he had lately received a despatch from home to that effect. Upon their arrival in Carthage these envoys first had an audience of the Senate, and then were introduced to a meeting of the people. On both occasions they spoke with great freedom on the situation of affairs, reminding their hearers that "Their ambassadors who had come to the Roman camp at Tunes, on being admitted to the council of officers, had not been content with appealing to the gods and kissing the ground, as other people do, but had thrown themselves upon the earth, and in abject humiliation had kissed the feet of the assembled officers; and then, rising

Some transports under Cn. Octavius wrecked in the Bay of Carthage, and taken possession of by the Carthaginians in spite of the truce. Autumn of B.C. 203. See Livy, 30, 24.

Speech of the Roman envoys.

from the ground, had reproached themselves for breaking the existing treaty between the Romans and Carthaginians, and acknowledged that they deserved every severity at the hands of the Romans; but intreated to be spared the last severities, from a regard to the vicissitudes of human fortune, for their folly would be the means of displaying the generosity of the Romans. Remembering all this, the general and the officers then present in the council were at a loss to understand what had encouraged them to forget what they then said, and to venture to break their sworn articles of agreement. Plainly it was this—they trusted in Hannibal and the forces that had arrived with him. But they were very ill advised. All the world knew that he and his army had been driven these two years past from every port of Italy, and had retreated into the neighbourhood of the Lacinian promontory, where they had been so closely shut up and almost besieged, that they had barely been able to get safe away home. Not that, even if they had come back," he added, "as conquerors, and were minded to engage us who have already defeated you in two consecutive battles, ought you to entertain any doubt as to the result, or to speculate on the chance of victory. The certainty of defeat were a better subject for your reflections: and when that takes place, what are the gods that you will summon to your aid? And what arguments will you use to move the pity of the victors for your misfortunes? You must needs expect to be debarred from all hope of mercy from gods and men alike by your perfidy and folly."

Hannibal leaves Italy, 23d June, B.C. 203.

2. After delivering this speech the envoys retired. Some few of the citizens were against breaking the treaty; but the majority, both of the politicians and the Senate, were much annoyed by its terms, and irritated by the plain speaking of the envoys; and, moreover, could not make up their minds to surrender the captured transports and the provisions which were on board them. But their main motive was a confident hope that they might yet conquer by means of Hannibal. The people therefore voted to dismiss the envoys without an answer. Moreover, the political party, whose aim it was to

Treacherous attempt on the lives of the Roman envoys.

bring on the war at all hazards, held a meeting and arranged the following act of treachery. They gave out that it was necessary to make provision for conducting the envoys back to their camp in safety. They therefore at once caused two triremes to be got ready to convoy them; but at the same time sent a message to the Navarch Hasdrubal to have some vessels ready at no great distance from the Roman camp, in order that, as soon as the convoys had taken leave of the Roman envoys, he might bear down upon their ships and sink them; for the Carthaginian fleet was stationed at the time close under Utica. Having made this arrangement with Hasdrubal, they despatched the envoys, with instructions to the officers of the convoys to leave them and return, as soon as they had passed the mouth of the River Macara; for it was from this point that the enemy's camp came into sight. Therefore, according to their instructions, as soon as they had passed this point, the officers of the convoys made signs of farewell to the Roman envoys and returned. Lucius and his colleagues suspected no danger, and felt no other annoyance at this proceeding than as regarding it as a mark of disrespect. But no sooner were they left thus alone, than three Carthaginian vessels suddenly started out to attack them, and came up with the Roman quinquereme. They failed, indeed, to stave her in, because she evaded them; nor did they succeed in boarding her, because the men resisted them with great spirit. But they ran up alongside of the vessel, and kept attacking her at various points, and managed to wound the marines with their darts and kill a considerable number of them; until at last the Romans, observing that their forage parties along the shore were rushing down to the beach to their assistance, ran their ships upon land. Most of the marines were killed, but the envoys had the unexpected good fortune to escape with their lives.

Renewal of hostilities.

3. This was the signal for the recommencement of the war in a fiercer and more angry spirit than before. The Romans on their part, looking upon themselves as having been treated with perfidy, were possessed with a furious determination to conquer the Carthaginians; while the latter, conscious of the consequences of what they had done, were ready to go all lengths to avoid

falling under the power of the enemy. With such feelings animating both sides, it was quite evident that the result would have to be decided on the field of battle. Consequently everybody, not only in Italy and Libya, but in Iberia, Sicily, and Sardinia, was in a state of excited expectation, watching with conflicting feelings to see what would happen. But meanwhile Hannibal, finding himself too weak in cavalry, sent to a certain Numidian named Tychaeus, who was a friend of Syphax, and was reputed to possess the most warlike cavalry in Libya, urging him "to lend his aid, and not let the present opportunity slip; as he must be well aware that, if the Carthaginians won the day, he would be able to maintain his rule; but if the Romans proved victorious, his very life would be in danger, owing to the ambition of Massanissa." This prince was convinced by these arguments, and joined Hannibal with two thousand horsemen.

Hannibal's cavalry reinforced by Tychaeus.

4. Having secured his fleet, Scipio left Baebius in command of it in his place, while he himself went a round of the cities. This time he did not admit to mercy those who voluntarily surrendered, but carried all the towns by force, and enslaved the inhabitants, to show his anger at the treachery of the Carthaginians. To Massanissa he sent message after message, explaining to him how the Punic government had broken the terms, and urging him to collect the largest army he was able and join him with all speed. For as soon as the treaty had been made, Massanissa, as I have said, had immediately departed with his own army and ten Roman cohorts, infantry and cavalry, accompanied by some commissioners from Scipio, that he might not only recover his own kingdom, but secure the addition of that of Syphax also, by the assistance of the Romans. And this purpose was eventually effected.

B.C. 202. Scipio traverses the Carthaginian territory, and summons Massanissa to his aid.

It happened that just at this time the envoys from Rome arrived at the naval camp. Those of them who had been sent by the Roman government, Baebius at once caused to be escorted to Scipio, while he retained those who were Carthaginians. The latter were much cast down, and regarded

Scipio orders the Carthaginian envoys to be released.

their position as one of great danger; for when they were informed of the impious outrage committed by their countrymen on the persons of the Roman envoys, they thought there could be no doubt that the vengeance for it would be wreaked upon themselves. But when Scipio learnt from the recently-arrived commissioners that the senate and people accepted with enthusiasm the treaty which he had made with the Carthaginians, and were ready to grant everything he asked, he was highly delighted, and ordered Baebius to send the envoys home with all imaginable courtesy. And he was very well advised to do so, in my opinion. For as he knew that his countrymen made a great point of respecting the rights of ambassadors, he considered in his own mind, not what the Carthaginians deserved to have done to them, but what it was becoming in Romans to inflict. Therefore, though he did not relax his own indignation and anger at what they had done, he yet endeavoured, in the words of the proverb, "to maintain the good traditions of his sires." The result was that, by this superiority in his conduct, a very decided impression was made upon the spirits of the Carthaginians and of Hannibal himself.

5. When the people of Carthage saw the cities in their territory being sacked, they sent a message to Hannibal begging him to act without delay, to come to close quarters with the enemy, and bring the matter to the decision of battle. He bade the messengers in answer "to confine their attention to other matters, and to leave such things to him, for he would choose the time for fighting himself." Some days afterwards he broke up his quarters at Adrumetum, and pitched his camp near ZAMA, a town about five days' march to the west of Carthage. From that place he sent spies to ascertain the place, nature, and strength of the Roman general's encampment. These spies were caught and brought to Scipio, who, so far from inflicting upon them the usual punishment of spies, appointed a tribune to show them everything in the camp thoroughly and without reserve; and when this had been done, he asked the men whether the appointed officer had been careful to point out everything to them. Upon their replying that

Hannibal moves to Zama.

he had, he gave them provisions and an escort, and despatched them with injunctions to be careful to tell Hannibal everything they had seen. On their return to his camp, Hannibal was so much struck with the magnanimity and high courage of Scipio, that he conceived a lively desire for a personal interview with him. With this purpose he sent a herald to say that he was desirous of a parley to discuss the matters at issue. When the herald had delivered his message, Scipio at once expressed his consent, and said that he would himself send him a message when it suited him to meet, naming the time and place. The herald returned to Hannibal with this answer. Next day Massanissa arrived with six thousand infantry and about four thousand cavalry. Scipio received him with cordiality, and congratulated him on having added to his sway all those who had previously been subject to Syphax. Thus reinforced, he removed his camp to Naragara: selecting it as a place which, among other advantages, enabled him to get water within a javelin's throw.

Arrival of Massanissa.

6. From this place he sent to the Carthaginian general, informing him that he was ready to meet him, and discuss matters with him. On hearing this, Hannibal moved his quarters to within thirty stades of Scipio, and pitched his camp on a hill, which seemed a favourable position for his present purpose, except that water had to be fetched from a considerable distance, which caused his soldiers great fatigue.

Next day both commanders advanced from their camps attended by a few horsemen. Presently they left these escorts and met in the intervening space by themselves, each accompanied by an interpreter. Hannibal was the first to speak, after the usual salutation. He said that "He wished that the Romans had never coveted any possession outside Italy, nor the Carthaginians outside Libya; for these were both noble empires, and were, so to speak, marked out by nature. But since," he continued, "our rival claims to Sicily first made us enemies, and then those for Iberia; and since, finally, unwarned by the lessons of misfortune, we have gone so far that the one nation has en-

Meeting of Scipio and Hannibal.

Hannibal's speech.

dangered the very soil of its native land, and the other is now actually doing so, all that there remains for us to do is to try our best to deprecate the wrath of the gods, and to put an end, as far as in us lies, to these feelings of obstinate hostility. I personally am ready to do this, because I have learnt by actual experience that Fortune is the most fickle thing in the world, and inclines with decisive favour now to one side and now to the other on the slightest pretext, treating mankind like young children.

7. "But it is about you that I am anxious, Scipio. For you are still a young man, and everything has succeeded to your wishes both in Iberia and Libya, and you have as yet never experienced the ebb tide of Fortune; I fear, therefore, that my words, true as they are, will not influence you. But do look at the facts in the light of one story, and that not connected with a former generation, but our own. Look at me! I am that Hannibal who, after the battle of Cannae, became master of nearly all Italy; and presently advancing to Rome itself, and pitching my camp within forty stades of it, deliberated as to what I should do with you and your country; but now I am in Libya debating with you, a Roman, as to the bare existence of myself and my countrymen. With such a reverse as that before your eyes, I beg you not to entertain high thoughts, but to deliberate with a due sense of human weakness on the situation; and the way to do that is among good things to choose the greatest, among evils the least. What man of sense, then, would deliberately choose to incur the risk which is now before you. If you conquer, you will add nothing of importance to your glory or to that of your country; while, if you are worsted, you will have been yourself the means of entirely cancelling all the honours and glories you have already won. What then is the point that I am seeking to establish by these arguments? It is that the Romans should retain all the countries for which we have hitherto contended—I mean Sicily, Sardinia, and Iberia; and that the Carthaginians should engage never to go to war with Rome for these; and also that all the islands lying between Italy and Libya should belong to Rome. For I am persuaded that such a treaty will be at once safest for the

Carthaginians, and most glorious for you and the entire people of Rome."

Scipio's reply.

8. In reply to this speech of Hannibal, Scipio said "That neither in the Sicilian nor Iberian war were the Romans the aggressors, but notoriously the Carthaginians, which no one knew better than Hannibal himself. That the gods themselves had confirmed this by giving the victory, not to those who struck the first and unprovoked blow, but to those who only acted in self-defence. That he was as ready as any one to keep before his eyes the uncertainty of Fortune, and tried his best to confine his efforts within the range of human infirmity. But if," he continued, "you had yourself quitted Italy before the Romans crossed to Libya with the offer of these terms in your hands, I do not think that you would have been disappointed in your expectation. But now that your departure from Italy has been involuntary, and we have crossed into Libya and conquered the country, it is clear that matters stand on a very different footing. But above all, consider the point which affairs have reached now. Your countrymen have been beaten, and at their earnest prayer we arranged a written treaty, in which, besides the offer now made by you, it was provided that the Carthaginians should restore prisoners without ransom, should surrender all their decked vessels, pay five thousand talents, and give hostages for their performance of these articles. These were the terms which I and they mutually agreed upon; we both despatched envoys to our respective Senates and people,—we consenting to grant these terms, the Carthaginians begging to have them granted. The Senate agreed: the people ratified the treaty. But though they had got what they asked, the Carthaginians annulled the compact by an act of perfidy towards us. What course is left to me? Put yourself in my place and say. To withdraw the severest clauses of the treaty? Are we to do this, say you, not in order that by reaping the reward of treachery they may learn in future to outrage their benefactors, but in order that by getting what they ask for they may be grateful to us? Why, only the other day, after obtaining what they begged for as suppliants, because your presence gave them a slender hope of success, they at once

treated us as hated foes and public enemies. In these circumstances, if a still severer clause were added to the conditions imposed, it might be possible to refer the treaty back to the people; but, if I were to withdraw any of these conditions, such a reference does not admit even of discussion. What then is the conclusion of my discourse? It is, that you must submit yourselves and your country to us unconditionally, or conquer us in the field."

9. After these speeches Hannibal and Scipio parted without coming to any terms; and next morning by daybreak both generals drew out their forces and engaged. To the Carthaginians it was a struggle for their own lives and the sovereignty of Libya; to the Romans for universal dominion and supremacy. And could any one who grasped the situation fail to be moved at the story? Armies more fitted for war than these, or generals who had been more successful or more thoroughly trained in all the operations of war, it would be impossible to find, or any other occasion on which the prizes proposed by destiny to the combatants were more momentous. For it was not merely of Libya or Europe that the victors in this battle were destined to become masters, but of all other parts of the world known to history,—a destiny which had not to wait long for its fulfilment.

The momentous issues depending on the battle of Zama, B.C. 202.

Scipio placed his men on the field in the following order: the *hastati* first, with an interval between their maniples; behind them the *principes*, their maniples not arranged to cover the intervals between those of the *hastati* as the Roman custom is, but immediately behind them at some distance, because the enemy was so strong in elephants. In the rear of these he stationed the *triarii*. On his left wing he stationed Gaius Laelius with the Italian cavalry, on the right Massanissa with all his Numidians. The intervals between the front maniples he filled up with maniples of *velites*, who were ordered to begin the battle; but if they found themselves unable to stand the charge of the elephants, to retire quickly either to the rear of the whole army by the intervals between the maniples, which went straight through the ranks, or, if they got entangled with

Scipio's order of battle.

the elephants, to step aside into the lateral spaces between the maniples.

10. These dispositions made, he went along the ranks delivering an exhortation to the men, which, though short, was much to the point in the circumstances in which they were placed. He called upon them, "Remembering their former victories, to show themselves to be men of mettle and worthy their reputation and their country. To put before their eyes that the effect of their victory would be not only to make them complete masters of Libya, but to give them and their country the supremacy and undisputed lordship of the world. But if the result of the battle were unfavourable, those who fell fighting gallantly would have the record of having died for their country, while those that saved themselves by flight would spend the rest of their days as objects of pitying contempt and scorn. For there was no place in Libya which could secure their safety if they fled; while, if they fell into the hands of the Carthaginians, no one who looked facts in the face could doubt what would happen to them. May none of you," he added, "learn that by experience! Since, then, Fortune puts before us the most glorious of rewards, in whichever way the battle is decided, should we not be at once the most mean-spirited and foolish of mankind if we abandon the most glorious alternative, and from a paltry clinging to life deliberately choose the worst of misfortunes? Charge the enemy then with the steady resolve to do one of two things, to conquer or to die! For it is men thus minded who invariably conquer their opponents, since they enter the field with no other hope of life."

Scipio's speech to his men.

11. Such was Scipio's address to his men. Meanwhile Hannibal had put his men also into position. His elephants, which numbered more than eighty, he placed in the van of the whole army. Next his mercenaries, amounting to twelve thousand, and consisting of Ligurians, Celts, Baliarians, and Mauretani; behind them the native Libyans and Carthaginians; and on the rear of the whole the men whom he had brought from Italy, at a distance of somewhat more than a stade. His wings he strengthened

Hannibal's order of battle.

with cavalry, stationing the Numidian allies on the left wing, and the Carthaginian horsemen on the right. He ordered each officer to address his own men, bidding them rest their hopes of victory on him and the army he had brought with him; while he bade their officers remind the Carthaginians in plain terms what would happen to their wives and children if the battle should be lost. While these orders were carried out by the officers, Hannibal himself went along the lines of his Italian army and urged them "to remember the seventeen years during which they had been brothers-in-arms, and the number of battles they had fought with the Romans, in which they had never been beaten or given the Romans even a hope of victory. Above all, putting aside minor engagements and their countless successes, let them place before their eyes the battle of the River Trebia against the father of the present Roman commander; and again the battle in Etruria against Flaminius; and lastly that at Cannae against Aemilius, with none of which was the present struggle to be compared, whether in regard to the number or excellence of the enemy's men. Let them only raise their eyes and look at the ranks of the enemy; they would see that they were not merely fewer, but many times fewer than those with whom they had fought before, while, as to their soldierly qualities, there was no comparison. The former Roman armies had come to the struggle with them untainted by memories of past defeats: while these men were the sons or the remnants of those who had been beaten in Italy, and fled before him again and again. They ought not therefore," he said, "to undo the glory and fame of their previous achievements, but to struggle with a firm and brave resolve to maintain their reputation of invincibility."

Hannibal's speech to the "army of Italy."

Such were the addresses of the two commanders.

12. All arrangements for the battle being complete, and the two opposing forces of Numidian cavalry having been for some time engaged in skirmishing attacks upon each other, Hannibal gave the word to the men on the elephants to charge the enemy. But as they heard the horns and trumpets braying all round them, some of the elephants became unmanageable and rushed back

A stampede of the elephants.

upon the Numidian contingents of the Carthaginian army; and this enabled Massanissa with great speed to deprive the Carthaginian left wing of its cavalry support. The rest of the elephants charged the Roman velites in the spaces between the maniples of the line, and while inflicting much damage on the enemy suffered severely themselves; until, becoming frightened, some of them ran away down the vacant spaces, the Romans letting them pass harmlessly along, according to Scipio's orders, while others ran away to the right under a shower of darts from the cavalry, until they were finally driven clear off the field. It was just at the moment of this stampede of the elephants, that Laelius forced the Carthaginian cavalry into headlong flight, and along with Massanissa pressed them with a vigorous pursuit. While this was going on, the opposing lines of heavy infantry were advancing to meet others with deliberate step and proud confidence, except Hannibal's "army of Italy," which remained in its original position. When they came within distance the Roman soldiers charged the enemy, shouting as usual their war-cry, and clashing their swords against their shields: while the Carthaginian mercenaries uttered a strange confusion of cries, the effect of which was indescribable, for, in the words of the poet,[1] the "voice of all was not one"—

Flight of the Carthaginian cavalry.

"nor one their cry:
But manifold their speech as was their race."

13. The whole affair being now a trial of strength between man and man at close quarters, as the combatants used their swords and not their spears, the superiority was at first on the side of the dexterity and daring of the mercenaries, which enabled them to wound a considerable number of the Romans. The latter, however, trusting to the steadiness of their ranks and the excellence of their arms, still kept gaining ground, their rear ranks keeping close up with them and encouraging them to advance; while the Carthaginians did not keep up with their mercenaries nor support them, but showed a thoroughly cowardly spirit. The result was that the foreign soldiers gave way: and, believing that they had been shamelessly abandoned by their own side, fell

The fight of the heavy infantry.

[1] Homer, *Iliad*, 4, 437.

upon the men on their rear as they were retreating, and began killing them; whereby many of the Carthaginians were compelled to meet a gallant death in spite of themselves. For as they were being cut down by their mercenaries they had, much against their inclination, to fight with their own men and the Romans at the same time; and as they now fought with desperation and fury they killed a good many both of their own men and of the enemy also. Thus it came about that their charge threw the maniples of the *hastati* into confusion; whereupon the officers of the *principes* caused their lines to advance to oppose them. However, the greater part of the mercenaries and Carthaginians had fallen either by mutual slaughter or by the sword of the *hastati*. Those who survived and fled Hannibal would not allow to enter the ranks of his army, but ordered his men to lower their spears and keep them back as they approached; and they were therefore compelled to take refuge on the wings or make for the open country.

Final struggle between Hannibal's reserves, his "army of Italy," and the whole Roman infantry.

14. The space between the two armies that still remained in position was full of blood, wounded men, and dead corpses; and thus the rout of the enemy proved an impediment of a perplexing nature to the Roman general. Everything was calculated to make an advance in order difficult,—the ground slippery with gore, the corpses lying piled up in bloody heaps, and with the corpses arms flung about in every direction. However Scipio caused the wounded to be carried to the rear, and the *hastati* to be recalled from the pursuit by the sound of a bugle, and drew them up where they were in advance of the ground on which the fighting had taken place, opposite the enemy's centre. He then ordered the *principes* and *triarii* to take close order, and, threading their way through the corpses, to deploy into line with the *hastati* on either flank. When they had surmounted the obstacles and got into line with the *hastati*, the two lines charged each other with the greatest fire and fury. Being nearly equal in numbers, spirit, courage, and arms, the battle was for a long time undecided, the men in their obstinate valour falling dead without giving way a step; until at last the divisions of Massanissa and Laelius, returning from the

The battle is decided by the

pursuit, arrived providentially in the very nick of time. Upon their charging Hannibal's rear, the greater part of his men were cut down in their ranks; while of those who attempted to fly very few escaped with their life, because the horsemen were close at their heels and the ground was quite level. On the Roman side there fell over fifteen hundred, on the Carthaginian over twenty thousand, while the prisoners taken were almost as numerous.

return of the Roman and Numidian cavalry.

15. Such was the end of this battle, fought under these famous commanders: a battle on which everything depended, and which assigned universal dominion to Rome. After it had come to an end, Scipio pushed on in pursuit as far as the Carthaginian camp, and, after plundering that, returned to his own. Hannibal, escaping with a few horsemen, did not draw rein until he arrived safely at Adrumetum. He had done in the battle all that was to be expected of a good and experienced general. First, he had tried by an interview with his opponent to see what he could do to procure a pacification; and that was the right course for a man, who, while fully conscious of his former victories, yet mistrusts Fortune, and has an eye to all the possible and unexpected contingencies of war. Next, having accepted battle, the excellence of his dispositions for a contest with the Romans, considering the identity of the arms on each side, could not have been surpassed. For though the Roman line is hard to break, yet each individual soldier and each company, owing to the uniform tactic employed, can fight in any direction, those companies, which happen to be in nearest contact with the danger, wheeling round to the point required. Again, the nature of their arms gives at once protection and confidence, for their shield is large and their sword will not bend: the Romans therefore are formidable on the field and hard to conquer.

Hannibal escapes to Adrumetum.

16. Still Hannibal took his measures against each of these difficulties in a manner that could not be surpassed. He provided himself with those numerous elephants, and put them in the van, for the express purpose of throwing the enemy's ranks into confusion and breaking their order. Again he stationed the mercenaries in front and the Carthaginians behind them, in

order to wear out the bodies of the enemy with fatigue beforehand, and to blunt the edge of their swords by the numbers that would be killed by them; and moreover to compel the Carthaginians, by being in the middle of the army, to stay where they were and fight, as the poet says[1]—

"That howsoe'er unwilling fight he must."

But the most warlike and steady part of his army he held in reserve at some distance, in order that they might not see what was happening too closely, but, with strength and spirit unimpaired, might use their courage to the best advantage when the moment arrived. And, if in spite of having done everything that could be done, he who had never been beaten before failed to secure the victory now, we must excuse him. For there are times when chance thwarts the plans of the brave; and there are others again, when a man

"Though great and brave has met a greater still."[2]

And this we might say was the case with Hannibal on this occasion. . . .

Scipio's answer to the envoys from Carthage after Zama, who made extravagant displays of sorrow.

17. Manifestations of emotion which go beyond what is customary among a particular people, if they are thought to be the result of genuine feeling evoked by extraordinary disasters, excite pity in the minds of those who see or hear them; and we are all in a manner moved by the novelty of the spectacle. But when such things appear to be assumed for the purpose of taking in the spectators and producing a dramatic effect, they do not provoke pity, but anger and dislike. And this was the case in regard to the Carthaginian envoys. Scipio deigned to give a very brief answer to their prayers, saying that "They, at any rate, deserved no kindness at the hands of the Romans, since they had themselves confessed that they were the aggressors in the war, by having, contrary to their treaty obligations, taken Saguntum and enslaved its inhabitants, and had recently been guilty of treachery and breaking the terms of a treaty to which they had subscribed and sworn. It was from

[1] Homer, *Iliad*, 4, 300.

[2] A line of which the author is unknown; perhaps it was Theognis.

a regard to their own dignity, to the vicissitudes of Fortune, and to the dictates of humanity that the Romans had determined to treat them with lenity and behave with magnanimity. And of this they would be convinced if they would take a right view of the case. For they ought not to consider it a hardship if they found themselves charged to submit to any punishment, to follow a particular line of conduct, or to give up this or that; they ought rather to regard it as an unexpected favour that any kindness was conceded to them at all; since Fortune, after depriving them of all right to pity and consideration, owing to their own unrighteous conduct, had put them in the power of their enemies." After this preamble he mentioned the concessions to be made to them, and the penalties to which they were to submit.

18. The following are the heads of the terms offered them:—*The Carthaginians to retain the towns in Libya, of which they were possessed before they commenced the last war against Rome, and the territory which they also heretofore held, with its cattle, slaves, and other stock: and from that day should not be subject to acts of hostility, should enjoy their own laws and customs, and not have a Roman garrison in their city.* These were the concessions favourable to them. The clauscs of an opposite character were as follows:—*The Carthaginians to pay an indemnity to the Romans for all wrongs committed during the truce; to restore all captives and runaway slaves without limit of time; to hand over all their ships of war except ten triremes, and all elephants; to go to war with no people outside Libya at all, and with none in Libya without consent from Rome; to restore to Massanissa all houses, territory, and cities belonging to him or his ancestors within the frontiers assigned to that king; to supply the Roman army with provisions for three months, and with pay, until such time as an answer shall be returned from Rome on the subject of the treaty; to pay ten thousand talents of silver in fifty years, two hundred Euboic talents every year; to give a hundred hostages of their good faith,—such hostages to be selected from the young men of the country by the Roman general, and to be not younger than fourteen or older than thirty years.*

Terms imposed on Carthage after the battle of Zama, B.C. 202-201.

A scene in the Carthaginian assembly. Hannibal persuades them to accept the treaty.

19. This was the nature of Scipio's answer to the envoys, who hastened home and communicated its terms to their countrymen. It was then that the story goes that, upon a certain Senator intending to speak against accepting the terms and actually beginning to do so, Hannibal came forward and pulled the man down from the tribune; and when the other senators showed anger at this breach of custom, Hannibal rose again and "owned that he was ignorant of such things; but said that they must pardon him if he acted in any way contrary to their customs, remembering that he had left the country when he was but fourteen, and had only returned when now past forty-five. Therefore he begged them not to consider whether he had committed a breach of custom, but much rather whether he were genuinely feeling for his country's misfortunes; for that was the real reason for his having been guilty of this breach of manners. For it appeared to him to be astonishing, and, indeed, quite unaccountable, that any one calling himself a Carthaginian, and being fully aware of the policy which they had individually and collectively adopted against the Romans, should do otherwise than adore the kindness of Fortune for obtaining such favourable terms, when in their power, as a few days ago no one—considering the extraordinary provocation they had given—would have ventured to mention, if they had been asked what they expected would happen to their country, in case of the Romans proving victorious. Therefore he called upon them now not to debate, but unanimously to accept the terms offered, and with sacrifices to the gods to pray with one accord that the Roman people might confirm the treaty." His advice being regarded as both sensible and timely, they resolved to sign the treaty on the conditions specified; and the senate at once despatched envoys to notify their consent. . . .

The intrigues of Philip V. and Antiochus the Great to divide the dominions of the infant king of Egypt, Ptolemy Epiphanes, B.C. 204.

20. Is it not astonishing that while Ptolemy Philopator was alive and did not need such assistance, these two kings

were ready with offers of aid, but that as soon as he was dead, leaving his heir a mere child, whose kingdom they were bound by the ties of nature to have defended, they then egged each other on to adopt the policy of partitioning the boy's kingdom between themselves, and getting rid entirely of the heir; and that too without putting forward any decent pretext to cover their iniquity, but acting so shamelessly, and so like beasts of prey, that one can only compare their habits to those ascribed to fishes, among which, though they may be of the same species, the destruction of the smaller is the food and sustenance of the larger. This treaty of theirs shows, as though in a mirror, the impiety to heaven and cruelty to man of these two kings, as well as their unbounded ambition. However, if a man were disposed to find fault with Fortune for her administration of human affairs, he might fairly become reconciled to her in this case; for she brought upon those monarchs the punishment they so well deserved, and by the signal example she made of them taught posterity a lesson in righteousness. For while they were engaged in acts of treachery against each other, and in dismembering the child's kingdom in their own interests, she brought the Romans upon them, and the very measures which they had lawlessly designed against another, she justly and properly carried out against them. For both of them, being promptly beaten in the field, were not only prevented from gratifying their desire for the dominions of another, but were themselves made tributary and forced to obey orders from Rome. Finally, within a very short time Fortune restored the kingdom of Ptolemy to prosperity; while as to the dynasties and successors of these two monarchs, she either utterly abolished and destroyed them, or involved them in misfortunes which were little short of that. . . .

Shameless ambition of Philip and Antiochus.

B.C. 197.
B.C. 191.

21. There was a certain man at Cius named Molpagoras, a ready speaker and of considerable ability in affairs, but at heart a mere demagogue and selfish intriguer. By flattering the mob, and putting the richer citizens into its power, he either got them put to death right out, or drove them into exile

The intrigues and tyranny of Molpagoras at Cius, in Bithynia.

and distributed their confiscated goods among the common people, and thus rapidly secured for himself a position of despotic power. . . .

The causes of the ruin of Cius.

The miseries which befel the Cians were not so much owing to Fortune or the aggressions of their neighbours, as to their own folly and perverse policy. For by steadily promoting their worst men, and punishing all who were opposed to these, that they might divide their property among themselves, they seemed as it were to court the disasters into which they fell. These are disasters into which, somehow or another, though all men fall, they yet not only cannot learn wisdom, but seem not even to acquire the cautious distrust of brute beasts. The latter, if they have once been hurt by bait or trap, or even if they have seen another in danger of being caught, you would find it difficult to induce to approach anything of the sort again: they are shy of the place, and suspicious of everything they see. But as for men, though they have been told of cities utterly ruined by their policy, and see others actually doing so before their eyes, yet directly any one flatters their wishes by holding out to them the prospect of recruiting their fortunes at the cost of others, they rush thoughtlessly to the bait: although they know quite well that no one, who has ever swallowed such baits, has ever survived; and that such political conduct has notoriously been the ruin of all who have adopted it.

Capture of Cius by Philip V. B.C. 202.[1]

22. Philip was delighted at taking the city, as though he had performed a glorious and honourable achievement; for while displaying great zeal in behalf of his brother-in-law (Prusias), and overawing all who opposed his policy, he had secured for himself in fair warfare a large supply of slaves and money. But the reverse of this picture he did not see in the least, although it was quite plain. In the first place, that he was assisting his brother-in-law, who, without receiving any provocation, was treacherously assailing his neighbours. In the second place, that by involving a Greek city without just cause in the most dreadful misfortunes, he was sure to confirm the report, which had been widely spread, of his severity to his friends; and by both of these

[1] See Livy, 31, 31; Strabo, 12, c. 4. Philip handed over Cius to Prusias.

actions would justly gain throughout Greece the reputation of a man reckless of the dictates of piety. In the third place, that he had outraged the envoys from the above-mentioned states,[1] who had come with the hope of saving the Cians from the danger which threatened them, and who, after being day after day mocked by his professions, had been at length compelled to witness what they most abhorred. And lastly, that he had so infuriated the Rhodians, that they would never henceforth listen to a word in his favour: a circumstance for which Philip had to thank Fortune as well as himself.

23. For it happened that just when his ambassador was defending his master before the Rhodians in the theatre,—enlarging on "the magnanimity of Philip," and announcing that "though already in a manner master of Cius, he conceded its safety to the wishes of the Rhodian people; and did so because he desired to refute the calumnies of his enemies, and to establish the honesty of his intentions in the eyes of Rhodes,"—just then a man entered the Prytaneum who had newly arrived in the island, and brought the news of the enslavement of the Cians and the cruelty which Philip had exercised upon them. The Prytanis coming into the theatre to announce this news, while the ambassador was absolutely in the middle of his speech, the Rhodians could scarcely make up their minds to believe a report which involved such monstrous treachery.

The anger of the Rhodians at the fall of Cius.

He had then betrayed himself quite as grossly as the Cians; and so blind or misguided had he become as to the principles of right and wrong, that he boasted of actions of which he ought to have been most heartily ashamed, and plumed himself upon them as though they were to his credit. But the people of Rhodes from that day forth regarded Philip as their enemy, and made their preparations with that view. And no less by this course had he gained the hatred of the Aetolians. He had but lately made terms with, and held out the hand of friendship to that nation: no excuse for a breach had arisen; and the Lysimachians, Calchedonians, and Cianians were friends and allies of the Aetolians. Nevertheless only a

It causes a breach with the Aetolians.

[1] That is, from Rhodes and other states.

short time before he had separated Lysimachia from the Aetolian alliance, and induced it to submit to him: then he had done the same to Calchedon: and lastly he had enslaved the Cians, though there was an Aetolian officer actually in Cius and conducting the government. Prusias, however, in so far as his policy was accomplished, was delighted; but inasmuch as another was in possession of the prizes of the operations, while he himself got as his share nothing but the bare site of a city, was extremely annoyed, but was yet unable to do anything. . . .

Philip at Thasos, B.C. 202-201.

24. During his return voyage Philip engaged in one act of treachery after another, and among others put in about mid-day at the town of Thasos, and though it was on good terms with him, took it and enslaved its inhabitants. . . .

The Thasians answered Philip's general Metrodorus, that they would surrender their city, on condition that he would guarantee them freedom from a garrison, tribute, or billeting of soldiers, and the enjoyment of their own laws. Metrodorus having declared the king's consent to this, the whole assembly signified their approval of the words by a loud shout, whereupon they admitted Philip into the town. . . .

All kings perhaps at the beginning of their reign dangle the name of liberty before their subjects' eyes, and address as friends and allies those who combine in pursuing the same objects as themselves; but when they come to actual administration of affairs they at once cease to treat these as allies, and assume the airs of a master. Such persons accordingly find themselves deceived as to the honourable position they expected to occupy, though as a rule not as to the immediate advantage which they sought. But if a king is meditating undertakings of the greatest importance, and only bounding his hopes by the limits of the world, and has as yet had nothing to cast a damp upon his projects, would it not seem the height of folly and madness to proclaim his own fickleness and untrustworthiness in matters which are of the smallest consequence, and lie at the very threshold of his enterprise? . . .

EGYPT

24 (*a*). My plan being to narrate under each year all the events in the several parts of the world which were contemporary, it is clear that in some cases it will be necessary to mention the end before the beginning; when, that is to say, that particular part of the subject calls for mention, first as being in place in the general course of my narrative, and the events which embrace the end of an episode fit in sooner than those which belong to its beginning and first conception. . . .

25. Sosibius, the unfaithful guardian of Ptolemy Epiphanes, was a creature of extraordinary cunning, who long retained his power, and was the instrument of many crimes at court: he contrived first the murder of Lysimachus, son of Arsinoe, daughter of Ptolemy and Berenice; secondly, that of Maga, son of Ptolemy and Berenice the daughter of Maga; thirdly, that of Berenice the mother of Ptolemy Philopator; fourthly, that of Cleomenes of Sparta; and fifthly, that of Arsinoe the daughter of Berenice. . . .

The previous career of Sosibius.

Three or four days after the death of Ptolemy Philopator, having caused a platform to be erected in the largest court of the palace Agathocles and Sosibius summoned a meeting of the foot-guards and the household, as well as the officers of the infantry and cavalry. The assembly being formed, they mounted the platform, and first of all announced the deaths of the king and queen, and proclaimed the customary period of mourning for the people. After that they placed a diadem upon the head of the child, Ptolemy Epiphanes, proclaimed him king, and read a forged will, in which the late king nominated Agathocles and Sosibius guardians of his son. They ended by an exhortation to the officers to be loyal to the boy and maintain his sovereignty. They next brought in two silver urns, one of which they declared contained the ashes of the king, the other those of Arsinoe. And in fact one of them did really contain the king's ashes, the other was filled with spices. Having done this they proceeded to complete the funeral ceremonies. It was then that all the world at last learnt the truth about the

B.C. 205. The death of Ptolemy Philopator announced, and Epiphanes crowned.

death of Arsinoe. For now that her death was clearly established, the manner of it began to be a matter of speculation. Though rumours which turned out to be true had found their way among the people, they had up to this time been disputed; now there was no possibility of hiding the truth, and it became deeply impressed in the minds of all. Indeed there was great excitement among the populace: no one thought about the king; it was the fate of Arsinoe that moved them. Some recalled her orphanhood; others the tyranny and insult she had endured from her earliest days; and when her miserable death was added to these misfortunes, it excited such a passion of pity and sorrow that the city was filled with sighs, tears, and irrepressible lamentation. Yet it was clear to the thoughtful observer that these were not so much signs of affection for Arsinoe as of hatred towards Agathocles.

Agathocles propitiates the army and gets rid of rivals.

The first measure of this minister, after depositing the urns in the royal mortuary, and giving orders for the laying aside of mourning, was to gratify the army with two months' pay; for he was convinced that the way to deaden the resentment of the common soldiers was to appeal to their interests. He then caused them to take the oath customary at the proclamation of a new king; and next took measures to get all who were likely to be formidable out of the country. Philammon, who had been employed in the murder of Arsinoe, he sent out as governor of Cyrene, while he committed the young king to the charge of Oenanthe and Agathocleia. Next, Pelops the son of Pelops he despatched to the court of Antiochus in Asia, to urge him to maintain his friendly relations with the court of Alexandria, and not to violate the treaty he had made with the young king's father. Ptolemy, son of Sosibius, he sent to Philip to arrange for a treaty of intermarriage between the two countries, and to ask for assistance in case Antiochus should make a serious attempt to play them false in any matter of importance.

He also selected Ptolemy, son of Agesarchus, as ambassador to Rome: not with a view of his seriously prosecuting the embassy, but because he thought that, if he once entered Greece, he would find himself among friends and kinsfolk,

and would stay there; which would suit his policy of getting rid of eminent men. Scopas the Aetolian also he sent to Greece to recruit foreign mercenaries, giving him a large sum in gold for bounties. He had two objects in view in this measure: one was to use the soldiers so recruited in the war with Antiochus; another was to get rid of the mercenary troops already existing, by sending them on garrison duty in the various forts and settlements about the country; while he used the new recruits to fill up the numbers of the household regiments with new men, as well as the pickets immediately round the palace, and in other parts of the city. For he believed that men who had been hired by himself, and were taking his pay, would have no feelings in common with the old soldiers, with whom they would be totally unacquainted; but that, having all their hopes of safety and profit in him, he would find them ready to co-operate with him and carry out his orders.

Now all this took place before the intrigue of Philip, though it was necessary for the sake of clearness to speak of that first, and to describe the transactions which took place, both at the audience and the dispatch of the ambassadors.

The debauchery of Agathocles.

To return to Agathocles: when he had thus got rid of the most eminent men, and had to a great degree quieted the wrath of the common soldiers by his present of pay, he returned quickly to his old way of life. Drawing round him a body of friends, whom he selected from the most frivolous and shameless of his personal attendants or servants, he devoted the chief part of the day and night to drunkenness and all the excesses which accompany drunkenness, sparing neither matron, nor bride, nor virgin, and doing all this with the most offensive ostentation. The result was a widespread outburst of discontent; and when there appeared no prospect of reforming this state of things, or of obtaining protection against the violence, insolence and debauchery of the court, which on the contrary grew daily more outrageous, their old hatred blazed up once more in the hearts of the common people, and all began again to recall the misfortunes which the kingdom already owed to these very men. But the absence of any one fit to take the lead, and

by whose means they could vent their wrath upon Agathocles and Agathocleia, kept them quiet. Their one remaining hope rested upon Tlepolemus, and on this they fixed their confidence.

Tlepolemus, governor of Pelusium, determines to depose Agathocles, B.C. 205-204.

As long as the late king was alive Tlepolemus remained in retirement; but upon his death he quickly propitiated the common soldiers, and became once more governor of Pelusium. At first he directed all his actions with a view to the interest of the king, believing that there would be some council of regency to take charge of the boy and administer the government. But when he saw that all those who were fit for this charge were got out of the way, and that Agathocles was boldly monopolising the supreme power, he quickly changed his purpose; because he suspected the danger that threatened him from the hatred which they mutually entertained. He therefore began to draw his troops together, and bestir himself to collect money, that he might not be an easy prey to any one of his enemies. At the same time he was not without hope that the guardianship of the young king, and the chief power in the state might devolve upon him; both because, in his own private opinion, he was much more fit for it in every respect than Agathocles, and because he was informed that his own troops and those in Alexandria were looking to him to put an end to the minister's outrageous conduct. When such ideas were entertained by Tlepolemus, it did not take long to make the quarrel grow, especially as the partisans of both helped to inflame it. Being eager to secure the adhesion of the generals of divisions and the captains of companies, he frequently invited them to banquets; and at these assemblies, instigated partly by the flattery of his guests and partly by his own impulse (for he was a young man and the conversation was over the wine), he used to throw out sarcastic remarks against the family of Agathocles. At first they were covert and enigmatic, then merely ambiguous, and finally undisguised, and containing the bitterest reflections. He proposed the health of the scribbler of pasquinades, the sackbut-girl and waiting-woman; and spoke of his shameful boyhood, when as cupbearer of the king he had submitted

to the foulest treatment. His guests were always ready to laugh at his words and add their quota to the sum of vituperation. It was not long before this reached the ears of Agathocles: and the breach between the two thus becoming an open one, Agathocles immediately began bringing charges against Tlepolemus, declaring that he was a traitor to the king, and was inviting Antiochus to come and seize the government. And he brought many plausible proofs of this forward, some of which he got by distorting facts that actually occurred, while others were pure invention. His object in so doing was to excite the wrath of the common people against Tlepolemus. But the result was the reverse; for the populace had long fixed their hopes on Tlepolemus, and were only too delighted to see the quarrel growing hot between them. The actual popular outbreak which did occur began from the following circumstances. Nicon, a relation of Agathocles, was in the lifetime of the late king commander of the navy. . . .

Agathocles will anticipate him.

26 (*a*). Another murder committed by Agathocles was that of Deinon, son of Deinon. But this, as the proverb has it, was the fairest of his foul deeds. For the letter ordering the murder of Arsinoe had fallen into this man's hands, and he might have given information about the plot and saved the Queen; but at the time he chose rather to help Philammon, and so became the cause of all the misfortunes which followed; while, after the murder was committed, he was always recalling the circumstances, commiserating the unhappy woman, and expressing repentance at having let such an opportunity slip: and this he repeated in the hearing of many, so that Agathocles heard of it, and he met with his just punishment in losing his life. . . .

A fragment from the earlier history of Agathocles.

THE DEATH OF AGATHOCLES AND HIS FAMILY

26. (*b*) The first step of Agathocles was to summon a meeting of the Macedonian guards. He entered the assembly accompanied by the young king and his own sister Agathocleia. At first he feigned not to be able to say what he wished for tears; but after again and again wiping his eyes with his chlamys he

Agathocles pretends a plot of Tlepolemus against the king, B.C. 202.

at length mastered his emotion, and, taking the young king in his arms, spoke as follows: "Take this boy, whom his father on his death-bed placed in this lady's arms" (pointing to his sister) "and confided to your loyalty, men of Macedonia! That lady's affection has but little influence in securing the child's safety: it is on you that that safety now depends; his fortunes are in your hands. It has long been evident to those who had eyes to see, that Tlepolemus was aiming at something higher than his natural rank; but now he has named the day and hour on which he intends to assume the crown. Do not let your belief of this depend upon my words; refer to those who know the real truth and have but just come from the very scene of his treason." With these words he brought forward Critolaus, who deposed that he had seen with his own eyes the altars being decked, and the victims being got ready by the common soldiers for the ceremony of a coronation.

Anger of the populace and soldiers against Agathocles.

When the Macedonian guards had heard all this, far from being moved by his appeal, they showed their contempt by hooting and loud murmurs, and drove him away under such a fire of derision that he got out of the assembly without being conscious how he did it. And similar scenes occurred among other corps of the army at their meetings. Meanwhile great crowds kept pouring into Alexandria from the up-country stations, calling upon kinsmen or friends to help the movement, and not to submit to the unbridled tyranny of such unworthy men. But what inflamed the populace against the government more than anything else was the knowledge that, as Tlepolemus had the absolute command of all the imports into Alexandria, delay would be a cause of suffering to themselves.

27. Moreover, an action of Agathocles himself served to heighten the anger of the multitude and of Tlepolemus. For he took Danae, the latter's mother-in-law, from the temple of Demeter, dragged her through the middle of the city unveiled, and cast her into prison. His object in doing this was to manifest his hostility to Tlepolemus; but its effect was to loosen the tongues of the people. In their anger they no longer confined themselves to secret murmurs: but some of

them in the night covered the walls in every part of the city with pasquinades; while others in the day time collected in groups and openly expressed their loathing for the government.

Seeing what was taking place, and beginning to fear the worst, Agathocles at one time meditated making his escape by secret flight; but as he had nothing ready for such a measure, thanks to his own imprudence, he had to give up that idea. At another time he set himself to drawing out lists of men likely to assist him in a bold *coup d'état*, by which he should put to death or arrest his enemies, and then possess himself of absolute power. While still meditating these plans he received information that Moeragenes, one of the body-guard, was betraying all the secrets of the palace to Tlepolemus, and was co-operating with him on account of his relationship with Adaeus, at that time the commander of Bubastus. Agathocles immediately ordered his secretary Nicostratus to arrest Moeragenes, and extract the truth from him by every possible kind of torture. Being promptly arrested by Nicostratus, and taken to a retired part of the palace, he was at first examined directly as to the facts alleged; but, refusing to confess anything, he was stripped. And now some of the torturers were preparing their instruments, and others with scourges in their hands were just taking off their outer garments, when just at that very moment a servant ran in, and, whispering something in the ear of Nicostratus, hurried out again. Nicostratus followed close behind him, without a word, frequently slapping his thigh with his hand.

Terror of Agathocles.

Arrest of Moeragenes.

28. The predicament of Moeragenes was now indescribably strange. There stood the executioners by his side on the point of raising their scourges, while others close to him were getting ready their instruments of torture: but when Nicostratus withdrew they all stood silently staring at each other's faces, expecting him every moment to return; but as time went on they one by one slipped away, until Moeragenes was left alone. Having made his way through the palace, after this unhoped-for escape, he rushed in his half-clothed state

Moeragenes rouses the soldiers.

into a tent of the Macedonian guards which was situated close to the palace. They chanced to be at breakfast, and therefore a good many were collected together; and to them he narrated the story of his wonderful escape. At first they would not believe it, but ultimately were convinced by his appearing without his clothes. Taking advantage of this extraordinary occurrence, Moeragenes besought the Macedonian guards with tears not only to help him to secure his own safety, but the king's also, and above all their own. "For certain destruction stared them in the face," he said, "unless they seized the moment when the hatred of the populace was at its height, and every one was ready to wreak vengeance on Agathocles. That moment was *now*, and all that was wanted was some one to begin."

29. The passions of the Macedonians were roused by these words, and they finally agreed to do as Moeragenes advised. They at once went round to the tents, first those of their own corps, and then those of the other soldiers; which were all close together, facing the same quarter of the city. The wish was one which had for a long time been formed in the minds of the soldiery, wanting nothing but some one to call it forth, and with courage to begin. No sooner, therefore, had a commencement been made than it blazed out like a fire: and before four hours had elapsed every class, whether military or civil, had agreed to make the attempt.

Agathocles despairs.

At this crisis, too, chance contributed a great deal to the final catastrophe. For a letter addressed by Tlepolemus to the army as well as some of his spies, had fallen into the hands of Agathocles. The letter announced that he would be at Alexandria shortly, and the spies informed Agathocles that he was already there. This news so distracted Agathocles that he gave up taking any measures at all or even thinking about the dangers which surrounded him, but departed at his usual hour to his wine, and kept up the carouse to the end in his usual licentious fashion. But his mother Oenanthe went in great distress to the temple of Demeter and Persephone, which was open on account of a certain annual sacrifice; and there first

Oenanthe in the temple of Demeter.

of all she besought the aid of those goddesses with bendings of the knee and strange incantations, and then sat down close to the altar and remained motionless. Most of the women present, delighted to witness her dejection and distress, kept silence: but the ladies of the family of Polycrates, and certain others of the nobility, being as yet unaware of what was going on around them, approached Oenanthe and tried to comfort her. But she cried out in a loud voice: "Do not come near me, you monsters! I know you well! Your hearts are always against us; and you pray the goddess for all imaginable evil upon us. Still I trust and believe that, God willing, you shall one day taste the flesh of your own children." With these words she ordered her female attendants to drive them away, and strike them with their staves if they refused to go. The ladies availed themselves of this excuse for quitting the temple in a body, raising their hands and praying that she might herself have experience of those very miseries with which she had threatened her neighbours.

30. The men having by this time decided upon a revolution, now that in every house the anger of the women was added to the general resentment, the popular hatred blazed out with redoubled violence. As soon as night fell the whole city was filled with tumult, torches, and hurrying feet. Some were assembling with shouts in the stadium; some were calling upon others to join them; some were running backwards and forwards seeking to conceal themselves in houses and places least likely to be suspected. And now the open spaces round the palace, the stadium, and the street were filled with a motley crowd, as well as the area in front of the Dionysian Theatre. Being informed of this, Agathocles roused himself from a drunken lethargy,—for he had just dismissed his drinking party,—and, accompanied by all his family, with the exception of Philo, went to the king. After a few words of lamentation over his misfortunes addressed to the child, he took him by the hand, and proceeded to the covered walk which runs between the Maeander garden and the Palaestra, and leads to the entrance of the theatre. Having securely fastened the two first doors through which he passed,

A mob assembles.

he entered the third with two or three bodyguards, his own family, and the king. The doors, however, which were secured by double bars, were only of lattice work and could therefore be seen through.

By this time the mob had collected from every part of the city in such numbers, that, not only was every foot of ground occupied, but the doorsteps and roofs also were crammed with human beings; and such a mingled storm of shouts and cries arose, as might be expected from a crowd in which women and children were mixed with men: for in Alexandria, as in Carthage, the children perform as conspicuous a part in such commotions as the men.

31. Day now began to break and the uproar was still a confused babel of voices; but one cry made itself heard conspicuously above the rest, it was a call for THE KING. The first thing actually done was by the Macedonian guard: they left their quarters and seized the vestibule which served as the audience hall of the palace; then, after a brief pause, having ascertained whereabouts in the palace the king was, they went round to the covered walk, burst open the first doors, and, when they came to the next, demanded with loud shouts that the young king should be surrendered to them. Agathocles, recognising his danger, begged his bodyguards to go in his name to the Macedonians, to inform them that "he resigned the guardianship of the king, and all offices, honours, or emoluments which he possessed, and only asked that his life should be granted him with a bare maintenance; that by sinking to his original situation in life he would be rendered incapable, even if he wished it, of being henceforth oppressive to any one." All the bodyguards refused except Aristomenes, who afterwards obtained the chief power in the state.

Cries for the king.

This man was an Acarnanian, and, though far advanced in life when he obtained supreme power, he is thought to have made a most excellent and blameless guardian of the king and kingdom. And as he was distinguished in that capacity, so had he been remarkable before for his adulation of Agathocles in the time of his prosperity. He was the first, when entertaining Agathocles at his

Aristomenes.

house, to distinguish him among his guests by the present of a gold diadem, an honour reserved by custom to the kings alone; he was the first too who ventured to wear his likeness on his ring; and when a daughter was born to him he named her Agathocleia.

But to return to my story. Aristomenes undertook the mission, received his message, and made his way through a certain wicket-gate to the Macedonians. He stated his business in few words: the first impulse of the Macedonians was to stab him to death on the spot; but some of them held up their hands to protect him, and successfully begged his life. He accordingly returned with orders to bring the king or to come no more himself. Having dismissed Aristomenes with these words, the Macedonians proceeded to burst open the second door also. When convinced by their proceedings, no less than by the answers they had returned, of the fierce purpose of the Macedonians, the first idea of Agathocles was to thrust his hand through the latticed door,—while Agathocleia did the same with her breasts which she said had suckled the king,—and by every kind of entreaty to beg that the Macedonians would grant him bare life.

The guards insist on the surrender of the king.

32. But finding that his long and piteous appeals produced no effect, at last he sent out the young king with the bodyguards. As soon as they had got the king, the Macedonians placed him on a horse and conducted him to the stadium. His appearance being greeted with loud shouts and clapping of hands, they stopped the horse, and dismounting the child, ushered him to the royal stall and seated him there. But the feelings of the crowd were divided: they were delighted that the young king had been brought, but they were dissatisfied that the guilty persons had not been arrested and met with the punishment they deserved. Accordingly, they continued with loud cries to demand that the authors of all the mischief should be brought out and made an example. The day was wearing away, and yet the crowd had found no one on whom to wreak their vengeance, when Sosibius, who, though a son of the elder Sosibius, was at that time a member of the

The king conducted to the stadium.

bodyguard, and as such had a special eye to the safety of the king and the State,—seeing that the furious desire of the multitude was implacable, and that the child was frightened at the unaccustomed faces that surrounded him and the uproar of the crowd, asked the king whether he would "surrender to the populace those who had injured him or his mother." The boy having nodded assent, Sosibius bade some of the bodyguard announce the king's decision, while he raised the young child from his seat and took him to his own house which was close by to receive proper attention and refreshment. When the message from the king was declared, the whole place broke out into a storm of cheering and clapping of hands. But meanwhile Agathocles and Agathocleia had separated and gone each to their own lodgings. Without loss of time soldiers, some voluntarily and others under pressure from the crowd, started in search of them.

33. The beginning of actual bloodshed, however, was this. One of the servants and flatterers of Agathocles, whose name was Philo, came out to the stadium still flustered with wine. Seeing the fury of the multitude, he said to some bystanders that they would have cause to repent it again, as they had only the other day, if Agathocles were to come there. Of those who heard him some began to abuse him, while others pushed him about; and on his attempting to defend himself, some tore his cloak off his back, while others thrust their spears into him and wounded him mortally. He was dragged into the middle of the crowd breathing his last gasp; and, having thus tasted blood, the multitude began to look impatiently for the coming of the other victims. They had not to wait long. First appeared Agathocles dragged along bound hand and foot. No sooner had he entered than some soldiers rushed at him and struck him dead. And in doing so they were his friends rather than enemies, for they saved him from the horrible death which he deserved. Nicon was brought next, and after him Agathocleia stripped naked, with her two sisters; and following them the whole family. Last of all some men came bringing Oenanthe, whom they had torn from the temple of Demeter and Persephone, riding stripped naked upon a horse.

Death of Agathocles, his sister, and Oenanthe.

They were all given up to the populace, who bit, and stabbed them, and knocked out their eyes, and, as soon as any one of them fell, tore him limb from limb, until they had utterly annihilated them all: for the savagery of the Egyptians when their passions are roused is indeed terrible. At the same time some young girls who had been brought up with Arsinoe, having learnt that Philammon, the chief agent in the murder of that Queen, had arrived three days before from Cyrene, rushed to his house; forced their way in; killed Philammon with stones and sticks; strangled his infant son; and, not content with this, dragged his wife naked into the street and put her to death.

Such was the end of Agathocles and Agathocleia and their kinsfolk.

34. I am quite aware of the miraculous occurrences and embellishments which the chroniclers of this event have added to their narrative with a view of producing a striking effect upon their hearers, making more of their comments on the story than of the story itself and the main incidents. Some ascribe it entirely to Fortune, and take the opportunity of expatiating on her fickleness and the difficulty of being on one's guard against her. Others dwell upon the unexpectedness of the event, and try to assign its causes and probabilities. It was not my purpose, however, to treat this episode in this way, because Agathocles was not a man of conspicuous courage or ability as a soldier; nor particularly successful or worth imitating as a statesman; nor, lastly, eminent for his acuteness as a courtier or cunning as an intriguer, by which latter accomplishments Sosibius and many others have managed to keep one king after another under their influence to the last day of their lives. The very opposite of all this may be said of this man. For though he obtained high promotion owing to Philopator's feebleness as a king; and though after his death he had the most favourable opportunity of consolidating his power, he yet soon fell into contempt, and lost his position and his life at once, thanks to his own want of courage and vigour.

The contemptible character of Agathocles.

35. To such a story then no such dissertation is required, as was in place, for instance, in the case of the Sicilian monarchs,

Agathocles and Dionysius, and certain others who have administered governments with reputation. For the former of these, starting from a plebeian and humble position—having been, as Timaeus sneeringly remarks, a potter—came from the wheel, clay, and smoke, quite a young man to Syracuse. And, to begin with, both these men in their respective generations became tyrants of Syracuse, a city that had obtained at that time the greatest reputation and the greatest wealth of any in the world; and afterwards were regarded as suzerains of all Sicily, and lords of certain districts in Italy. While, for his part, Agathocles not only made an attempt upon Africa, but eventually died in possession of the greatness he had acquired. It is on this account that the story is told of Publius Scipio, the first conqueror of the Carthaginians, that being asked whom he considered to have been the most skilful administrators and most distinguished for boldness combined with prudence, he replied, "the Sicilians Agathocles and Dionysius." Now, in the case of such men as these, it is certainly right to try to arrest the attention of our readers, and, I suppose, to speak of Fortune and the mutability of human affairs, and in fact to point a moral: but in the case of such men as we have been speaking of, it is quite out of place to do so.

See 12, 15.

36. For these reasons I have rejected all idea of making too much of the story of Agathocles. But another and the strongest reason was that all such wonderful and striking catastrophes are only worth listening to once; not only are subsequent exhibitions of them unprofitable to ear and eye, but elaborate harping upon soon becomes simply troublesome. For those who are engaged on representing anything either to eye or ear can have only two objects to aim at,—pleasure and profit; and in history, more than in anything else, excessive prolixity on events of tragic interest fails of both these objects. For, in the first place, who would wish to emulate extraordinary catastrophes? And next, no one likes to be continually seeing and hearing things that are unnatural and beyond the ordinary conceptions of mankind. We are, indeed, eager to see and hear such things once and for the first time, because we want to know that a thing is possible which was supposed to be im-

possible: but when once convinced on that point no one is pleased at lingering on the Unnatural; but in fact would rather not come across it at all oftener than need be. In fact, the dwelling upon misfortunes which exceed the ordinary limits is more suitable to tragedy than to history. But perhaps we ought to make allowances for men who have studied neither nature nor universal history. They think, I presume, that the most important and astonishing events in all history are those which they happen to have come across themselves or to have heard from others, and they therefore give their attention exclusively to those. They accordingly do not perceive that they are making a mistake in expatiating on events which are neither novel,—for they have been narrated by others before,—nor capable of giving instruction or pleasure. So much on this point. . . .

ANTIOCHUS

37. King Antiochus, at the beginning of his reign, was thought to be a man of great enterprise and courage, and great vigour in the execution of his purposes; but as he grew older his character evidently deteriorated in itself, and disappointed the expectation of the world. . . .

Disappointments as to the character of Antiochus the Great.

BOOK XVI

PHILIP V. WAGES WAR WITH ATTALUS, KING OF PERGAMUM, AND THE RHODIANS. See *supra* 15, 20-24; Livy, 31, 17, *sqq.*

1. KING PHILIP having arrived at Pergamum, and believing that he had as good as made an end of Attalus, gave the rein to every kind of outrage; and by way of gratifying his almost insane fury he vented his wrath even more against the gods than against man. For his skirmishing attacks being easily repelled by the garrison of Pergamum, owing to the strength of the place, and being prevented by the precautions taken by Attalus from getting booty from the country, he directed his anger against the seats of the gods and the sacred enclosures; in which, as it appears to me, he did not wrong Attalus so much as himself. He threw down the temples and the altars, and even had their stones broken to pieces that none of the buildings he had destroyed might be rebuilt. After spoiling the Nicephorium, cutting down its grove, and demolishing its ring wall, and levelling with the ground many costly fanes, he first directed his attack upon Thyatira, and thence marched into the plain of Thebe, thinking that this district would supply him with the richest spoil. But finding himself again disappointed in this respect, on arriving at the "Holy Village" he sent a message to Zeuxis, demanding that he would furnish him with corn, and render the other services stipulated for in the treaty.[1] Zeuxis, however, though feigning to fulfil the obligations of the treaty, was not minded to give Philip real and substantial help. . . .

Philip's impious conduct in Asia, B.C. 201.

Zeuxis, Satrap of Antiochus, fails to help Philip substantially.

[1] That is the treaty between Philip and Antiochus.

GREAT SEA-FIGHT OFF CHIOS BETWEEN PHILIP AND THE ALLIED FLEETS OF ATTALUS AND RHODES, B.C. 201

2. As the siege was not going on favourably for him, and the enemy were blockading him with an increasing number of decked vessels, he felt uncertain and uneasy as to the result. But as the state of affairs left him no choice, he suddenly put to sea quite unexpectedly to the enemy; for Attalus expected that he would persist in pushing on the mines he had commenced. But Philip was especially keen to make his putting to sea a surprise, because he thought that he would thus be able to outstrip the enemy, and complete the rest of his passage along the coast to Samos in security. But he was much disappointed in his calculations; for Attalus and Theophiliscus (of Rhodes), directly they saw him putting to sea, lost no time in taking action. And although, from their previous conviction that Philip meant to stay where he was, they were not in a position to put to sea quite simultaneously, still by a vigorous use of their oars they managed to overtake him, and attacked,—Attalus the enemy's right wing, which was his leading squadron, and Theophiliscus his left. Thus intercepted and surrounded, Philip gave the signal to the ships of his right wing, ordering them to turn their prows towards the enemy and engage them boldly; while he himself retreated under cover of the smaller islands, which lay in the way, with some light galleys, and thence watched the result of the battle. The whole number of ships engaged were, on Philip's side, fifty-three decked, accompanied by some undecked vessels, and galleys and beaked ships to the number of one hundred and fifty; for he had not been able to fit out all his ships in Samos. On the side of the enemy there were sixty-five decked vessels, besides those which came from Byzantium, and along with them nine *triemioliae* (light-decked vessels), and three triremes.

Philip failing to take Chios sails off to Samos.

Attalus and Theophiliscus follow him.

3. The fight having been begun on the ship on which King Attalus was sailing, all the others near began charging each other without waiting for orders. Attalus ran into an eight-banked ship, and having struck it a well-directed blow below the water-line, after

Incidents in the battle.

a prolonged struggle between the combatants on the decks, at length succeeded in sinking it. Philip's ten-banked ship, which, moreover, was the admiral's, was captured by the enemy in an extraordinary manner. For one of the *triemioliae*, having run close under her, she struck against her violently amidships, just beneath the thole of the topmost bank of oars, and got fast jammed on to her, the steersman being unable to check the way of his ship. The result was that, by this craft hanging suspended to her, she became unmanageable and unable to turn one way or another. While in this plight, two quinqueremes charged her on both sides at once, and destroyed the vessel itself and the fighting men on her deck, among whom fell Democrates, Philip's admiral. At the same time Dionysodorus and Deinocrates, who were brothers and joint-admirals of the fleet of Attalus, charged, the one upon a seven-banked, the other upon an eight-banked ship of the enemy, and had a most extraordinary adventure in the battle. Deinocrates, in the first place, came into collision with an eight-banked ship, and had his ship struck above the water-line; for the enemy's ship had its prow built high; but he struck the enemy's ship below the water-line,[1] and at first could not get himself clear, though he tried again and again to back water; and, accordingly, when the Macedonian boarded him and fought with great gallantry, he was brought into the most imminent danger. Presently, upon Attalus coming to his aid, and by a vigorous charge separating the two ships, Deinocrates unexpectedly found himself free, and the enemy's boarders were all killed after a gallant resistance, while their own vessel being left without men was captured by Attalus. In the next place, Dionysodorus, making a furious charge, missed his blow; but running up alongside of the enemy lost all the oars on his right side, and had the timbers supporting his towers smashed to pieces, and was thereupon immediately surrounded by the enemy. In the midst of loud shouts and great confusion, all the rest of his marines perished along with the ship, but he himself with two others managed to

Loss of Philip's flagship and admiral.

Deinocrates.

Dionysodorus.

[1] The word *βίαχα* in the text is unknown, and certainly corrupt. The most obvious remedy is *ὑπόβρυχα* or *ὑποβρύχια*. But we cannot be sure.

escape by swimming to the *triemiolia* which was coming up to the rescue.

4. The fight between the rest of the fleet, however, was an undecided one; for the superiority in the numbers of Philip's galleys was compensated for by Attalus's superiority in the number of his decked ships. Thus on the right wing of Philip's fleet the state of things was that the ultimate result was doubtful, but that, of the two, Attalus had the better hope of victory. As for the Rhodians, they were, at first starting, as I have said, far behind the enemy, but being much their superiors in speed they managed to come up with the rear of the Macedonians. At first they charged the vessels on the stern as they were retiring, and broke off their oars; but upon Philip's ships swinging round and beginning to bring help to those in danger, while those of the Rhodians who had started later than the rest reached the squadron of Theophiliscus, both parties turned their ships in line prow to prow and charged gallantly, inciting each other to fresh exertions by the sound of trumpets and loud cheers. Had not the Macedonians placed their galleys between the opposing lines of decked ships, the battle would have been quickly decided; but, as it was, these proved a hindrance to the Rhodians in various ways. For as soon as the first charge had disturbed the original order of the ships, they became all mixed up with each other in complete confusion, which made it difficult to sail through the enemy's line or to avail themselves of the points in which they were superior, because the galleys kept running sometimes against the blades of their oars so as to hinder the rowing, and sometimes upon their prows, or again upon their sterns, thus hampering the service of steerers and rowers alike. In the direct charges, however, the Rhodians employed a particular manœuvre. By depressing their bows they received the blows of the enemy above the water-line, while by staving in the enemy's ships below the water-line they rendered the blows fatal. Still it was rarely that they succeeded in doing this, for, as a rule, they avoided collisions, because the Macedonians fought gallantly from their decks when they came to close quarters. Their most frequent manœuvre was to row through the Macedonian line, and disable the enemy's ships by

The skill of the Rhodian sailors.

breaking off their oars, and then, rowing round into position, again charge the enemy on the stern, or catch them broadside as they were in the act of turning; and thus they either stove them in or broke away some necessary part of their rigging. By this manner of fighting they destroyed a great number of the enemy's ships.

Further incidents in the fight on the left wing. The Rhodian admiral Theophiliscus mortally wounded.

5. But the most brilliant and hazardous exploits were those of three quinqueremes: the flagship on which Theophiliscus sailed, then that commanded by Philostratus, and lastly the one steered by Autolycus, and on board of which was Nicostratus. This last charged an enemy's ship, and left its beak sticking in it. The ship thus struck sank with all hands; but Autolycus and his comrades, as the sea poured into his vessel through the prow, was surrounded by the enemy. For a time they defended themselves gallantly, but at last Autolycus himself was wounded, and fell overboard in his armour, while the rest of the marines were killed fighting bravely. While this was going on, Theophiliscus came to the rescue with three quinqueremes, and though he could not save the ship, because it was now full of water, he yet stove in three hostile vessels, and forced their marines overboard. Being quickly surrounded by a number of galleys and decked ships, he lost the greater number of his marines after a gallant struggle on their part; and after receiving three wounds himself, and performing prodigies of valour, just managed to get his own ship safely off with the assistance of Philostratus, who came to his aid and bravely took his share of the danger. Having thus rejoined his own squadron, he darted out once more and ran in upon the enemy, utterly prostrated in body by his wounds, but more dashing and vehement in spirit than before.

So that there were really two sea-fights going on at a considerable distance from each other. For the right wing of Philip's fleet, continually making for land in accordance with his original plan, was not far from the Asiatic coast; while the left wing, having to veer round to support the ships on the rear, were engaged with the Rhodians at no great distance from Chios.

6. As the fleet of Attalus, however, was rapidly overpowering the right wing of Philip, and was now approaching the small islands, under cover of which Philip was moored watching the result of the battle, Attalus saw one of his quinqueremes staved in and in the act of being sunk by an enemy's ship. He therefore hurried to its assistance with two quadriremes. The enemy's ship turning to flight, and making for the shore, he pursued it somewhat too eagerly in his ardent desire to effect its capture. Thereupon Philip, observing that Attalus had become detached a considerable distance from his own fleet, took four quinqueremes and three *hemioliae*, as well as all the galleys within reach, and darting out got between Attalus and his ships, and forced him in the utmost terror to run his three ships ashore. After this mishap the king himself and his crew made their way to Erythrae, while Philip captured his vessels and the royal equipage on board them. For in this emergency Attalus had employed an artifice. He caused the most splendid articles of the royal equipage to be spread out on the deck of his ship; the consequence of which was that the first Macedonians who arrived on the galleys, seeing a quantity of flagons and purple robes and such like things, abandoned the pursuit, and turned their attention to plundering these. Thus it came about that Attalus got safe away to Erythrae; while Philip, though he had distinctly got the worst of it in the general engagement, was so elated at the unexpected reverse which had befallen Attalus, that he put to sea again and exerted himself strenuously in collecting his ships and restoring the spirits of his men by assuring them that they were the victors. For when they saw Philip put to sea towing off the royal ship, they very naturally thought that Attalus had perished. But Dionysodorus, conjecturing what had really happened to the king, set about collecting his own ships by raising a signal; and this being speedily done, he sailed away unmolested to their station in Asia. Meanwhile those Macedonians who were engaged with the Rhodians, having been for some time past in evil case, were gradually extricating themselves from the battle, one after the

Attalus intercepted by Philip, and forced to abandon his ship.

Victory of the Rhodians.

other retiring on the pretence of being anxious to support their comrades. So the Rhodians, taking in tow some of their vessels, and having destroyed others by charging them, sailed away to Chios.

B.C. 201. The losses in the battle.

7. In the battle with Attalus Philip had had destroyed a ten-banked, a nine-banked, a seven-banked, and a six-banked ship, ten other decked vessels, three *triemioliae*, twenty-five galleys and their crews. In the battle with the Rhodians ten decked vessels and about forty galleys. While two quadriremes and seven galleys with their crews were captured. In the fleet of Attalus one *triemiolia* and two quinqueremes were sunk, while two quadriremes besides that of the king were captured. Of the Rhodian fleet two quinqueremes and a trireme were destroyed, but no ship was taken. Of men the Rhodians lost sixty, Attalus seventy; while Philip lost three thousand Macedonians and six thousand rowers. And of the Macedonians and their allies two thousand were taken prisoners, and of their opponents six hundred.

Philip vainly pretends that he won the battle.

8. Such was the end of the battle of Chios; in which Philip claimed the victory on two pretexts. First, because he had driven Attalus ashore and had captured his ship; and secondly, because, as he had anchored at the promontory of Argennum, he had the credit of having taken up his anchorage where the wrecks were floating. He acted in accordance with this assertion next day by collecting the wrecks, and causing the corpses which could be recognised to be picked up for burial, all for the sake of strengthening this pretence. For that he did not himself believe that he had won was shortly afterwards proved by the Rhodians and Dionysodorus. For on that very next day, while he was actually engaged on these operations, after communication with each other they sailed out to attack him, but, on nobody putting out to meet them, they returned to Chios. Philip indeed had never before lost so many men either by land or sea at one time, and was extremely mortified at what had happened and had lost much of his spirit for the enterprise. To the outside world, however, he tried to conceal his real sentiments: though this was forbidden by facts.

Besides everything else, what happened after the battle impressed all who saw it too strongly. For the slaughter and destruction was so great that, on the day of battle itself the whole strait was filled with corpses, blood, arms, and wrecks ; while on the subsequent days the strands might be seen piled up with all these together in wild confusion. Hence the extreme consternation of the king could not be confined to himself, but was shared by all his Macedonians.

9. Theophiliscus survived for one day; and then having written a despatch home with an account of the battle, and appointed Cleonaeus to succeed him in his command, died from his wounds. He had shown great valour in the engagement, and his far-sighted policy deserves to be remembered. If it had not been for his boldness in attacking Philip in time, all the allies would have let the opportunity pass, in terror at Philip's audacity. But by beginning the war as he did he forced his countrymen to seize the opportunity, and compelled Attalus not to lose time in mere preparatory measures for war, but to go to war energetically and grapple with the danger. The Rhodians, therefore, were quite right to pay him, even after his death, such honours as were incentives, not only to men living at the time, but to future generations also, to prompt service in their country's cause. . . .

Death of Theophiliscus.

THE INDECISIVE BATTLE OF CHIOS WAS FOLLOWED BY ANOTHER OFF LADE, IN WHICH PHILIP WAS PARTLY SUCCESSFUL [1]

10. After the battle of Lade, the Rhodians being out of his way, and Attalus not having yet appeared on the scene, it is clear that Philip might have accomplished his voyage to Alexandria. And here we have evidence stronger than any other of Philip's infatuation in acting as he did. What, then, prevented his design? Nothing in the world but what always occurs in the natural course of affairs. For at a distance many men at times desire the impossible from the extravagant prospects it holds out, their ambition over-mastering their reason;

[1] *Jam cum Rhodiis et Attalo navalibus certaminibus, neutro feliciter, vires expertus.* Livy, 31, 14.

but when they approach the moment of action they quite as irrationally abandon their purpose, because their calculations are obscured and confused by the embarrassments and difficulties which meet them. . . .

PHILIP'S OPERATIONS IN CARIA, B.C. 201

11. Having made some assaults which proved abortive owing to the strength of the place, Philip went away again, plundering the forts and villages in the country. Thence he marched to Prinassus and pitched his camp under its wall. Having promptly got ready his pent-houses and other siege artillery, he began to attempt the town by mines. This plan proving impracticable, owing to the rocky nature of the soil, he contrived the following stratagem. During the day he caused a noise to be made under ground, as though the mines were being worked at; while during the night he caused earth to be brought and piled up at the mouth of the mine, in order that the men in the city, by calculating the quantity of earth thrown up, might become alarmed. At first the Prinassians held out bravely: but when Philip sent them a message informing them that he had underpinned two plethra of their walls, and asking them whether they preferred to march out with their lives, or one and all to perish with their town when he set fire to the props, then at last, believing that what he said was true, they surrendered the city.

The stratagem by which Philip took Prinassus.

12. The town of Iassus is situated in Asia on the gulf between the temple of Poseidmen, the territory of Miletus, and the city of Myndus, called the gulf [of Iassus by some], but by most the gulf of Bargylia, from the names of the cities built upon its inner coast. The Iassians boast of being originally colonists from Argos, and more recently from Miletus, their ancestors having invited to their town the son of Neleus, the founder of Miletus, owing to their losses in the war with the Carians. The size of the town is ten stades. Among the people of Bargylia it is a common report widely believed that the statue of the Kindyan Artemis, though in the open air, is never touched by snow or

Legends of Iassus and Bargylia.

rain; and the same belief is held among the Iassians as to the Artemis Astias.[1] All these stories have been repeated by certain historians. But, for my part, I have in the whole course of my work set myself against such statements of our historiographers and have had no toleration for them. For it appears to me that such tales are only fit to amuse children, when they transgress not only the limits of probability but even those of possibility. For instance, to say that certain bodies when placed in full light cast no shadow argues a state of quite deplorable folly. But Theopompus has done this; for he says that those who enter the holy precinct of Zeus in Arcadia cast no shadow, which is on a par with the statements to which I have just referred. Now, in so far as such tales tend to preserve the reverence of the vulgar for religion, a certain allowance may be made for some historians when they record these miraculous legends. But they must not be allowed to go too far. Perhaps it is difficult to assign a limit in such a matter; still it is not impossible. Therefore, in my judgment, such displays of ignorance and delusion should be pardoned if they do not go very far, but anything like extravagance in them should be rejected. . . .

AFFAIRS IN GREECE

13. I have already described the deliberate policy of Nabis, tyrant of the Lacedaemonians; how he drove the citizens into exile, freed the slaves, and gave them the wives and daughters of their masters. How also, by opening his kingdom as a kind of inviolable sanctuary for all who fled from their own countries, he collected a number of bad characters in Sparta. I will now proceed to tell how in the same period, being in alliance with Aetolians, Eleans, and Messenians, and being bound by oaths and treaties to support one and all of those peoples in case of any one attacking them, he yet in utter contempt of these obligations determined to make a treacherous attack on Messene. . . .

The tyranny of Nabis. See 13, 6-8.

B.C. 202-201.

[1] An inscription found at Iassus [C.I.G. 2683] has confirmed this name which is found in one MS. instead of *Hestias*. Whether the meaning of the title is Artemis of the City, or some local designation, is uncertain.

DIGRESSION ON THE MERITS OF THE HISTORIANS ZENO AND ANTISTHENES OF RHODES

14. As some episodical historians have written on the period which embraces the affair at Messene and the sea-fights already described, it is my intention to discuss them briefly. I will not however speak of them all, but only those whom I suppose to be worthy of commemoration and full discussion. These are the Rhodian writers Zeno and Antisthenes, whom I judge to deserve this distinction, for more than one reason. They were contemporary with the events, and were engaged in practical politics; and, lastly, they composed their histories with no view to gain, but for the sake of fame, and as part of the business of politicians. Since then they write of the same events as myself, I cannot omit mentioning them; lest, from the reputation of their country, and the idea that naval affairs are peculiarly the province of Rhodians, some students may prefer their authority to mine where I differ from them.

The necessity of discussing the histories of Zeno and Antisthenes.

Now both these writers, to begin with, describe the battle of Lade as not less severe than that of Chios, but more fiercely and daringly contested, both in detail and as a whole, and finally assert that the victory was with the Rhodians. For my part I should be inclined to allow that historians must show some partiality to their own countries; not however that they should state what is exactly opposite to the facts regarding them. There are quite enough mistakes which writers make from ignorance, and which it is difficult for poor human nature to avoid: but if we deliberately write what is false for the sake of country, friends, or favour, how do we differ from those who do the same to get a living? For as the latter, by measuring everything by the standard of private gain, ruin the credit of their works, so your politicians often fall into the same discredit by yielding to the influence of hatred or affection. Therefore readers ought to be jealously watchful on this head; while writers ought to be on their guard for their own sakes.

Their description of the battle of Lade. See ch. 10.

15. The present matter is an example. When coming to de-

tails of the battle of Lade, these writers confess that in it "two quinqueremes of Rhodes were captured by the enemy; and that upon one ship raising its studding-sail to escape from the conflict, owing to its having being staved in and shipping sea, many of the vessels near it did the same and made for the open sea; and that at last the admiral, being left with only a few vessels, was forced to follow their example. That for the present they were forced by unfavourable winds to drop anchor on the territory of Myndus, but next day put to sea and crossed to Cos; while the enemy, having secured the quinqueremes, landed at Lade and took up their quarters in the Rhodian camp: that, moreover, the Milesians, deeply impressed by what had taken place, presented not only Philip, but Heracleides also, with a garland of victory on his entrance to their territory." And yet, though they give all these particulars, which all evidently indicate the losing side, they still declare the Rhodians to have been victorious both in particular combats and in the whole battle; and that too in spite of the fact that the original despatch from the admiral concerning the battle, sent to the Senate and Prytanies, still exists in their Prytaneium, which testifies to the truth, not of the statements of Antisthenes and Zeno, but of mine.

16. Next as to their account of the treacherous attempt upon Messene. Zeno says that "Nabis started from Sparta, crossed the Eurotas near the tributary called the Hoplites, and advanced along the narrow road past Poliasium until he arrived at Sallasia, thence past Pharae to Thalamae, and so to the river Pamisus." About which I do not know what to say. It is just as if one were to say that a man started from Corinth and marched through the Isthmus and arrived at the Scironean way, and then came straight to the Contoporian road, and journeyed past Mycenae to Argos. For such a statement would not be merely slightly wrong but wholly contradictory. For the Isthmus and the Scironian rocks are east of Corinth, while the Contoporian road and Mycenae are nearly due south-west; so that it is completely impossible to go by way of the former to the latter. The same may be said about Lacedaemon; for the Eurotas and Sallasia are to the north-east of Sparta, while Thalamae, Pharae, and the Pamisus are

Zeno's account of the attack of Nabis upon Messene. See ch. 13.

to the south-west. Therefore it is not possible to go to Sallasia, nor necessary to cross the Eurotas, if a man means to go to Messenia by way of Thalamae.

17. Besides these mistakes, he says that Nabis started on his return from Messenia by the gate on the road to Tegea. This is another absurdity; for Megalopolis is between Tegea and Messene, so that it is impossible that a gate at Messene should be called the "Gate to Tegea." The fact is that there is a gate there called the "Tegean Gate," by which Nabis commenced his return; and this led Zeno into the mistake of supposing that Tegea was near Messene, which is not the fact: for the Laconian territory, as well as that of Megalopolis, lies between that of Messene and Tegea. Lastly, he says that the Alpheus flows underground from its source for a considerable distance, and comes up near Lycoa, in Arcadia. The truth is that this river does go down underground not far from its source, and, after remaining hidden for about ten stades, comes up again, and then flows through the territory of Megalopolis, at first with a gentle stream, and then gaining volume, and watering that whole district in a splendid manner for two hundred stades, at length reaches Lycoa, swollen by the tributary stream of the Lusius, and become unfordable and deep. . . .

However, I think that the points I have mentioned, though all of them blunders, admit of some palliation and excuse; for the latter arose from mere ignorance, those connected with the sea-fight from patriotic affection. But is it not then a fault in Zeno, that he does not bestow as much pains on investigating the truth and thoroughly mastering his subject, as upon the ornaments of style; and shows on many occasions that he particularly plumes himself on this, as many other famous writers do? To my mind it is quite right to take great care and pay great attention to the presentation of one's facts in correct and adequate language, for this contributes in no small degree to the effectiveness of history; still I do not think that serious writers should regard it as their primary and most important object. Far from it. Quite other are the parts of his history on which a practical politician should rather pride himself.

18. The best illustration of what I mean will be the following. This same writer, in his account of the siege of Gaza and Antiochus's pitched battle with Scopas in Coele-Syria, at Mount Panium,[1] showed such extreme anxiety about ornaments of style, that he made it quite impossible even for professional rhetoricians or mob-orators to outstrip him in theatrical effect; while he showed such a contempt of facts, as once more amounted to unsurpassable carelessness and inaccuracy. For, intending to describe the first position in the field taken up by Scopas, he says that "the right extremity of his line, together with a few cavalry, rested on the slope of the mountain; while its left with all the cavalry belonging to this wing, was in the plains below. That Antiochus, just before the morning watch, despatched his elder son Antiochus with a division of his army to occupy the high ground which commanded the enemy; and that at daybreak he led the rest of his army across the river which flowed between the two camps, and drew them up on the plain: arranging his heavy-armed infantry in one line, facing the enemy's centre, and his cavalry, some on the right and the rest on the left wing of the phalanx, among which were the heavy-armed horsemen, under the sole command of the younger of the king's sons Antiochus. That in advance of this line he stationed the elephants at certain intervals, and the Tarentines[2] commanded by Antipater; while he filled up the spaces between the elephants with archers and slingers. And finally, that he took up his own station on the rear of the elephants with a squadron of household cavalry and bodyguards." After this preliminary description he continues: "The younger Antiochus"—whom he had described as being on the level ground with the heavy-armed cavalry—"charged down from the high ground and put to flight and pursued the cavalry under Ptolemy, son of Aeropus, who was in command of the Aetolians in the plain on the left wing; but the two lines,

Zeno's account of the battle of Panium between Antiochus the Great and Scopas, B.C. 201.

[1] Called Panion or Paneion. See Josephus *B. Jud.* 3, 10, 7, Ιορδάνου πήγη τὸ Πάνειον. The town near it was called Paneas, and afterwards Paneas Caesarea, and later still Caesarea Philippi. Scopas, the Aetolian, was now serving Ptolemy Epiphanes; see 13, 2; 18, 53.

[2] See on 4, 77; 13, 1.

when they met, maintained a stubborn fight." But he fails to observe that, as the elephants, cavalry, and light-armed infantry were in front, the two lines could not possibly meet at all.

19. Next he says that "the phalanx, outmatched in agility and forced backwards by the Aetolians, retired step by step, while the elephants received the retreating line, and did great service in charging the enemy." But how the elephants got on the rear of the phalanx it is not easy to understand, or how, if they had got there, they could have done good service. For as soon as the two lines were once at close quarters, the animals would no longer have been able to distinguish friend from foe among those that came in their way. Again, he says that "the Aetolian cavalry were thrown into a panic during the engagement, because they were unaccustomed to the look of the elephants." But, by his own account, the cavalry which was originally stationed on the right wing remained unbroken; while the other division of the cavalry, that on the right wing, had all fled before the successful attack of Antiochus. What portion of the cavalry was it, then, that was on the centre of the phalanx, and was terrified by the elephants? And where was the king, or what part did he take in the battle, seeing that he had with him the very flower of the infantry and cavalry? For not a word has been told us about these. And where was the elder of the young Antiochi, who, with a division of the troops, occupied the high ground? For this prince is not represented even as returning to his quarters after the battle. And very naturally so. For Zeno started by assuming two sons of the king named Antiochus, whereas there was only one in the army on that occasion. How comes it, again, that according to him, Scopas returned first and also last from the field? For he says: "when he saw the younger Antiochus, after returning from the pursuit, on the rear of his phalanx, and accordingly gave up all hopes of victory, he retired." But afterwards he says that "he sustained the most imminent peril when his phalanx got surrounded by the elephants and cavalry, and was the last man to retire from the field."

20. These and similar blunders appear to me to reflect very great discredit upon writers. It is necessary, therefore,

to endeavour to make one's self master of all departments of history alike. That is the ideal; but if that is impossible, one ought at least to be excessively careful on the most essential and important points in it. I have been induced to say this because I have observed that in history, as in other arts and sciences, there is a tendency to neglect the true and essential, while the ostentatious and the showy secure praise and emulation as something great and admirable. The fact being that in history, as in other departments of literature, these latter qualities require less trouble and gain a cheaper reputation. As to his ignorance of the topography of Laconia, considering that his error was an important one, I did not hesitate to write to Zeno personally. For I thought it a point of honour not to look upon the mistakes of others as personal triumphs, as is the way with some writers; but to do the best I could to secure correctness, not only of my own historical writings, but of those of others also, for the benefit of the world at large. When Zeno received my letter and found that it was impossible to make the correction, because his history was already published, he was much vexed, but could do nothing. He, however, put the most friendly interpretation on my proceeding; and, in regard to this point, I would beg my own readers, whether of my own or future generations, if I am ever detected in making a deliberate misstatement, and disregarding truth in any part of my history, to criticise me unmercifully; but if I do so from lack of information, to make allowances: and I ask it for myself more than others, owing to the size of my history and the extent of ground covered by its transactions. . . .

Polybius wrote to Zeno on his geographical mistakes.

EGYPT

21. Tlepolemus,[1] the chief minister in the kingdom of Egypt, was a young man, but one who had spent all his life in the camp, and with reputation. By nature aspiring and ambitious, he had done much that was glorious in the service of his country, but much that was evil also. As a general in a campaign, and as an administrator of military expeditions, he was a man of

Character and extravagance of Tlepolemus.

[1] See 15, 25.

great ability, high natural courage, and extremely well fitted to deal personally with soldiers. But on the other hand, for the management of complicated affairs, he was deficient in diligence and sobriety, and had the least faculty in the world for the keeping of money or the economical administration of finance. And it was this that before long not only caused his own fall, but seriously damaged the kingdom as well. For though he had complete control of the exchequer, he spent the greater part of the day in playing ball and in matches in martial exercises with the young men; and directly he left these sports he collected drinking parties, and spent the greater part of his life in these amusements and with these associates. But that part of his day which he devoted to business, he employed in distributing, or, I might rather say, in throwing away the royal treasures among the envoys from Greece and the Dionysian actors, and, more than all, among the officers and soldiers of the palace guard. He was utterly incapable of saying no, and bestowed anything there was at hand on any one who said anything to please him. The evil which he himself thus began continually increased. For every one who had received a favour expressed his gratitude in extravagant language, both for the sake of what he had got and of what he hoped to get in the future. And thus being informed of the universal praise which was bestowed on him, of the toasts proposed in his honour at banquets, of complimentary inscriptions, and songs sung in his praise by the public singers all through the town, he became entirely befooled, and grew daily more and more puffed up with conceit, and more reckless in squandering favours upon foreigners and soldiers.

Tlepolemus suppresses a court intrigue against himself.

22. These proceedings were very offensive to the other members of the court; and, therefore, they watched everything he did with a jealous eye, and conceived a detestation for his insolence, which they began to compare unfavourably with the character of Sosibius. For the latter was considered to show more wisdom in his guardianship of the king than his age gave reason to expect; and, in his dealings with other persons, to maintain the dignity proper to his high trust, which was the

royal seal and person. Just at this time, Ptolemy, the son of Sosibius, returned from his mission to Philip. Before he left Alexandria on his voyage, he had been full of foolish pride, partly from his own natural disposition and partly from his father's success. But upon landing in Macedonia, and mixing with the young men at court, he conceived the notion that the virtue of the Macedonians consisted in the better fashion of their boots and clothes; he therefore came home got up in imitation of all these peculiarities, and fully persuaded that his foreign tour and association with Macedonians had made a man of him. He therefore immediately began showing jealousy of Tlepolemus, and inveighing against him; and as all the courtiers joined him, on the ground that Tlepolemus was treating the business and revenue of the state as though he were its heir and not its guardian, the quarrel quickly grew. Meanwhile Tlepolemus, being informed of certain unfriendly speeches, originating in the jealous observation and malignity of the courtiers, at first turned a deaf ear to them and affected to despise them; but when at length they ventured to hold a meeting and openly express their disapproval of him in his absence, on the ground of his maladministration of the government of the kingdom, he grew angry; and, summoning the council, came forward and said that "they brought their accusations against him secretly and in private, but he judged it right to accuse them in public and face to face." . . .

After making his public speech, Tlepolemus deprived Sosibius of the custody of the seal also, and having got that into his hands, thenceforth conducted the administration exactly as he chose. . . .

THE WAR IN COELE-SYRIA

22 (*a*). It seems to me to be at once just and proper to give the people of Gaza[1] the praise which they deserve. For though they do not differ as to bravery in war from the rest of the inhabitants of Coele-Syria, yet as parties to an international

B.C. 201. Valour of the people of Gaza.

[1] Ptolemy Philopator had made Gaza his chief depôt of war material; see 5, 68. Antiochus destroyed it in B.C. 198 for its loyalty to the King of Egypt.

agreement, and in their fidelity to their promises, they far surpass them, and show altogether a courage in such matters that is irresistible. In the first place, when all the other people were terrified at the invasion of the Persians,[1] in view of the greatness of their power, and one and all submitted themselves and their countries to the Medes, they alone faced the danger and stood a siege. Again, on the invasion of Alexander, when not only did the other cities surrender, but even Tyre was stormed and its inhabitants sold into slavery; and when it seemed all but hopeless for any to escape destruction, who resisted the fierce and violent attack of Alexander, they alone of all the Syrians withstood him, and tested their powers of defence to the uttermost. Following the same line of conduct on the present occasion, they omitted nothing within their power in their determination to keep faith with Ptolemy. Therefore, just as we distinguish by special mention in our history individuals of eminent virtue, so ought we, in regard to states as such, to mention with commendation those which act nobly in any point from traditional principles and deliberate policy. . . .

B.C. 332.

ITALY (LIVY, 30, 45)

23. Publius Scipio returned from Libya soon after the events I have narrated. The expectation of the people concerning him was proportionable to the magnitude of his achievements: and the splendour of his reception, and the signs of popular favour which greeted him were extraordinary. Nor was this otherwise than reasonable and proper. For after despairing of ever driving Hannibal from Italy, or of averting that danger from themselves and their kinsfolk, they now looked on themselves as not only securely removed from every fear and every menace of attack, but as having conquered their enemies. Their joy therefore knew no bounds; and when Scipio came into the city in triumph, and the actual sight of

Scipio's return to Rome and triumph, B.C. 201, cp. 15, 19.

[1] Syria was conquered by the Assyrian king Tiglath-Pilezer about B.C. 747, and was afterwards a part of the Babylonian and Persian empires. It does not seem certain to what invasion Polybius is here referring.

the prisoners who formed the procession brought still more clearly to their memories the dangers of the past, they became almost wild in the expression of their thanks to the gods, and their affection for the author of such a signal change. For among the prisoners who were led in the triumphal procession was Syphax, the king of the Masaesylii, who shortly afterwards died in prison. The triumph concluded, the citizens celebrated games and festivals for several days running with great splendour, Scipio, in his magnificent liberality, supplying the cost. . . .

WAR BETWEEN ROME AND PHILIP V.

24. At the beginning of the winter in which Publius Sulpicius was elected consul at Rome, king Philip, who was staying at Bargylia, was rendered exceedingly uneasy and filled with many conflicting anxieties for the future, when he observed that the Rhodians and Attalus, far from dismissing their navy, were actually manning additional ships and paying more earnest attention than ever to guarding the coasts. He had a double cause, indeed, for uneasiness: he was afraid of sailing from Bargylia, and foresaw that he would have to encounter danger at sea; and at the same time he was not satisfied with the state of things in Macedonia, and therefore was unwilling on any consideration to spend the winter in Asia, being afraid both of the Aetolians and the Romans; for he was fully aware of the embassies sent to Rome to denounce him [as soon as it was known] that the war in Libya was ended. These considerations caused him overwhelming perplexity; but he was compelled for the present to remain where he was, leading the life of a wolf, to use the common expression: for he robbed and stole from some, and used force to others, while he did violence to his nature by fawning on others, because his army was suffering from famine; and by these means managed sometimes to get meat to eat, sometimes figs, and sometimes nothing but a very short allowance of corn. Some of these provisions were supplied to him by

Winter of B.C. 201-200. Coss. P. Sulpicius Galba, Maximus II., C. Aurelius Cotta (for B.C. 200).

Philip's anxieties,

and the starving state of his army.

Zeuxis, and some by the people of Mylae, Alabanda, and Magnesia, whom he flattered whenever they gave him anything, and barked at and plotted against when they did not. Finally, he made a plot to seize Mylae by the agency of Philocles, but failed from the clumsiness with which the scheme was contrived. The territory of Alabanda he harried as though it were an enemy's, alleging that it was imperatively necessary to get food for his troops. . . .

When this Philip, father of Perseus, was thus overrunning Asia, being unable to get provisions for his army, he accepted a present of figs from the Magnesians, as they had no corn. For which reason, when he conquered Myus, he granted its territory to the Magnesians in return for their figs. . . .

The visit of Attalus to Athens, B.C. 200.

25. The Athenian people sent envoys to king Attalus, both to thank him for the past, and to urge him to come to Athens to consult with them on the dangers that still threatened them.[1] The king was informed a few days afterwards that Roman ambassadors had arrived at the Peiraeus; and, believing that it was necessary to have an interview with them, he put to sea in haste. The Athenian people, being informed of his coming, passed very liberal votes as to the reception and general entertainment of the king. Arrived at the Peiraeus, Attalus spent the first day in transacting business with the Roman ambassadors, and was extremely delighted to find that they were fully mindful of their ancient alliance with him, and quite prepared for the war with Philip. Next morning, in company with the Romans and the Athenian magistrates, he began his progress to the city in great state. For he was met, not only by all the magistrates and the knights, but by all the citizens with their children and wives. And when the two processions met, the warmth of the welcome given by the populace to the Romans, and still more to Attalus, could not have been exceeded. At his entrance into the city by the gate Dipylum the priests and priestesses lined the street on both sides: all the temples were then thrown open; victims were placed ready at all the altars; and the king was requested to offer sacrifice. Finally they voted

[1] That is from the wars undertaken by them against Philip. Livy, 31, 14, 24.

him such high honours as they had never without great hesitation voted to any of their former benefactors: for, in addition to other compliments, they named a tribe after Attalus, and classed him among their eponymous heroes.

26. They next summoned an ecclesia and invited the king to address them. But upon his excusing himself, on the plea that it would be ill-bred for him to appear before the people and recount his own good services in the presence of those on whom they had been bestowed, they gave up asking for his personal appearance; but begged him to give them a written statement as to what he thought was the best thing to do in view of the existing circumstances. On his consenting to do this, and writing the document, the magistrates produced the despatch to the ecclesia. The contents of this written communication were briefly these: he recalled the good services he had done the people in the past; enumerated the things he had accomplished in the existing war against Philip; and lastly exhorted them to activity in this war, and protested that, if they did not determine resolutely to adopt this policy of hostility to Philip in common with the Rhodians, Romans, and himself, and yet afterwards wished to share in the benefits which had been secured by others, they would miss securing the true interests of their country. As soon as this despatch had been read, the people, influenced both by its contents and by their warm feeling towards Attalus, were prepared to vote the war: and when the Rhodians also entered and argued at great length to the same effect, the Athenians at once decreed the war against Philip. They gave the Rhodians also a magnificent reception, honoured their state with a crown of valour, and voted all Rhodians equal rights of citizenship at Athens, on the ground of their having, besides other things, restored the Athenian ships which had been captured with the men on board them. After concluding this arrangement, the Rhodian ambassadors sailed to Ceos with their fleet to visit the islands. . . .

The Athenians vote for war against Philip.

27. While the Roman ambassadors were still at Athens, Nicanor, by the command of Philip, made a raid upon Attica, and came as far as the Aca-

The Romans warn Philip to

abstain from attacking Greece, and to do justice to Attalus, on pain of war.

demy. Thereupon the Romans sent a herald to him, and bade him announce to his master Philip that "The Romans admonished him to make no war upon any Greek State, and to submit to an arbitration before a fair tribunal as to the injuries he had inflicted upon Attalus: that, if he did this, he might have peace with Rome, but, if he refused to obey, the opposite would immediately follow." On the receipt of this message Nicanor retired. Then the Romans sailed along the coast of Epirus and delivered a similar announcement in regard to Philip in the town of Phoenice; also to Amynandrus in the district of Athamania; also to the Aetolians in Naupactus, and the Achaeans in Aegium. And having thus by the mouth of Nicanor given Philip this clear warning, the Roman envoys themselves sailed away to visit Antiochus and Ptolemy with a view to settle their controversies. . . .

The firmness and vigour of Philip in meeting the danger.

28. It appears to me that to make a good beginning, and even to maintain enthusiasm long enough to secure a considerable measure of success, is an achievement of which many have been found capable; but to carry a purpose through to its end, and, even though fortune be adverse, to make up by cool reason for the deficiency of enthusiasm is within the power of few. From this point of view one cannot but disparage the inactivity of Attalus and the Rhodians, while regarding with admiration the royal and lofty spirit displayed by Philip, and his constancy to his purpose,—not meaning to speak in praise of his character as a whole, but simply commending the vigour with which he acted on this occasion. I make this distinction to prevent any one supposing that I contradict myself, because I recently praised Attalus and the Rhodians and found fault with Philip, whereas I am now doing the reverse. This is just such a case as I referred to at the beginning of my history, when I said that it was necessary sometimes to praise, and sometimes to blame the same persons, since it frequently happens that changes of circumstances for the worse and calamities alter men's original dispositions, and frequently also changes for the better; and sometimes too it is the case that from natural

1, 14.

temperament men are at one time inclined to what is right, at another to the reverse. And it is a variation of this sort that I think occurred to Philip in this instance. For, irritated by his defeats, and influenced in a great degree by anger and passion, he addressed himself with a kind of insane or inspired eagerness to meet the dangers of the hour; and it was in this spirit that he rose to the attack upon the Rhodians and king Attalus, and gained the successes which followed. I was induced to make these remarks, because I observe that some men, like bad runners in the stadium, abandon their purposes when close to the goal; while it is at that particular point, more than at any other, that others secure the victory over their rivals. . . .

29. Philip was anxious to anticipate the Romans in seizing bases of operation and landing-places in this country (Asia). . . . B.C. 200.

In order that, if it should be his purpose again to cross to Asia, he might have a landing-place at Abydos. . . .

The position of Abydos and Sestos, and the advantages of the situation of those towns it would, I think, be waste of time for me to state in great detail, because the singularity of those sites has made them familiar to all persons of intelligence. Still I imagine that it will not be otherwise than useful to remind my readers briefly of the facts, by way of attracting their attention. A man would best realise the advantages of these cities, not by regarding their sites by themselves, but by comparing and contrasting them with those about to be mentioned. For just as it is impossible to sail from the Ocean,—or as some call it the Atlantic,—into our sea, except by passing between the Pillars of Heracles, so is it impossible to sail from our sea into the Propontis and the Pontus except through the channel separating Sestos and Abydos. But as though Fortune had designed these two straits to counterbalance each other, the passage between the Pillars of Heracles is many times as broad as that of the Hellespont,—the former being sixty, the latter two stades; the reason being, as far as one may conjecture, the great superiority in size of the external Ocean to our sea: while the channel at Abydos is more convenient than that at the Pillars of Heracles. For the former being lined on both sides

The Dardanelles compared with the Straits of Gibraltar.

by human habitations is of the nature of a gate admitting mutual intercourse, sometimes being bridged over by those who determine to cross on foot, and at all times admitting a passage by sea. But the channel at the Pillars of Heracles is seldom used, and by very few persons, owing to the lack of intercourse between the tribes inhabiting those remote parts of Libya and Europe, and owing to the scantiness of our knowledge of the external Ocean. The city of Abydos itself is enclosed on both sides by two European promontories, and possesses a harbour capable of sheltering ships anchoring in it from every wind; while there is no possibility of anchoring at any point near the city outside the harbour mouth, owing to the rapidity and violence of the current setting through the strait.

Siege of Abydos.

30. Having then invested Abydos partly by a palisade and partly by an earthwork, Philip began blockading it by land and sea together. This siege was not at all remarkable for the extent of the machinery employed, or the ingenuity displayed in those works on which besiegers and besieged are wont to exhaust all their invention and skill against each other; but still it deserves, if any ever did, to be remembered and recorded for the noble spirit and extraordinary gallantry exhibited by the besieged. At first, feeling full confidence in themselves, the inhabitants of Abydos maintained a courageous resistance to the attempts of Philip; struck and dislodged some of his engines, which he brought against their walls by sea, with stones from their catapults, and destroyed others by fire, and with such fierceness, that the enemy were barely able to drag their ships out of danger. Against the siege operations on land, too, up to a certain point they offered an undaunted resistance, not at all despairing of ultimately overpowering the enemy. But when their outer wall was undermined and fell, and when moreover the Macedonians by means of these same mines were approaching the inner wall, which had been erected by the besieged to cover the breach: then at length they send Iphiades and Pantacnotus as ambassadors, with an offer to Philip that he should take over the city, on condition of letting the soldiers from Rhodes and Attalus depart under a truce; and of permitting all free persons to depart as they could, and wherever each might choose, with

the clothes that each was wearing. But on Philip bidding them "surrender at discretion or fight like men," the ambassadors returned to the town.

31. On being informed of the message the people of Abydos met in public assembly, and with feelings of utter despair deliberated upon their position. They thereupon resolved, first to liberate the slaves, that they might secure their sincere interest and loyalty; next, to collect all the women into the temple of Artemis, and the children with their nurses into the gymnasium; and finally to bring together their silver and gold into the market-place, as well as collect their clothes which were of any value into the quadrireme of the Rhodians and the trireme of the Cyzicenes. Having formed these resolutions and acted on the decree with unanimity, they again assembled in public meeting, and elected fifty of the older and most trusted men, who at the same time were possessed of sufficient bodily vigour to enable them to carry out what had been determined upon; and these they bound on oath in the presence of the whole of the citizens, that "whenever they saw the inner wall being captured by the enemy, they would kill the children and women, and would burn the abovementioned ships, and, in accordance with the curses that had been invoked, would throw the silver and gold into the sea." After this they brought the priests forward, and all the citizens swore that they would conquer the enemy or die fighting for their country. To crown all, they slew victims and compelled the priests and priestesses to dictate the words of this imprecation over the burnt offerings. Having bound themselves by this solemn agreement, they left off attempting to countermine the enemy, and resolved that, directly the interior wall fell, they would fight to the last in the breach with the enemy's storming party and there die.

Desperate resolution of the people of Abydos.

32. This would justify us in saying that the gallantry of the Abydenians outdid the proverbial Phocian recklessness and Acarnanian courage.[1] For the Phocians have the reputation of having adopted

Comparison of this resolution of the Abydenians

[1] For the Phocians see Pausan. 10, 1, 6. For the Acarnanians see *supra*, 9, 40.

with similar ones of the Phocians and Acarnanians.

a similar resolution as to their families, but not because they despaired of victory, for they were about to fight a pitched battle with the Thessalians in the open field. So too the Acarnanians, upon the mere prospect of an Aetolian invasion, adopted a like resolution; the details of which I have already narrated. But the Abydenians, at a time when they were closely invested and in all but complete despair of being saved, elected by a unanimous resolution to meet their fate along with their children and wives, rather than to live any longer with the knowledge that their children and wives would fall into the power of the enemy. Therefore one might justly complain of Fortune for having, in the former cases, given victory and safety to those who despaired of them, while she adopted the opposite decision in regard to the Abydenians. For the men were killed, and the city was taken, but the children with their mothers fell into the hands of the enemy.

How the city was surrendered and the women and children saved after all.

33. As soon as the interior wall had fallen, the men, according to their oaths, sprang upon the ruins and fought the enemy with such desperate courage, that Philip, though he had kept sending the Macedonians to the front in relays till nightfall, at last abandoned the contest in despair of accomplishing the capture at all. For not only did the Abydenian forlorn hope take their stand upon the dead bodies of the fallen enemies, and maintain the battle with fury; nor was it only that they fought gallantly with mere swords and spears; but when any of these weapons had been rendered useless, or had been knocked out of their hands, they grappled with the Macedonians, and either hurled them to the ground arms and all, or broke their sarissae, and stabbing their faces and exposed parts of their bodies with the broken ends, threw them into a complete panic. But the fight being interrupted by nightfall, most of the citizens having now fallen in the breach, and the rest being utterly exhausted by fatigue and wounds, Glaucides and Theognetus collected a few of the older men together, and, instigated by hopes of personal safety, lowered the special eminence and unique glory which their fellow-citizens had acquired. For they resolved to save the

children and women alive, and at daybreak to send the priests and priestesses with garlands to Philip, to entreat his mercy and surrender the city to him.

34. While this was going on, king Attalus, having heard that Abydos was being besieged, sailed through the Aegean to Tenedos; and similarly the youngest of the Roman ambassadors, Marcus Aemilius, arrived on board ship at Abydos itself. For the Roman ambassadors, having learnt at Rhodes the fact of the siege of Abydos, and wishing in accordance with their commission to deliver their message to Philip personally, put off their purpose of visiting the two kings, and despatched this man to him. Having found the king outside Abydos, he explained to him that "The Senate had resolved to order him not to wage war with any Greek state; nor to interfere in the dominions of Ptolemy; and to submit the injuries inflicted on Attalus and the Rhodians to arbitration; and that if he did so he might have peace, but if he refused to obey he would promptly have war with Rome." Upon Philip endeavouring to show that the Rhodians had been the first to lay hands on him, Marcus interrupted him by saying: "But what about the Athenians? And what about the Cianians? And what about the Abydenians at this moment? Did any one of them also lay hands on you first?" The king, at a loss for a reply, said: "I pardon the offensive haughtiness of your manners for three reasons: first, because you are a young man and inexperienced in affairs; secondly, because you are the handsomest man of your time" (this was true); "and thirdly, because you are a Roman. But for my part, my first demand to the Romans is that they should not break their treaties or go to war with me; but if they do, I shall defend myself as courageously as I can, appealing to the gods to defend my cause." With these words they separated. On becoming master of Abydos, Philip found all the property of the citizens collected by themselves ready to his hand. But when he saw the numbers and fury of those who were stabbing, burning, hanging, throwing into wells, or precipitating themselves from housetops, and their children and wives, he was overpowered with surprise; and

A Roman envoy arrives to warn Philip to desist.

The voluntary death of the Abydenians.

resenting these proceedings he published a proclamation, announcing, that "he gave three days' grace to those who wished to hang or stab themselves." The Abydenians, already bent on executing their original decree, and looking upon themselves as traitors to those who had fought and died for their country, could not endure remaining alive on any terms; and, accordingly, with the exception of those who had previously been put in chains or some similar restraint, they all without delay hastened to their death, each family by itself. . . .

The Rhodians resolve to side with Rome.

35. After the capture of Abydos, envoys came from the Achaean nation to Rhodes urging the Rhodians to make terms with Philip. But upon these being followed by the arrival of the ambassadors from Rome, who argued that they should make no terms with Philip without consulting the Romans, the Rhodian people voted to listen to the latter and to hold to their friendship with them. . . .

THE PELOPONNESE—WAR WITH NABIS

Philopoemen's device for collecting all the Achaean levies at Tegea simultaneously, B.C. 200.

36. Philopoemen calculated the distances of all the cities of the Achaean league, and from which of them men could arrive at Tegea along the same roads. He then wrote despatches to each of them, and sent them to the most distant cities, so dividing them that each city that was farthest on a particular road should get, not only the one addressed to itself, but those also of the other cities on the same road. The contents of these first despatches addressed to the chief magistrate were as follows: "As soon as ye receive this despatch, forthwith cause all the men of military age, with arms, and provisions, and money for five days, to assemble immediately in the market-place. And as soon as they are thus collected, march them out and lead them to the next city. As soon as ye have arrived there, deliver the despatch addressed to its chief magistrate and follow the instructions therein contained." Now, this second despatch contained exactly the same words as the former, except of course that the name of the next town was changed to which

they were to march. By this arrangement being repeated right along the road, in the first place no one knew for what purpose or undertaking the expedition was directed; and in the next place, every one was absolutely ignorant where he was going, beyond the name of the next town, but all marched forward in a state of complete mystification, taking on the successive contingents as they went. But as of course the most remote towns were not equally distant from Tegea, the letters were not delivered to them all at the same time, but to each in proportion to its distance. By which arrangement, without either the Tegeans or the new arrivals knowing what was going to happen, all the Achaeans marched into Tegea under arms by all the gates simultaneously.

A raid upon Laconia.

37. What suggested to Philopoemen this stratagem was the great number of the tyrant's eavesdroppers and spies. On the day then on which the main body of the Achaeans were to arrive at Tegea, he despatched a band of picked men, so timing their start, that they might pass the night near Sellasia and at daybreak begin a raid on Laconia. They had orders that, in case the mercenaries of Nabis left their quarters and attacked them, they were to retire on Scotita, and in other respects follow the directions of Didascalondas of Crete; for Philopoemen had given his confidence to this officer, and full directions as to the whole expedition. These men therefore set out in good spirits to the task assigned to them. Philopoemen himself having issued orders to the Achaeans to sup early, led out his army from Tegea, and after a rapid night's march halted it about the time of the morning watch in the neighbourhood of Scotita, which is between Tegea and Lacedaemon. When day broke the mercenaries in Pellene, being informed by their scouts of the raid which the enemy were making, started at once to the rescue, as was their custom, and bore down upon them; and when the Achaeans, in accordance with their instructions, retired, they followed, harassing them with bold and daring assaults. But as soon as they came to the place where Philopoemen lay in ambush, the Achaeans sprang up and cut some of them to pieces, and took others prisoners. . . .

38. Philip seeing that the Achaeans were disposed to hesi-

tate about undertaking the war with Rome, tried earnestly by every means to rouse their feeling of hostility. . . .

COELE-SYRIA

39. Ptolemy's general Scopas marched into the upper region during the winter and subdued the Jewish nation. . . .

The siege having been conducted in a desultory manner, Scopas fell into bad repute and was attacked with all the petulance of youth. . . .

B.C. 200. Antiochus conquers Coele-Syria and the Jews after beating Scopas at Panium. See *supra*, ch. 18.

Having conquered Scopas, Antiochus took Batanaea, Samaria, Abila, and Gadara; and after a while those of the Jews who inhabit the sacred town called Jerusalem submitted to him also. On the subject of this town I have a good deal more to say, and especially on account of the splendour of its temple, but I shall put it off to another opportunity.

BOOK XVIII[1]

THE WAR WITH PHILIP

1. When the time appointed arrived, Philip put to sea from Demetrias and came into the Melian Gulf, with five galleys and one beaked war-ship (pristis), on the latter of which he himself was sailing. There met him the Macedonian secretaries Apollodorus and Demosthenes, Brachylles from Boeotia, and the Achaean Cycliadas, who had been driven from the Peloponnese for the reasons I have already described. With Flamininus came king Amynandras, and Dionysodorus, legate of king Attalus. The commissioners from cities and nations were Aristaenus and Xenophon from the Achaeans; Acesimbrotus the navarch from the Rhodians; Phaeneas their Strategus from the Aetolians, and several others of their statesmen with him. Approaching the sea near Nicaea, Flamininus and those with him took their stand upon the very edge of the beach, while Philip, bringing his ship close to shore, remained afloat. Upon Flamininus bidding him disembark, he stood up on board and refused to leave his ship. Flamininus again asked him what he feared, he said that he feared no one but the gods, but he distrusted most of those who were there, especially the Aetolians. Upon the Roman expressing his surprise, and remarking that the danger was the same to all and the risk common, Philip retorted that "He was mistaken in saying that:

Congress at Nicaea in Locris, winter of B.C. 198-197. Coss. Titus Quinctius Flamininus, Sext. Aelius Paetus Catus.

Cycliadas expelled for favouring Philip. See Livy, 32, 19.

[1] According to Hultsch no fragments or extracts of book 17 are preserved. In it would have been contained the campaign of B.C. 199, in the war between Rome and Philip, for which see Livy, 31, 34-43. And the operations of Flamininus in the season of B.C. 198, Livy, 32, 9-18. The first seventeen chapters of this book are generally classed in book 17.

for that, if anything happened to Phaeneas, there were many who would act as Strategi for the Aetolians; but if Philip were to perish at the present juncture, there was no one to be king of the Macedonians." Though all thought this an unconciliatory way of opening the discussion, Flamininus nevertheless bade him speak on the matters he had come to consider. Philip however said that "The word was not with himself but with Flamininus; and therefore begged that he would state clearly what he was to do in order to have peace." The Roman consul replied that "What he had to say was simple and obvious: it was to bid him evacuate Greece entirely; restore the prisoners and deserters in his hands to their several states; hand over to the Romans those parts of Illyricum of which he had become possessed since the peace of Epirus; and, similarly, to restore to Ptolemy all the cities which he had taken from him since the death of Ptolemy Philopator.

The Roman demand.

Peace of Epirus, B.C. 205.

See *supra* II, 5-7.

2. Having said this Flamininus refrained from any further speech of his own; but turning to the others he bade them deliver what they had been severally charged to say by those who sent them. And first Dionysodorus, the envoy of Attalus, took up the discourse by declaring that "Philip ought to restore the king's ships which had been captured in the battle at Chios and their crews with them; and to restore also the temple of Aphrodite to its original state, as well as the Nicephorium, both of which he had destroyed." He was followed by the Rhodian navarch Acesimbrotus, who demanded "That Philip should evacuate Peraea, which he had taken from them; withdraw his garrisons from Iasus, Bargylia, and Euromus; restore the Perinthians to their political union with Byzantium; and evacuate Sestos, Abydos, and all commercial ports and harbours in Asia." Following the Rhodians the Achaeans demanded "The restoration of Corinth and Argos uninjuired." Then came the Aetolians, who first demanded, like the Romans, that "Philip should entirely evacuate Greece; and, secondly, that he should restore to them uninjured all cities formerly members of the Aetolian league."

Demands of Attalus,

of the Rhodians,

of the Achaeans.

and of the Aetolians.

3. When Phaeneas the Aetolian strategus had delivered this demand, a man called Alexander Isius, who had the reputation of being an able politician and good speaker, said that "Philip was neither sincere at the present moment in proposing terms, nor bold in his manner of making war, when he had to do that. In conferences and colloquies he was always setting ambushes and lying in wait, and using all the practices of war, but in actual war itself took up a position at once unjust and ignoble: for he avoided meeting his enemies face to face, and, as he fled before them, employed himself in burning and plundering the cities; and by this policy, though himself beaten, he spoilt the value of the victor's reward. Yet former kings of Macedonia had not adopted this plan, but one exactly the reverse: for they were continually fighting with each other in the open field, but rarely destroyed and ruined cities. This was shown clearly by Alexander's war in Asia against king Darius; and again in the contentions between his successors, when they combined to fight Antigonus for the possession of Asia. So too had the successors of these kings followed the same policy down to the time of Pyrrhus: they had been prompt to war against each other in the open field, and to do everything they could to conquer each other in arms, but had spared the cities, that they might rule them if they conquered, and be honoured by their subjects. But that a man should abandon war, and yet destroy that for which the war was undertaken, seemed an act of madness, and madness of a very violent sort. And this was just what Philip was doing at that moment; for he had destroyed more cities in Thessaly, on his rapid march from the pass of Epirus, though he was a friend and ally of that country, than any one who had ever been at war with the Thessalians."

Speech of Alexander Isius.

After a good deal more to the same effect he ended by asking Philip, "On what grounds he was holding the town of Lysimacheia with a garrison, having expelled the strategus sent by the Aetolian league, of which it was a member? Also on what grounds he had enslaved the Ciani who were also in alliance with the Aetolians? Lastly, on what plea he was in actual occupation of Echinus, Phthiotid Thebes, Pharsalus, and Larisa?"

The rejoinder of Philip.

4. When Alexander had concluded his speech, Philip came somewhat nearer to the shore than he was before, and, rising on board his ship, said that "Alexander had composed and delivered a speech in the true Aetolian and theatrical style. For every one knew quite well that nobody willingly destroys his own allies, but that, at times of special danger, military commanders are compelled to do many things contrary to their natural feelings." While the king was still speaking, Phaeneas, who was very short-sighted, interrupted him by saying, "You are trifling with us; you must either fight and conquer, or obey the commands of the stronger." Philip, in spite of the unfortunate position of his affairs, could not refrain from his habitual humour: turning towards Phaeneas he said, "Even a blind man could see that." Such a knack had he of cutting repartee. Then he turned to Alexander again and said, "You ask me, Alexander, why I took possession of Lysimacheia. I reply, in order that it might not by your neglect be devastated by Thracians, as it has now actually been; because I was compelled by this war to remove my soldiers, who indeed were no hostile garrison, as you say, but were there for its protection. As for the Ciani, I did not go to war with them, but only assisted Prusias to take them who was at war with them. And of this you yourselves were the cause. For though I sent envoy after envoy to you desiring that you would repeal the law which allows you the privilege of taking 'spoil from spoil,' you replied that rather than abolish this law you would remove Aetolia from Aetolia."

Philip explains the peculiar law of the Aetolians.

5. When Flamininus expressed some wonder at what he meant by this, the king tried to explain it to him by saying that "The Aetolian custom was this. They not only plundered those with whom they were at war, and harried their country; but, if certain other nations were at war with each other, even though both were friends and allies of the Aetolians, none the less the Aetolians might, without a formal decree of the people, take part with both combatants and plunder the territory of both. The result was that in the eyes of the Aetolians there were no defined limits of friendship or enmity, but they were ready to be the enemies and assailers of all who had a dispute on any-

thing. "How then," he added, "have they any right to blame me if, while on terms of friendship with the Aetolians, I did anything against the Ciani in support of my own allies? But the most outrageous part of their conduct is that they try to rival Rome, and bid me entirely evacuate Greece! The demand in itself is sufficiently haughty and dictatorial: still, in the mouths of Romans, it is tolerable, but in that of Aetolians quite intolerable. What is this Greece, pray, from which ye bid me depart? How do you define it? Why, most of the Aetolians themselves are not Greeks; for neither the Agrai, nor the Apodoti, nor the Amphilochi are counted as Greek. Do you then give up those tribes to me?"

6. Upon Flamininus laughing at these words, Philip proceeded: "Well, enough said to the Aetolians! But to the Rhodians and Attalus I have to say that, in the eyes of a fair judge, it would be held more just that they should restore to me the ships captured, than I to them. For I did not begin the attack upon Attalus and the Rhodians, but they upon me, as everybody acknowledges. However, at your instance, Titus, I restore Peraea to the Rhodians, and to Attalus his ships and as many of the men as are still alive. As for the destruction of the Nicephorium and the grove of Aphrodite, I am not able to do anything else towards their restoration, but I will send plants and gardeners to attend to the place and the growth of the trees that have been cut down." Flamininus once more laughing at the king's sarcastic tone, Philip turned to the Achaeans, and first went through the list of benefactions received by them from Antigonus and himself; then quoted the extraordinary honours Antigonus and he had received from them; and concluded by reading their decree for abandoning him and joining Rome. Taking this for his text, he expatiated at great length on the fickleness and ingratitude of the Achaeans. Still he said he would restore Argos to them, and as to Corinth would consult with Flamininus.

Philip's answer to the Rhodians and Attalus.

and the Achaeans.

7. Having thus concluded his conversation with the other envoys, he asked Flamininus, observing that the discussion was really confined to himself and the Romans, "Whether he considered that

A retort of Flamininus.

he was bound to evacuate only those places in Greece which he had himself acquired, or those also which he had inherited from his ancestors?" On Flamininus making no answer, Aristaenus for the Achaeans, and Phaeneas for the Aetolians, were on the point of replying. But as the day was closing in, time prevented them from doing so; and Philip demanded that they should all hand into him a written statement of the terms on which peace was to be granted: for being there alone he had no one with whom to consult; and therefore wished to turn their demands over in his own mind. Now Flamininus was much amused at Philip's sarcastic banter; but not wishing the others to think so, he retaliated on him by a sarcasm also, saying: "Of course you are alone, Philip: for you have killed all the friends likely to give you the best advice!" The king smiled sardonically, but said nothing. And for the present, all having handed in the written statements of their demands as aforesaid, the conference broke up, after appointing to meet again next day at Nicaea. But next morning, though Flamininus came to the appointed place and found the others there, Philip did not arrive.

Second day's conference, Philip comes late.

8. When the day, however, had nearly come to an end, and Titus and the others had almost given him up, Philip appeared accompanied as before, and excused himself by saying that he had spent the whole day in perplexity and doubt, caused by the severity of the demands made upon him. But every one else thought that he had acted thus from a wish to prevent, by the lateness of the hour, the delivery of invectives by the Achaeans and Aetolians: for he saw, as he was going away on the previous evening, that both were ready to attack him and state grievances. Therefore, as soon as he approached the meeting this time, he demanded that "The Roman Consul should discuss the matter with him in private; that they might not have a mere war of words on both sides, but that a definite settlement should be come to on the points in dispute." On his several times repeating this request and pressing it strongly, Flamininus asked those present what he ought to do. On their bidding him meet the king and hear what he had to say, he took with him Appius Claudius, at that time a military Tribune,

and telling the others to retire a short way from the sea and remain there, he himself bade Philip disembark. Accordingly the king, attended by Apollodorus and Demosthenes, left his ship, and, joining Flamininus, conversed with him for a considerable time. What was said by the one and the other on that occasion it is not easy to state. However, when Philip and he had parted, Flamininus, in explaining the king's views to the others, said that he consented to restore Pharsalus and Larisa to the Aetolians, but not Thebes: and that to the Rhodians he surrendered Peraea, but not Iasus and Bargylia: to the Achaeans he gave up Corinth and Argos: to the Romans he promised that he would surrender Illyricum and all prisoners: and to Attalus the ships, and as many of the men captured in the sea-fights as survived.

Philip's final offers.

9. All present expressed their dissatisfaction at these terms, and alleged that it was necessary before all that he should perform the general injunction, that, namely, of evacuating all Greece: otherwise these particular concessions were vain and useless. Observing that there was an animated discussion going on among them, and fearing at the same time that they would indulge in accusations against himself, Philip requested Flamininus to adjourn the conference till next day, as the evening was closing in; and promised that he would then either persuade them to accept his terms or submit to theirs. Flamininus consenting, they separated, after appointing to meet next day on the beach near Thronium.

Dissatisfaction of the Congress.

Next day all came to the appointed place in good time. Philip in a short speech called on all, and especially on Flamininus, "Not to break off the negotiation for peace now that by far the greater number were inclined to come to some arrangement; but, if possible, to come to an understanding by themselves on the points in dispute; or, if that could not be, to send envoys to the Senate, and either convince it as to this controversy, or submit to whatever it enjoined."

Third day's conference. A reference to the Senate agreed on.

On this proposition of the king, all the others declared that they preferred war to such a demand. But the Roman Consul

said that "He was quite aware that it was improbable that Philip would submit to any of their demands, yet, as it did not in the least stand in the way of such action as they chose to take to grant the favour demanded by the king, he would concede it. For not one of the proposals actually made at present could be confirmed without the authority of the Senate; and besides the season now coming on was a favourable one for ascertaining its opinion; for, even as things were, the armies could do nothing owing to the winter: it was therefore against no one's interests, but, on the contrary, very convenient for them all, to devote this time to a reference to the Senate on the present state of affairs."

The embassies to Rome.

10. Seeing that Flamininus was not averse to referring the matter to the Senate, all the others presently consented, and voted to allow Philip to send envoys to Rome, and that they too should severally send envoys of their own to plead their cause before the Senate, and state their grievances against Philip.

The business of the conference having thus been concluded in accordance with his views and the opinions he had originally expressed, Flamininus at once set about carefully securing his own position, and preventing Philip from taking any undue advantage. For though he granted him three months' suspension of hostilities, he stipulated that he should complete his embassy to Rome within that time, and insisted on his immediately removing his garrisons from Phocis and Locris. He was also very careful to insist on behalf of the Roman allies, that no act of hostility should be committed against them during this period by the Macedonians. Having made these terms in writing with Philip, he immediately took the necessary steps himself to carry out his own policy. First, he sent Amynandrus to Rome at once, knowing that he was a man of pliable character, and would be easily persuaded by his own friends in the city to take any course they might propose; and at the same time would carry with him a certain prestige, and rouse men's curiosity and interest by his title of royalty. Next to him he sent as personal envoys his wife's nephew Quintus Fabius, Quintus Fulvius, and Appius Claudius Nero. From the Aetolians went Alexander Isius, Damocritus

of Calydon, Dicaearchus of Trichonium, Polemarchus of Arsinoe, Lamius of Ambracia, Nicomachus of Acarnania,—one of those who had fled from Thurium and settled in Ambracia,—and Theodotus of Pherae, an exile from Thessaly who settled in Stratus: from the Achaeans Xenophon of Aegium: from King Attalus only Alexander: and from the Athenian people Cephisodorus and his colleagues.

11. Now these envoys arrived in Rome before the Senate had settled the provinces of the Consuls appointed for this year, and whether it would be necessary to send both to Gaul, or one of them against Philip. But the friends of Flamininus having assured themselves that both Consuls would remain in Italy owing to the threat of an attack from the Celts, all the ambassadors appeared and bluntly stated their grievances against Philip. The bulk of their accusations was to the same effect as what they had before stated to the king himself; but they also endeavoured carefully to instil this idea in the minds of the Senators, "That so long as Chalcis, Corinth, and Demetrias were subject to Macedonia, it was impossible for the Greeks to think of liberty; for Philip himself had spoken the exact truth when he called these places the 'fetters of Greece.' For neither could the Peloponnese breathe while a royal garrison was stationed in Cornith, nor the Locrians, Boeotians, and Phocians feel any confidence while Philip was in occupation of Chalcis and the rest of Euboea; nor indeed could the Thessalians or Magnesians raise a spark of liberty[1] while Philip and the Macedonians held Demetrias. That, therefore, Philip's offer to evacuate the other places was a mere pretence in order to escape the immediate danger; and that on the very first day he chose he would with ease reduce the Greeks again under his power, if he were in possession of these places." They accordingly urged the Senate "either to force Philip to evacuate the cities they had named, or to stand by the policy they had begun, and vigorously prosecute the war against him. For in truth the most difficult part of the war was already accomplished, the Macedonians having already been

The speeches of the Greek envoys in the Senate.

[1] The reading *ἐναύσασθαι*, which I attempt to represent, is doubtful. Schweig. suggests *ἐγγεύσασθαι* "to taste."

twice defeated, and most of their resources on land already expended."

They concluded by beseeching the Senate "not to beguile the Greeks of their hopes of liberty, nor deprive themselves of the most glorious renown." Such, or nearly so, were the arguments advanced by the Greek envoys. Philip's envoys were prepared to make a long speech in reply: but they were stopped at the threshold. For being asked whether they were prepared to evacuate Chalcis, Corinth, and Demetrias, they declared that they had not any instructions as to those towns. They were accordingly rebuked by the Senate and obliged to discontinue their speech.

12. The Senate then, as I have said before, assigned Gaul to both the consuls as their province, and ordered that the war against Philip should go on, assigning to Titus Flamininus the entire control of Greek affairs. These decrees having been quickly made known in Greece, Flamininus found everything settled to his mind, partly no doubt by the assistance of chance, but for the most part by his own foresight in the management of the whole business. For he was exceedingly acute, if ever Roman was. The skill and good sense with which he conducted public business and private negotiations could not be surpassed, and yet he was quite a young man, not yet more than thirty, and the first Roman who had crossed to Greece with an army. . . .

B.C. 197 Coss. G. Cornelius Cathagus, Q. Minucius Rufus.

13. It has often and in many cases occurred to me to wonder at the mistakes men make; but none seems to me so surprising as that of traitors. I wish, therefore, to say a word in season on the subject. I know very well that it is one which does not admit of easy treatment or definition. For it is not at all easy to say whom we ought to regard as a real traitor. Plainly all those, who at a time of tranquillity make compacts with kings or princes, cannot be reckoned such off hand; nor, again, those who in the midst of dangers transfer their country from existing friendships and alliances to others. Far from it. For such men have again and again been the authors of manifold advantages to their own countries. But not to go any

Was Aristaenus a traitor or a wise Opportunist?

further for example, my meaning can be made clear by the circumstances of the present case. For, if Aristaenus had not at this time opportunely caused the Achaeans to leave their alliance with Philip and join that of Rome, it is clear that the whole league would have been utterly ruined. But as it was, this man and this policy were confessedly the sources, not only of security to individual Achaeans at the time, but of the aggrandisement of the whole league. Therefore he was not looked upon as a traitor, but universally honoured as a benefactor and saviour of the country. The same principle will hold good in the case of all others who regulate their policy and measures by the necessities of the hour.

Comparison of the policy of the Achaeans and other Peloponnesians towards Philip V. with that recommended by Demosthenes towards Philip II.

14. From this point of view fault might be found with Demosthenes, admirable as he is in many respects, for having rashly and indiscriminately launched an exceedingly bitter charge at the most illustrious Greeks. For he asserted that in Arcadia, Cercidas, Hieronymus, and Eucampidas were traitors to Greece for making an alliance with Philip; in Messene the sons of Philiades, Neon and Thraylochus; in Argos, Mystis, Teledamus, one Mnaseas; in Thessaly, Daochus and Cineas; in Boeotia, Theogeiton and Timolas: and many more besides he has included in the same category, naming them city by city; and yet all these men have a weighty and obvious plea to urge in defence of their conduct, and above all those of Arcadia and Messene.[1] For it was by their bringing Philip into the Peloponnese, and humbling the Lacedaemonians, that these men in the first place enabled all its inhabitants to breathe again, and conceive the idea of liberty; and in the next place, by recovering the territory and cities which the Lacedaemonians in the hour of prosperity had taken from the Messenians, Megalopolitans, Tegeans, and Argives, notoriously raised the fortunes of their own countries.[2] In return for this they were bound not to make war

[1] Demosthenes, *de Corona*, §§ 43, 48, 295.

[2] B.C. 338 after the battle of Chaeronea. See Thirlwall, 6, 77; Grote, 11, 315 (ch. 90); Kennedy's translation of the *de Corona*, Appendix vi. The argument of Polybius is of course an *ex post facto* one. It is open still to

on Philip and the Macedonians, but to do all they could to promote his reputation and honour. Now, if they had been doing all this, or if they had admitted a garrison from Philip into their native cities, or had abolished their constitutions and deprived their fellow-citizens of liberty and freedom of speech, for the sake of their own private advantage or power, they would have deserved this name of traitor. But if, while carefully maintaining their duty to their countries, they yet differed in their judgment of politics, and did not consider that their interests were the same as those of the Athenians, it is not, I think, fair that they should have been called traitors on that account by Demosthenes. The man who measures everything by the interests of his own particular state, and imagines that all the Greeks ought to have their eyes fixed upon Athens, on the pain of being styled traitors, seems to me to be ill-informed and to be labouring under a strange delusion, especially as the course which events in Greece took at that time has borne witness to the wisdom, not of Demosthenes, but of Eucampidas, Hieronymus, Cercidas, and the sons of Philiades. For what did the Athenians eventually get by their opposition to Philip? Why, the crowning disaster of the defeat at Chaeronea. And had it not been for the king's magnanimity and regard for his own reputation, their misfortunes would have gone even further, thanks to the policy of Demosthenes. Whereas, owing to the men I have mentioned, security and relief from attacks of the Lacedaemonians were obtained for Arcadia and Messenia generally, and many advantages accrued to their states separately.

B.C. 338.

15. It is not easy then to define to whom one may properly apply this name. The nearest approach to truth would be to assign it to those who in times of public danger, either for the sake of personal security or advantage, or to retaliate upon political opponents, put their cities into the hands of the enemy: or indeed to those who, by admitting a foreign garrison, and employing external assistance to carry out private

The true traitor is the man who acts with personal objects or from party spirit.

maintain that, had the advice of Demosthenes been followed, these states might have been freed from the tyranny of Sparta without becoming subject to another master in the king of Macedonia.

aims and views, bring their country under the direction of a superior power. All such men as these one might include in the category of traitors with perfect reasonableness. Such men, indeed, gain neither profit nor honour, but the reverse, as every one acknowledges. And this brings me back to my original observation, that it is difficult to understand with what object, and supported by what reasoning, men rush upon such a disastrous position. For no one ever yet betrayed his city or camp or fort without being detected; but even if a man here and there managed to conceal it at the moment of his crime, yet all have been detected in the course of time. Nor when known has any such ever had a happy life; but, as a rule, they meet with the punishment they deserve from the very persons in whose favour they act. For, indeed, though generals and princes constantly employ traitors for their own purposes; yet when they have got all they can out of them, they treat them thenceforth as traitors, as Demosthenes says; very naturally considering that those, who have put their country and original friends into the hands of their enemies, are never likely to be really loyal or to keep faith with themselves. Nay, even though they escape violence at the hands of these, yet they do not easily avoid the vengeance of those whom they betrayed. Or if, finally, they manage to evade the designs of both the one and the other, yet all over the world fame dogs their footsteps with vengeance to their lives' end, suggesting to their imaginations night and day numberless terrors, false and true; helping and hounding on all who design any evil against them; and, finally, refusing to allow them even in sleep to forget their crimes, but forcing them to dream of every kind of plot and disaster, because they are aware of the universal loathing and hatred which attend them. Yet, though all this is true, nobody who wanted one was ever at a loss for a traitor, except in the rarest cases. From which one might say with some plausibility that man, reputed the most cunning of animals, gives considerable grounds for being regarded as the stupidest. For the other animals, which obey their bodily appetites alone, can be deceived by these alone; while man, though he has reason

The reward of treason.

Demosth. *de Corona*, § 47.

to guide him, is led into error by the failure of that reason no less than by his physical appetites. . . .

Attalus in Sicyon, B.C. 198.

16. King Attalus had for some time past been held in extraordinary honour by the Sicyonians, ever since the time that he ransomed the sacred land of Apollo for them at the cost of a large sum of money; in return for which they set up the colossal statue of him, ten cubits high, near the temple of Apollo in the market-place. But on this occasion, on his presenting them with ten talents and ten thousand medimni of wheat, their devotion to him was immensely increased; and they accordingly voted him a statue of gold, and passed a law to offer sacrifice in his honour every year. With these honours, then, Attalus departed to Cenchreae.[1] . . .

The cruelty of Apega, wife of Nabis.

17. The tyrant Nabis, leaving Timocrates of Pellene at Argos,—because he trusted him more than any one else and employed him in his most important undertakings,—returned to Sparta: and thence, after some few days, despatched his wife with instructions to go to Argos and raise money. On her arrival she far surpassed Nabis himself in cruelty. For she summoned women to her presence either privately or in families, and inflicted every kind of torture and violence upon them, until she had extorted from almost all of them, not only their gold ornaments, but also the most valuable parts of their clothing. . . .

B.C. 197. King Attalus before the assembled Boeotians. See Livy, 33, 2.

In a speech of considerable length Attalus reminded them of the ancient valour of their ancestors. . . .

THE END OF THE FIRST MACEDONIAN WAR

B.C. 197, at the beginning of spring. Livy, 33, 1.

18. Flamininus being unable to ascertain where the enemy were encamped, but yet being clearly informed that they had entered Thessaly, gave orders to all his men to cut stakes to carry with them, ready for use at any moment. This seems im-

[1] Attalus spent the winter of B.C. 198-197 at Aegina, in the course of which he seems to have visited Sicyon.

possible to Greek habits, but to those of Rome it is easy. For the Greeks find it difficult to hold even their sarissae on the march, and can scarcely bear the fatigue of them; but the Romans strap their shields to their shoulders with leathern thongs, and, having nothing but their javelins in their hands, can stand the additional burden of a stake. There is also a great difference between the stakes employed by the two peoples. The Greeks hold that the best stake is that which has the largest and most numerous shoots growing round the stem; but the Roman stakes have only two or three side shoots, or at most four; and those are selected which have these shoots on one side only. The result is that their porterage is very easy (for each man carries three or four packed together), and they make an exceedingly secure palisade when put into use. For the Greek palisading, when set in the front of the camp, in the first place can easily be pulled down; for since the part that is firm and tightly fixed in the ground is single, while the projecting arms of it are many and large, two or three men can get hold of the same stake by its projecting arms, and easily pull it up; and directly that is done, its breadth is so great that a regular gateway is made: and because in such a palisade the stakes are not closely interlaced or interwoven with each other, when one is pulled up the part next to it is made insecure. With the Romans it is quite different. For as soon as they fix their stakes, they interlace them in such a manner that it is not easy to know to which of the stems fixed in the ground the branches belong, nor on which of these branches the smaller shoots are growing. Moreover, it is impossible to insert the hand and grasp them, owing to the closeness of the interlacing of the branches and the way they lie one upon another, and because the main branches are also carefully cut so as to have sharp ends. Nor, if one is got hold of, is it easy to pull up: because, in the first place, all the stakes are sufficiently tightly secured in the ground to be self-supporting; and, in the second place, because the man who pulls away one branch must, owing to the close interlacing, be able to move several others in its train; and it is quite unlikely that two or three men should happen to get hold

The methods of forming palisades among the Greeks and Romans.

of the same stake. But even if, by the exertion of enormous force, a man has succeeded in pulling one or another up, the gap is scarcely perceptible. Considering, therefore, the vast superiority of this method, both in the readiness with which such stakes are found, the ease with which they are carried, and the security and durability of the palisade made with them, it is plain, in my opinion, that if any military operation of the Romans deserves to be admired and imitated, it is this.

19. After providing for contingencies by these preparations, Flamininus advanced with his whole force at a moderate pace, and, having arrived at about fifty stades from Pherae, pitched a camp there; and next morning, just before the morning watch, sent out some reconnoitring parties to see whether they could get any opportunity of discovering the position and movements of the enemy. Philip, at the same time, being informed that the Romans were encamped near Thebes, started with his whole force from Larisa in the direction of Pherae. When about thirty stades from that town, he pitched his camp there, and gave orders for all his men to make their preparations early next morning, and about the morning watch got his troops on the march. The division whose usual duty it was to form the advance guard he sent forward first, with instructions to cross the heights above Pherae, while he personally superintended the main army's advance from the camp as the day was breaking. The advanced guards of the two armies were within a very little of coming into collision in the pass; for the darkness prevented their seeing each other until they were quite a short distance apart. Both sides halted, and sent speedy intelligence to their respective leaders of what had happened, and asking for instructions. . . .

Flamininus marches to Pherae in Thessaly.

Thebae Phthiotides.

The advanced guards of the two armies meet.

[The generals decided] to remain in their intrenchments, and recall these advanced guards. Next morning both sent out about three hundred cavalry and light infantry to reconnoitre, among which Flamininus also sent two squadrons of Aetolians, because they were acquainted with the country. These opposing reconnoitring parties fell in with each other on the road between Pherae and Larisa, and joined battle

with great fury. The men under Eupolemus the Aetolian fighting gallantly, and urging the Italian troops to do the same, the Macedonians were repulsed; and, after skirmishing for a long while, both parties retired to their respective camps.

20. Dissatisfied with the country near Pherae, as being thickly wooded and full of walls and gardens, both parties broke up their camps next day. Philip directed his march towards Scotusa, because he desired to supply himself with provisions from that town, and thus, with all his preparations complete, to find a district more suitable to his army: while Flamininus, divining his intention, got his army on the march at the same time as Philip, in great haste to anticipate him in securing the corn in the territory of Scotusa. A range of hills intervening between their two lines of march, the Romans could not see in what direction the Macedonians were marching, nor the Macedonians the Romans. Both armies, however, continued their march during this day, Flamininus to Eretria in Phthiotis, and Philip to the river Onchestus; and there they respectively pitched their camps. Next day they advanced again, and again encamped: Philip at Melambium in the territory of Scotusa, and Flamininus at the temple of Thetis in that of Pharsalus, being still ignorant of each other's whereabouts. A violent storm of rain and thunder coming on next day, the whole atmosphere descended from the clouds to the earth about the time of the morning watch, so that the darkness was too dense to see even those who were quite close. In spite of this, Philip was so eager to accomplish his object, that he started with his whole army; but finding himself much embarrassed on the march by the mist, after accomplishing a very small distance he again encamped; but he sent his reserve back, with instructions to halt upon the summit of the intervening hills.[1]

Autumn of B.C. 197. Both Philip and Flamininus advance towards Scotusa, on opposite sides of a range of hills.

21. Flamininus, in his camp near the temple of Thetis,

[1] That is of Cynoscephalae. *Supergressi tumulos qui Cynoscephalae vocantur, relicta ibi statione firma peditum equitumque, posuerunt castra.* Livy, 33, 7.

Another skirmish between detached parties.

being uncertain as to the position of the enemy, sent out ten troops of cavalry and a thousand light infantry in advance, with instructions to keep a careful look-out as they traversed the country. As these men were approaching the ridge of the hills they came upon the Macedonian reserve without expecting it, owing to the dimness of the light. After a short interval of mutual alarm, both sides began irregular attacks on each other, and both despatched messengers to their respective chiefs to give information of what had occurred; and when the Romans began to get the worst of it in the encounter, and to suffer heavily at the hands of the Macedonian reserve, they sent to their camp begging for supports. Flamininus accordingly despatched the Aetolians under Archedamus and Eupolemus, as well as two of his own tribunes, with a force altogether of five hundred cavalry and two thousand infantry, after properly exhorting them to do their duty. On their arrival to the support of the skirmishing party already engaged, the aspect of affairs was promptly changed. For the Romans, inspired by the hope which this reinforcement gave, renewed the contest with redoubled spirit; while the Macedonians, though offering a gallant defence, were now in their turn hard pressed, and being forced to make a general retreat, retired to the highest points in the hills, and despatched messengers to the king for help.

22. But Philip, who had not expected, for reasons indicated above, that a general engagement would take place on that day, happened to have sent a considerable part of his troops out of camp foraging. But when informed of what was taking place by these messengers, the mist at the same time beginning to lift, he despatched, with due exhortation, Heracleides of Gyrton, the commander of his Thessalian cavalry; Leon, the general of his Macedonian horse; and Athenagoras, with all the mercenaries except those from Thrace. The reserve being joined by these troops, and the Macedonian force having thus become a formidable one, they advanced against the enemy, and in their turn drove the Romans back from the heights. But what prevented them, more than anything else, from entirely routing

Philip sends supports.

the enemy was the gallantry of the Aetolian cavalry, which fought with desperate fury and reckless valour. For the Aetolians are as superior to the rest of the Greeks in cavalry for fighting in skirmishing order, troop to troop, or man to man, as they are inferior to them both in the arms and tactics of their infantry for the purpose of a general engagement. The enemy being held in check therefore by these troops, the Romans were not forced back again quite on to the level ground, but, after retiring to a short distance, faced round and halted. But when Flamininus saw that not only had the cavalry and light infantry retired, but that, owing to them, his whole force was rendered uneasy, he drew out his entire army and got them into order of battle close to the hills. Meanwhile one man after another of the Macedonian reserve ran towards Philip shouting out, "King, the enemy are flying: do not let slip the opportunity. The barbarians cannot stand before us: now is the day for you to strike: now is your opportunity!" The result was that he was induced to fight in spite of his dissatisfaction with the ground. For these hills, which are called Cynoscephalae, are rough, precipitous, and of considerable height; and it was because he foresaw the disadvantages of such a ground, that he was originally disinclined to accept battle there; but, being excited now by the extravagantly sanguine reports of these messengers, he gave the order for his army to be drawn out of camp.

Valour of the Aetolian cavalry.

Cynoscephalae. Flamininus offers battle, which Philip, against his better judgment, accepts.

23. Having got his main body into order, Flamininus gave his attention at the same time to relieving his advanced guard, and to going along the ranks to encourage his men. His exhortation was short, but clear and intelligible to the hearers: for, pointing to the enemy with his hand, he said to his soldiers: "Are not these the Macedonians, my men, whom, when occupying in their own country the pass to Eordaea, you routed in open battle, under the command of Sulpicius, and drove to take refuge on the hills with the loss of many of their comrades? Are not these the Macedonians whom, when defended by what seemed an impassable country in Epirus, you dis-

Flamininus addresses his men, and advances to the attack.

lodged by sheer valour, and forced to throw away their shields and fly right into Macedonia? Why then should you feel any hesitation when you are to fight the same men on equal ground? Why look anxiously to the past, rather than let that past minister courage to you for the present? Therefore, my men, rouse each other by mutual exhortations, and hasten in your might to the struggle! For, with God's will, I am persuaded that this battle will quickly have the same issue as the contests in the past." With these words he ordered his right wing to remain where they were, and the elephants in front of them; while with his left, supported by the light infantry, he advanced in gallant style to attack the enemy. And the Roman troops already on the field, finding themselves thus reinforced by the legions on their rear, once more faced round and charged their opponents.

The advanced guard are encouraged.

24. Meanwhile, when he had seen the main part of his army in position outside the camp, Philip himself advanced with his peltasts and the right wing of his phalanx, commencing the ascent of the hills with great rapidity, and having left instructions with Nicanor, surnamed the Elephant, to see that the rest of the army followed at once. As soon as his first files reached the summit, he deployed his men into line by the left, and occupied the range of high ground: for the Macedonians who had been sent in advance had forced the Romans a considerable distance down the other side of the hills, and therefore he found the ridges unoccupied by the enemy. But while he was still engaged in getting the right wing of his army into line, his mercenaries came on the ground, having been decisively repulsed by the enemy. For when the Roman light infantry found themselves supported by the heavy, as I said just now, with their assistance, which they regarded as turning the scale in their favour, they made a furious charge on the enemy, and killed a large number of them. When the king first came on the ground, and saw that the fighting between the light armed was going on near the enemy's camp, he was delighted: but when, on the other hand, he saw his own men giving ground and requiring

Philip also advances and occupies the hills.

Philip's advanced guard defeated.

support, he was compelled to give it, and allow the necessities of the moment to decide the fortunes of the whole day, in spite of the fact that the greater part of his phalanx was still on the march and engaged in mounting the hills. Receiving therefore the men who had been already engaged, he massed them all upon his right wing, both infantry and cavalry; while he ordered the peltasts and heavy armed to double their depth and close up to the right. By the time this was effected the enemy were close at hand; and, accordingly, the word was given to the phalanx to lower spears and charge; to the light infantry to cover their flank. At the same time Flamininus also, having received his advanced party into the intervals between his maniples, charged the enemy.

25. The charge was made with great violence and loud shouting on both sides: for both advancing parties raised their war cry, while those who were not actually engaged shouted encouragement to those that were; and the result was a scene of the wildest excitement, terrible in the last degree. Philip's right wing came off brilliantly in the encounter, for they were charging down hill and were superior in weight, and their arms were far more suited for the actual conditions of the struggle: but as for the rest of the army, that part of it which was in the rear of the actual fighters did not get into contact with the enemy; while the left wing, which had but just made the ascent, was only beginning to show on the ridge. Seeing that his men were unable to stand the charge of the phalanx, and that his left wing was losing ground, some having already fallen and the rest slowly retiring, but that hopes of saving himself still remained on the right, Flamininus hastily transferred himself to the latter wing; and when he perceived that the enemy's force was not well together—part being in contact with the actual fighters, part just in the act of mounting the ridge, and part halting on it and not yet beginning to descend,[1]—

The battle.

Philip's right wing repulse the Roman left.

Successful advance of the Roman right.

[1] I have given the meaning which I conceive this sentence to have; but the editors generally suspect the loss of a word like *ἄπρακτα* or *ἀπραγοῦντα* after *τὰ μὲν συνεχῆ τοῖς διαγωνιζομένοις*. This is unnecessary if we regard *συνεχῆ* as predicative, and I think this way of taking it gives sufficient sense. Polybius is thinking of the Macedonian army as being so dislocated by the

keeping the elephants in front he led the maniples of his right against the enemy. The Macedonians having no one to give them orders, and unable to form a proper phalanx, owing to the inequalities of the ground and to the fact that, being engaged in trying to come up with the actual combatants, they were still in column of march, did not even wait for the Romans to come to close quarters: but, thrown into confusion by the mere charge of the elephants, their ranks were disordered and they broke into flight.

26. The main body of the Roman right followed and slaughtered the flying Macedonians. But one of the tribunes, with about twenty maniples, having made up his mind on his own account what ought to be done next, contributed by his action very greatly to the general victory. He saw that the division which was personally commanded by Philip was much farther forward than the rest of the enemy, and was pressing hard upon the Roman left by its superior weight; he therefore left the right, which was by this time clearly victorious, and directing his march towards the part of the field where a struggle was still going on, he managed to get behind the Macedonians and charge them on the rear. The nature of the phalanx is such that the men cannot face round singly and defend themselves: this tribune, therefore, charged them and killed all he could get at; until, being unable to defend themselves, they were forced to throw down their shields and fly; whereupon the Romans in their front, who had begun to yield, faced round again and charged them too. At first, as I have said, Philip, judging from the success of his own division, felt certain of a complete victory; but when he saw his Macedonians all on a sudden throwing away their shields, and the enemy close upon their rear, he withdrew with a small body of foot and horse a short distance from the field and took a general survey of the whole battle: and when he observed that the Romans in their pursuit of his left wing were already approaching the tops of the hills, he rallied as many Thracians and Macedonians as he could at the moment,

The Macedonian phalanx outflanked.

The king quits the field and flies.

nature of the ground, that, while some parts were in contact with the enemy, the rest had not arrived on the scene of the fighting.

and fled. As Flamininus was pursuing the fugitives he came upon the lines of the Macedonian left, just as they were scaling the ridge in their attempt to cross the hills, and at first halted in some surprise because the enemy held their spears straight up, as is the custom of the Macedonians when surrendering themselves or intending to pass over to the enemy. Presently, having had the reason of this movement explained to him, he held his men back, thinking it best to spare the lives of those whom fear had induced to surrender. But whilst he was still reflecting on this matter, some of the advanced guard rushed upon these men from some higher ground and put most of them to the sword, while the few survivors threw away their shields and escaped by flight.

27. The battle was now at an end in every part of the field; the Romans everywhere victorious; and Philip in full retreat towards Tempe. The first night he passed at what is called Alexander's tower; the next day he got as far as Gonni, on the pass into Tempe, and there remained, with a view of collecting the survivors of the battle.

Philip retreats to Tempe.

But the Romans, after following the fugitives for a certain distance, returned; and some employed themselves in stripping the dead; others in collecting the captives; while the majority hurried to the plunder of the enemy's camp. But there they found that the Aetolians had been beforehand with them; and thinking, therefore, that they were deprived of their fair share of the booty, they began grumbling at the Aetolians and protesting to their general that "he imposed the dangers upon them, but yielded the spoil to others." For the present, however, they returned to their own camp, and passed the night in their old quarters: but next morning they employed themselves in collecting the prisoners and the remainder of the spoils, and then started on the march towards Larisa. In the battle the Romans lost seven hundred men; the Macedonians eight thousand killed, and not less than five thousand taken prisoners.

The Romans soon abandon pursuit and devote themselves to the plunder.

The losses on both sides.

Such was the result of the battle at Cynoscephalae in Thessaly between the Romans and Philip.

28. In my sixth book I made a promise, still unfulfilled, of taking a fitting opportunity of drawing a comparison between the arms of the Romans and Macedonians, and their respective system of tactics, and pointing out how they differ for better or worse from each other. I will now endeavour by a reference to actual facts to fulfil that promise. For since in former times the Macedonian tactics proved themselves by experience capable of conquering those of Asia and Greece; while the Roman tactics sufficed to conquer the nations of Africa and all those of Western Europe; and since in our own day there have been numerous opportunities of comparing the men as well as their tactics,—it will be, I think, a useful and worthy task to investigate their differences, and discover why it is that the Romans conquer and carry off the palm from their enemies in the operations of war: that we may not put it all down to Fortune, and congratulate them on their good luck, as the thoughtless of mankind do; but, from a knowledge of the true causes, may give their leaders the tribute of praise and admiration which they deserve.

Now as to the battles which the Romans fought with Hannibal, and the defeats which they sustained in them, I need say no more. It was not owing to their arms or their tactics, but to the skill and genius of Hannibal that they met with those defeats: and that I made quite clear in my account of the battles themselves. And my contention is supported by two facts. First, by the conclusion of the war: for as soon as the Romans got a general of ability comparable with that of Hannibal, victory was not long in following their banners. Secondly, Hannibal himself, being dissatisfied with the original arms of his men, and having immediately after his first victory furnished his troops with the arms of the Romans, continued to employ them thenceforth to the end.[1] Pyrrhus, again, availed himself not only of the arms, but also of the troops of Italy, placing a maniple of Italians and a company of his own phalanx alternately, in his battles against the Romans. Yet even this did not enable him to win; the battles were somehow or another always indecisive.

The Roman defeats in the Punic wars were not from inferior tactics, but owing to the genius of Hannibal.

[1] See 3, 87.

It was necessary to speak first on these points, to anticipate any instances which might seem to make against my theory. I will now return to my comparison.

29. Many considerations may easily convince us that, if only the phalanx has its proper formation and strength, nothing can resist it face to face or withstand its charge. For as a man in close order of battle occupies a space of three feet; and as the length of the sarissae is sixteen cubits according to the original design, which has been reduced in practice to fourteen; and as of these fourteen four must be deducted, to allow for the distance between the two hands holding it, and to balance the weight in front; it follows clearly that each hoplite will have ten cubits of his sarissa projecting beyond his body, when he lowers it with both hands, as he advances against the enemy: hence, too, though the men of the second, third, and fourth rank will have their sarissae projecting farther beyond the front rank than the men of the fifth, yet even these last will have two cubits of their sarissae beyond the front rank; if only the phalanx is properly formed and the men close up properly both flank and rear, like the description in Homer[1]—

> "So buckler pressed on buckler; helm on helm;
> And man on man: and waving horse-hair plumes
> In polished head-piece mingled, as they swayed
> In order: in such serried rank they stood."

And if my description is true and exact, it is clear that in front of each man of the front rank there will be five sarissae projecting to distances varying by a descending scale of two cubits.

30. With this point in our minds, it will not be difficult to imagine what the appearance and strength of the whole phalanx is likely to be, when, with lowered sarissae, it advances to the charge sixteen deep. Of these sixteen ranks, all above the fifth are unable to reach with their sarissae far enough to take actual part in the fighting. They, therefore, do not lower them, but hold them with the points inclined upwards over the shoulders of the ranks in front of them, to shield the heads of the whole phalanx; for the sarissae are so closely serried, that they repel missiles which have carried over the front ranks and might fall upon the heads of those in the rear. These rear ranks, how-

[1] *Iliad*, 13. 131.

ever, during an advance, press forward those in front by the weight of their bodies; and thus make the charge very forcible, and at the same time render it impossible for the front ranks to face about.

The Roman more open order compared with the phalanx.

Such is the arrangement, general and detailed, of the phalanx. It remains now to compare with it the peculiarities and distinctive features of the Roman arms and tactics. Now, a Roman soldier in full armour also requires a space of three square feet. But as their method of fighting admits of individual motion for each man—because he defends his body with a shield, which he moves about to any point from which a blow is coming, and because he uses his sword both for cutting and stabbing,—it is evident that each man must have a clear space, and an interval of at least three feet both on flank and rear, if he is to do his duty with any effect. The result of this will be that each Roman soldier will face two of the front rank of a phalanx, so that he has to encounter and fight against ten spears, which one man cannot find time even to cut away, when once the two lines are engaged, nor force his way through easily—seeing that the Roman front ranks are not supported by the rear ranks, either by way of adding weight to their charge, or vigour to the use of their swords. Therefore it may readily be understood that, as I said before, it is impossible to confront a charge of the phalanx, so long as it retains its proper formation and strength.

Why the phalanx fails.

31. Why is it then that the Romans conquer? And what is it that brings disaster on those who employ the phalanx? Why, just because war is full of uncertainties both as to time and place; whereas there is but one time and one kind of ground in which a phalanx can fully work. If, then, there were anything to compel the enemy to accommodate himself to the time and place of the phalanx, when about to fight a general engagement, it would be but natural to expect that those who employed the phalanx would always carry off the victory. But if the enemy finds it possible, and even easy, to avoid its attack, what becomes of its formidable character? Again, no one denies that for its employment it is indispensable to have a country

flat, bare, and without such impediments as ditches, cavities, depressions, steep banks, or beds of rivers: for all such obstacles are sufficient to hinder and dislocate this particular formation. And that it is, I may say, impossible, or at any rate exceedingly rare to find a piece of country of twenty stades, or sometimes of even greater extent, without any such obstacles, every one will also admit. However, let us suppose that such a district has been found. If the enemy decline to come down into it, but traverse the country sacking the towns and territories of the allies, what use will the phalanx be? For if it remains on the ground suited to itself, it will not only fail to benefit its friends, but will be incapable even of preserving itself; for the carriage of provisions will be easily stopped by the enemy, seeing that they are in undisputed possession of the country: while if it quits its proper ground, from the wish to strike a blow, it will be an easy prey to the enemy. Nay, if a general does descend into the plain, and yet does not risk his whole army upon one charge of the phalanx or upon one chance, but manœuvres for a time to avoid coming to close quarters in the engagement, it is easy to learn what will be the result from what the Romans are now actually doing.

32. For no speculation is any longer required to test the accuracy of what I am now saying: that can be done by referring to accomplished facts.

The Romans do not, then, attempt to extend their front to equal that of a phalanx, and then charge directly upon it with their whole force: but some of their divisions are kept in reserve, while others join battle with the enemy at close quarters. Now, whether the phalanx in its charge drives its opponents from their ground, or is itself driven back, in either case its peculiar order is dislocated; for whether in following the retiring, or flying from the advancing enemy, they quit the rest of their forces: and when this takes place, the enemy's reserves can occupy the space thus left, and the ground which the phalanx had just before been holding, and so no longer charge them face to face, but fall upon them on their flank and rear. If, then, it is easy to take precautions against the opportunities and peculiar advantages of the phalanx, but impossible to do so in the case of its disadvantages, must it not

follow that in practice the difference between these two systems is enormous? Of course those generals who employ the phalanx must march over ground of every description, must pitch camps, occupy points of advantage, besiege, and be besieged, and meet with unexpected appearances of the enemy: for all these are part and parcel of war, and have an important and sometimes decisive influence on the ultimate victory. And in all these cases the Macedonian phalanx is difficult, and sometimes impossible to handle, because the men cannot act either in squads or separately. The Roman order on the other hand is flexible: for every Roman, once armed and on the field, is equally well equipped for every place, time, or appearance of the enemy. He is, moreover, quite ready and needs to make no change, whether he is required to fight in the main body, or in a detachment, or in a single maniple, or even by himself. Therefore, as the individual members of the Roman force are so much more serviceable, their plans are also much more often attended by success than those of others.

Flexibility of the Roman order.

I thought it necessary to discuss this subject at some length, because at the actual time of the occurrence many Greeks supposed when the Macedonians were beaten that it was incredible; and many will afterwards be at a loss to account for the inferiority of the phalanx to the Roman system of arming.

33. Philip having thus done all he could in the battle, but having been decisively beaten, after taking up as many of the survivors as he could, proceeded through Tempe into Macedonia. On the night previous to his start he sent one of his guard to Larisa, with orders to destroy and burn the king's correspondence. And it was an act worthy of a king to retain, even in the midst of disaster, a recollection of a necessary duty. For he knew well enough that, if these papers came into the possession of the Romans, they would give many handles to the enemy both against himself and his friends. It has, perhaps, been the case with others that in prosperity they could not use power with the moderation which becomes mortal men, while in disaster they displayed caution and good sense; but certainly

Prudent conduct of Philip.

this was the case with Philip. And this will be made manifest by what I shall subsequently relate. For as I showed without reserve the justice of his measures at the beginning of his reign, and the change for the worse which they subsequently underwent; and showed when and why and how this took place, with a detailed description of the actions in this part of his career;[1] in the same way am I bound to set forth his repentance, and the dexterity with which he changed with his change of fortune, and may be said to have shown the highest prudence in meeting this crisis in his affairs.

As for Flamininus, having after the battle taken the necessary measures as to the captives and the rest of the spoils, he proceeded to Larisa. . . .

34. Flamininus was much annoyed at the selfishness displayed by the Aetolians in regard to the spoils; and had no idea of leaving them to be masters of Greece after he had deprived Philip of his supremacy there. He was irritated also by their braggadocio, when he saw that they claimed all the credit of the victory, and were filling Greece with the report of their valour. Wherefore, wherever he met them he behaved with hauteur, and never said a word on public business, but carried out all his measures independently or by the agency of his own friends. While the relations between these two were in this strained state, some few days after the battle Demosthenes, Cycliadas, and Limnaeus came on a mission from Philip; and, after considerable discussion with them, Flamininus granted an immediate armistice of fifteen days, and agreed to have a personal interview also with Philip in the course of them to discuss the state of affairs. And this interview being conducted in a courteous and friendly manner, the suspicions entertained of Flamininus by the Aetolians blazed forth with double fury. For as corruption, and the habit of never doing anything without a bribe, had long been a common feature in Greek politics, and as this was the acknowledged characteristic of the Aetolians, they could not believe that Flamininus could so change in his relations with Philip without a bribe. They did not know the habits and principles

Estrangement of Aetolians.

Flamininus grants fifteen days' truce to Philip.

[1] See 4, 77; 7, 12; 10, 26.

of the Romans on this subject; but judging from themselves they concluded that there was every probability of Philip in his present position offering a large sum of money, and of Flamininus being unable to resist the temptation.

The disinterestedness of the Romans generally as to money.

35. If I had been speaking of an earlier period, and expressing what was generally true, I should have had no hesitation in asserting of the Romans as a nation that they would not be likely to do such a thing,—I mean in the period before they engaged in wars beyond the sea, and while they retained their own habits and principles uncontaminated.[1] But in the present times I should not venture to say this of them all; still, as individuals, I should be bold to say of the majority of the men of Rome that they are capable of preserving their honesty in this particular: and as evidence that I am making no impossible assertion, I would quote two names which will command general assent,—I mean first, Lucius Aemilius who conquered Perseus, and won the kingdom of Macedonia. In that kingdom, besides all the other splendour and wealth, there was found in the treasury more than six thousand talents of gold and silver: yet he was so far from coveting any of this, that he even refused to see it, and administered it by the hands of others; though he was far from being superfluously wealthy himself, but, on the contrary, was very badly off. At least, I know that on his death, which occurred shortly after the war, when his own sons Publius Scipio and Quintus Maximus wished to pay his wife her dowry, amounting to twenty-five talents, they were reduced to such straits that they would have been quite unable to do so if they had not sold the household furniture and slaves, and some of the landed property besides. And if what I say shall appear incredible to any one, he may easily convince himself on the subject: for though there are many controversies at Rome, and especially on this particular point, arising from the antagonistic parties among them, yet he will find that what I have just said about Aemilius is acknowledged by every one. Again, Publius Scipio, son by blood of this Aemilius, and son by adoption

Lucius Aemilius Paulus.

Publius Cornelius, Scipio Africanus Minor.

[1] See 6, 56; 32, 11.

of Publius called the Great, when he got possession of Carthage, reckoned the wealthiest city in the world, took absolutely nothing from it for his own private use, either by purchase or by any other manner of acquisition whatever, although he was by no means a very rich man, but very moderately so for a Roman. But he not only abstained from the wealth of Carthage itself, but refused to allow anything from Africa at all to be mixed up with his private property. Therefore, in regard to this man once more, any one who chooses to inquire will find that his reputation in this particular is absolutely undisputed at Rome. I shall, however, take a more suitable opportunity of treating this subject at greater length.

36. Titus then having appointed Philip a day for the congress, immediately wrote to the allies announcing when they were to appear; and a few days afterwards came himself to the pass of Tempe at the appointed time. When the allies had assembled, and the congress met, the Roman imperator rose and bade each say on what terms they ought to make peace with Philip. King Amynandros then delivered a short and moderate speech, merely asking that "they would all have some consideration for him, to prevent Philip, as soon as the Romans left Greece, from turning the whole weight of his anger upon him; for the Athamanes were always an easy prey to the Macedonians, because of their weakness and the close contiguity of their territory." When he had finished, Alexander the Aetolian rose and complimented Flamininus for "having assembled the allies in that congress to discuss the terms of peace; and, above all, for having on the present occasion called on each to express his opinion. But he was deluded and mistaken," he added, "if he believed that by making terms with Philip he would secure the Romans peace or the Greeks freedom. For neither of these was possible. But if he desired to accomplish both the design of his own government and his own promises, which he had given to all the Greeks, there was one way, and one only, of making terms with Macedonia, and that was to eject Philip from his throne; and this could easily be done if he did not let slip the present opportunity."

The congress of Tempe, B.C. 197.

Speech of King Amynandros.

Alexander the Aetolian.

After some further arguments in support of this view he sat down.

Reply of Flamininus.

37. Flamininus here took up the argument, and said that "Alexander was mistaken not only as to the policy of Rome, but also as to the object which he proposed to himself, and above all as to the true interests of Greece. For it was not the Roman way to utterly destroy those with whom they had been at open war. A proof of his assertion might be found in the war with Hannibal and the Carthaginians; for though the Romans had received the severest provocation at their hands, and afterwards had it in their power to do absolutely what they pleased to them, yet they had adopted no extreme measures against the Carthaginians. For his part, moreover, he had never entertained the idea that it was necessary to wage an inexpiable war with Philip; but on the contrary had been prepared before the battle to come to terms with him, if he would have submitted to the Roman demands. He was surprised, therefore, that those who had taken part in the former peace conference should now adopt a tone of such irreconcilable hostility. Have we not conquered? (say they). Yes, but this is the most senseless of arguments. For brave men, when actually at war, should be terrible and full of fire; when beaten, undaunted and courageous; when victorious, on the other hand, moderate, placable, and humane. But your present advice is the reverse of all this. Yet, in truth, to the Greeks themselves it is greatly to their interest that Macedonia should be humbled, but not at all so that she should be destroyed. For it might chance thereby that they would experience the barbarity of Thracians and Gauls, as has been the case more than once already." He then added that "the final decision of himself and Roman colleagues was, that, if Philip would consent to fulfil all the conditions formerly enjoined by the allies, they would grant him peace, subject, of course, to the approval of the Senate: and that the Aetolians were free to take what measures they chose for themselves." Upon Phaeneas attempting to reply that "Everything done hitherto went for nothing; for if Philip managed to extricate himself from his present difficulties, he would at once find some other occasion for hostilities,"—Flamininus sprang

at once from his seat, and said, with some heat, "Cease this trifling, Phaeneas! For I will so settle the terms of the peace that Philip will be unable, even if he wished it, to molest the Greeks."

38. After this they separated for that day. On the next the king arrived: and on the third, when all the delegates were met for discussion, Philip entered, and with great skill and tact diverted the anger which they all entertained against him. For he said that "He conceded the demands made on the former occasion by the Romans and the allies, and remitted the decision on the remaining points to the Senate." But Phaeneas, one of the Aetolians present, said: "Why then, Philip, do not you restore to us Larisa Cremaste, Pharsalus, Phthiotid Thebes, and Echinus?" Whereupon Philip bade them take them over. But Flamininus here interposed, and forbade the Aetolians to take over any of the towns except Phthiotid Thebes; "for upon his approaching this town with his army, and summoning it to submit to the Roman protection, the Thebans had refused; and, as it had now come into his hands in the course of war, he had the right of taking any measures he chose regarding it." Phaeneas and his colleagues indignantly protested at this, and asserted that it was their clear right to recover the towns previously members of their league, "first on the ground that they had taken part in the recent war; and secondly in virtue of their original treaty of alliance, according to which the movable property of the conquered belonged to the Romans, the towns to the Aetolians." To which Flamininus answered that "they were mistaken in both points; for their treaty with Rome had been annulled when they abandoned the Romans, and made terms with Philip: and, even supposing that treaty to be still in force, they had no right to recover or take over such cities as had voluntarily put themselves under the protection of Rome, as the whole of the cities in Thessaly had done, but only such as were taken by force.[1]

On the third day of the conference Philip appears.

The Aetolians checkmated by Flamininus.

[1] Livy (33, 13) has mistaken the meaning of Polybius in this passage, representing the quarrel of the Aetolians and Flamininus as being for the possession of Thebes,—the only town, in fact, on which there was no dispute.

39. The other members of the congress were delighted at this speech of Flamininus. But the Aetolians listened with indignation; and what proved to be the beginning of serious evils was engendered. For this quarrel was the spark from which, not long afterwards, both the war with the Aetolians and that with Antiochus flamed out. The principal motive of Flamininus in being thus forward in coming to terms was the information he had received that Antiochus had started from Syria with an army, with the intention of crossing over into Europe. Therefore he was anxious lest Philip, catching at this chance, should determine to defend the towns and protract the war; and lest meanwhile he should himself be superseded by another commander from home, on whom the honour of all that he had achieved would be diverted. Therefore the terms which the king asked were granted: namely, that he should have four months' suspension of hostilities, paying Flamininus at once the two hundred talents; delivering his son Demetrius and some others of his friends as hostages; and sending to Rome to submit the decision on the whole pacification to the Senate. Flamininus and Philip then separated, after interchanging mutual pledges of fidelity, on the understanding that, if the treaty were not confirmed, Flamininus was to restore to Philip the two hundred talents and the hostages. All the parties then sent ambassadors to Rome, some to support and others to oppose the settlement. . . .

The terms of the peace settled. Winter of B.C. 197.

40. Why is it that, though deceived again and again by the same things and persons, we are unable to abandon our blind folly? For this particular kind of fraud has often been committed before now, and by many. That other men should allow themselves to be taken in is perhaps not astonishing; but it is wonderful that those should do so who are the authors and origin of the same kind of malpractice. But I suppose the cause is the absence of that rule so happily expressed by Epicharmus:

Foolish credulity, see ch. 13; and 31, 21.

"Cool head and wise mistrust are wisdom's sinews." . . .

ASIA

41. [They endeavoured] to prevent Antiochus from sailing along their coast, not from enmity to him, but from a suspicion that by giving support to Philip he would become an obstacle in the way of Greek liberty. . . .

King Antiochus was very desirous of possessing Ephesus, owing to its extremely convenient position; for it appeared to occupy the position of an Acropolis for expeditions by land and sea against Ionia and the cities of the Hellespont, and to be always a most convenient base of operations for the kings of Asia against Europe. . . .

Death of King Attalus, who had fallen ill at Thebes, before the battle of Cynoscephalae, and had been brought home to die at Pergamum, autumn, B.C. 197. Livy, 33, 21.

Of King Attalus, who now died, I think I ought to speak a suitable word, as I have done in the case of others. Originally he had no other external qualification for royalty except money alone, which, indeed, if handled with good sense and boldness, is of very great assistance in every undertaking, but without these qualities is in its nature the origin of evil, and, in fact, of utter ruin to very many. For in the first place it engenders envy and malicious plots, and contributes largely to the destruction of body and soul. For few indeed are the souls that are able by the aid of wealth to repel dangers of this description. This king's greatness of mind therefore deserves our admiration, because he never attempted to use his wealth for anything else but the acquisition of royal power,—an object than which none greater can be mentioned. Moreover he made the first step in this design, not only by doing services to his friends and gaining their affection, but also by achievements in war. For it was after conquering the Gauls, the most formidable and warlike nation at that time in Asia, that he assumed this rank and first puts himself forward as king. And though he obtained this honour, and lived seventy-two years, of which he reigned forty-four, he passed a life of the utmost virtue and goodness towards his wife and children; kept faith with all allies and friends; and died in the midst of a most glorious campaign, fighting for the liberty of the Greeks; and what is more

remarkable than all, though he left four grown-up sons, he so well settled the question of succession, that the crown was handed down to his children's children without a single dispute. . . .

ITALY

42. After Marcus Marcellus had entered upon the consulship the ambassadors from Philip, and from Flamininus and the allies, arrived at Rome to discuss the treaty with Philip; and after a lengthened hearing the confirmation of the terms was decreed in the Senate. But on the matter being brought before the people, Marcus Claudius, who was ambitious of being himself sent to Greece, spoke against the treaty, and did his best to get it rejected. The people however ratified the terms, in accordance with the wish of Flamininus; and, upon this being settled, the Senate immediately despatched a commission of ten men of high rank to arrange the settlement of Greece in conjunction with Flamininus, and to confirm the freedom of the Greeks. Among others Damoxenus of Aegium and his colleagues, envoys from the Achaean league, made a proposal in the Senate for an alliance with Rome; but as some opposition was raised to this at the time, on account of a counter-claim of the Eleians upon Triphylia, and of the Messenians, who were at the time actually in alliance with Rome, upon Asine and Pylus, and of the Aetolians upon Heraea,—the decision was referred to the commission of ten. Such were the proceedings in the Senate. . . .

B.C. 196. Coss. L. Furius Purpureo, M. Claudius Marcellus. The treaty with Philip is confirmed.

GREECE

43. After the battle of Cynoscephalae, as Flamininus was wintering at Elateia, the Boeotians, being anxious to recover their citizens who had served in Philip's army, sent an embassy to Flamininus to try and secure their safety. Wishing to encourage the loyalty of the Boeotians to himself, because he was already anxious as to the action of Antiochus, he readily assented to their petition. These men were promptly restored from Macedonia, and one of them named Brachylles the Boeotians at once elected Boeotarch; and in a similar spirit honoured and pro-

Philip allows his Boeotian followers to return home.

moted, as much as before, such of the others as were thought to be well disposed to the royal house of Macedonia. They also sent an embassy to Philip to thank him for the return of the young men, thus derogating from the favour done them by Flamininus,—a measure highly disquieting to Zeuxippus and Peisistratus, and all who were regarded as partisans of Rome; because they foresaw what would happen to themselves and their families, knowing quite well that if the Romans quitted Greece, and Philip remained closely supporting the political party opposed to themselves, it would be unsafe for them to remain citizens of Boeotia. They therefore agreed among themselves to send an embassy to Flamininus in Elateia: and having obtained an interview with him, they made a lengthy and elaborate statement on this subject, describing the state of popular feeling which was now adverse to themselves, and discanting on the untrustworthiness of democratic assemblies. And finally, they ventured to say that "Unless they could overawe the common people by getting rid of Brachylles, there could be no security for the party in favour of Rome as soon as the legions departed." After listening to these arguments Flamininus replied that "He would not personally take any part in such a measure, but he would not hinder those who wished to do so." Finally, he bade them speak to Alexamenus the Strategus of the Aetolians. Zeuxippus and his colleagues accepted the suggestion, and communicated with Alexamenus, who at once consented; and agreeing to carry out their proposal sent three Aetolians and three Italians, all young men, to assassinate Brachylles. . . .

Zeuxippus and Peisistratus, heads of the Romanising party, determine to get rid of Brachylles, B.C. 196.

There is no more terrible witness, or more formidable accuser, than the conscience which resides in each man's breast. . . .

Zeuxippus condemned by his own conscience. See Livy, 33, 28.

44. About this same time the ten commissioners arrived from Rome who were to effect the settlement of Greece, bringing with them the decree of the Senate on the peace with Philip. The main points of the decree were these: "All other Greeks, whether in Asia or Europe, to be free and enjoy their own

The Senatus Consultum.

laws; but that Philip should hand over to the Romans those at present under his authority, and all towns in which he had a garrison, before the Isthmian games; and restore Eurōmus, Pedasa, Bargylia, Iasus, Abydos, Thasus, Marinus, and Perinthus to freedom, and remove his garrisons from them. That Flamininus should write to Prusias commanding him to liberate Cius, in accordance with the decree of the Senate. That Philip should restore to the Romans within the same period all captives and deserters; and likewise all decked ships, except three and his one sixteen-banked vessel; and should pay a thousand talents, half at once, and half by instalments spread over ten years."

Objections of the Aetolians.

45. Upon this decree being published in Greece, it created a feeling of confidence and gratification in all the communities except the Aetolians. These last were annoyed at not getting all they expected, and attempted to run down the decree by saying that it was mere words, without anything practical in it; and they based upon the clauses of the decree itself some such arguments as follow, by way of disquieting those who would listen to them. They said "That there were two distinct clauses in the decree relating to the cities garrisoned by Philip: one ordering him to remove those garrisons and to hand over the cities to the Romans; the other bidding him withdraw his garrisons and set the cities free. Those that were to be set free were definitely named, and they were towns in Asia; and it was plain, therefore, that those which were to be handed over to the Romans were those in Europe, namely, Oreus, Eretria, Chalcis, Demetrias, and Corinth. Hence it was plain that the Romans were receiving the 'fetters of Greece' from the hands of Philip, and that the Greeks were getting, not freedom, but a change of masters."

These arguments of the Aetolians were repeated *ad nauseam*. But, meanwhile, Flamininus left Elateia with the ten commissioners, and having crossed to Anticyra, sailed straight to Corinth, and there sat in council with the commissioners, and considered the whole settlement to be made.

The commissioners sit at

But as the adverse comments of the Aetolians obtained wide currency, and were accepted by

some, Flamininus was forced to enter upon many elaborate arguments in the meetings of the commission, trying to convince the commissioners that if they wished to acquire unalloyed praise from the Greeks, and to establish firmly in the minds of all that they had originally come into the country not to gain any advantage for Rome, but simply to secure the freedom of Greece, they must abandon every district and free all the cities now garrisoned by Philip. But this was just the point in dispute among the commissioners; for, as to all other cities, a decision had been definitely arrived at in Rome, and the ten commissioners had express instructions; but about Chalcis, Corinth, and Demetrias they had been allowed a discretion on account of Antiochus, in order that they might take such measures as they thought best from a view of actual events. For it was notorious that this king had for some time past been meditating an interference in Europe. However, as far as Corinth was concerned, Flamininus prevailed on the commissioners to free it at once and restore it to the Achaean league, from respect to the terms of the original agreement; but he retained the Acrocorinthus, Demetrias, and Chalcis.

Corinth, and declare all Greek cities free, except the Acrocorinthus, Demetrias, and Chalcis.

46. When these decisions had been come to, the time for the celebration of the Isthmian games arrived. The expectation of what would happen there drew the men of highest rank from nearly every quarter of the world; and there was a great deal of talk on the subject from one end of the assembled multitude to the other, and expressed in varied language. Some said that from certain of the places and towns it was impossible that the Romans could withdraw; while others asserted that they would withdraw from those considered most important, but would retain others that were less prominent, though capable of being quite as serviceable. And such persons even took upon themselves in their ingenuity to designate the precise places which would be thus treated. While people were still in this state of uncertainty, all the world being assembled on the stadium to watch the games, the herald came forward, and having proclaimed silence by the sound of a trumpet,

The Isthmian games, July B.C. 196.

delivered the following proclamation: "The senate of Rome and Titus Quintus, proconsul and imperator, having conquered King Philip and the Macedonians in war, declare the following peoples free, without garrison, or tribute, in full enjoyment of the laws of their respective countries: namely, Corinthians, Phocians, Locrians, Euboeans, Achaeans of Phiotis, Magnesians, Thessalians, Perrhaebians."

Proclamation of the freedom of the Greek cities.

Now as the first words of the proclamation were the signal for a tremendous outburst of clapping, some of the people could not hear it at all, and some wanted to hear it again; but the majority feeling incredulous, and thinking that they heard the words in a kind of dream, so utterly unexpected was it, another impulse induced every one to shout to the herald and trumpeter to come into the middle of the stadium and repeat the words: I suppose because the people wished not only to hear but to see the speaker, in their inability to credit the announcement. But when the herald, having advanced into the middle of the crowd, once more, by his trumpeter, hushed the clamour, and repeated exactly the same proclamation as before, there was such an outbreak of clapping as is difficult to convey to the imagination of my readers at this time. When at length the clapping ceased, no one paid any attention whatever to the athletes, but all were talking to themselves or each other, and seemed like people bereft of their senses. Nay, after the games were over, in the extravagance of their joy, they nearly killed Flamininus by the exhibition of their gratitude. Some wanted to look him in the face and call him their preserver; others were eager to touch his hand; most threw garlands and fillets upon him; until between them they nearly crushed him to death. But though this expression of popular gratitude was thought to have been extravagant, one might say with confidence that it fell short of the importance of the actual event. For that the Romans and their leader Flamininus should have deliberately incurred unlimited expense and danger, for the sole purpose of freeing Greece, deserved their admiration; and it was also a great thing that their power was equal to their intention. But the greatest thing of all is that Fortune foiled their attempt by none of her

An exciting scene.

usual caprices, but that every single thing came to a successful issue at the same time: so that all Greeks, Asiatic and European alike, were by a single proclamation become "free, without garrison or tribute, and enjoying their own laws."

47. The Isthmian festival having come to an end, the first persons with whom the commissioners dealt were the ambassadors from Antiochus. They instructed them that "Their master must abstain from attacking those cities in Asia which were autonomous, and go to war with none of them; and must evacuate those that had been subject to Ptolemy or Philip. In addition to this they forbade him to cross over into Europe with an army; for no Greek henceforth was to be attacked in war or to be enslaved to any one. Finally, they said that some of their own number would go to visit Antiochus." With this answer Hegesianax and Lysias returned to Antiochus. They next summoned the representatives of all the nations and cities, and declared to them the decisions of the commissioners. The Macedonian tribe of the Orestae, on the ground of their having joined Rome during the war, they declared autonomous; the Perrhaebians, Dolopes, and Magnesians they declared to be free. To the Thessalians, in addition to their freedom, they assigned the Phiotid Achaeans, with the exception, however, of Phthiotid Thebes and Pharsalus: for the Aetolians made such a point of their claim to Pharsalus, as also to Leucas, on the ground of the rights secured them by the original treaty, that the commissioners referred the consideration of their demand in regard to these places back again to the Senate, but allowed them to retain Phocis and Locris as members of their league, as they had been before. Corinth, Triphylia, and Heraea they handed over to the Achaeans. Oreus and Eretria the majority wished to give to King Eumenes, but on the instance of Flamininus this design was not confirmed; and, accordingly, a short time afterwards these towns, with Carystus, were declared free by the Senate. To Pleuratus they assigned Lychnis and Parthus in Illyria, towns which had been subject to Philip; and Amynandros they allowed to retain all such strongholds as he had taken from Philip during the war.

Answer of commissioners to King Antiochus.

Final arrangements.

48. This business completed, the commissioners separated in various directions: Publius Lentulus sailed to Bargylia and announced its freedom; Leucius Stertinius did the same to Hephaestia, Thasus, and the cities in Thrace; while Publius Ventilius and Lucius Terentius started to visit Antiochus; and Gnaeus Cornelius with his colleagues went to king Philip. They met him near Tempe, and after speaking with him on the other matters about which they had instructions, they advised him to send an embassy to Rome, to ask for an alliance, in order to obviate all suspicion of being on the watch for an opportunity in expectation of the arrival of Antiochus. The king agreeing to follow this advice, Cornelius left him and went to the league congress at Thermus; and coming into the public assembly urged the Aetolians in a lengthy speech to abide by the policy they had adopted, from the first, and maintain their good disposition towards the Romans. Many rose to answer: of whom some expressed dissatisfaction with the Romans in moderate and decorous language, for not having used their good fortune with sufficient regard to their joint interests, and for not observing the original compact; while others delivered violent invectives, asserting that the Romans would never have set foot on Greece or conquered Philip if it had not been for them. Cornelius disdained to answer these speeches in detail, but he advised them to send ambassadors to Rome, for they would get full justice in the Senate: which they accordingly did. Such was the conclusion of the war with Philip. . . .

The commissioners separate and go to various parts of Greece.

Two go to Antiochus and others to Philip.

Gnaeus Cornelius at the congress of the Aetolian league.

ASIA

49. Whenever they are reduced to the last extremity, as the phrase goes, they will fly to the Romans for protection and commit themselves and their city to them.[1] . . .

[1] Referring apparently to the conduct of the Hellenic cities in Asia in presence of Antiochus, who, having wintered in Ephesus (B.C. 197-196), was endeavouring in 196 by force or stratagem to consolidate his power in Asia Minor. Livy, 33, 38.

50. Just when the designs of Antiochus in Thrace were succeeding to his heart's desire, Lucius Cornelius and his party sailed into Selybria. These were the envoys sent by the Senate to conclude a peace between Antiochus and Ptolemy. And at the same time there arrived Publius Lentulus from Bargylia, Lucius Terentius and Publius Villius from Thasus, three of the ten commissioners for Greece. Their arrival having been promptly announced to Antiochus, they all assembled within the next few days at Lysimacheia; and it so happened that Hegesianax and Lysias, who had been on the mission to Flamininus, arrived about the same time. The private intercourse between the king and the Romans was informal and friendly; but when presently they met in conference to discuss public affairs, things took quite another aspect. Lucius Cornelius demanded that Antiochus should evacuate all the cities subject to Ptolemy which he had taken in Asia; while he warned him in solemn and emphatic language that he must do so also to the cities subject to Philip, "for it was ridiculous that Antiochus should come in and take the prizes of the war which Rome had waged with Philip." He also admonished him to abstain from attacking autonomous cities, and added that "He was at a loss to conjecture with what view Antiochus had crossed over to Europe with such a powerful army and fleet; for if it were not with the intention of attacking the Romans, there was no explanation left that any reasonable person could accept." With these words the Romans ceased speaking.

Antiochus in the Chersonesus and Thrace, B.C. 196.

Speech of Lucius Cornelius.

51. The king began his reply by saying that "He did not understand by what right the Romans raised a controversy with him in regard to the cities in Asia. They were the last people in the world who had any claim to do so." Next he claimed that "They should refrain entirely from interfering in the affairs of Asia, seeing that he never in the least degree interposed in those of Italy. He had crossed into Europe with his army to recover his possessions in the Chersonese and the cities in Thrace; his right to the government of these places being superior to that of any one in the world. For this was originally the

The reply of Antiochus.

principality of Lysimachus; and as Seleucus waged war with and conquered that prince, the whole domain of Lysimachus passed to Seleucus:[1] then owing to the multifarious interests which distracted the attention of his predecessors, first Ptolemy and then Philip had managed to wrest this country from them and secure it for themselves. He had not then availed himself of Philip's difficulties to take it, but had *recovered* possession of it in the exercise of his undoubted rights. It was no injury to the Romans that he should now be restoring to their homes, and settling again in their city, the people of Lysimacheia who had been expelled by an unexpected raid of the Thracians. He was doing this, not from any intention of attacking the Romans, but to prepare a place of residence for his son Seleucus. As for the autonomous cities of Asia, they must acquire their freedom by his free grace, not by an injunction from Rome.. As for Ptolemy, he was about to settle matters amicably with him: for it was his intention to confirm their friendship by a matrimonial alliance."

Lysimachus conquered by Seleucus Nicanor, B.C. 281.

52. But upon Lucius expressing an opinion that they ought to call in the representatives of Lampsacus and Smyrna and give them a hearing, this was done. The envoys from Lampsacus were Parmenio and Pythodorus, and from Smyrna Coeranus. These men expressing themselves with much openness, Philip was irritated at the idea of defending himself against accusers before a tribunal of Romans, and interrupting Parmenio, said: "A truce to your long speeches: I do not choose to have my controversies with you decided before a Roman but before a Rhodian court." Thereupon they broke up the conference very far from pleased with each other. . . .

Antiochus refuses to acknowledge the Romans as arbitrators.

EGYPT

53. Many people have a yearning for bold and glorious undertakings, but few dare actually attempt them. Yet Scopas had much fairer opportunities for a

Death of Scopas. See *supra*,

[1] Justin. 17, 1-2; Appian *Syr.* 62. The battle was in the plain of Corus in Phrygia.

hazardous and bold career than Cleomenes. For the latter, though circumvented by his enemies, and reduced to depend upon such forces as his servants and friends could supply, yet left no chance untried, and tested every one to the best of his ability, valuing an honourable death more highly than a life of disgrace. But Scopas, with all the advantages of a formidable body of soldiers and of the excellent opportunity afforded by the youth of the king, by his own delays and halting counsels allowed himself to be circumvented. For having ascertained that he was holding a meeting of his partisans at his own house, and was consulting with them, Aristomenes sent some of the royal bodyguards and summoned him to the king's council. Whereupon Scopas was so infatuated that he was neither bold enough to carry out his designs, nor able to make up his mind to obey the king's summons,—which is in itself the most extreme step,—until Aristomenes, understanding the blunder he had made, caused soldiers and elephants to surround his house, and sent Ptolemy son of Eumenes in with some young men, with orders to bring him quietly if he would come, but, if not, by force. When Ptolemy entered the house and informed Scopas that the king summoned him, he refused at first to obey, but remained looking fixedly at Ptolemy, and for a long while preserved a threatening attitude as though he wondered at his audacity; and when Ptolemy came boldly up to him and took hold of his chlamys, he called on the bystanders to help him. But seeing that the number of young men who had accompanied Ptolemy into the house was large, and being informed by some one of the military array surrounding it outside, he yielded to circumstances, and went, accompanied by his friends, in obedience to the summons.

13, 2; 16, 18, B.C. 196.

54. On his entering the council chamber the king was the first to state the accusation against him, which he did briefly. He was followed by Polycrates lately arrived from Cyprus; and he again by Aristomenes. The charges made by them all were much to the same effect as what I have just stated; but there was now added to them the seditious meeting with his friends, and his refusal to obey the summons of the king. On these charges

Scopas before the council.

he was unanimously condemned, not only by the members of the council, but also by the envoys of foreign nations who were present. And when Aristomenes was about to commence his accusation he brought in a large number of other Greeks of rank also to support him, as well as the Aetolian ambassadors who had come to negotiate a peace, among whom was Dorimachus son of Nicostratus. When these speeches had been delivered, Scopas endeavoured to put forward certain pleas in his defence: but gaining no attention from any one, owing to the senseless nature of his proceedings, he was taken along with his friends to prison. There after nightfall Aristomenes caused Scopas and his family to be put to death by poison; but did not allow Dicaearchus to die until he had had him racked and scourged, thus inflicting on him a punishment which he thoroughly deserved in the name of all Greece. For this was the Dicaearchus whom Philip, when he resolved upon his treacherous attack on the Cyclades and the cities of the Hellespont, appointed leader of the whole fleet and the entire enterprise: who being thus sent out to perform an act of flagrant wickedness, not only thought that he was doing nothing wrong, but in the extravagance of his infatuation imagined that he would strike terror into the gods as well as man. For wherever he anchored he used to build two altars, to Impiety and Lawlessness, and, offering sacrifice upon these altars, worshipped them as his gods. Therefore in my opinion he met with a just retribution both from gods and men: for as his life had been spent in defiance to the laws of nature, his end was properly also one of unnatural horror. All the other Aetolians who wished to depart were allowed by the king to go in possession of their property.

Death of Dicaearchus.

55. As in the lifetime of Scopas his love of money had been notorious, for his avarice did in fact surpass that of any man in the world, so after his death was it made still more conspicuous by the enormous amount of gold and other property found in his house; for by the assistance of the coarse manners and drunken habits of Charimortus he had absolutely pillaged the kingdom.

Enormous wealth collected by Scopas.

Having thus settled the Aetolian business to their liking, the courtiers turned their attention to the ceremony of instituting the king into the management of his office, called the *Anacleteria*. His age was not indeed yet so far advanced as to make this necessary; but they thought that the kingdom would gain a certain degree of firmness and a fresh impulse towards prosperity, if it were known that the king had assumed the independent direction of the government. They then made the preparations for the ceremony with great splendour, and carried it out in a manner worthy of the greatness of the kingdom, Polycrates being considered to have contributed very largely to the accomplishment of their efforts. For this man had enjoyed even during his youth, in the reign of the late king, a reputation second to no one in the court for fidelity and practical ability; and this reputation he had maintained during the present reign also. For having been entrusted with the management of Cyprus and its revenues, when its affairs were in a critical and complicate state, he not only preserved the island for the young king, but collected a very considerable sum of money, with which he had just arrived and had paid to the king, after handing over the government of Cyprus to Ptolemy of Megalopolis. But though he obtained great applause by this, and a large fortune immediately afterwards, yet, as he grew older, he drifted into extravagant debauchery and scandalous indulgence. Nor was the reputation of Ptolemy, son of Agesarchus very different in the later part of his life. But in regard to these men, when we come to the proper time, I shall not shrink from stating the circumstances which disgraced their official life. . . .

The anacleteria of Ptolemy Epiphanes, B.C. 176. Aet. 14.

BOOK XIX

THE only fragment we possess of the nineteenth book of Polybius is a statement quoted by Plutarch as to M. Porcius Cato, to the effect that by his orders the walls of all the numerous Spanish cities north of the Baetis were dismantled on the same day. Cato was in Spain B.C. 195. The means taken by him to secure this simultaneous destruction of fortifications are told by Frontinus, *Strateg*, I, I, I.

We thus lose the history of the years B.C. 195, 194, 193; as well as the greater part of that of B.C. 192, 191, contained in the early part of book 20, of which only a few fragments remain. Livy, however, has evidently translated from Polybius in his history of these years, and a brief abstract of events in Greece may help the reader in following the fragmentary book which follows with more interest.

B.C. 195.

Lucius Valerius Flaccus,
M. Porcius Cato, } Coss.

Flamininus's imperium is extended for this year, because of the danger from Antiochus and Nabis. The Aetolians, still discontented, push their demand for Pharsalus and Leucas, and are referred by the Senate back to Flamininus. The latter summons a conference of Greek states at Corinth, and a war is decreed against Nabis, the Aetolians still expressing their dislike of Roman interference. The levies are collected; Argos is freed from Nabis; Sparta all but taken; and Nabis forced to submit to most humiliating terms: the Aetolians again objecting to his being allowed to remain at Sparta on any terms at all. In this year also legates from Antiochus visit Flamininus, but are referred to the Senate.

B.C. 194.

Publius Cornelius Scipio II.,
Tiberius Sempronius Longus, } Coss.

Flamininus leaves Greece after a speech at Corinth to the assembled league advising internal peace and loyalty to Rome, and enters Rome in triumph. There is a time of comparative tranquillity in Greece.

B.C. 193.

L. Cornelius Merula,
Q. Minucius Thermus, } Coss.

The legates from Antiochus are sent back with the final answer that, unless the king abstains from entering Europe in arms, the Romans will

free the Asiatic Greek cities from him. Roman legates, P. Sulpicius, P. Villius, P. Aelius, are sent to him. Hannibal arrives at the court of Antiochus, and urges him to resist; and the Aetolians urge the same course, trying also to stir up Nabis and Philip of Macedon. Antiochus accordingly will give the Roman envoys no satisfactory answer.

B.C. 192.

L. Quintius Flamininus,
Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus, } Coss.

The Romans therefore prepare for war. A fleet under the praetor Atilius is sent against Nabis: commissioners are sent into Greece—T. Quintius Flamininius, C. Octavius, Cn. Servilius, P. Villius—early in the year: M. Baebius is ordered to hold his army in readiness at Brundisium. Then news is brought to Rome by Attalus of Pergamum (brother of king Eumenes) that Antiochus has crossed the Hellespont, and the Aetolians on the point of joining him. Therefore Baebius is ordered to transport his army to Apollonia.

Meanwhile Nabis takes advantage of the alarm caused by Antiochus to move. He besieges Gythium, and ravages the Achaean territory. The league, under Philopoemen, proclaim war against him, and, after losing an unimportant naval battle, decisively defeat him on land and shut him up in Sparta.

The Aetolians now formally vote to call in Antiochus, "to liberate Greece and arbitrate between them and Rome." They occupy Demetrias; and kill Nabis by a stratagem. Whereupon Philopoemen annexes Sparta to the Achaean league. Later in the year Antiochus meets the assembly of the Aetolians at Lamia in Thessaly, is proclaimed "Strategus"; and after a vain attempt to conciliate the Achaeans seizes Chalcis, where he winters, and marries a young wife.

B.C. 191.

P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica,
M. Acilius Glabrio, } Coss.

The Romans declare war with Antiochus. Manius Acilius is selected to go to Greece, where he takes over the army of Baebius, and after taking many towns in Thessaly meets and defeats Antiochus at Thermopylae; where the Aetolian league did after all little service to the king, who retires to Ephesus.

See Livy, 34, 43 —— 36, 21. See also Plutarch, *Philopoemen*, and *Flamininus;* Appian, *Syriacae*, 6—21.

BOOK XX

GREECE

1. The Aetolians chose thirty of the Apocleti[1] to confer with King Antiochus. . . .

Antiochus the Great at a meeting of Aetolians at Lamia, autumn of B.C. 192. Livy, 35, 43-46.

He accordingly summoned a meeting of the Apocleti and consulted them on the state of affairs. . . .

2. When Antiochus sent an embassy to the Boeotians, they answered that they would not consider his proposals until the king came in person. . . .

3. As Antiochus was staying at Chalcis, just as the winter was beginning, two ambassadors came to visit him, Charops from Epirus, and Callistratus from Elis. The prayer of the Epirotes was that "The king would not involve them in the war with Rome, for they dwelt on the side of Greece immediately opposite Italy; but that, if he could, he would secure their safety by defending the frontier of Epirus: in that case he should be admitted into all their towns and harbours: but if he decided not to do so at present, they asked his indulgence if they shrank from a war with Rome." The Eleans, in their turn, begged him "To send a reinforcement to their town; for as the Achaeans had voted war against them, they were in terror of an attack from the troops of the league." The king answered the Epirotes by saying that he would send envoys to confer with them on their mutual

Antiochus passes the winter of B.C. 192-191 at Chalcis. Visit of envoys from Epirus and Elis.

[1] The Apocleti, of the numbers of whom we have no information, acted as a consultative senate to prepare measures for the Aetolian Assembly. See Freeman, *History of Federal Government*, p. 335. Livy, 35, 34.

interests; but to Elis he despatched a thousand foot soldiers under the command of Euphanes of Crete. . . .

4. The Boeotians had long been in a very depressed state, which offered a strong contrast to the former prosperity and reputation of their country. They had acquired great glory as well as great material prosperity at the time of the battle of Leuctra; but by some means or another from that time forward they steadily diminished both the one and the other under the leadership of Amaeocritus; and subsequently not only diminished them, but underwent a complete change of character, and did all that was possible to wipe out their previous reputation. For having been incited by the Achaeans to go to war with the Aetolians, they adopted the policy of the former and made an alliance with them, and thenceforth maintained a steady war with the Aetolians. But on the Aetolians invading Boeotia, they marched out with their full available force, and without waiting for the arrival of the Achaeans, who had mustered their men and were on the point of marching to their assistance, they attacked the Aetolians; and being worsted in the battle were so completely demoralised, that, from the time of that campaign, they never plucked up spirit to claim any position of honour whatever, and never shared in any enterprise or contest undertaken by the common consent of the Greeks. They devoted themselves entirely to eating and drinking, and thus became effeminate in their souls as well as in their bodies.

The decline of Boeotia, from B.C. 371-361.

B.C. 245. See Plutarch, *Arat.* 16.

5. Such were, briefly, the steps in the degeneracy of Boeotia. Immediately after the battle just mentioned they abandoned the Achaeans and joined the Aetolians.[1] But on the latter presently going to war with Philip's father Demetrius, they once more abandoned the Aetolians; and upon Demetrius entering Boeotia with an army, without attempting resistance they submitted completely to the Macedonians. But as a spark of

Demetrius II. B.C. 239-229.

[1] *προσένειμαν Αἰτώλοις τὸ ἔθνος*, cp. 2, 43. Some have thought that a regular political union with the Aetolian League is meant. But the spirit of the narrative seems to point rather to an alliance.

their ancestral glory still survived, there were found some who disliked the existing settlement and the complete subservience to Macedonia: and they accordingly maintained a violent opposition to the policy of Ascondas and Neon, the ancestors of Brachylles, who were the most prominent in the party which favoured Macedonia. However, the party of Ascondas eventually prevailed, owing to the following circumstance. Antigonus (Doson), who, after the death of Demetrius, was Philip's guardian, happened to be sailing on some business along the coast of Boeotia; when off Larymna he was surprised by a sudden ebb of the tide, and his ships were left high and dry. Now just at that time a rumour had been spread that Antigonus meant to make a raid upon the country; and therefore Neon, who was Hipparch at the time, was patrolling the country at the head of all the Boeotian cavalry to protect it, and came upon Antigonus in this helpless and embarrassed position: and having it thus in his power to inflict a serious blow upon the Macedonians, much to their surprise he resolved to spare them. His conduct in so doing was approved by the other Boeotians, but was not at all pleasing to the Thebans. Antigonus, however, when the tide flowed again and his ships floated, proceeded to complete the voyage to Asia on which he was bound, with deep gratitude to Neon for having abstained from attacking him in his awkward position.

The rise of the house of Neon.

B.C. 222.

Accordingly, when at a subsequent period he conquered the Spartan Cleomenes and became master of Lacedaemon, he left Brachylles in charge of the town, by way of paying him for the kindness done him by his father Neon. This proved to be the beginning of a great rise in importance of the family of Brachylles. But this was not all that Antigonus did for him: from that time forward either he personally, or king Philip, continually supported him with money and influence; so that before long this family entirely overpowered the political party opposed to them in Thebes, and forced all the citizens, with very few exceptions, to join the party of Macedonia. Such was the origin of the political adherence to Macedonia of the family of Neon, and of its rise to prosperity.

6. But Boeotia as a nation had come to such a low pitch, that for nearly twenty-five years the administration of justice had been suspended in private and public suits alike. Their magistrates were engaged in despatching bodies of men to guard the country or in proclaiming national expeditions, and thus continually postponed their attendance at courts of law. Some of the Strategi also dispensed allowances to the needy from the public treasury; whereby the common people learnt to support and invest with office those who would help them to escape the penalties of their crimes and undischarged liabilities, and to be enriched from time to time with some portion of the public property obtained by official favour. No one contributed to this lamentable state of things more than Opheltas, who was always inventing some plan calculated to benefit the masses for the moment, while perfectly certain to ruin them in the future. To these evils was added another unfortunate fashion. It became the practice for those who died childless not to leave their property to the members of their family, as had been the custom of the country formerly, but to assign it for the maintenance of feasts and convivial entertainments to be shared in by the testator's friends in common; and even many who did possess children left the larger part of their property to the members of their own club. The result was that there were many Boeotians who had more feasts to attend in the month than there were days in it. The people of Megara therefore, disliking this habit, and remembering their old connexion with the Achaean league, were inclined once more to renew their political alliance with it. For the Megarians had been members of the Achaean league since the time of Antigonus Gonatas; but upon Cleomenes blockading the Isthmus, finding themselves cut off from the Achaeans they joined the Boeotians, with the consent of the former. But a little before the time of which we are now speaking, becoming dissatisfied with the Boeotian constitution, they again joined the Achaeans. The Boeotians, incensed at what they considered acts of contempt, sallied out in full force to attack Megara; and on the Megarians declining to listen to

Disorganised state of Boeotia.

Antigonus Gonatas, *ob.* B.C. 239.

Cleomenic war B.C. 227-221.

them, they determined in their anger to besiege and assault their city. But being attacked by a panic, on a report spreading that Philopoemen was at hand at the head of a force of Achaeans, they left their scaling ladders against the walls and fled back precipitately to their own country.

7. Such being the state of Boeotian politics, it was only by extraordinary good fortune that they evaded destruction in the dangerous periods of the wars of Philip and Antiochus. But in the succeeding period they did not escape in the same way. Fortune, on the contrary, seemed determined to make them pay for their former good luck by a specially severe retribution, as I shall relate hereafter. . . .

Antiochus received in Thebes, B.C. 192.

Many of the Boeotians defended their alienation from the Romans by alleging the assassination of Brachylles,[1] and the expedition made by Flamininus upon Coronea owing to the murders of Romans on the roads.[2] But the real reason was their moral degeneracy, brought about by the causes I have mentioned. For as soon as the king approached, the Boeotian magistrates went out to meet him, and after holding a friendly conversation with him conducted him into Thebes. . . .

Antiochus wintering in Chalcis, B.C. 192-191.

8. Antiochus the Great came to Chalcis in Euboea, and there completed his marriage, when he was fifty years old, and had already undertaken his two most important labours, the liberation of Greece—as he called it—and the war with Rome. However, having fallen in love with a young lady of Chalcis, he was bent on marrying her, though the war was still going on; for he was much addicted to wine and delighted in excesses. The lady was a daughter of Cleoptolemus, a man of rank, and was possessed of extraordinary beauty. He remained in Chalcis all the winter occupied in marriage festivities, utterly regardless of the pressing business of the time. He gave the girl the name of Euboea, and after his defeat[3] fled with his bride to Ephesus. . . .

[1] Brachylles, when a Boeotarch in B.C. 196, was assassinated by a band of six men, of whom three were Italians and three Aetolians, on his way home from a banquet. Livy, 33, 28.

[2] Livy, 33, 29.

[3] At Thermopylae, in which battle Livy (36, 19) states on the authority of Polybius that only 500 men out of 10,000 brought by Antiochus into Greece escaped, B.C. 191.

9. When the Romans took Heracleia, Phaeneas the Aetolian Strategus, in view of the danger threatening Aetolia, and seeing what would happen to the other towns, determined to send an embassy to Manius Acilius to demand a truce and treaty of peace. With this purpose he despatched Archidamus, Pantaleon and Chalesus, who on meeting the Roman consul were intending to enter upon a long argument, but were interrupted in the middle of their speech and prevented from finishing it. For Acilius remarked that "For the present he had no leisure to attend to them, being much engaged with the distribution of the spoils of Heracleia: he would, however, grant a ten days' truce and send Lucius Valerius Flaccus with them, with instructions as to what he was to say." The truce being thus made, and Valerius having come to Hypata, a lengthened discussion took place on the state of affairs. The Aetolians sought to establish their case by referring to their previous services to Rome. But Valerius cut this line of argument short by saying that "Such justification did not apply to the present circumstances; for as these old friendly relations had been broken off by them, and the existing hostility was owing entirely to the Aetolians themselves, the services of the past could be of no assistance to them in the present. They must therefore abandon all idea of justification, and adopt a tone of supplication, and beseech the consul's pardon for their transgressions." After a long discussion on various details, the Aetolians eventually decided to leave the whole matter to Acilius, and commit themselves without reserve to the good faith of the Romans. They had no comprehension of what this really involved; but they were misled by the word "faith" into supposing that the Romans would thereby be more inclined to grant them terms. But with the Romans for a man "to commit himself to their good faith" is held to be equivalent to "surrendering unconditionally."

Heracleia Trachinia taken by Acilius after the battle of Thermopylae, B.C. 191.

Embassy of the Aetolians.

10. Having come to this resolution, Phaeneas despatched legates with Valerius to announce the decision of the Aetolians to Acilius. On being admitted to the presence of the Consul, these legates, after

Aetolian embassy to Acilius.

once more entering upon a plea of self-justification, ended by announcing that the Aetolians had decided to commit themselves to the good faith of the Romans. Hereupon Acilius interrupted them by saying, "Is this really the case, men of Aetolia?" And upon their answering in the affirmative, he said: "Well then, the first condition is that none of you, individually or collectively, must cross to Asia; the second is that you must surrender Menestratus the Epirote" (who happened at that time to be at Naupactus, where he had come to the assistance of the Aetolians), "and also King Amynander, with such of the Athamanians as accompanied him in his desertion to your side." Here Phaeneas interrupted him by saying: "But it is neither just nor consonant with Greek customs, O Consul, to do what you order." To which Acilius replied,—not so much because he was angry, as because he wished to show him the dangerous position in which he stood, and to thoroughly frighten him,—"Do you still presume to talk to me about Greek customs, and about honour and duty, after having committed yourselves to my good faith? Why, I might if I chose put you all in chains and commit you to prison!" With these words he ordered his men to bring a chain and an iron collar and put it on the neck of each of them. Thereupon Phaeneas and his companions stood in speechless amazement, as though bereft of all power of thought or motion, at this unexpected turn of affairs. But Valerius and some others who were present besought Acilius not to inflict any severity upon the Aetolians then before him, as they were in the position of ambassadors. And on his yielding to these representations, Phaeneas broke silence by saying that "He and the Apocleti were ready to obey the injunctions, but they must consult the general assembly if they were to be confirmed." Upon Acilius agreeing to this, he demanded a truce of ten days to be granted. This also having been conceded, they departed with these terms, and on arrival at Hypata told the Apocleti what had been done and the speeches that had been made. This report was the first thing which made their error, and the compulsion under which they were placed, clear to the Aetolians. It was therefore decided to write round to the various cities

Roman terms.

and call the Aetolians together, to consult on the injunctions imposed upon them. When the news of the reception Phaeneas had met with was noised abroad, the Aetolian people were so infuriated that no one would even attend the meeting to discuss the matter at all. It was thus impossible to hold the discussion. They were further encouraged by the arrival of Nicander, who just at that time sailed into Phalara, on the Malian gulf, from Asia, bringing news of the warm reception given him by Antiochus, and the promises for the future which the king had made; they therefore became quite indifferent as to the non-completion of the peace. Thus when the days of the truce had elapsed the Aetolians found themselves still at war with Rome.

The Aetolians fail to ratify the peace.

11. But I ought not to omit to describe the subsequent career and fate of Nicander. He arrived back at Phalara on the twelfth day after leaving Ephesus, and found the Romans still engaged in Heracleia, and the Macedonians having already evacuated Lamia, but encamped at no great distance from the town: he thereupon conveyed his money unexpectedly into Lamia, and attempted himself to make his way between the two camps into Hypata. But, falling into the hands of the Macedonian pickets, he was taken to Philip, while his evening party was still at the midst of their entertainment, greatly alarmed lest he should meet with rough treatment from having incurred Philip's resentment, or should be handed over to the Romans. But when the matter was reported to the king, he at once gave orders that the proper officers should offer Nicander refreshments, and show him every politeness and attention. After a time he got up from table and went personally to visit him; and after enlarging at great length on "the folly of the Aetolians, for having first brought the Romans into Greece, and afterwards Antiochus," he still, even at this hour, urged that "they should forget their past, adhere to their loyalty to himself, and not show a disposition to take advantage of each other's difficulties." He bade Nicander convey this message to the leaders of the Aetolians, and exhorting him personally to remember the favours which he had received at his hands, he despatched him with a sufficient escort, which he ordered to see him safe into Hypata.

The fate of Nicander.

This result was far beyond Nicander's hopes or expectations. He was restored in due course to his friends, and from the moment of this adventure remained devoted to the royal family of Macedonia. Thus, in the subsequent period of the war with Perseus, the obligations which this favour had imposed upon him caused him to offer such an unwilling and lukewarm opposition to the designs of Perseus, that he exposed himself to suspicion and denunciation, and at last was summoned to Rome and died there. . . .

12. The Spartans could not find one of their own citizens willing to address Philopoemen on this subject. To men who for the most part undertake work for what they can get by it there are plenty of people to offer such rewards, and to regard them as the means of founding and consolidating friendship: but in the case of Philipoemen no one could be found willing to convey this offer to him at all. Finally, being completely at a loss, they elected Timolaus to do it, as being his ancestral guest-friend and very intimate with him. Timolaus twice journeyed to Megalopolis for this express purpose, without daring to say a word to Philopoemen about it. But having goaded himself to making a third attempt, he at length plucked up courage to mention the proposed gifts. Much to his surprise Philopoemen received the suggestion with courtesy; and Timolaus was overjoyed by the belief that he had attained his object. Philopoemen, however, remarked that he would come to Sparta himself in the course of the next few days; for he wished to offer all the magistrates his thanks for this favour. He accordingly came, and, being invited to attend the Senate, he said: "He had long been aware of the kindness with which the Lacedaemonians regarded him; but was more convinced than ever by the compliments and extraordinary mark of honour they now offered him. But while gratefully accepting their intention, he disliked the particular manner of its exhibition. They should not bestow such honour and rewards on their friends, the poison of which would indelibly infect the receiver, but rather upon their enemies; that the former might retain their freedom of speech and the confidence of the Achaeans

The Spartans wish to offer Philopoemen the palace of Nabis, as a reward, and as an inducement to defend their liberty. Plutarch, *Philop.* 15.

when proposing to offer assistance to Sparta; while the latter, by swallowing the bait, might be compelled either to support their cause, or at any rate to keep silence and do them no harm. . . ."

The remaining events of the war against Antiochus in this year are related by Livy, 36, 41-45. *Acilius was engaged for two months in the siege of Naupactus: while the Roman fleet under Gaius Livius defeated that of Antiochus, under his admiral Polyxenidas, off Phocaea.*

To see an operation with one's own eyes is not like merely hearing a description of it. It is, indeed, quite another thing; and the confidence which such vivid experience gives is always greatly advantageous. . . .

BOOK XXI

1. At this time also it happened that the embassy, which the Lacedaemonians had sent to Rome, returned disappointed. The subject of their mission was the hostages and the villages. As to the villages the Senate answered that they would give instructions to envoys sent by themselves; and as to the hostages they desired to consider further. But as to the exiles of past times, they said that they wondered why they were not recalled, now that Sparta had been freed from her tyrants. . . .

B.C. 190. Embassy from Sparta, and the answer of the Roman Senate.

2. At the same period the Senate dealt with the ambassadors from Philip. They had come to set forth the loyalty and zeal of the king, which he had shown to the Romans in the war against Antiochus. On hearing what the envoys had to say, the Senate released the king's son Demetrius from his position as hostage at once, and promised that they would also remit part of the yearly indemnity, if he kept faith with Rome in future. The Senate likewise released the Lacedaemonian hostages, except Armenas, son of Nabis; who subsequently fell ill and died. . . .

3. Directly the news of the victory at sea reached Rome, the Senate first decreed a public *supplicatio* for nine days,—which means a public and universal holiday, accompanied by the sacrifice of thank-offerings to the gods for the happy success,—and next gave audience to the envoys from Aetolia and Manius Acilius. When both parties had pleaded their cause at some length, the Senate decreed to offer the Aetolians the alternative of committing their cause unconditionally to the arbitration of the

Supplicatio for the victory off Phocaea.

Answer to the Aetolian Envoys sent, on the intercession of Flamininus, when

Senate, or of paying a thousand talents down and making an offensive and defensive alliance with Rome. But on the Aetolians desiring the Senate to state definitely on what points they were to submit to such arbitration, the Senate refused to define them. Accordingly the war with the Aetolians went on. . . .

Acilius was about to take Naupactus. Livy, 36, 34-35 : 37, 1.

4. While Amphissa was still being besieged by Manius Acilius, the Athenians, hearing at that time both of the distress of the Amphissians and of the arrival of Publius Scipio, despatched Echedemus and others on an embassy to him, with instructions to pay their respects to both Lucius and Publius Scipio, and at the same time to try what could be done to get peace for the Aetolians. On their arrival, Publius welcomed them gladly and treated them with great courtesy ; because he saw that they would be of assistance to him in carrying out his plans. For he was very desirous of effecting a settlement in Aetolia on good terms ; but had resolved that, if the Aetolians refused to comply, he would at all hazards relinquish that business for the present, and cross to Asia : for he was well aware that the ultimate object of the war and of the entire expedition was not to reduce the Aetolian nation to obedience, but to conquer Antiochus and take possession of Asia. Therefore, directly the Athenians mentioned the pacification, he accepted their suggestion with eagerness, and bade them sound the Aetolians also. Accordingly, Echedemus and his colleagues, having sent a preliminary deputation to Hypata, presently followed in person, and entered into a discussion with the Aetolian magistrates on the subject of a pacification. They, too, readily acquiesced in the suggestion, and certain envoys were appointed to meet the Romans. They found Publius and the army encamped sixty stades from Amphissa, and there discoursed at great length on their previous services to Rome. Publius Scipio adopted in reply a still milder and more conciliatory style, quoting his own conduct in Iberia and Libya, and explaining how he had treated all who in those countries had

Spring of B.C. 190. Coss. L. Cornelius Scipio, C. Laelius.

P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus in Greece as legatus to his brother Lucius. (March.)

Aetolian envoys visit the consuls.

confided to his honour: and finally expressing an opinion that they had better put themselves in his hands. At first, all who were present felt very sanguine that the pacification was about to be accomplished. But when, in answer to the Aetolian demand to know on what terms they were to make the peace, Lucius Scipio explained that they had two alternatives—to submit their entire case unconditionally to the arbitrament of Rome, or to pay a thousand talents down and to make an offensive and defensive alliance with her — the Aetolians present were thrown into the state of the most painful perplexity at the inconsistency of this announcement with the previous talk: but finally they said that they would consult the Aetolians on the terms imposed.

5. On the return of the Aetolian envoys for the purpose of consulting their countrymen, Echedemus and his colleagues joined the council of the *apocleti* in their deliberations on this subject. One of the alternatives was impossible owing to the amount of money demanded, and the other was rendered alarming in their eyes by the deception they had experienced before, when, after submitting to the surrender, they had narrowly escaped being thrown into chains. Being then much perplexed and quite unable to decide, they sent the same envoys back to beg the Scipios that they would either abate part of the money, so as to be within their power to pay, or except from the surrender the persons of citizens, men and women. But upon their arrival in the Roman camp and delivering their message, Lucius Scipio merely replied that "The only terms on which he was commissioned by the Senate to treat were those which he had recently stated." They therefore returned once more, and were followed by Echedemus and his colleagues to Hypata, who advised the Aetolians that "Since there was at present a hitch in the negotiations for peace, they should ask for a truce; and, having thus at least delayed the evils threatening them, should send an embassy to the Senate. If they obtained their request, all would be well; but, if they did not, they must trust to the chapter of accidents: for their position could not be worse than it was now, but for many reasons might not impossibly be better." The advice of Echedemus was thought

See bk. 20, ch. 10.

sound, and the Aetolians accordingly voted to send envoys to obtain a truce; who, upon reaching Lucius Scipio, begged that for the present a truce of six months might be granted them, that they might send an embassy to the Senate. Publius Scipio, who had for some time past been anxious to begin the campaign in Asia, quickly persuaded his brother to grant their request. The agreement therefore was reduced to writing, and thereupon Manius Acilius handed over his army to Lucius Scipio, and returned with his military tribunes to Rome. . . .

A six months' truce with the Aetolians.

ASIA

6. Factions became rife at Phocaea,[1] partly because they suffered from the Romans left with the ships being quartered on them, and partly because they were annoyed at the tribute imposed on them. . . .

A party at Phocaea wish to join Antiochus, B.C. 190.

Then the Phocaean magistrates, alarmed at the state of popular excitement caused by the dearth of corn, and the agitation kept up by the partisans of Antiochus, sent envoys to Seleucus,[2] who was on their frontiers, ordering him not to approach the town, as they were resolved to remain neutral and await the final decision of the quarrel, and then obey orders. Of these ambassadors the partisans of Seleucus and his faction were Aristarchus, Cassander, and Rhodon; those, on the contrary, who inclined to Rome were Hegias and Gelias. On their arrival Seleucus at once showed every attention to Aristarchus and his partisans, but treated Hegias and Gelias with complete neglect. But when he was informed of the state of popular feeling, and the shortness of provisions in Phocaea, he threw aside all negotiation or discussion with the envoys, and marched towards the town. . . .

Two Galli, with sacred images and figures on their breasts, advanced from the town, and besought them not to adopt any extreme measures against the city.[3] . . .

The Roman fleet at Sestos. Intercession of the Galli or priests of Cybele. Livy, 37, 9.

[1] Livy, 37, 9. [2] Son of Antiochus the Great, afterwards King Seleucus IV.
[3] This extract, preserved in Suidas, s. v. *προστηθιδίων*, has been restored by

7. The fire-carrier used by Pausistratus, the navarch of the Rhodians, was a scoop or basket. On either side of the prow two staples were fixed into the inner part of the two sides of the ship, into which poles were fitted with their extremities extending out to sea. To the end of these the scoop filled with fire was attached by an iron chain, in such a way that in charging the enemy's ship, whether on the prow or the broadside, fire was thrown upon it, while it was kept a long way off from his own ship by the slope of the poles. . . .

The Rhodian firing apparatus.

The Rhodian admiral Pamphilidas was thought to be better capable than Pausistratus of adapting himself to all possible contingencies, because his character was more remarkable for its depth and solidity than for its boldness. For most men judge not from any fixed principle but by results. Thus, though they had recently elected Pausistratus to the command, on the ground of his possessing these very qualities of energy and boldness, their opinions at once underwent a complete revolution when he met with his disaster. . . .

Pausistratus beaten by Polyxenidas, the admiral of the king. Livy, 37, 10, 11.

8. At this time a letter arrived at Samos for Lucius Aemilius and Eumenes from the consul Lucius Scipio, announcing the agreement made with the Aetolians for the truce, and the approaching advance of the land forces to the Hellespont. Another to the same effect was sent to Antiochus and Seleucus from the Aetolians. . . .

The Aetolian truce announced to Eumenes and Antiochus.

9. An embassy from King Eumenes having arrived in Achaia proposing an alliance, the Achaeans met in public assembly and ratified it, and sent out some soldiers, a thousand foot and a hundred horse, under the command of Diophanes of Megalopolis. . . .

Achaean contingent sent to the war. Livy, 37, 20.

Diophanes was a man of great experience in war; for during the protracted hostilities with Nabis in the neighbourhood of Megalopolis, he had served throughout under

a brilliant emendation of Toupe, who reads ἐξελθόντες μὲν Γάλλοι for the meaningless ἐξελθόντες μεγάλοι. Livy calls them *fanatici Galli*.

Philopoemen, and accordingly had gained a real familiarity with the operations of actual warfare. And besides this advantage, his appearance and physical prowess were impressive; and, most important of all, he was a man of personal courage and exceedingly expert in the use of arms. . . .

10. King Antiochus had already penetrated into the territory of Pergamum; but when he heard that king Eumenes was close at hand, and saw that the land forces as well as the fleet were ready to attack him, he began to consider the propriety of proposing a pacification with the Romans, Eumenes, and the Rhodians at once. He therefore removed with his whole army to Elaea, and having seized a hill facing that town, he encamped his infantry upon it, while he entrenched his cavalry, amounting to over six thousand, close under the walls of the town. He took up his own position between these two, and proceeded to send messengers to Lucius Aemilius in the town, proposing a peace. The Roman imperator thereupon called Eumenes and the Rhodians to a meeting, and desired them to give their opinions on the proposal. Eudemus and Pamphilidas were not averse to making terms; but the king said that "To make peace at the present moment was neither honourable nor possible. How could it be an honourable conclusion of the war that they should make terms while confined within the walls of a town? And how was it possible to give validity to those terms without waiting for the Consul and obtaining his consent? Besides, even if they did give any indication of coming to an agreement with Antiochus, neither the naval nor military forces could of course return home until the Senate and people had ratified the terms of it. All that would be left for them to do would be to spend the winter where they were, waiting idly for the decision from home, doing nothing, and exhausting the wealth and resources of their allies. And then, if the Senate withheld its approval of the terms, they would have to begin the war all over again, having let the opportunity pass, which, with God's help, would have enabled them to put a period to the whole war." Such was the speech

Antiochus proposes peace with Rome, Eumenes, and Rhodes.

Eumenes opposes the peace, on the grounds of honour and prudence.

of king Eumenes. Lucius Aemilius accepted the advice, and answered the envoys of Antiochus that the peace could not possibly be made until the Proconsul arrived. On hearing this Antiochus immediately began devastating the territory of Elaea; and subsequently, while Seleucus remained in occupation of that district, Antiochus continued his march through the country as far as the plain of Thebe, and having there entered upon an exceedingly fertile and wealthy district, he gorged his army with spoil of every description. . . .

Prusias, king of Bithynia.

11. On his arrival at Sardis after this expedition, Antiochus at once sent to Prusias to urge him to an alliance. Now in former times Prusias had by no means been disinclined to join Antiochus, because he was much alarmed lest the Romans should cross over to Asia for the purpose of putting down all crowned heads. But the perusal of a letter received from Lucius and Publius Scipio had served to a great extent to relieve his anxiety, and give him a tolerably correct forecast of the result of the war. For

Letter of the Scipios to Prusias.

the Scipios had put the case with great clearness in their letter, and had supported their assertions by numerous proofs. They entered not only upon a defence of the policy adopted by themselves, but of that also of the Roman people generally; by which they showed that, so far from depriving any of the existing kings of their sovereignties, they had themselves been the authors in some cases of their establishment, in others of the extension of their powers and the large increase of their dominions. To prove this they quoted the instances of Andobales and Colichas in Iberia, of Massanissa in Libya, and of Pleuratus in Illyria, all of whom they said they had raised from petty and insignificant princes to the position of undisputed royalty. They further mentioned the cases of Philip and Nabis in Greece. As to Philip, they had conquered him in war and reduced him to the necessity of giving hostages and paying tribute: yet, after receiving a slight proof of his good disposition, they had restored his son and the young men who were hostages with him, had remitted the tribute, and given him back several of the towns that had been taken in the course of war. While as for Nabis, though they might have utterly destroyed him, they had not done so, but

had spared him, tyrant as he was, on receiving the usual security for his good faith. With these facts before his eyes they urged Prusias in their letter not to be in any fear for his kingdom, but to adopt the Roman alliance without misgiving, for he would never have reason to regret his choice. This letter worked an entire change in the feelings of Prusias; and when, besides, Caius Livius and the other legates arrived at his court, after conversation with them, he entirely relinquished all ideas of looking for support from Antiochus. Foiled, therefore, of hope in this quarter, Antiochus retired to Ephesus: and being convinced on reflection that the only way of preventing the transport of the enemy's army, and in fact of repelling an invasion of Asia at all, was to keep a firm mastery of the sea, he determined to fight a naval battle and leave the issue of the struggle to be decided by his success in that. . . .

On its voyage from Samos to Teos the Roman fleet sight some pirate vessels. Livy, 37, 27.

12. When the pirates saw that the Roman fleet was coming they turned and fled. . . .

The battle between the fleets of Rome and Antiochus took place between the promontories Myonnesus and Corycum, which form the bay of Teos, Antiochus was beaten with a loss of forty-two ships early in B.C. 190. *Livy*, 37, 30.

13. After sustaining this defeat at sea, Antiochus remained in Sardis, neglecting to avail himself of such opportunities as he had left, and taking no steps whatever to prosecute the war; and when he learnt that the enemy had crossed into Asia he lost all heart, and determined in despair to send an envoy to Lucius and Publius Scipio to treat of peace. He selected Heracleides of Byzantium for this purpose, and despatched him with instructions to offer to surrender the territories of Lampsacus and Smyrna as well as Alexandria (Troas), which were the original cause of the war, and any other cities in Aeolis and Ionia of which they might wish to deprive him, as having embraced their side in the war; and in addition to this to promise an indemnity of half the expenses they had incurred in their quarrel with him. Such were the offers which the envoy was instructed to make in his

Antiochus despairs of resistance, and sends an envoy to the Scipios to treat of peace.

public audience; but, besides these, there were others to be committed to Publius Scipio's private ear, of which I will speak in detail later on. On his arrival at the Hellespont the envoy found the Romans still occupying the camp which they had constructed immediately after crossing. At first he was much cheered by this fact, for he thought it would materially aid his negotiation that the enemy were exactly where they were at first, and had not as yet taken any further action. But when he learnt that Publius Scipio was still on the other side of the water he was much disturbed, because the turn which his negotiations were to take depended principally on Scipio's view of the matter. The reason of the army being still in their first camp, and of Publius Scipio's absence from the army, was that he was one of the Salii. These are, as I have before stated, one of the three colleges of priests by whom the most important sacrifices to the gods are offered at Rome. And it is the law that, at the time of these sacrifices, they must not quit the spot for thirty days in which it happens to find them.[1] This was the case at the present time with Publius Scipio; for just as the army was on the point of crossing this season arrived, and prevented him from changing his place of abode. Thus it came about that he was separated from the legions and remained in Europe, while, though the army crossed, it remained encamped, and could take no further step, because they were waiting for him.

The laws relating to the Salii or priests of Mars.

14. However, Publius arrived a few days afterwards, and Heracleides being summoned to attend the Council, delivered the message with which he was charged, announcing that Antiochus abandoned Lampsacus, Smyrna, and Alexandria; and also all such towns in Aeolis and Ionia as had sided with Rome; and that he offered, further, an indemnity of half their expenses in the present war. He added many arguments besides, urging the Romans "Not to tempt fortune too far, as they were but

Speech of Heracleides.

[1] *Dies forte, quibus Ancilia moventur, religiosi ad iter inciderant.* Livy, 37, 33. The festival of Mars, during which the *ancilia* were carried about, was on the 1st of March and following days. If this incident, therefore, took place in the late spring or summer of B.C. 190, the Roman Calendar must have been very far out.

men; nor to extend their empire indefinitely, but rather to keep it within limits, if possible those of Europe,—for even then they would have an enormous and unprecedented dominion, such as no nation before them had attained;—but if they were determined at all hazards to grasp parts of Asia also, let them say definitely what parts those were, for the king would go to the utmost stretch of his power to meet their wishes." After the delivery of this speech the council decided that the Consul should answer that "It was only fair that Antiochus should pay, not the half, but the whole expense of the war, seeing that he, and not they, had originally begun it; and as to the cities, he must not only liberate those in Aeolis and Ionia, but must surrender his whole dominion on this side of Mount Taurus." On receiving this answer from the council, conveying demands which went far beyond his instructions, the envoy, without answering a word, abstained from a public audience thenceforth, but exerted himself to conciliate Publius Scipio.

The Consul's answer.

15. Having at length got a suitable opportunity, he disclosed to him the offers with which he was charged. These were that the king would first restore his son without ransom, who had been taken prisoner in the early part of the war; and was prepared, secondly, to pay him any sum of money he might name, and thenceforth share with him the wealth of his kingdom, if he would only support the acceptance of the terms offered by the king. Publius replied that the promise as to his son he accepted, and would feel under an obligation to the king if he fulfilled it; but as to the rest he assured him that the king, among his other delusions, was under a complete mistake as to the course demanded by his own interests. "For if he had made these offers while still master of Lysimacheia and the entrance into the Chersonese, he would at once have got what he asked: and so too, even after evacuating these places, if he had appeared with his army at the Hellespont and shown that he meant to prevent our crossing, and then had sent his envoys, he might even thus have obtained his demands. But when he comes with his proposals of equitable terms, after allowing our troops to set foot in Asia,

The secret offers of Antiochus to Publius Scipio.

Scipio's reply.

and having so not only submitted to the bridle, but allowed the rider to mount, he must expect to fail and be disappointed of his hopes. Therefore, I advise him to adopt wiser measures, and look at the facts in their true light. In return for his promise in regard to my son, I will give him a hint which is well worth the favour he offers me: make any concession, do anything, rather than fight with the Romans." With this answer Heracleides returned and told the king everything. And Antiochus, considering that no severer terms could be imposed on him if he were beaten in the field, abandoned all idea of negotiation, and began making preparations of all sorts and in every direction for the battle. . . .

Antiochus sent Scipio's son back. The decisive battle took place in the neighbourhood of Thyatira, and proved a decisive victory for the Romans. This was in the late autumn of B.C. 190. *See Livy*, 37, 38-44.

16. After the victory the Romans took Sardis and its Acropolis, and there they were visited by Musaeus bringing a message from Antiochus. Being politely received by the Scipios, he announced that Antiochus wished to send envoys to treat on the terms of peace, and therefore desired that a safe conduct should be given them. This was granted and the herald returned; and some days after, Zeuxis, formerly Satrap of Lydia, and Antipater, his nephew, came as ambassadors from king Antiochus. Their first anxiety was to meet king Eumenes, because they feared that his old quarrel would cause him to be only too ready to do them a bad turn. But when they found him, contrary to their expectation, disposed to moderate and gentle methods, they at once addressed themselves to meeting the council. Being summoned to attend it they made a lengthy speech, among other things exhorting the Romans to use their victory with mildness and generosity; and alleging that such a course was still more to the interest of the Romans than of Antiochus, since Fortune had committed to them the empire and lordship of the world. Finally, they asked "What they were to do to obtain peace and the friendship of Rome?" The members of the council had already in a previous sitting discussed and agreed upon this

point, and now bade Publius Scipio deliver their decision.

17. Scipio began by saying that victory never made the Romans more severe than before, and accordingly the envoys would receive the same answer as they had previously received when they came to the Hellespont before the battle. "They must evacuate Europe and all Asia this side Taurus: must pay the Romans fifteen thousand Euboic talents as an indemnity for the expenses of the war, five hundred at once, two thousand five hundred on the ratification of the treaty by the people, and the rest in twelve yearly instalments of a thousand talents. Further, Antiochus must pay Eumenes the four hundred talents owing to him, and the balance of the corn due in accordance with the treaty made with his father Attalus. He must at the same time deliver Hannibal the Carthaginian, Thoas the Aetolian, Mnasilochus the Acarnanian, and Philo and Eubulides the Chalcidians. As security for the fulfilment of these terms, Antiochus must at once give twenty hostages named in the treaty." Such was the decision announced by Publius Scipio in the name of the whole Council. Antipater and Zeuxis having expressed their consent to them, it was agreed by all to send envoys to Rome to appeal to the Senate and people to confirm the treaty. The ambassadors of Antiochus departed with this understanding: and during the following days the Roman commanders divided their forces into their winter quarters; and when some few days later the hostages arrived, both Eumenes and the envoys of Antiochus started on their voyage to Rome. Nor were they alone in their mission; for Rhodes also, and Smyrna, and nearly all the nations and states on this side Taurus sent ambassadors to Rome. . . .

The Roman terms imposed on Antiochus.

The terms are accepted, and missions sent to Rome.

18.[1] At the beginning of the summer following the victory of the Romans over Antiochus, the ambassadors of that king, and those from Rhodes, as well as from the other states arrived in Rome. For, as I

B.C. 189. Coss. Cn. Manlius Vulso, M. Fulvius

[1] The remaining chapters of this book are placed by Schweighaeuser and others in book 22, 1-27.

Nobilior. Reception of king Eumenes and the ambassadors at Rome.

said, nearly all the states in Asia began sending envoys to Rome immediately after the battle, because the hopes of all as to their future position rested at that time on the Senate. All who arrived were graciously received by the Senate; but the most imposing reception was that accorded to king Eumenes, both in the complimentary processions sent out to meet him and the arrangements made for his entertainment; and next in cordiality to his reception was that given to the Rhodians.

The audiences in the Senate.

When the time for the audiences came, they first called in the king and bade him say freely what he wished to obtain at the hands of the Senate.

Eumenes.

But Eumenes at first evaded the task by saying: "If I had been desirous of obtaining any favour from others, I should have looked to the Romans for advice, that I might neither desire anything that was wrong nor ask anything unfair; but seeing that I am here to prefer my request to the Romans themselves, I think it better to leave the interests of myself and my brothers unreservedly in their hands." And though one of the Senators rose and begged him to have no apprehension, but to speak his mind, he still adhered to this view. And so after a certain time had elapsed the king withdrew; and the Senate, remaining in the curia, debated what was to be done. Eventually it was decreed to call upon Eumenes to declare with his own mouth the objects of his visit without reserve, on the ground that he knew best what his own kingdom required, and what was the state of things in Asia. He was then called in; and, one of the Senators having informed him of the vote, he was compelled to speak on the business.

19. He said therefore that "He would not say another word on his own concerns, but would adhere strictly to his resolution of leaving the decision as to them entirely in the hands of the Romans.

Speech of Eumenes.

But there was one subject on which he felt anxiety, namely, the policy of Rhodes; and it was this that induced him to address the Senate on the present occasion. These Rhodians had come to Rome to further the interests of their own country, and their own prosperity, quite as much as he had come to promote those of his own kingdom at that moment;

but their professions were entirely at variance with their real purpose. And it was easy to satisfy one's self of this: for, when they enter the Senate house, they will say that they come neither to ask anything for themselves nor to thwart Eumenes in any way whatever; but are ambassadors for the liberty of the Greek inhabitants of Asia. 'To secure this,' they will say, 'is not so much a favour to themselves as an act incumbent on the Romans, and in consonance with their former achievements.' Such will be their specious professions; but the real truth of the case will be wholly different. For if these cities are once set free, the result will be that their dominion will be many times increased, while his own would be in a manner entirely broken up. For the attractive name of liberty and autonomy would draw from his rule not only the cities to be freed at present, but those also which had been under his rule from of old, directly it is made apparent that the Senate has adopted that policy, and would add them to the dominion of Rhodes. That was the natural course for things to take. Imagining that they owed their freedom to Rhodes, those cities would become in name its allies, but in reality entirely subservient, owing to the heavy obligation under which they will find themselves. He begged the Senators, therefore, to be on their guard on that point: lest they should find that they had unwittingly aggrandised one friendly nation too much, and disproportionately weakened another; or even that they were benefiting men who had once been their foes, to the neglect and contempt of their genuine friends."

20. "For myself," he continued, "though in every other point I would yield, if it were necessary, to my neighbours, yet in the matter of your friendship and of my goodwill towards you I will never, if I can help it, yield to any one alive. And I think that my father, if he had been living, would have said the same: for as he was the first to become your friend and ally, so of all the inhabitants of Asia and Greece he was the most nobly loyal to you to the last day of his life, not only in heart but in deed. For he took his part in all your wars in Greece, and furnished the largest contingents of men and ships of all your allies; contributed the largest share of supplies; and faced the most serious dangers: and to sum up all,

ended his life actually engaged in the war with Philip, while employed in urging the Boeotians to join your alliance. I, too, when I succeeded to his kingdom, while fully maintaining my father's views, for it was impossible to do more, have yet gone even beyond him in actual achievements: for the state of the times brought me to a more fiery test than they did him. Antiochus offered me his daughter and a share in his whole kingdom: offered me immediate restoration of all the cities that had been before wrested from me: and finally promised me any price I chose if I would join him in his war with you. But so far from accepting any one of these offers, I joined you in your struggle against Antiochus with the largest military and naval contingents of any of your allies; contributed the largest share of supplies at the time of your utmost need; and exposed myself unreservedly to every danger along with your generals. Finally, I submitted to being invested in Pergamos itself, and risked my life as well as my crown in my loyalty to your people.

21. "Therefore, men of Rome, as many of you have been eye-witnesses of the truth of my words, and all of you know it, it is but just that you should have a corresponding regard for my interests. You have made Massanissa king of the greater part of Libya, though he had once been your enemy and at last deserted to your side accompanied only by a few horsemen, only because he kept faith with you in one war: you have raised Pleuratus to the first position among the princes of Illyria, though he had done absolutely nothing for you beyond keeping loyal; it would be the height of inconsistency if you should neglect me and my family, who from generation to generation have co-operated in your most important and glorious undertakings. What is it, then, that I am asking you to do, and what do I claim at your hands? I will tell you openly, since you have called upon me to speak my mind to you. If you decide, then, to continue holding certain parts of Asia which are on this side Taurus, and were formerly subject to Antiochus, that is what I should wish to see best of all: for I consider that the security of my realm would best be secured by having you for neighbours, and especially by my sharing in your prestige. But if you decide not to do this, but to evacuate

Asia entirely, there is no one to whom you may with greater justice surrender the prizes you have won in the field than to me. But it may be said, it is a more honourable thing still to set the enslaved free. Yes! if they had not ventured to join Antiochus in the war against you. But since they had the hardihood to do so, it is a much more honourable course to make a proper return to your sincere friends, than to benefit those who have shown themselves your enemies."

22. After the delivery of this effective speech Eumenes retired. The Senate received both the king himself and the speech with every mark of favour, and were enthusiastic for doing everything in their power to gratify him. They wished to call in the Rhodians next after him; but one of the Rhodian ambassadors not being there in time, they called in those from Smyrna, who delivered a long disquisition on the goodwill and zeal which they had displayed towards Rome during the late war. But as there are no two opinions about the fact of their having been, of all the autonomous states in Asia, the most strenuous in the cause, I do not think it necessary to set forth their speech in detail.

The legates from Smyrna.

But next to them came in the Rhodians: who, after a short preamble as to their services to the Romans, quickly came to the discussion of the position of their own country. They said that "It was a very great embarrassment to them, in the discharge of their ambassadorial duties, to find themselves placed by the necessities of the case in opposition to a sovereign with whom their public and private relations were of the most friendly description. It was the opinion of their countrymen that the most honourable course, and the one which above all others would redound to the credit of Rome, was, that the Greeks in Asia should be set free, and should recover that possession dearest to all mankind—autonomy: but this was the last thing to suit Eumenes and his brothers. It was the nature of monarchy to hate equality, and to endeavour to have everybody, or at least as many as possible, subject and obedient. But though that was the case now, still they felt convinced that they should gain their object, not because they had greater influence with

Speech of the Rhodians.

the Romans than Eumenes, but because they would be shown to be suggesting a course more just in itself and more indisputably advantageous to all concerned. If, indeed, the only way the Romans could requite Eumenes was by handing over to him the autonomous towns, they might reasonably be at a loss to determine what to do; for they would have had to decide between neglecting a sincere friend and disregarding their own honour and duty, and thus entirely obscuring and degrading the glory of their great achievements. But if, on the other hand, it were possible adequately to consult for both these objects at the same time, who could doubt about the matter any longer? Yet the fact was that, as in a costly banquet, there was enough and to spare for all. Lycaonia, Phrygia on the Hellespont, and Pisidia, the Chersonese also and the districts bordering on it, were at the disposal of the Romans to give to whom they chose; only a few of which added to the kingdom of Eumenes would double its present extent, while if all, or even the great part were assigned to him, it would become second to that of no other prince in Asia.

23. "It was therefore in the power of the Romans to strengthen their friends very materially without destroying the glory of their own policy. For the end which they proposed to themselves in their war was not the same as that of other nations, but widely different. The rest of the world all entered upon war with the view of conquering and seizing cities, wealth, or ships: but heaven had ordained that they should want none of these things, by having put everything in the whole world under their rule. What was it, then, that they had still occasion to wish for, and to take the securest means to obtain? Plainly praise and glory among mankind; which it was difficult indeed to gain, but most difficult of all to preserve when gained. Their war with Philip might show them their meaning. That war they had, as they professed, undertaken with the sole object of liberating Greece; and that was in fact the only prize they gained in it, and no other whatever: yet the glory they got by it was greater than that which the tribute of the Carthaginians had brought them. And justly so: for money is a possession common to all mankind, but honour and praise and glory are

attributes of the gods and of those men who approach nearest to them. Therefore, the most glorious of all their achievements was the liberation of Greece; and if they now completed that work their fame would receive its consummation: but if they neglected to do so, even what they had already accomplished would lose its lustre." They finally wound up by saying, "As for us, gentlemen, having once deliberately adopted this policy and joined with you in the severest battles and in genuine dangers, we do not now propose to abandon the part of friends; but have not hesitated to say openly what we believe to be for your honour and your interests alike, with no ulterior design whatever, and with a single eye to our duty as the highest earthly object."

24. This speech of the Rhodians was universally regarded as temperate and fair. The Senate next caused Antipater and Zeuxis, the ambassadors of Antiochus, to be introduced: and on their speaking in a tone of entreaty and supplication, an approval of the agreement made by him with Scipio in Asia was voted. A few days later the people also ratified it, and oaths were accordingly interchanged with Antipater and his colleague. This done, the other ambassadors from Asia were introduced into the Senate: but a very brief hearing was given to each, and the same answer was returned to all; namely, that ten commissioners would be sent to decide on all points of dispute between the cities. The Senate then appointed ten commissioners, to whom they gave the entire settlement of particulars; while as a general principle they decided that of Asia this side Taurus such inhabitants as had been subject to Antiochus were to be assigned to Eumenes, except Lycia and Caria up to the Maeander, which were to belong to the Rhodians; while of the Greek cities, such of them as had been accustomed to pay tribute to Attalus were to pay the same to Eumenes; and only those who had done so to Antiochus were to be relieved of tribute altogether. Having given the ten commissioners these outlines of the general settlement, they sent them out to join the consul, Cnaeus Manlius Vulso, in Asia.

Treaty with Antiochus confirmed.

Settlement of Asia, B.C. 189.

After these arrangements had been completed, the Rhodian envoys came to the Senate again with a request in regard to Soli in Cilicia, alleging that they were called upon by ties of kindred to think of the interests of that city; for the people of Soli were, like the Rhodians, colonists from Argos. Having listened to what they had to say, the Senate invited the attendance of the ambassadors from Antiochus, and at first were inclined to order Antiochus to evacuate the whole of Cilicia; but upon these ambassadors resisting this order, on the ground of its being contrary to the treaty, they once more discussed the case of Soli by itself. The king's ambassadors still vehemently maintaining their rights, the Senate dismissed them and called in the Rhodians. Having informed them of the opposition raised by Antipater, they added that they were ready to go any length in the matter, if the Rhodians, on a review of the whole case, determined to push their claim. The Rhodian envoys, however, were much gratified by the spirit shown by the Senate, and said that they would ask nothing more. This question, therefore, was left as it was; and just as the ten commissioners and the other ambassadors were on the point of starting, the two Scipios, and Lucius Aemilius, the victor in the sea fight with Antiochus, arrived at Brundisium; and after certain days all three entered Rome in triumph. . . .

Soli in Cilicia.

Summer B.C. 189.

Amynandrus was restored to the kingdom of Athamania, which was occupied by a garrison of Philip's, by the aid of the Aetolians, who then proceeded to invade Amphilochia and the Dolopes. Hence the Aetolian war, beginning with the siege of Ambracia by M. Fulvius Nobilior. *Livy*, 38, 1-11.

25. Amynandrus, king of the Athamanes, thinking that he had now permanently recovered his kingdom, sent envoys to Rome and to the Scipios in Asia, for they were still in the neighbourhood of Ephesus, partly to excuse himself for having, as it appeared, secured his recall by the help of the Aetolians, but chiefly to entreat that he might be received again into the Roman alliance. But the Aetolians, imagining that they had now a

Summer of B.C. 190.

good opportunity of once more annexing Amphilochia and Aperantia, determined on an expedition against those countries; and when Nicander their Strategus had mustered the league army, they invaded Amphilochia. Finding most of the people willing to join them, they advanced into Aperantia; and the Aperantians also willingly yielding to them, they continued their expedition into Dolopia. The Dolopians for a time made a show of resistance, and of keeping loyal to Philip; but on considering what had happened to the Athamanes, and the check which Philip had received there, they quickly changed their minds and gave in their adhesion to the Aetolians. After this successful issue of his expedition Nicander led his army home, believing that Aetolia was secured by the subjection of these tribes and places, against the possibility of any one injuring its territory. But immediately after these events, and when the Aetolians were still in the full elation of their successes, a report reached them of the battle in Asia, in which they learnt that Antiochus had been utterly defeated. This caused a great revulsion of feeling; and when presently Damoteles came from Rome and announced that a continuation of the war was decreed against them, and that Marcus Fulvius and an army had crossed to attack them, they were reduced to a state of complete despair; and not knowing how to meet the danger which was impending over them, they resolved to send to Rhodes and Athens, begging them to despatch envoys to Rome to intercede in their behalf, and, by softening the anger of the Romans, to find some means of averting the evils that threatened Aetolia. They also sent ambassadors of their own to Rome once more, Alexander, Isius, and Phaeneas, accompanied by Callippus of Ambracia and Lycopus. . . .

Late autumn of B.C. 190.

Spring of B.C. 189.

XXII.

26. Some envoys from Epirus having visited the Roman Consul, he consulted with them as to the best way of attacking the Aetolians. They advised that he should begin by attacking Ambracia, which was at that time a member of the Aetolian league. They gave as their reasons that, if the Aetolians ventured to give

M. Fulvius Nobilior at Apollonia.

battle, the neighbourhood of Ambracia was very favourable for the legions to fight in; and that if, on the other hand, the Aetolians avoided an engagement, the town was an excellent one to besiege: for the district round it would supply abundant timber for the construction of siege artillery; and the river Arachthus, which flowed right under the walls, would be of great use in conveying supplies to the army in the summer season, and serve as a protection to their works. Fulvius thought the advice good, and accordingly marched through Epirus to attack Ambracia. On his arrival there, as the Aetolians did not venture to meet him, he reconnoitred the city, and set vigorously to work on the siege. Meanwhile the Aetolian envoys that had been sent to Rome were caught off Cephallenia by Sibyrtus, son of Petraeus, and brought into Charadrus. The Epirotes first resolved to place these men at Buchetus and keep them under strict guard. But a few days afterwards they demanded a ransom of them on the ground that they were at war with the Aetolians. It happened that one of them, Alexander, was the richest man in Greece, while the others were badly off, and far inferior to Alexander in the amount of their property. At first the Epirotes demanded five talents from each. The others did not absolutely refuse this, but were willing to pay if they could, because they cared above everything to secure their own safety. But Alexander refused to consent, for it seemed a large sum of money, and he lay awake at night bewailing himself at the idea of being obliged to pay five talents. The Epirotes, however, foresaw what would happen, and were extremely alarmed lest the Romans should hear that they had detained men who were on a mission to themselves, and should send a despatch ordering their release; they, therefore, lowered their demand to three talents a-piece. The others gladly accepted the offer, gave security, and departed: but Alexander said that he would not pay more than a talent, and that was too much; and at last, giving up all thought of saving himself, remained in custody, though he was an old man, and possessed property worth more than two hundred talents; and I think he would have died rather than pay the three

Fulvius advances upon Ambracia.

The Aetolian envoys intercepted.

talents. So extraordinarily strong in some men is the passion for accumulating money. But on this occasion Fortune so favoured his greed, that the result secured all men's praise and approval for his infatuation. For, a few days afterwards, a despatch arrived from Rome ordering the release of the ambassadors; and, accordingly, he was the only one of them that was set free without ransom. When the Aetolians learnt what had happened to him, they elected Damoteles as their ambassador to Rome; who, however, when as far as Leucas on his voyage, was informed that Marcus Fulvius was marching through Epirus upon Ambracia, and, therefore, gave up the mission as useless, and returned back to Aetolia. . . .

27. The Aetolians being besieged by the consul Marcus Fulvius, offered a gallant resistance to the assault of the siege artillery and battering rams. Marcus having first strongly secured his camp began the siege on an extensive scale; he opened three separate parallel works across the plain against the Pyrrheium, and a fourth opposite the temple of Asclepius, and a fifth directed against the Acropolis. And the attack being pushed on energetically at all these points at once, the besieged became terribly alarmed at the prospect before them. Still, as the rams vigorously battered the walls, and the long poles with their iron sickles tore off the battlements, they tried to invent machines to baffle them, letting down huge masses of lead and stones and oak logs by means of levers upon the battering rams; and putting iron hooks upon the sickles and hauling them inside the walls, so that the poles to which they were fastened broke against the battlements, and the sickles fell into their hands. Moreover they made frequent sallies, in which they fought with great courage: sometimes making a descent by night upon the pickets quartered at the works, and at others attacking in broad daylight the day-parties of the besiegers: and by these means they managed to protract the siege. . . .

Siege of Ambracia, and the gallant resistance of the Aetolians.

Nicander was outside the city, and sent five hundred horse into it. They carried the intervening entrenchment of the enemy and forced their way into the town. With these he had fixed on a day on which they were to sally out, and he was to be ready to support them. They accordingly made the sally

with great courage and fought gallantly; but either from fear of the danger, or because he conceived that what he was engaged upon at the time could not be neglected, Nicander failed to come up to time, and accordingly the attempt failed. . . .[1]

28. By assiduously working the battering rams the Romans were always breaking down this or that part of the wall. But yet they could not succeed in storming any of these breaches, because the besieged were energetic in raising counter walls, and the Aetolians fought with determined gallantry on the débris. They, therefore, in despair had recourse to mines and underground tunnels. Having safely secured the central one of their three works, and carefully concealed the shaft with wattle screens, they erected in front of it a covered walk or stoa about two hundred feet long, parallel with the wall; and beginning their digging from that, they carried it on unceasingly day and night, working in relays. For a considerable number of days the besieged did not discover them carrying the earth away through the shaft; but when the heap of earth thus brought out became too high to be concealed from those inside the city, the commanders of the besieged garrison set to work vigorously digging a trench inside, parallel to the wall and to the stoa which faced the towers. When the trench was made to the required depth, they next placed in a row along the side of the trench nearest the wall a number of brazen vessels made very thin; and, as they walked along the bottom of the trench past these, they listened for the noise of the digging outside. Having marked the spot indicated by any of these brazen vessels, which were extraordinarily sensitive and vibrated to the sound outside, they began digging from within, at right angles to the trench, another underground tunnel leading under the wall, so calculated as to exactly hit the enemy's tunnel. This was soon accomplished, for the Romans had not only brought their mine up to the wall, but had under-pinned a considerable length of it on either side of their mine; and thus the two parties found themselves face to face. At first they conducted this underground fighting with their spears: but as neither side could do much good, because

The Romans begin mining operations.

Counter-mines by the besieged.

[1] The text of this fragment is much dislocated.

both parties protected themselves with shields and wattles, some one suggested another plan to the defenders. Putting in front of them an earthenware jar, made to the width of the mine, they bored a hole in its bottom, and, inserting an iron funnel of the same length as the depth of the vessel, they filled the jar itself with fine feathers, and putting a little fire in it close to the mouth of the jar, they clapped on an iron lid pierced full of holes. They carried this without accident through the mine with its mouth towards the enemy. When they got near the besiegers they stopped up the space all round the rim of the jar, leaving only two holes on each side through which they thrust spears to prevent the enemy coming near the jar. They then took a pair of bellows such as blacksmiths use, and, having attached them to the orifice of the funnel, they vigorously blew up the fire placed on the feathers near the mouth of the jar, continually withdrawing the funnel in proportion as the feathers became ignited lower down. The plan was successfully executed; the volume of smoke created was very great, and, from the peculiar nature of feathers, exceedingly pungent, and was all carried into the faces of the enemy. The Romans, therefore, found themselves in a very distressing and embarrassing position, as they could neither stop nor endure the smoke in the mines.[1] The siege being thus still further protracted the Aetolian commander determined to send an envoy to the Consul. . . .

The Romans smoked out.

29. About this time the ambassadors from Athens and Rhodes came to the Roman camp for the purpose of furthering, if they could, the conclusion of a peace. The Athamanian king, Amynandrus, also arrived, very eager to relieve the Ambraciots from their miserable position, and having received a safe conduct from Marcus Fulvius in consideration of the urgent nature of the business: For he had a very friendly feeling towards the Ambraciots, from having passed most of the

Intercession of Athens, Rhodes, and king Amynandrus.

[1] Smoking out an enemy in a mine was one of the regular manœuvres. See Aen. Tact. 37. It was perhaps suggested by the illegal means taken by workmen in the silver mines to annoy a rival; for we find an Athenian law directed against it. See Demosth. *in Pantaen.* § 36.

time of his exile in that town.[1] A few days afterwards also some Acarnanians arrived, bringing Damoteles and his fellow envoys. For Marcus Fulvius, having been informed of their misfortunes, had written to the people of Thyreum to bring the men to him. All these various persons, therefore, having assembled, the negotiations for peace were pushed on energetically. For his part, Amynandrus was urgent in his advice to the Ambraciots to save themselves from the destruction which would not be long in coming to them unless they adopted wiser counsels. On his coming again and again up to the wall and conversing with them on this subject, the Ambraciots decided to invite him inside the town. The consul having given the king leave to enter the walls, he went in and discussed the situation with the inhabitants. Meanwhile the Athenian and Rhodian envoys got hold of the consul and tried by ingenious arguments to mollify his anger. Some one also suggested to Damoteles and Phaeneas to apply to Caius Valerius and endeavour to win him over. He was the son of that Marcus Valerius Laevinus who made the first alliance with the Aetolians; and half brother, by the mother's side, of the consul Marcus Fulvius, and being a young man of vigorous character enjoyed the greatest confidence of the consul. Being appealed to by Damoteles, and thinking that in a way he had a family interest in the matter, and was bound to undertake the patronage of the Aetolians, he exerted himself with the greatest zeal and enthusiasm to rescue that people from their perilous position. The matter then being vigorously pushed forward on all sides at once was at length accomplished. For the Ambraciots, by the persuasion of the king, surrendered to the consul unreservedly as far as they themselves were concerned, and gave up the town, on the one condition that the Aetolian garrison should march out under truce. This primary exception they made that they might keep faith with their allies.

30. So the consul agreed to grant the Aetolians peace on condition of receiving two hundred Euboic talents down, and

[1] Nothing seems to be known of this exile of Fulvius, who had been granted an ovation in B.C. 191 for his victories in Spain. He was, however, in opposition to Cato, one of whose numerous prosecutions may have been against him.

three hundred in six yearly instalments of fifty: of the restoration to the Romans of all prisoners and deserters within six months without ransom: of their retaining no city in their league, nor thenceforth admitting any fresh one, of such as had been captured by the Romans, or had voluntarily embraced their friendship since Titus Quinctius crossed into Greece: the Cephallenians not to be included in these terms.

Terms granted to the Aetolians.

Such was the sketch in outline of the main points of the treaty. But it required first the consent of the Aetolians, and then to be referred to Rome: and meanwhile the Athenian and Rhodian envoys remained where they were, waiting for the decision of the Aetolians. On being informed by Damoteles and his colleagues on their return of the nature of the terms that had been granted them, the Aetolians consented to the general principle—for they were in fact much better than they had expected,—but in regard to the towns formerly included in their league they hesitated for some time; finally, however, they acquiesced. Marcus Fulvius accordingly took over Ambracia, and allowed the Aetolian garrison to depart under terms; but removed from the town the statues and pictures, of which there was a great number, owing to the fact of Ambracia having been a royal residence of Pyrrhus. He was also presented with a crown[1] weighing one hundred and fifty talents. After this settlement of affairs he directed his march into the interior of Aetolia, feeling surprised at meeting with no communication from the Aetolians. But on arriving at Amphilochian Argos, a hundred and eighty stades from Ambracia, he pitched his camp; and being there met by Damoteles and his colleagues with the information that the Aetolians had resolved to ratify the treaty which they had concluded, they went their several ways, the Aetolians back to their own country, and Marcus to Ambracia, where he busied himself about getting his army across to Cephallenia; while the Aetolians appointed Phaeneas and Nicander ambassadors to go to Rome about the peace: for not a single line of the above treaty held good until ratified by the Roman people.

The Aetolian people confirm the treaty.

[1] Or "a compliment." The Greek word *στέφανος* seems to be used for any present made to a victor. So also in ch. 34, and elsewhere.

31. While these envoys, accompanied by those from Rhodes and Athens, were on their voyage with this object, Marcus Fulvius sent Caius Valerius also, and some others of his friends to Rome to secure the ratification of the treaty. But when they arrived at Rome they found that a fresh cause of anger with the Aetolians had arisen by the instrumentality of king Philip; who, looking upon himself as wronged by the Aetolians having taken Athamania and Dolopia from him, had sent to some of his friends at Rome, urging them to share his displeasure and secure the rejection of the pacification. Accordingly, on the first arrival of the Aetolians, the Senate would not listen to them; but afterwards, at the intercession of the Rhodians and Athenians, changed its mind and consented to their request: for Damis,[1] besides other excellences displayed in his speech, was thought to have introduced a very apt simile, extremely applicable to the case in hand. He said

Speech of Damis.

"The Romans had good cause for anger with the Aetolians; for, instead of being grateful for the many kindnesses received at their hands, they had brought the Roman Empire into great danger by causing the war with Antiochus to break out. But the Senate were wrong in one point, namely in directing their anger against the masses. For in states the common people were like the sea, which left to its own nature was ever calm and unmoved, and not in the least likely ever to trouble any of those who approached or used it; but directly violent winds blew upon and disturbed it, and forced it against its nature to become agitated, then indeed nothing could be more dreadful or formidable than the sea. This was just the case with the Aetolians. As long as they were left to themselves, no people in Greece were more loyal to you or more staunch in supporting your active measures. But when Thoas and Dicaearchus brought a storm from Asia, and Mnestas and Damocritus from Europe, and, disturbing the calm of the Aetolian masses, compelled

[1] Hultsch's text, supported by the MSS., has Δάμις ὁ κιχησίων, from which no sense seems obtainable. According to Suidas, Damis was a philosopher from Nineveh who had settled in Athens. Livy (38, 10), has *Leon Hicesiae filius*. He must therefore have found the name Leon in his copy, which could hardly have been substituted for Δᾶμις by mistake, though ΙΚΕΣίου may have become κιχησίων.

them to become reckless of what they said or did,—then indeed their good disposition gave way to bad, and while intending to do mischief to you they really inflicted damage upon themselves. It is against these mischief-makers therefore that you should be implacable; while you should take pity on the masses and make peace with them: with the assurance that, if once more left to themselves, with the additional feeling of having owed their safety on the present occasion to you, their attachment to you will be the warmest in Greece."

32. By these arguments the Athenian envoy persuaded the Senate to make peace with the Aetolians. The decree therefore having been passed and confirmed by a vote of the people, the treaty was formally ratified, of which the text was as follows: "The people of the Aetolians shall in good faith maintain the empire and majesty of the people of Rome.

Treaty with Aetolia, B.C. 189.

"They shall not allow hostile forces to pass through their territory or cities against the Romans, their allies or friends; nor grant them any supplies from the public fund.

"They shall have the same enemies as the people of Rome; and if the Roman people go to war with any, the Aetolian people shall do so also.

"The Aetolians shall surrender to the praefectus in Corcyra, within a hundred days from the completion of the treaty, runaway slaves, and prisoners of the Romans and their allies, except such as having been taken during the war have returned to their own land and been subsequently captured; and except such as were in arms against Rome during the time that the Aetolians were fighting on the side of the Romans.

"If there should be any not found within that time, they shall hand them over as soon as they are forthcoming, without deceit or fraud. And such persons, after the completion of the treaty, shall not be allowed to return to Aetolia.

"The Aetolians shall pay the consul in Greece at once two hundred Euboic talents of silver, of a standard not inferior to the Attic. In place of one third of this silver, they may, if they so choose, pay gold, at the rate of a mina of gold to ten minae of silver. They shall pay the money in the six years

next following the completion of the treaty in yearly instalments of fifty talents; and shall deliver the money in Rome.

"The Aetolians shall give the Consul forty hostages, not less than ten or more than forty years old, to remain for the six years; they shall be selected by the Romans freely, excepting only the Strategus, Hipparch, public secretary, and such as have already been hostages at Rome.

"The Aetolians shall deliver such hostages in Rome; and if any one of them die, they shall give another in his place.

"Cephallenia shall not be included in this treaty.

"Of such territories, cities, and men as once belonged to the Aetolians, and, in the consulship of Titus Quinctius and Cnaeus Domitius, or subsequently, were either captured by the Roman or voluntarily embraced their friendship, the Aetolians shall not annex any, whether city or men therein.

B.C. 192.

"The city and territory of Oeniadae shall belong to the Acarnanians."

The treaty having been solemnly sworn, peace was concluded, and the war in Aetolia, as is in the rest of Greece, thus came to an end. . . .

THE WAR WITH THE GAULS OF ASIA

33. While the negotiations for peace with Antiochus, and for the settlement of Asia generally were going on at Rome, and the Aetolian war was being fought in Greece, it happened that another war in Asia, that, namely, against the Gauls, was brought to a conclusion, the account of which I am now about to give. . . .

34. Moagĕtes was Tyrant of Cibyra, a cruel and crafty man, whose career deserves somewhat more than a passing reference. . . .

When Cnaeus Manlius was approaching Cibyra and had sent Helvius to find out the intentions of Moagĕtes, the latter begged him by ambassadors not to damage the country, because he was a friend of Rome, and ready to do anything that was required of him; and, at the same time, he offered Helvius a compliment of fifteen

Coss. Cn. Manlius Vulso, M. Fulvius Nobilior, B.C. 189; Moagĕtes reduced to submission.

talents. In answer to this, Helvius said that he would refrain from damaging the territory; but that as to the general question Moagĕtes must communicate with the Consul, for he was close behind with his army. Moagĕtes accordingly sent ambassadors to Cnaeus, his own brother being one of them. When the Consul met them in the road, he addressed them in threatening and reproachful terms, asserting that "Not only had Moagĕtes shown himself the most determined enemy of Rome, of all the princes in Asia, but had done his very best to overthrow their empire, and deserved punishment rather than friendship."[1] Terrified by this display of anger, the ambassadors abstained from delivering the rest of the message with which they were charged, and merely begged him to have an interview with Moagĕtes: and when Cnaeus consented they returned to Cibyra. Next morning the Tyrant came out of the town accompanied by his friends, displaying his humility by a mean dress and absence of all pomp; and, in conducting his defence, descanted in melancholy terms on his own helplessness and the poverty of the towns under his rule (which consisted of Cibyra, Syleium, and the town in the Marsh), and entreated Cnaeus to accept the fifteen talents. Astonished at his assurance, Cnaeus made no answer, except that, "If he did not pay five hundred talents, and be thankful that he was allowed to do so, he would not loot the country, but he would storm and sack the city." In abject terror Moagĕtes begged him not to do anything of the sort; and kept adding to his offer little by little, until at last he persuaded Cnaeus to take one hundred talents, and one thousand medimni of corn, and admit him to friendship.[2] . . .

Pacification of Pamphylia.

35. When Cnaeus Manlius was crossing the River Colobatus, ambassadors came to him from the town of Sinda (in Pisidia) begging for help, because the people of Termessus had called in the aid of the people of Philomelus, and had depopulated their territory and sacked their town; and were at that very moment besieg-

[1] The Greek text is corrupt. The sense is given from Livy, 38, 14.

[2] The dynasty lasted until the time of the Mithridatic wars. The last Moagĕtes being deposed by Muraena, when Cibyra was joined to Lycia. Strabo, 13, 4, 71.

ing its citadel, into which all the citizens, with wives and children, had retreated. On hearing this, Cnaeus immediately promised them aid with the greatest readiness; and thinking the affair was a stroke of luck for himself, directed his march towards Pamphylia. On his arrival in the neighbourhood of Termessus, he admitted the Termessians to friendship on the payment of fifty talents. He did the same with the Aspendians: and having received the ambassadors of the other towns in Pamphylia, he impressed on them in these interviews the conviction mentioned above,[1] and having relieved the Sindians from their siege, he once more directed his march against the Gauls. . . .

Conquest of Pisidia.

36. After taking the town of Cyrmasa (in Pisidia), and a very large booty, Cnaeus Manlius continued his advance. And as he was marching along the marsh, envoys came from Lysinoe, offering an unconditional surrender. After accepting this, Cnaeus entered the territory of Sagalassus, and having driven off a vast quantity of spoil waited to see what the Sagalassians were prepared to do. When their ambassadors arrived he received them; and accepting a compliment of fifty talents, twenty thousand medimni of barley, and twenty thousand of wheat, admitted them to friendship with Rome. . . .

Cnaeus Manlius in Galatia.

37. Cnaeus sent envoys to Eposognatus the Gaul, desiring him to send embassies to the kings of the Gauls. Eposognatus in his turn sent envoys to Cnaeus begging him not to move his quarters or attack the Tolistobogian Gauls; and assuring him that he would send embassies to the kings, and propose peace to them, and felt quite certain that he would be able to bring them to a proper view of affairs in all respects. . . .

In the course of his march through the country Cnaeus made a bridge over the River Sangorius, which was extremely deep and difficult to cross. And having encamped on the bank of the river, he was visited by some Galli[2] sent by Attis and Battacus, the priests of the mother of the gods at Pesinus, wearing figures and images on their breasts, and announcing

[1] That is probably "of the necessity of submitting to Rome;" but the passage referred to is lost.

[2] See ch. 6.

that the goddess promised him victory and power; to whom Cnaeus gave a courteous reception. . . .

When Cnaeus was at the small town of Gordieium, ambassadors came from Eposognatus, announcing that he had been round and talked with the kings of the Gauls, but that they would not consent to make any overtures of friendship whatever; on the contrary, they had collected their children and women on Mount Olympus, and were prepared to give battle. . . .

The victory of the Romans over the Tolistoboii at Mount Olympus is described by Livy, 38, 19-23; *that over the Tectosages, a few miles from Ancyra, in* 38, 24-27. *The second battle took place in mid-autumn*, B.C. 189; *and the result was that the Gauls gave in their submission at Ephesus, and were forced to engage to leave off predatory excursions, and to confine themselves to their own frontiers. Livy*, 38, 27 *and* 40.

The vengeance of Chiomara, wife of the Gallic chief Ortiago. See Livy, 38, 24.

38. It chanced that among the prisoners made when the Romans won the victory at Olympus over the Gauls of Asia, was Chiomara, wife of Ortiago. The centurion who had charge of her availed himself of his chance in soldierly fashion, and violated her.

He was a slave indeed both to lust and money: but eventually his love of money got the upper hand; and, on a large sum of gold being agreed to be paid for the woman, he led her off to put her to ransom. There being a river between the two camps, when the Gauls had crossed it, paid the man the money, and received the woman, she ordered one of them by a nod to strike the Roman as he was in the act of taking a polite and affectionate farewell of her. The man obeyed, and cut off the centurion's head, which she picked up and drove off with, wrapped in the folds of her dress. On reaching her husband she threw the head at his feet; and when he expressed astonishment and said: "Wife to keep faith is a good thing," she replied: "Yes; but it is a better thing that there should be only one man alive who has lain with me!" [Polybius says that he conversed with the

woman at Sardis, and was struck with her dignified demeanour and intelligence.][1] . . .

The Gauls try to take Cnaeus Manlius by a stratagem, but are foiled. See Livy, 38, 25.

39. After the victory over the Gauls at Olympus, when the Romans were encamped at Ancyra, and Cnaeus was on the point of continuing his advance, ambassadors came from the Tectosages asking that Cnaeus would leave his troops in their quarters, and advance himself in the course of the next day into the space between the two camps; and promising that their kings would come to meet him, and discuss the terms of a peace. But when Cnaeus consented, and duly arrived at the appointed place with five hundred horse, the kings did not appear. After his return to the camp, however, the ambassadors came again, and, offering some excuses for the kings, begged him to come once more, as they would send some of their chief men to discuss the whole question. Cnaeus consented; but, without leaving the camp himself, sent Attalus and some tribunes with three hundred horse. The envoys of the Gauls duly appeared and discussed the business: but finally said that it was impossible for them to conclude the matter or ratify anything they agreed upon; but they engaged that the kings would come next day to agree on the terms, and finally settle the treaty, if the Consul would also come to them. Attalus promised that Cnaeus would come, and they separated for that day. But the Gauls were deliberately contriving these postponements, and amusing the Romans, because they wanted to get some part of their families and property beyond the river Halys; and, first of all, to get the Roman Consul into their hands if they could, but if not, at any rate to kill him. With this purpose they watched next day for the coming of the Romans, with a thousand horse ready to fall upon him. When Cnaeus heard the result of Attalus's interview, believing that the kings would come, he left the camp, attended as usual by five hundred horse. Now it happened that, on the days of the previous interviews, the foraging parties which went out

[1] This is really Plutarch's version of a story he found in Polybius, and, to judge from Livy, 38, 24, not a very complete one. It took place near Ancyra. Plutarch *de mulierum virtutibus.*

from the Roman camp to fetch wood and hay had gone in the same direction, in order to have the protection of the squadron which went to the parley. A numerous foraging party acted in the same way on this third occasion, and the tribunes ordered them to proceed in the same direction, with the usual number of horsemen to protect them as they advanced. And their being out on this duty proved accidentally to be the salvation of their comrades in the danger which threatened them. . . .

CEPHALLENIA

40. M. Fulvius took the quarter of the town in which was the citadel by a night surprise, and introduced the Romans into the town.[1]

The citadel of Same in Cephallenia taken by a night surprise.

41. The good and the expedient are seldom compatible, and rare indeed are those who can combine and reconcile them. For as a general rule we all know that the good shuns the principles of immediate profit, and profit those of the good. However, Philopoemen attempted this task, and succeeded in his aim. For it was a good thing to restore the captive exiles to Sparta; and it was an expedient thing to humble the Lacedaemonian state, and to punish those who had served as bodyguards to a tyrant. But seeing clearly that money is ever the support on which every dynasty rests, and having a clear head and the instincts of a ruler, he took measures to prevent the introduction into the town of money from outside. . . .

Philopoemen's policy towards Sparta. See above, bk. 19.

43.[2] Meanwhile in Asia the Roman consul Cnaeus Manlius wintered at Ephesus, in the last year of this Olympiad, and was there visited by embassies from the Greek cities in Asia and many others,

Cnaeus Manlius spends the winter of 189-188 B C.

[1] See Livy, 38, 28, 29. The fragment here seems to be that translated by Livy in ch. 29, *Romani nocte per arcem, quam Cyatidem vocant* (*nam urbs in mare devexa in Occidentem vergit*) *muro superato in forum pervenerunt.* The people of Same suddenly threw off the terms under which the rest of Cephallania had submitted and stood a four months' siege.

[2] A fragment, arranged in Hultsch's text as ch. 42, is too much mutilated to be translated with any approach to correctness.

at Ephesus, the last year of the 147th Olympiad, and arranges the settlement of Asia.

bringing complimentary crowns to him for his victories over the Gauls. For the entire inhabitants of Asia this side Taurus were not so much rejoiced at the prospect given them by Antiochus's defeat of being relieved from tribute, garrisons, or other royal exactions, as at the removal of all fear of the barbarians, and at their escape from their insolence and lawlessness. Among the rest Musaeus came from Antiochus, and some envoys from the Gauls, desiring to ascertain the terms upon which friendship would be granted them; and also from Ariarathes, the king of Cappadocia. For this latter prince, having attached himself to the fortunes of Antiochus, and having taken part in his battle with the Romans, had become alarmed and dismayed for his own fate, and therefore was endeavouring by frequent embassies to ascertain what he would have to pay or do to get pardon for his error. The Consul complimented the ambassadors from the cities, and dismissed them after a very favourable reception; but he replied to the Gauls that he would not make a treaty with them until king Eumenes, whom he expected, had arrived. To the envoys from Ariarathes he said that they might have peace on the payment of six hundred talents. With the ambassador of Antiochus he arranged that he would come with his army to the frontier of Pamphylia, to receive the two thousand five hundred talents, and the corn with which the king had undertaken to furnish the Roman soldiers before his treaty with Lucius Scipio. This business being thus settled, he solemnly purified his army; and, as the season for military operations was now beginning, he broke up his quarters, and, taking Attalus with him, arrived at Apameia in eight days' march, and remained there three days. On the fourth he continued his advance; and, pushing on at great speed, arrived on the third day at the rendezvous with Antiochus, and there pitched his camp. Here he was visited by Musaeus, who begged him to wait, as the carts and cattle that were bringing the corn and money were late. He consented to wait: and, when the supply arrived, he distributed the corn among the soldiers, and handed over the money to one of his tribunes, with orders to convey it to Apameia.

Spring of B.C. 188.

44. He himself started in full force for Perga, where he heard that a commander of a garrison placed in that town by Antiochus had neither left it himself nor withdrawn his garrison. When he came within a short distance of the place he was met by the captain of the garrison, who begged Cnaeus not to condemn him unheard. "He had received the city from Antiochus in trust, and was holding it until he should be instructed what to do by the sovereign who had entrusted it to him." And he therefore begged for thirty days' respite, to enable him to send and ask the king for instructions. Observing that Antiochus was behaving straightforwardly in other particulars, Cnaeus consented to allow him to send and ask the king the question. After some days the officer accordingly received an answer, and surrendered the city.

A faithful officer at Perga.

About this time, just at the beginning of summer, the ten commissioners and king Eumenes arrived by sea at Ephesus; and, after giving themselves two days to recover from the voyage, proceeded up the country to Apameia. When their arrival was known to Cnaeus Manlius, he sent his brother Lucius with four thousand men to Oroanda (in Pisidia), as a forcible hint that they must pay the money owing, in accordance with the terms agreed on; while he himself marched his army at full speed to meet Eumenes and the commissioners. On his arrival he found the king and the ten commissioners, and immediately held a consultation with them on the measures to be taken. The first resolution come to was to confirm the sworn agreement and treaty with Antiochus, about which I need say no more, beyond giving the actual text of the treaty, which was as follows:—

Summer, B.C. 188. The ten Roman commissioners arrive in Asia. See ch. 24.

45. "There shall be perpetual peace between Antiochus and the Romans if he fulfils the provisions of the treaty.

Text of the treaty between Antiochus and Rome.

"Neither Antiochus nor any subject to him shall allow any to pass through their territories to attack the Romans or their allies, nor supply them with aught. Neither shall the Romans or their allies do the like for those attacking Antiochus or those subject to him.

"Antiochus shall not wage war upon the Islanders or the dwellers in Europe.

"He shall evacuate all cities and territory (this side Taurus[1]). His soldiers shall take nothing out with them except the arms they are carrying. If they chance to have taken anything away they shall restore it to the same cities.

"He shall receive neither soldiers nor other men from the territory of king Eumenes.

"If there be any men in the army of Antiochus coming from any of the cities taken over by the Romans, he shall deliver them up at Apameia.

"If there be any from the kingdom of Antiochus with the Romans or their allies, they may remain or depart as they choose.

"Antiochus and those subject to him shall give back the slaves, captives, and deserters of the Romans or their allies and any captive received from any quarter. Antiochus shall give up, if it be within his power so to do, Hannibal, son of Hamilcar, the Carthaginian, Mnesilochus the Acarnanian, Thoas the Aetolian, Euboulidas and Philo the Chalcidians, and such of the Aetolians as have held national offices.

"Antiochus shall give up all his elephants, and shall have none henceforth.

"Antiochus shall surrender his ships of war, their tackle, and fittings, and henceforth have only ten decked ships. He shall not have a vessel rowed by thirty oars, [or by less][2] for purposes of war begun by himself.

"He shall not sail west of the river Calycadnus and the promontory of Sarpedon, except to convey tribute or ambassadors or hostages.

"It shall not be lawful for Antiochus to enlist soldiers or receive exiles from the territory subject to Rome.

"Such houses as belonged to the Rhodians or their allies, in the territory subject to Antiochus, shall continue to belong to the Rhodians as before the war: any money owed to them

[1] These words are wanting in the text. From Livy (38, 38) it appears that the territory was defined as between the Taurus and the R. Halys as far as the borders of Lycaonia.

[2] Livy (*l.c.*) has *neve monerem ex belli causa quod ipse illaturus erit.*

shall still be recoverable: and any property left behind by them, if sought for, shall be restored.

"The Rhodians shall, as before the war, be free from tribute.

"If Antiochus has given any of the towns to others which he is bound to restore, he shall remove from them also his garrisons and men. And if any shall wish hereafter to desert to him, he shall not receive them.

"Antiochus shall pay to the Romans ten thousand talents, in ten yearly instalments, of the best Attic silver, each talent to weigh not less than eighty Roman pounds, and ninety thousand medemni of corn.

"Antiochus shall pay to king Eumenes three hundred and fifty talents in the five years next following, in yearly instalments of seventy talents; and in lieu of the corn, according to the valuation of Antiochus himself, one hundred and twenty-seven talents, two hundred and eight drachmae, which sum Eumenes has consented to accept 'as satisfying his claims.'

"Antiochus shall give twenty hostages, not less than eighteen nor more than forty-five years old, and change them every three years.

"If there be in any year a deficit in the instalment paid, Antiochus shall make it good in the next year.

"If any of the cities or nations, against whom it has been hereby provided that Antiochus should not make war, should commence war against him, it shall be lawful for Antiochus to war with them; but of such nations and cities he shall not have sovereignty nor attach them as friends to himself.

"Such complaints as arise between the parties to this treaty shall be referred to arbitration.

"If both parties agree in wishing anything to be added to or taken from this treaty, it shall be lawful so to do."

46. Immediately after this treaty had been solemnly sworn to, the proconsul Cnaeus sent Quintus Minucius Thermus and his brother Lucius, who had just brought the money from Oroanda to Syria, with orders to receive the oath from the king, and confirm the several clauses of the treaty. And to Quintus Fabius Labeo, who was in command of the fleet, he sent a despatch ordering

Burning of Antiochus's ships at Patara in Lycia.

him to sail back to Patara, and take over and burn the ships there. . . .

Ariarathes V. King of Cappadocia.

47. The proconsul Cnaeus Manlius made Ariarathes a friend of Rome on receipt of three hundred talents. . . .

Final settlement of the affairs of Asia Minor by the commissioners. Autumn B.C. 188.

48. At Apameia the Proconsul and the ten commissioners, after listening to all who appealed to them, assigned in the case of disputed claims to territory, money, or anything else, certain cities in which the parties might have their claims settled by arbitration. The general scheme which they drew out was as follows: Those of the autonomous cities which, having formerly paid tribute to Antiochus, had remained faithful to Rome, they relieved from tribute altogether. Those that had been tributary to Attalus they ordered to pay the same tribute to his successor Eumenes. Such as had abandoned the Roman friendship and joined Antiochus in the war, they ordered to pay Eumenes the amount of tribute imposed on them by Antiochus. The people of Colophon, Notium, Cymae, and Mylae, they freed from tribute. To the Clazomenians, besides this relief, they gave the Island Drymussa. To the Ephesians they restored the sacred district which they had been obliged by the enemy to evacuate. . . .[1] To the people of Chios, Smyrna, and Erythrae, besides other marks of honour, they assigned the territory which they severally expressed a wish to have at the time, and alleged was their right, from regard for their loyalty and zeal which they had shown to Rome during the war. To the Phocaeans they restored their ancestral city and the territory which they possessed of old. They next transacted business with the Rhodians, giving them Lycia and Caria up to the river Maeander, except Telmissus. As to king Eumenes and his brothers, not content with the liberal provision made for them in their treaty with Antiochus, they now assigned him in addition the Chersonese, Lysimacheia, and the castles on the borders of these districts, and such country as had been subject to Antiochus in Europe; and in Asia, Phrygia on the

[1] See Livy, 38, 39. Some words are lost referring to grants to the people of Ilium.

Hellespont, Great Phrygia, so much of Mysia as he had before subjugated, Lycaonia, Milyas, Lydia, Tralles, Ephesus, and Telmissus: all these they gave to Eumenes. As to Pamphylia, Eumenes alleged that it was on this side Taurus, the ambassadors of Antiochus on the other; and the commissioners feeling unable to decide, referred the question to the Senate. Having thus decided the largest number and most important of the matters brought before them, they started on the road towards the Hellespont, intending on their journey to still further secure the settlement arrived at with the Gauls. . . .

BOOK XXII

CONTENTS

In the 148*th Olympiad* (B.C. 188-184) *embassies came from Philip and the tribes bordering on Macedonia to Rome. The decrees of the Senate concerning them. In Greece the quarrel of Philip with the Thessalians and Perrhaebians about the cities held by Philip in their countries from the time of the war with Antiochus. The decision concerning them before Q. Caecilius at Tempe. Decisions of Caecilius. A difference of Philip with the ambassadors of Eumenes and the exiles from Maroneia; the pleadings on these points at Thessalonica and the decision of Caecilius. The massacre at Maroneia instigated by king Philip. The arrival of the Roman legates, and their decisions. The causes of the war between the Romans and Perseus. Arrival of ambassadors from kings Ptolemy and Eumenes and Seleucus in the Peloponnese. The decision of the Achaeans on the alliance with Ptolemy, and on the gifts offered them by these kings. Arrival of Q. Caecilius and his disapprobation of the measures taken in regard to Sparta. Embassy of Areus and Alcibiades, two of the earlier exiles from Sparta, to Rome, and their accusations against Philopoemen and the Achaeans. The Roman envoys come to Cleitor, where there is an Achaean assembly. The speeches delivered for both parties, and the Achaean decrees in the affair of Sparta.*[1]

xii. 23c

3. After the execution of the men at Compasium,[2] some of the Lacedaemonians, incensed at what had been done, and

[1] This summary is arranged by Hultsch as chs. 1 and 2 of book 22. It appears as book 23, chs. 4, 5 in Schweighaeuser's text.

[2] In B.C. 191 Philopoemen secured the adhesion of Sparta to the Achaean league: but the Spartans were never united in their loyalty to it, and during his year as Strategus (B.C. 189) he punished a massacre of some Achaean

believing that the power and authority of the Romans had been set at naught by Philopoemen, went to Rome and accused Philopoemen and his proceedings; and finally obtained a letter addressed to the Achaeans from Marcus Lepidus, the consul of the year, and afterwards Pontifex Maximus, in which he told the Achaeans that they had not acted equitably in the matters of the Lacedaemonians. At the same time as this mission from Sparta, Philopoemen also appointed Nicodemus of Elis and others to go on an embassy to Rome.

An appeal to Rome against Philopoemen.

B.C. 187. Coss. M. Aemilius Lepidus, C. Flamininus.

Just at that time Demetrius of Athens came on a mission from Ptolemy, to renew the existing alliance between the king and the Achaean league. This was eagerly accepted, and my father, Lycortas, and Theodoridas, and Rositeles of Sicyon were appointed ambassadors to take the oaths on behalf of the Achaeans, and receive those of the king. And on that occasion a circumstance occurred, which, though not important perhaps, is still worth recording. After the completion of this renewal of alliance on behalf of the Achaeans, Philopoemen entertained the ambassador; and in the course of the banquet the ambassador introduced the king's name, and said a great deal in his praise, quoting anecdotes of his skill and boldness in hunting, as well as his excellence in riding and the use of arms; and ended by quoting, as a proof of what he said, that the king on horseback once transfixed a bull with a javelin. . . .

Renewal of the treaty between the Achaean league and Ptolemy.

The accomplishments of Ptolemy Epiphanes.

4. In Boeotia, after the formation of the treaty between Rome and Antiochus, the hopes of the whole revolutionary party were destroyed. Politics therefore began to assume a new aspect; and whereas the administration of justice among them had been postponed for nearly the last twenty years, voices began to make themselves heard in the cities to the

The effect of the collapse of Antiochus upon Boeotia.

sympathisers in Sparta by an execution of eighty Spartans at Compasium on the frontier of Laconia. This number Plutarch gives on the authority of Polybius, but another account stated it at three hundred and fifty. Plut. *Phil.* 16.

BOEOTIA

effect that "there ought to be an end and settlement of their mutual disputes." But after considerable controversy on this point, because the discontented were more numerous than the wealthy, the following circumstance occurred which helped accidently to support the party of order. Titus Flamininus had for some time past been zealously working in Rome to secure the restoration of Zeuxippus to Boeotia, because he had found him serviceable on many occasions during the wars with Antiochus and Philip. And just at this time he had induced the Senate to send a despatch to the Boeotians ordering them to recall Zeuxippus and his fellow exiles. When this despatch arrived, the Boeotians, fearing that, if these men were restored, they would become detached from their good understanding with Macedonia, determined that the legal sentence upon Zeuxippus and the rest should be publicly proclaimed,[1] which they had formerly drawn up against them. Thus they condemned them on two charges, first, of sacrilege for having stripped off the silver from the plated table of Zeus, and, secondly, of murder for having killed Brachylles. Having made this arrangement, they assumed that they need pay no further attention to the despatch of the Senate, but contented themselves with sending Callicritus and others to Rome with the message that they were unable to rescind what had been settled by their laws. Zeuxippus having sent an embassy to the Senate at the same time, the Romans wrote to the Aetolians and Achaeans an account of the attitude assumed by the Boeotians, and ordered them to restore Zeuxippus to his country. The Achaeans refrained from invading the country with an army, but selected some ambassadors to go and persuade the Boeotians to obey the orders from Rome; and also to settle the legal disputes existing between them and the Achaeans, on the same principles as they conducted the administration of justice at home: for it happened that there were some controversies between the two nations that had been dragging on for a long time. On receiving this message the Boeotians, whose Strategus was then Hippias, promised at the moment that they would do

Resistance to the recall of Zeuxippus.

See 18, 43. Livy, 33, 28.

[1] Some words are lost from the text describing their method of procedure.

RHODES & LYCIA.

what was demanded of them, but shortly afterwards neglected it at every point. Therefore, when Hippias had laid down his office and Alcetas had succeeded him, Philopoemen gave all who chose license to make reprisals on the territories of the Boeotians; which proved the beginning of a serious quarrel between the two nations. For on the cattle of Myrrichus and Simon being driven off,[1] and a struggle arising over this transaction, the contest soon ceased to be political, and became the beginning and prelude of open war. If indeed the Senate had persisted in carrying out the restoration of Zeuxippus, war would quickly have been kindled; but as it maintained silence on the subject, the Megareans were induced by an embassy proposing terms to stop the reprisals. . . .[1]

Rhodes and the Lycians.

5. A quarrel arose between the Lycians and Rhodians from the following causes. When the ten commissioners were employed in the settlement of Asia, they were visited by Theaetetus and Philophron on a mission from Rhodes, demanding that Lycia and Caria should be given to them in return for the goodwill and zeal displayed by them in the war with Antiochus. At the same time Hipparchus and Satyrus came from Ilium begging, on the ground of their kindred with the Lycians, that the latter should receive pardon for their transgressions. The commissioners listened to these pleadings, and tried to do what they could to satisfy both. For the sake of the people of Ilium, they inflicted no severity on the Lycians, but gratified the Rhodians by presenting them with the sovereignty over that people. This decision was the origin of a serious division and controversy between the Lycians and Rhodians. For the envoys of Ilium visited the Lycian cities, giving out that they had succeeded in pacifying the Roman anger, and that they owed their liberty to them; while Theaetetus and his colleague took back word to their countrymen that Lycia and all Caria south of the Maeander had been given as a free gift by the Romans to Rhodes. Presently an embassy came from Lycia to Rhodes desiring an alliance; while the Rhodians on their part had elected certain of their citizens to go to Lycia and give

[1] Some words are lost in the text which would more fully explain the transaction.

orders to the several cities as to what they were to do. They were thus entirely at cross purposes, and for some time the cause of the misunderstanding was not generally intelligible. But when the Lycian ambassadors appeared in the assembly and began talking about an alliance, and Pothion the Prytanis rose after them and explained the different ideas which the two people entertained on the subject, and moreover, sternly rebuked the Lycian envoys,[1] the latter declared that they would endure anything rather than be subject to the Rhodians. . . .

EGYPT UNDER PTOLEMY EPIPHANES AFTER THE DEATH OF ARISTOMENES (18, 53, 54)

6. All men admire the magnanimity of Philip towards Athens; for though he had been injured as well as abused by them, yet when he conquered them at Chaeroneia, so far from using this opportunity for injuring his opponents, he caused the corpses of the Athenians to be buried with the proper ceremonies; while those of them who had been taken prisoners he actually presented with clothes, and restored to their friends without ransom. But though men praise they do not imitate such conduct. They rather try to outdo those with whom they are at war, in bitterness of passion and severity of vengeance. Ptolemy, for instance, had men tied naked to carts and dragged at their tail, and then put to death with torture. . . .

Contrast of the conduct of Philip II. of Macedon to Athens in B.C. 338 with that of Ptolemy.

7. When this same Ptolemy was besieging Lycopolis, the Egyptian nobles surrendered to the king at discretion; and his cruel treatment of them involved him in manifold dangers. The same was the result at the time Polycrates suppressed the revolt. For Athinis, Pausiras, Chesuphus, and Irobastus, who still survived of the rebellious nobles, yielding to necessity, appeared at the city of Sais and surrendered at discretion to the king. But Ptolemy, regardless of all pledges, had them tied naked to the carts and dragged off, and then put to death with torture. He then went to

Suppression of the revolt in lower Egypt, B.C. 186-185.

Lycopolis in the Thebaid.

[1] Something is lost in the text.

Naucratis with his army, where he received the mercenaries enlisted for him by Aristonicus from Greece, and thence sailed to Alexandria, without having taken any part whatever in the actual operations of the war, thanks to the dishonest advice of Polycrates, though he was now twenty-five years old. . . .

8. At this time were sowed the seeds of fatal evils to the royal house of Macedonia. I am aware that some historians of the war between Rome and Perseus, when they wish to set forth the causes of the quarrel for our information, assign as the primary one the expulsion of Abrupolis from his principality, on the ground of having made a raid upon the mines at Pangaeum after the death of Philip, which Perseus repulsed, finally expelling him entirely out of his own dominions. Next they mention the invasion of Dolopia, and the visit of Perseus to Delphi, the plot against Eumenes at Delphi, and the murder of the ambassadors in Boeotia; and from these they say sprang the war between Perseus and the Romans. But my contention is that it is of most decisive advantage, both to historians and their readers, to know the causes from which the several events are born and spring. Most historians confound these, because they do not keep a firm hold upon the distinction between a pretext and a cause, or again between a pretext and a beginning of a war. And since events at the present time recall this distinction I feel compelled to renew my discussion of this subject. For instance, of the events just referred to, the first three are pretexts; the last two—the plot against Eumenes, the murder of the ambassadors, and other similar things that happened during the same period—are clear *beginnings* of the war between Rome and Perseus, and of the final overthrow of the Macedonian kingdom; but not one of them is a *cause* of these things. I will illustrate by examples. Just as we say that Philip son of Amyntas contemplated and determined upon accomplishing the war with Persia, while Alexander put into execution what he had projected, so in the present instance we say that Philip son of Demetrius first pro-

B.C. 186. The origin of the last Macedonian war.

Abrupolis, a Thracian prince and friend of the Romans. See Livy, 42, 13, 40. Death of Philip V. B.C. 179.

B.C. 176-172.

See bk. 3, ch. 6.

jected the last war against Rome, and had all his preparations ready for the execution of his design, but that after his death Perseus became the agent in carrying out the undertaking itself. If this be true, the following also is clear: it is impossible that the causes of the war should have been subsequent to the death of him who resolved upon and projected it; which would be the case if we accepted the account of these historians; for the events alleged by them as its causes were subsequent to the death of Philip. . . .

Complaints lodged against Philip at Rome, B.C. 185.

9. About the same time ambassadors came to Rome from king Eumenes, informing the Senate of the encroachment of Philip upon the cities in Thrace. There came also the exiles of the Maronitae denouncing Philip, and charging him with being the cause of their expulsion. These were followed by Athamanians, Perrhaebians, and Thessalians, demanding the restoration of their cities which Philip had taken from them during the war with Antiochus. Ambassadors also came from Philip to make answer to all accusers. After repeated debates between all these envoys and the ambassadors of Philip, the Senate decided to appoint a commission at once, to investigate the actions of Philip, and to protect all who chose to state their views and their complaints of the king to his face. The legates thus appointed were Quintus Caecilius, Marcus Baebius, and Tiberius Claudius.[1] . . .

A commission of investigation appointed.

Aenus in Thrace.

There was again a war of parties among the Aenii, one side inclining to Eumenes, the other to Macedonia. . . .

The result of these embassies was the Congress of Tempe, at which no definite settlement was made. Livy, 39, 25-28.

A MEETING OF THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE PARLIAMENT

Philopoemen Achaean Strategus for two years running, from

10. I have already stated that in the Peloponnese, while Philopoemen was still Strategus, the Achaean league sent an embassy to Rome

[1] Livy (39, 24) gives the names as Q. Caecilius Metellus, M. Baebius Tamphilus, Ti. Sempronius.

on the subject of Sparta, and another to king Ptolemy to renew their ancient alliance. May B.C. 189 to May B.C. 187.

Immediately after Philopoemen had been succeeded by Aristaenus as Strategus, the ambassadors of king Ptolemy arrived, while the league meeting was assembled at Megalopolis. King Eumenes also had despatched an embassy offering to give the Achaeans one hundred and twenty talents, on condition that it was invested and the interest used to pay the council of the league at the time of the federal assemblies. Ambassadors came also from king Seleucus, to renew his friendship with them, and offering a present of a fleet of ten ships of war. But when the assembly got to business, the first to come forward to speak was Nicodemus of Elis, who recounted to the Achaeans what he and his colleagues had said in the Roman Senate about Sparta, and read the answer of the Senate; which was to the effect that the Senate disapproved of the destruction of the walls, and of the execution of the men put to death at Compasium, but that it did not rescind any arrangement made. No one saying a word for or against this, the subject was allowed to pass.

Aristaenus. May, B.C. 187 to May, B.C. 186.

Seleucus Philopator succeeded his father Antiochus the Great, B.C. 187.

Business of the Achaean assembly.

Letter from the Senate on the subject of Philopoemen's actions at Sparta.

Next came the ambassadors from Eumenes, who renewed the ancestral friendship of the king with the Achaeans, and stated to the assembly the offer made by him. They spoke at great length on these subjects, and retired after setting forth the greatness of the king's kindness and affection to the nation.

The offer of Eumenes.

11. After they had finished their speech, Apollonidas of Sicyon rose and said that: "As far as the amount of the money was concerned, it was a present worthy of the Achaeans. But if they looked to the intention of the donor, or the purpose to which the gift was to be applied, none could well be more insulting and more unconstitutional. The laws prohibited any one, whether a private individual or magistrate, from accepting presents from a king on any pretence whatever; but if they took this money they

Answer of Apollonidas.

would every one of them be plainly accepting a present, which was at once the gravest possible breach of the law, and confessedly the deepest possible personal disgrace. For that the council should take a great wage from Eumenes, and meet to deliberate on the interests of the league after swallowing such a bait, was manifestly disgraceful and injurious. It was Eumenes that offered money now; presently it would be Prusias; and then Seleucus. But as the interests of democracies and of kings are quite opposite to each other, and as our most frequent and most important deliberations concern the points of controversy arising between us and the kings, one of two things must necessarily happen; either the interests of the king will have precedence over our own, or we must incur the reproach of ingratitude for opposing our paymasters." He therefore urged the Achaeans not only to decline the offer, but to hold Eumenes in detestation for thinking of making it.

Speech of Cassander of Aegina.

Next rose Cassander of Aegina and reminded the Achaeans of "The misfortunes which the Aeginetans had met with through being members of the Achaean league; when Publius Sulpicius sailed against them with the Roman fleet, and sold all the unhappy Aeginetans into slavery." In regard to this subject I have already related how the Aetolians, having got possession of Aegina in virtue of their treaty with Rome, sold it to Attalus for thirty talents. Cassander therefore drew the attention of the Achaeans to these facts; and demanded that Eumenes should not seek to gain the affection of the Achaeans by offering them money, but that he should establish an incontestable claim to every sign of devotion by giving back Aegina. He urged the Achaeans not to accept presents which would place them in the position of being the destroyers of the hopes of Aeginetan restoration for all time.

The present of Eumenes is refused.

After these speeches had been delivered, the people showed such signs of enthusiastic approval that no one ventured to speak on the side of the king; but the whole assembly rejected the offer by acclamation, though its amount certainly made it exceedingly tempting.

12. The next subject introduced for debate was that of king Ptolemy. The ambassadors who had been on the mission

to Ptolemy were called forward, and Lycortas, acting as spokesman, began by stating how they had interchanged oaths of alliance with the king; and next announced that they brought a present from the king to the Achaean league of six thousand stands of arms for peltasts, and two thousand talents in bronze coinage. He added a panegyric on the king, and finished his speech by a brief reference to the goodwill and active benevolence of the king towards the Achaeans. Upon this the Strategus of the Achaeans, Aristaenus, stood up and asked Lycortas and his colleagues in the embassy to Ptolemy "which alliance it was that he had thus renewed?"

Ptolemy. The speech of Lycortas.

A mistake discovered.

No one answering the question, but all the assembly beginning to converse with each other, the Council chamber was filled with confusion. The cause of this absurd state of things was this. There had been several treaties of alliance formed between the Achaeans and Ptolemy's kingdom, as widely different in their provision as in the circumstances which gave rise to them: but neither had Ptolemy's envoy made any distinction when arranging for the renewal, merely speaking in general terms on the matter, nor had the ambassadors sent from Achaia; but they had interchanged the oaths on the assumption of there being but one treaty. The result was, that, on the Strategus quoting all the treaties, and pointing out in detail the differences between them, which turned out to be important, the assembly demanded to know which it was that it was renewing. And when no one was able to explain, not even Philopoemen himself, who had been in office when the renewal was made, nor Lycortas and his colleagues who had been on the mission to Alexandria, these men all began to be regarded as careless in conducting the business of the league; while Aristaenus acquired great reputation as being the only man who knew what he was talking about; and finally, the assembly refused to allow the ratification, voting on account of this blunder that the business should be postponed.

Then the ambassadors from Seleucus entered with their proposal. The Achaeans, however, voted to renew the friendship with Seleucus, but to decline for the present the gift of the ships.

Offer of Seleucus.

iii . 10 Sc

13. Having thus finished their deliberations, the assembly broke up and the people separated to their several cities. But subsequently, while the (Nemean) games were in course of celebration, Quintus Caecilius arrived from Macedonia, on his way back from the embassy which he had been conducting to Philip. Aristaenus having called a meeting of the league magistrates in Argos, Quintus attended and upbraided them for having exceeded justice in the harshness and severity with which they had treated the Lacedaemonians, and urged them strongly to repair the error. Aristaenus said not a word, showing clearly by his silence that he disapproved of what had been done and agreed with the words of Caecilius. But Diophanes of Megalopolis, who was more of a soldier than a statesman, stood up to speak, and so far from offering any defence of the Achaeans, suggested to Caecilius, from hostility to Philopoemen, another charge that might be brought against them. For he said that "the Lacedaemonians were not the only people who had been badly treated; the Messenians had been so also." There were as a fact some controversies going on among the Messenians, in regard to the decree of Flamininus concerning the exiles, and the execution of it by Philopoemen: and Caecilius, thinking that he now had a party among the Achaeans themselves of the same opinion as himself, expressed still greater anger at the hesitation on the part of the assembled magistrates in obeying his orders. However, when Philopoemen, Lycortas, and Archon argued long and elaborately to prove that what had been done at Sparta was right, and advantageous to the Lacedaemonians themselves more than to any one else, and that it was impossible to disturb any existing arrangements without violating justice to man and piety to the gods, they came to the decision that they would maintain them, and give an answer to that effect to the Roman legate. Seeing what the disposition of the magistrates was, Caecilius demanded that the public assembly should be summoned, to which the Achaean magistrates demanded to see the instructions which he had from the Senate on these points: and when he gave no answer to this demand, they said that they would not summon the assembly for him, as their laws forbade them to do so unless a man

Winter of B.C. 185.

brought written instructions from the Senate, stating the subject on which they were to summon it. Caecilius was so angry at this uncompromising opposition to his orders, that he refused to receive his answer from the magistrates, and so departed without any answer at all. The Achaeans laid the blame both of the former visit of Marcus Fulvius and the present one of Caecilius on Aristaenus and Diophanes, on the ground that they had invited them on account of their political opposition to Philopoemen; and accordingly the general public felt a certain suspicion of these two men. Such was the state of the Peloponnese. . . .

14. Philopoemen had a sharp difference in debate with Archon the Strategus. In course of time, however, Philopoemen was convinced by Archon's arguments, and, changing his mind, spoke in warm commendation of Archon as having managed his business with skill and address. But when I heard the speech at the time it did not seem to me right to praise a man and yet do him an injury, nor do I think so now in my maturer years. For I think that there is as wide a distinction in point of morality between practical ability and success secured by absence of scruples, as there is between skill and mere cunning. The former are in a manner the highest attainments possible, the latter the reverse. But owing to the lack of discernment so general in our day, these qualities, which have little in common, excite the same amount of commendation and emulation in the world. . . . XXIII.

Philopoemen on Archon.

15. When Caecilius returned from Greece and made his report to the Senate concerning Macedonia and the Peloponnese, the ambassadors who had come to Rome on these matters were introduced into the Senate. First came those from Philip and Eumenes, as well as the exiles from Aenus and Maroneia; and on their saying much the same as they had said before Caecilius and his colleagues at Thessalonica, the Senate voted to send another deputation to Philip, to see first of all whether he had evacuated the cities in Perrhaebia in conformity with the answer he gave to Caecilius: and secondly, to order him to XXIII.

Ambassadors from Philip and the Achaeans heard on the report of Caecilius, B.C. 185-184.

remove his garrison from Aenus and Maroneia; and in a word, to abandon all fortresses, positions, and towns on the sea-board of Thrace.

The Achaean ambassadors make their defence.

After these the ambassadors from the Peloponnese were introduced. For the Achaeans on their part had sent Apollonidas of Sicyon, and others, to justify themselves to Caecilius for his having received no answer, and generally to inform the Senate on the question of Sparta; and at the same time Areus and Alcibiades had come from Sparta as ambassadors,—two of the old exiles recently restored by Philopoemen and the Achaeans. And this was a circumstance that particularly roused the anger of the Achaeans; because they thought it the height of ingratitude on the part of the exiles, after receiving so important and recent a service at their hands, to be now sending a hostile embassy, and accusing to the sovereign people those who had been the authors of their unlooked-for preservation and restoration to their country.

16. Both parties were heard in their defence in each other's presence. Apollonidas of Sicyon and his colleagues tried to convince the Senate that the affairs of Sparta could not have been better managed than they were managed by Philopoemen. Areus and his colleagues attempted to establish the reverse: alleging, first of all, that the power of the city was entirely destroyed by the violent withdrawal of so large a number; and, in the second place, that even those that were left were so few that their position was insecure, now that the walls were pulled down; and that their freedom of speech was entirely destroyed by the fact that they were not only amenable to the general decrees of the Achaean league, but were also made specially subject to the magistrates set over them from time to time.

The Spartan envoys.

The decision.

After hearing these envoys also, the Senate decided to give the same legates instructions regarding them as well as the others, and appointed Appius Claudius and his colleagues commissioners for Greece.

But the ambassadors from the Achaeans offered an explanation also to Caecilius in the Senate, on behalf of the

magistrates, asserting that "They did not act wrongly or deserve blame for refusing to summon the assembly, unless it were requisite to decide on an alliance or a war, or unless some one brought a letter from the Senate. The magistrates had therefore impartially considered the subject of summoning the assembly, but were prevented from doing so by the laws, because he neither brought a despatch from the Senate nor would show them any written instructions." At the conclusion of this speech Caecilius rose and made an attack on Philopoemen and Lycortas, and the Achaeans generally, and on the policy they had pursued towards the city of Sparta. After listening to the arguments, the Senate answered the Achaeans by saying that they would send commissioners to investigate the matter of Sparta; and they accompanied this answer by an admonition to them to pay attention to the ambassadors sent by them from time to time, and show them proper respect, as the Romans did to ambassadors who came to them. . . .

Defence of the refusal to call the Achaean assembly.

17. When Philip learnt, by a message from his own ambassadors at Rome, that he would be obliged to evacuate the cities in Thrace, he was extremely annoyed, because he regarded his kingdom as being now curtailed on every side; and he vented his wrath upon the unhappy people of Maroneia. He sent for Onomastus, his governor in Thrace, and communicated with him on the subject. And Onomastus on his return sent Cassander to Maroneia, who, from long residence there, was familiar with the inhabitants,—for Philip's practice had long been to place members of his court in these cities, and accustom the people to their residence among them. Some few days after his arrival, the Thracians having been prepared for what they had to do, and having obtained entrance to the city by night through the instrumentality of Cassander, a great massacre took place, and many of the Maronites were killed. Having wreaked this vengeance on those who opposed him, and satisfied his own anger, Philip waited for the arrival of the Roman legates, persuaded that no one would venture for fear of him to denounce his crime. But when Appius and his colleagues presently arrived, they

Philip's vengeance on the people of Maroneia, early in B.C. 184. Livy, 39, 33.

were promptly informed of what had happened at Maroneia, and expostulated in severe terms with Philip for it. The king attempted to defend himself by asserting that he had nothing to do with this act of violence; but that the Maronites, being divided into two hostile parties, one inclined to Eumenes and the other to himself, inflicted this misfortune upon themselves. He moreover bade them confront him with any one who wished to accuse him. He said this from a conviction that no one would venture to do so; because they would consider that Philip's vengeance upon those who opposed him would be near at hand, while assistance from Rome would have a long way to come. But when Appius and his colleagues said that "they required to hear no defence, for they were well aware of what had happened, and who was the cause of it," Philip became much confused.

He attempts to evade responsibility for it.

18. They went no further than this in the first interview: but during the next day Appius ordered Philip to send Onomastus and Cassander at once to Rome, that the Senate might inform itself on what had happened. The king was disturbed at this to the greatest possible degree, and for some time did not know what to say; but at last he said that he would send Cassander, who was the actual author of the business, that the Senate might learn the truth from him; but he tried to get Onomastus excused, both in this and subsequent interviews with the legates, alleging as a reason that not only had Onomastus not been in Maroneia at the time of the massacre, but not even in any part of the country in its neighbourhood. His real motive, however, was fear lest, if he got to Rome, having been engaged with him in many similar transactions, he would not only tell the Romans the story of Maroneia, but all the others also. Eventually he did get Onomastus excused; and having, after the departure of the legates, sent off Cassander, he sent some agents with him as far as Epirus, and there had him poisoned.[1] But Appius and his colleagues

The guilty agents are to be sent to Rome.

Another crime.

Philip's hostility to Rome.

[1] Livy (39, 34) more cautiously says: veneno *creditur* sublatus. Such accusations were easily made, and not easily proved or confuted.

left Philip with their minds fully made up both as to his guilt in the matter of Maroneia and his alienation from Rome.

The king, thus relieved of the presence of the legates, after consulting with his friends Apelles and Philocles became clearly conscious that his quarrel with Rome had now become serious, and that it could no longer be concealed, but was become notorious to most people in the world. He was therefore now wholly bent on measures of self-defence and retaliation. But as he was as yet unprepared for some of the plans which he had in his mind, he cast about to find some means of putting matters off, and gaining time for making his preparations for war. He accordingly resolved to send his youngest son Demetrius to Rome : partly to make his defence on the charges brought against him, and partly also to beg pardon for any error which he might have committed. He felt certain that everything he wished would be obtained from the Senate by means of this young prince, because of the extraordinary attentions which had been shown him when he was acting as a hostage. He no sooner conceived this idea than he set about making preparations for sending the prince and those of his own friends destined to accompany him on his mission. At the same time he promised the Byzantines to give them help : not so much because he cared for them, as from a wish under cover of their name to strike terror into the princes of the Thracians living beyond the Propontis, as a step towards the fulfilment of his main purpose. . . .

King Philip meditates a breach with Rome.

Sends his son Demetrius there, in hopes of putting off the war for a time.

19. In Crete, while Cydas son of Antalces was *Cosmus*,[1] the Gortynians, who sought in every way to depress the Gnossians, deprived them of a portion of their territory called Lycastium, and assigned it to the Rhaucii, and another portion called Diatonium to the Lyctii. But when about this time Appius and his colleagues arrived in the island from Rome, with the

Disputes in Crete.

[1] For the ten Cosmi of Crete, see Aristot. *Pol.* 2, 10; and Müller's *Dorians*, vol. ii. p. 133 *sq.* Cydas gives his name to the year as πρωτόκοσμος, see C. I. G. 2583. The same inscription contains the title κοσμόπολις, apparently like πολιοῦχος, as a name for a guardian hero of the city. We have already had this latter title as that of a chief magistrate at Locri. See bk. 12, ch. 16.

view of settling the controversies which existed among them, and addressed remonstrances to the cities of Gnossus and Gortyn on these points, the Cretans gave in, and submitted the settlement of their disputes to Appius. He accordingly ordered the restoration of their territory to the Gnossians; and that the Cydoniates should receive back the hostages which they had formerly left in the hands of Charmion, and should surrender Phalasarna, without taking anything out of it. As to sharing in the legal jurisdiction of the whole island, he left it free to the several cities to do so or not as they pleased, on condition that in the latter case they abstained from entering the rest of Crete, they and the exiles from Phalasarna who murdered Menochius and his friends, their most illustrious citizens. . . .

The Queen-Dowager, widow of Attalus, and her sons.

20. Apollonias, the wife of Attalus, father of king Eumenes, was a native of Cyzicus, and a woman who for many reasons deserves to be remembered, and with honour. Her claims upon a favourable recollection are that, though born of a private family, she became a queen, and retained that exalted rank to the end of her life, not by the use of meretricious fascinations, but by the virtue and integrity of her conduct in private and public life alike. Above all, she was the mother of four sons with whom she kept on terms of the most perfect affection and motherly love to the last day of her life. And so Attalus and his brother gained a high character, while staying at Cyzicus, by showing their mother proper respect and honour. For they took each of them one of her hands and led her between them on a visit to the temples and on a tour of the town, accompanied by their suite. At this sight all who saw it received the young princes with very warm marks of approval, and, recalling the story of Cleobis and Biton, compared their conduct with theirs; and remarked that the affectionate zeal shown by the young princes, though perhaps not going so far as theirs, was rendered quite as illustrious by the fact of their more exalted position. This took place in Cyzicus, after the peace made with king Prusias. . . .

Herodotus, 1, 31.

21. Ostiagon the Gaul, king of the Gauls of Asia, en-

deavoured to transfer to himself the sovereignty of all the Gauls; and he had many qualifications for such a post, both natural and acquired. For he was open-handed and generous, a man of popular manners and ready tact; and, what was most important in the eyes of the Gauls, he was a man of courage and skill in war. . . .

The policy of Ostiagon in Galatia.

22. Aristonicus was one of the eunuchs of Ptolemy, king of Egypt, and had been brought up from childhood with the king. As he grew up he displayed more manly courage and tastes than are generally found in an eunuch. For he had a natural predilection for a military life, and devoted himself almost exclusively to that and all that it involved. He was also skilful in dealing with men, and, what is very rare, took large and liberal views, and was naturally inclined to bestow favours and kindnesses. . . .

Character of Aristonicus. See above, ch. 7.

BOOK XXIII

1. In the 149th Olympiad a greater number of embassies came to Rome from Greece than were almost ever seen before. For as Philip was compelled by treaty to submit disputes with his neighbours to arbitration, and as it was known that the Romans were willing to receive accusations against Philip, and would secure the safety of those who had controversies with him, all who lived near the frontier of Macedonia came to Rome, some in their private capacity, some from cities, others from whole tribes, with complaints against Philip. At the same time also came ambassadors from Eumenes, accompanied by his brother Athenaeus, to accuse Philip in regard to the Thracian cities and the aid sent to Prusias. Philip's son, Demetrius, also came to make answer to all these various envoys, accompanied by Apelles and Philocles, who were at that time considered the king's first friends. Ambassadors also came from Sparta, representatives of each faction of the citizens.

149th Olympiad, B.C. 184-180.

Coss. P. Claudius Pulcher, L. Porcius Licinus, B.C. 184.

The first summoned to the Senate was Athenaeus, from whom the Senate accepted the compliments of fifteen thousand gold pieces, and passed a decree highly extolling Eumenes and his brothers for their answer, and exhorting them to continue in the same mind. Next the praetors called upon all the accusers of Philip, and brought them forward by one embassy at a time. But as they were numerous, and their entry occupied three days, the Senate became embarrassed as to the settlement to be made in each case. For from Thessaly there were ambassadors from the whole nation, and also from each

B.C. 183, Coss. M. Claudius Marcellus Q. Fabius Labeo.

city separately; so also from the Perrhaebians, Athamanians, Epirotes, and Illyrians. And of these some brought cases of dispute as to territory, slaves, or cattle; and some about contracts or injuries sustained by themselves. Some alleged that they could not get their rights in accordance with the treaty, because Philip prevented the administration of justice; while others impeached the justice of the decisions given, on the ground that Philip had corrupted the arbitrators. And, in fact, there was an inextricable confusion and multiplicity of charges.

2. In such a state of things the Senate felt unable to come to a clear decision itself, and did not think it fair that Demetrius should have to answer each of the several indictments; for it regarded him with great favour, and saw at the same time that his extreme youth unfitted him to cope with business of such intricacy and complexity. Besides, what it desired most was not to hear speeches of Demetrius, but to ascertain with certainty the disposition of Philip. Excusing him therefore from pleading his cause, the Senate asked the young man and his friends whether they were the bearers of any written memoir from the king; and upon Demetrius answering that he was, and holding out a paper of no great size, the Senate bade him give a summary of what the paper contained in answer to the accusations alleged. It amounted to this, that on each point Philip asserted that he had carried out the injunctions of the Senate, or, if he had not done so, laid the blame upon his accusers; while to the greater number of his declarations he had added the words, "though the commissioners with Caecilius were unfair to me in this point," or again, "though I am unjustly treated in this respect." Such being Philip's mind, as expressed in the several clauses of the paper, the Senate, after hearing the ambassadors who were come to Rome, comprehended them all under one measure. By the mouth of the praetor it offered an honourable and cordial reception to Demetrius, expressed in ample and emphatic language, and answered his speech by saying that "The Senate fully believe that on all the points mentioned by Demetrius, or read by him from his paper of instructions, full justice was

Demetrius in the Senate. Livy, 39, 47.

already done or would be done. But, in order that Philip might be made aware that the Senate paid this honour to Demetrius, ambassadors would be sent to see that everything was being done in accordance with the will of the Senate, and at the same time to inform the king that he owed this grace to his son Demetrius." Such was the arrangement come to on this part of the business.

3. The next to enter the Senate were the ambassadors of king Eumenes, who denounced Philip on account of the assistance sent to Prusias, and concerning his actions in Thrace, alleging that even at that moment he had not withdrawn his garrisons from the cities. But upon Philocles showing his wish to offer a defence on these points, as having been formerly charged with a mission to Prusias, and being now sent to the Senate to represent Philip on this business, the Senate, without listening very long to his speech, answered that "With regard to Thrace, unless the legates found everything there settled in accordance with its will, and all the cities restored to the entire control of Eumenes, the Senate would be unable any longer to allow it to pass, or to submit to being continually disobeyed."

The ambassadors of Eumenes complain that Philip has not evacuated Thrace.

Though the ill-feeling between the Romans and Philip was becoming serious, a check was put to it for the time by the presence of Demetrius. And yet this young prince's mission to Rome proved eventually no slight link in the chain of events which led to the final ruin of his house. For the Senate, by thus making much of Demetrius, somewhat turned the young man's head, and at the same time gravely annoyed Perseus and the king, by making them feel that the kindness they received from the Romans was not for their own sakes, but for that of Demetrius. And T. Quintius Flamininus contributed not a little to the same result by taking the young prince aside and communicating with him in confidence. For he flattered him by suggesting that the Romans meant before long to invest him with the kingdom; while he irritated Philip and Perseus by sending a letter ordering the king to send Demetrius to Rome again, with as many friends of the

The high honour paid to Demetrius at Rome, and its fatal result.

highest character as possible. It was, in fact, by taking advantage of these circumstances that Perseus shortly afterwards induced his father to consent to the death of Demetrius. But I shall relate that event in detail later on.

4. The next ambassadors called in were the Lacedaemonians. Of these there were four distinct factions. Lysis and his colleagues represented the old exiles, and their contention was that they ought to have back the possessions from which they had originally been driven. Areus and Alcibiades, on the contrary, contended that they should receive the value of a talent from their original property, and divide the rest among deserving citizens. Serippus pleaded that things should be left in exactly the state in which they were when they formerly belonged to the Achaean league. Lastly, Chaeron and his colleagues represented those who had been condemned to death or exile by the votes of the Achaean league, and demanded their own recall and the restoration of the constitution. These all delivered speeches against the Achaeans in conformity with their several objects. The Senate, finding itself unable to come to a clear decision on these particular controversies, appointed a committee of investigation, consisting of the three who had already been on a mission to the Peloponnese on these matters, namely Titus Flamininus, Q. Caecilius, and Appius Claudius Pulcher.[1] After long discussions before this committee it was unanimously decided that the exiles and the condemned were to be recalled, and that the city should remain a member of the Achaean league. But as to the property, whether the exiles were each to select a talent's worth from what had been theirs [or to receive it all back], on this point they continued to dispute. That they might not, however, have to begin the whole controversy afresh [the committee] caused the points agreed upon to be reduced to writing, to

The four Spartan embassies.

1. Lysis, for the men banished by Nabis.

2. Areus and Alcibiades.

3. Serippus.

4. Chaeron, for the recent exiles,

Decision of the IIIviri.

[1] There is some loss in the text as to these names. The last is mentioned on a Geeek embassy in 22, 16. See also the index. Livy, 39, 41, says nothing of this committee of three.

which all affixed their seals. But the committee, also wishing to include the Achaeans in the agreement, called in Xenarchus and his colleagues, who were at that time on a mission from the Achaeans, to renew their alliance with Rome, and at the same time to give an eye to their controversy with the Lacedaemonians. These men, being unexpectedly asked whether they consented to the terms contained in the written document, were somewhat at a loss what to answer. For they did not approve of the restoration of the exiles and the condemned persons, as being contrary to the decree of the league, and the contents of the tablet on which that decree was engraved; and yet they approved of the document as a whole, because it contained the clause providing that Sparta should remain a member of the league. Finally, however, partly from this difficulty, and partly from awe of the Roman commissioners, they affixed their seal. The Senate, therefore, selected Quintus Marcius to go as legate to settle the affairs of Macedonia and the Peloponnese. . . .

Deinocrates of Messene.

5. When Deinocrates of Messene arrived on a mission at Rome, he was delighted to find that Titus Flamininus had been appointed by the Senate to go as ambassador to Prusias and Seleucus. For having been very intimate with Titus during the Lacedaemonian war, he thought that this friendship, combined with his disagreements with Philopoemen, would induce him on his arrival in Greece to settle the affairs of Messene in accordance with his own views. He therefore gave up everything else to attach himself exclusively to Titus, on whom he rested all his hopes. . . .

This same Deinocrates was a courtier and a soldier by nature as well as habit, but he assumed the air of consummate statesmanship. His parts, however, were showy rather than solid. In war his fertility of resource and boldness were beyond the common run; and he shone in feats of personal bravery. Nor were these his only accomplishments: he was attractive and ready in conversation, versatile and courteous in society. But at the same time he was devoted to licentious intrigue, and in public affairs and questions of policy was quite incapable of sustained attention or far-sighted views, of forti-

fying himself with well-considered arguments, or putting them before the public. On this occasion, for instance, though he had really given the initiative to grave misfortunes, he did not think that he was doing anything of importance; but followed his usual manner of life, quite regardless of the future, indulging day after day in amours, wine, and song. Flamininus, however, did once force him to catch a glimpse of the seriousness of his position. For seeing him on a certain occasion in a party of revellers dancing in long robes, he said nothing at the time; but next morning, being visited by him with some request in behalf of his country, he said: "I will do my best, Deinocrates; but it does astonish me that you can drink and dance after having given the start to such serious troubles for Greece." He appears, indeed, at that to have a little recovered his soberer senses, and to have understood what an improper display he had been making of his tastes and habits. However, he arrived at this period in Greece in company with Flamininus, fully persuaded that the affairs of Messene would be settled at a blow in accordance with his views. But Philopoemen and his party were fully aware that Flamininus had no commission from the Senate in regard to affairs in Greece; they therefore awaited his arrival without taking any step of any sort. Having landed at Naupactus, Flamininus addressed a despatch to the Strategus and Demiurgi[1] bidding them summon the Achaeans to an assembly; to which they wrote back that "they would do so, if he would write them word what the subjects were on which he wished to confer with the Achaeans; for the laws enjoined that limitation on the magistrates." As Flamininus did not venture to write this, the hopes of Deinocrates and the so-called "old exiles," but who had at that time been recently banished from Sparta, came to nothing, as in fact did the visit of Flamininus and the plans which he had formed....

[1] The ten federal magistrates of the league, who formed a council to act with the general. Their number probably arose from the number of the Achaean cantons or towns, after two of the twelve—Helice and Olenus—were destroyed. Polybius nowhere else gives them this title in any part of the history we possess, but its use by Livy, 32, 22, seems to point to his having used it in other places. It also occurs in a letter of Philip II. (perhaps genuine) quoted in Demosth. *de Cor.* 157. Polybius calls them also οἱ ἄρχοντες, ἀρχαί, προεστῶτες συνάρχοντες, συναρχίαι. See Freeman's *Federal Gov.* p. 282.

6. About the same period some ambassadors were sent by the exiled citizens of Sparta to Rome, among whom was Arcesilaus and Agesipolis who, when quite a boy, had been made king in Sparta. These two men were fallen upon and killed by pirates on the high seas; but their colleagues arrived safely at Rome. . . .

See 4, 35.

7. On the return of Demetrius from Rome, bringing with him the formal reply, in which the Romans referred all the favour and confidence which they avowed to their regard for Demetrius, saying that all they had done or would do was for his sake,— the Macedonians gave Demetrius a cordial reception, believing that they were relieved from all fear and danger: for they had looked upon war with Rome as all but at their doors, owing to the provocations given by Philip. But Philip and Perseus were far from pleased, and were much offended at the idea of the Romans taking no account of them, and referring all their favour to Demetrius. Philip however concealed his displeasure; but Perseus, who was not only behind his brother in good feelings to Rome, but much his inferior in other respects, both in natural ability and acquired accomplishments, made no secret of his anger: and was beginning to be thoroughly alarmed as to his succession to the crown, and lest, in spite of being the elder, he should be excluded. Therefore he commenced by bribing the friends of Demetrius. . . .

The popularity of Demetrius in Macedonia. His father's anger and his brother's jealousy.

The end of this fraternal jealousy is described in Livy, 40, 5-24. *By a forged letter purporting to come from Flamininus, Philip is persuaded that his son played the traitor at Rome and gives an order or a permission for his being put to death; which is accordingly done, partly by poison and partly by violence, at Heracleia*, B.C. 181.

8. Upon Quintus Marcius arriving on his mission in Macedonia, Philip evacuated the Greek cities in Thrace entirely and withdrew his garrisons, though in deep anger and heaviness of spirit; and he put on a right footing everything else to which the Roman injunctions referred, wishing to give them no indica-

Philip feigns submission to Rome, B.C. 183.

tion of his estrangement, but to secure time for making his preparations for war. In pursuance of this design he led out an army against the barbarians, and marching through the centre of Thrace he invaded the Odrysae, Bessi, and Dentheleti. Coming to Philippopolis, the inhabitants flying for safety to the heights, he took it without a blow. And thence, after traversing the plain, and sacking some of the villages, and exacting a pledge of submission from others, he returned home, leaving a garrison in Philippopolis, which was after a time expelled by the Odrysae in defiance of their pledge of fidelity to Philip. . . .

The plain of the Hebrus.

9. In the second year of this Olympiad, on the arrival of ambassadors from Eumenes, Pharnaces, and the Achaean league, and also from the Lacedaemonians who had been banished from Sparta,[1] and from those who were in actual possession of it, the Senate despatched their business. But there came after them a mission from Rhodes in regard to the disaster at Sinope; to whom the Senate replied that it would send legates to investigate the case of the Sinopeans and their grievances against those kings. And Quintus Marcius having recently arrived from Greece and made his report on the state of affairs in Macedonia and the Peloponnese, the Senate did not require to hear much more; but having called in the envoys from the Peloponnese and Macedonia they listened indeed to what they had to say, but founded its reply, without any reference to their speeches, wholly on the report of Marcius, in which he had stated, in reference to king Philip, that he had indeed done all that was enjoined on him, but with great reluctance; and that, if he got an opportunity, he would go all lengths against the Romans. The Senate accordingly composed a reply to the king's envoys in which, while praising Philip for what he had done, they warned him for the future to be careful not to be found acting in opposition to the Romans. As to the Peloponnese, Marcius had reported that, as the Achaeans were unwilling to refer any matter whatever to the Senate, but were haughtily inclined

After midsummer of B.C. 183.

February, B.C. 182.

[1] That is, apparently, by some fresh disturbance towards the end of B.C. 183. See Strachan-Davidson, p. 495.

and desirous of managing all their affairs themselves, if the Senate would only reject their present application and give ever so slight an indication of displeasure, Sparta would promptly come to an understanding with Messene; and then the Achaeans would be glad enough to appeal to the protection of Rome. In consequence of this report they answered the Lacedaemonian Serippus and his colleagues, wishing to leave this city in a state of suspense, that they had done their best for them, but that for the present they did not think this matter concerned them. But when the Achaeans besought for help against the Messenians[1] in virtue of their alliance with Rome, or at least that they would take precautions to prevent any arms or corn from being brought from Italy into Messene, the Senate refused compliance with either request and answered that the Achaeans ought not to be surprised if Sparta or Corinth or Argos renounced their league, if they would not conduct their hegemony in accordance with the Senate's views. This answer the Senate made public, as a kind of proclamation that any people who chose might break off from the Achaeans for all the Romans cared; and they further retained the ambassadors in Rome, waiting to see the issue of the quarrel between the Achaeans and Messenians. . . .

The conflict of feelings in Philip's mind.

10. In this period a certain dreadful foreshadowing of misfortune fell upon king Philip and the whole of Macedonia, of a kind well worthy of close attention and record. As though Fortune had resolved to exact from him at once the penalties for all the impieties and crimes which he had committed in the whole course of his life, she now visited him with furies, those deities of retribution, those powers that had listened to the prayers of the victims of his cruelties, who, haunting him day and night, so plagued him to the last day of his life, that all the world was forced to acknowledge the truth of the proverb, that "Justice has an eye" which mere men should never despise. The first idea suggested to him by this evil power was that, as he

[1] The Messenians revolted from the league B.C. 183, and in the course of the fighting which ensued Philopoemen fell into an ambush, was taken prisoner, and put to death by them. See ch. 12.

was about to go to war with Rome, he had better remove from the most important cities, and those along the sea-coast, the leading citizens, with their wives and children, and place them in Emathia, formerly called Paeonia, and fill up the cities with Thracians and other barbarians, as likely to be more securely loyal to him in the coming hour of danger. The actual carrying out of this measure, and the uprooting of these men and their families, caused such an outburst of grief, and so violent an outcry, that one might have supposed the whole district to have been taken by the sword. Curses and appeals to heaven were rained upon the head of the king without any further attempt at concealment. His next step, prompted by the wish to leave no element of hostility or disaffection in the kingdom, was to write to the governors of the several cities ordering them to search out the sons and daughters of such Macedonians as had been put to death by him, and place them in ward; in which he referred especially to Admetus, Pyrrhicus, and Samus, and those who had perished with them: but he also included all others whosoever that had been put to death by order of the king, quoting this verse, we are told:—[1]

See 5, 9.

"Oh fool! to slay the sire and leave the sons."

Most of these men being persons of distinguished families, their fate made a great noise and excited universal pity. But Fortune had a third act in this bloody drama in reserve for Philip, in which the young princes plotted against each other; and their quarrels being referred to him, he was forced to choose between becoming the murderer of his sons and living the rest of his life in dread of being murdered by them in his old age; and to decide which of the two he had the greater reason to fear. Tortured day and night by these anxieties, the miseries and perturbations of his spirit lead to the inevitable reflection that the wrath of heaven fell upon his old age for the sins of his previous life: which will be rendered still more evident by what remains to be told. . . . Just when his soul was stung to madness by these circumstances, the quarrel between his sons blazed out: Fortune, as it were of set purpose, bringing their misfortunes upon the scene all at one time. . . .

[1] Stasinus *fr.*

Fragment referring to the military sham fight in which Perseus and Demetrius quarrelled, B.C. 182. See Livy, 40, 6.

The Macedonians make offerings to Xanthus as a hero, and perform a purification of the army with horses fully equipped. . . .

Part of a speech of Philip to his two sons after the quarrel at the manœuvres. See Livy, 40, 8.

11. "One should not merely read tragedies, tales, and histories, but should understand and ponder over them. In all of them one may learn that whenever brothers fall out and allow their quarrel to go any great length, they invariably end not only by destroying themselves but in the utter ruin of their property, children, and cities; while those who keep their self-love within reasonable bounds, and put up with each other's weaknesses, are the preservers of these, and live in the fairest reputation and fame. I have often directed your attention to the kings in Sparta, telling you that they preserved the hegemony in Greece for their country just so long as they obeyed the ephors, as though they were their parents, and were content to reign jointly. But directly they in their folly tried to change the government to a monarchy, they caused Sparta to experience every misery possible. Finally, I have pointed out to you as an example the case of Eumenes and Attalus; showing you that, though they succeeded to but a small and insignificant realm, they have raised it to a level with the best, simply by the harmony and unity of sentiment, and mutual respect which they maintained towards each other. But so far from taking my words to heart, you are, as it seems to me, whetting your angry passions against each other. . . ."

THE FALL OF PHILOPOEMEN

XXIV 8 b Sch

The death of Philopoemen, B.C. 183, or perhaps early in B.C. 182.

12. Philopoemen rose[1] and proceeded on his way, though he was oppressed at once by illness and the weight of years, being now in the seventieth year of his age. Conquering his weakness, however, by the force of his previous habits he reached Megalopolis, from Argos, in one day's journey. . . .

[1] He was ill with fever. Plutarch, *Phil.* 18.

He was captured, when Achaean Strategus, by the Messenians and poisoned. Thus, though second to none that ever lived before him in excellence, his fortune was less happy; yet in his previous life he seemed ever to have enjoyed her favour and assistance. But it was, I suppose, a case of the common proverb, "a man may have a stroke of luck, but no man can be lucky always." We must, therefore, call our predecessors fortunate, without pretending that they were so invariably—for what need is there to flatter Fortune by a meaningless and false compliment? It is those who have enjoyed Fortune's smiles in their life for the longest time, and who, when she changes her mind, meet with only moderate mishaps, that we must speak of as fortunate. . . .

Philopoemen was murdered by the Messenians, who had abandoned the league and were at war with it. See Livy, 39, 49-50.

Philopoemen was succeeded by Lycortas,[1] . . . and though he had spent forty years of an active career in a state at once democratic and composed of many various elements, he had entirely avoided giving rise to the jealousy of the citizens in any direction: and yet he had not flattered their inclinations, but for the most part had used great freedom of speech, which is a case of very rare occurrence. . . .

Character of Philopoemen. He is succeeded by Lycortas as Strategus.

13. An admirable feature in Hannibal's character, and the strongest proof of his having been a born ruler of men, and having possessed statesmanlike qualities of an unusual kind, is that, though he was for seventeen years engaged in actual warfare, and though he had to make his way through numerous barbaric tribes, and to employ innumerable men of different nationalities in what appeared desperate and hazardous enterprises, he was never made the object of a conspiracy by any of them, nor deserted by any of those who had joined him and put themselves under his command. . . .

Character of Hannibal, who poisoned himself at the court of Prusias, B.C. 183. See Livy, 39, 1.

14. Publius Scipio, in the course of an active career in

[1] Livy (39, 50) speaks of Lycortas at the time of Philopoemen's death as *alter imperator Achaeorum*. If he had been the ὑποστρατηγός we know that he would not by law have succeeded on the death of the Strategus. Plutarch, *Phil.* 21, seems to assert that an election was held at once, but not the ordinary popular election.

an aristocratic state, secured such popularity with the multitude and such credit with the Senate, that when some one took upon himself to bring him to trial before the people in the manner usual at Rome, and produced many bitter accusations against him, he came forward and said nothing but that "It ill-became the Roman people to listen to accusations against P. Cornelius Scipio, to whom his accusers owed it that they had the power of speech at all." At this the populace dispersed, and quitting the assembly, left the accuser alone. . . . Once when there was a sum of money required in the Senate for some pressing business, and the quaestor, on the ground of a legal difficulty, refused to open the treasury on that particular day, Scipio said that "he would take the keys himself and open it; for he was the cause of the treasury being locked at all." And again, when some one in the Senate demanded an account of the money which he had received from Antiochus before the treaty for the pay of his army, he said that he had the ledger, but that he ought not to be called to account by any one. But on his questioner persisting, and urging him to produce it, he bade his brother bring it. When the schedule was brought, he held it out in front of him, and tearing it to pieces in the sight of everybody bade the man who asked for it seek it out of these fragments, and he demanded of the rest "How they could ask for the items of the expenditure of these three thousand talents, and yet no longer ask for an account of how and by whose agency the fifteen thousand talents which they received from Antiochus came into the treasury, nor how it is that they have become masters of Asia, Libya, and Iberia?" This speech not only made a strong impression on the rest, but also reduced the man who demanded the account to silence.

Character of P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus, whose death Polybius places in this year, but according to Livy wrongly, who assigns it to the previous year (39, 52.)

These anecdotes have been related by me for the double purpose of enhancing the fame of the departed, and of encouraging future generations in the paths of honour. . . .

15. For my part, I never concur with those who indulge their anger against men of their own blood to the length of not only depriving them of the year's harvest when at war with them, but even of cutting down their trees and destroying

their buildings, and of leaving them no opportunity for repentance. Such proceedings seem to me to be rank folly. For, while they imagine that they are dismaying the enemy by the devastation of their territory, and the deprivation of their future as well as their present means of getting the necessaries of life, they are all the while exasperating the men, and converting an isolated ebullition of anger into a lasting hatred. . . .

Lycortas, the successor of Philopoemen, compels the Messenians to sue for peace, B.C. 183-182.

16. Lycortas the Achaean Strategus crushed the spirits of the Messenians in the war. Up to this time the populace at Messene had been afraid of their magistrates; but now at length, relying on the protection of the enemy, some of them plucked up courage to break silence and to say that the time was come to send an embassy to negotiate a peace. Deinocrates and his colleagues, being no longer able to face the people under this storm of popular odium, yielded to circumstances and retired to their own houses. Thereupon the people, acting under the advice of the older men, and especially under that of Epaenetus and Apollodorus, the ambassadors from Boeotia,—who, having arrived some time before to negotiate a peace, happened fortunately to be at that time at Messene,—appointed and despatched envoys, begging forgiveness for their transgressions. The Achaean Strategus, having summoned his colleagues[1] to council, and given the envoys a hearing, answered that "There was but one way in which the Messenians could reconcile themselves to the league, and that was by at once surrendering to him the authors of the revolt and of the murder of Philopoemen, leave the rest to the authority of the league assembly, and at once receive a garrison into their citadel." When this message was announced to the Messenian populace, those who had long been bitterly opposed to the authors of the war were ready enough to surrender them and to arrest them; while the rest, being persuaded that they would not be severely dealt with by the Achaeans, readily consented to submit the general question to the decision of the assembly. But what chiefly induced them to unanimously accept the proposal was, that they in fact had no choice in the matter. The Strategus accordingly

[1] That is the ten Demiurgi.

at once took over the citadel and marched his peltasts into it; and then, taking some picked troops with him, entered the city; and having summoned a meeting of the people, addressed them in terms befitting the occasion, promising that "they would never have reason to repent having committed themselves to the honour of the Achaeans." The general question of what was to be done he thus referred to the league,—for it happened conveniently that the Achaeans were just then re-assembling at Megalopolis for the second Congress,[1]—but of those who were guilty of the disturbances, he ordered all such as were actually implicated in the summary execution of Philopoemen to put an end to their own lives. . . .

Summer B.C. 182.

17. The Messenians were reduced by their own folly to the brink of ruin, but were restored to their former position in the league by the magnanimity of Lycortas and the Achaeans. But the towns of Abia, Thuria, and Pharae during these transactions abandoned their connection with Messene, and, setting up a pillar engraved with a treaty of alliance between themselves, formed a separate league. When the Romans were informed that the Messenian war had turned out successfully for the Achaeans, without taking any account of their previous declaration they gave a different answer to the same ambassadors, asserting that they had taken measures to prevent any one from conveying arms or corn from Italy into Messene. By this they showed clearly that, so far from avoiding or disregarding the affairs of foreign nations not directly concerning themselves, they were, on the contrary, annoyed at everything not being referred to them and carried out in accordance with their opinion.

Abia, Thuria, and Pharae make a separate league.

When the ambassadors arrived in Sparta with their answer, the Achaean Strategus as soon as he had settled the Messenian business, summoned a congress at Sicyon, and on its assembling, proposed a resolution for the reception of Sparta into the league, alleging

Achaean meeting at Sicyon.

[1] The second congress of the year seems to mean not that held for election of the Strategus for the next year, which met about 12th May, but the second regular meeting in August.

that "The Romans had declined the arbitration which had previously been offered to them in regard to this city,—for they had answered that they had now no concern with any of the affairs of Sparta. Those, however, at present in power at Sparta were desirous of being admitted to the privileges of the league. Therefore he advised that they should admit the town; for this would be advantageous in two ways: first, because they would be thus admitting men who had remained unshaken in their loyalty to the league; and secondly, because they would not be admitting those of the old exiles, who had behaved with ingratitude and impiety towards them, to any share of their privileges; but by confirming the measures of those who had excluded them, would at the same time be showing, with God's help, due gratitude to the latter." With these words Lycortas exhorted the Achaeans to receive the city of Sparta into the league. But Diophanes and some others attempted to put in a word for the exiles, and urged the Achaeans "Not to join in pressing heavily upon these banished men; and not to be influenced by a mere handful of men to strengthen the hands of those who had impiously and lawlessly expelled them from their country."

18. Such were the arguments employed on either side. The Achaeans, after listening to both, decided to admit the city, and accordingly the agreement was engraved on a tablet, and Sparta became a member of the Achaean league: the existing citizens having agreed to admit such of the old exiles as were not considered to have acted in a hostile spirit against the Achaeans. After confirming this arrangement the Achaeans sent Bippus of Argos and others as ambassadors to Rome, to explain to the Senate what had been done in the matter. The Lacedaemonians also sent Chaeron and others; while the exiles too sent a mission led by Cletis Diactorius[1] to oppose the Achaean ambassadors in the Senate.

Sparta admitted to the league.

[1] This looks like a local name, but no place is known corresponding to it. A Diactorides of Sparta is mentioned in Herodotus, 6, 127; and perhaps, as Hultsch suggests, we ought to read "Cletis and Diactorius."

BOOK XXIV

1. The ambassadors from the Spartan exiles and from the Achaeans arrived in Rome simultaneously with those of Eumenes, king Ariarathes, and Pharnaces; and the Senate attended to these latter first. A short time previously a report had been made to the Senate by Marcus,[1] who had been despatched on a mission respecting the war that had broken out between Eumenes and Pharnaces, speaking highly of the moderation of Eumenes in every particular, and the grasping temper and insolence of Pharnaces. The Senate accordingly did not require any lengthened arguments; but, after listening to the ambassadors, answered that they would once more send legates to examine more minutely into the points in dispute between the kings. Then came in the ambassadors from the Lacedaemonian exiles, and with them the ambassadors from the citizens actually in the city; and after giving them a long hearing, the Senate expressed no disapproval of what had been done, but promised the exiles to write to the Achaeans on the subject of their restoration to their country. Some days afterwards, Bippus of Argos and his colleagues, sent by the Achaeans, entered the Senate with a statement as to the restoration of order in Messene; and the Senate, without showing displeasure at any part of the arrangement, gave the ambassadors a cordial reception. . . .

Embassies at Rome from the Achaeans, the Spartan exiles, Eumenes of Pergamus, Ariarathes, king of Cappadocia, and Pharnaces, king of Pontus, B.C. 182.

[1] The mission to Eumenes and Pharnaces has been already mentioned in bk. 23, ch. 9, but the name of the ambassador was not given; nor is it mentioned by Livy (40, 20), who records the mission. It is uncertain who is meant by Marcus, some editors have altered it to Marcius, *i.e.* Q. Marcius Philippus, who had been sent to Macedonia, imagining him to have fulfilled both missions.

2. When the ambassadors of the Spartan exiles arrived in the Peloponnese from Rome with a letter from the Senate to the Achaeans, desiring that measures should be taken for their recall and restoration to their country, the Achaeans resolved to postpone the consideration of the question until their own ambassadors should return. After making this answer, they caused the agreement between themselves and the Messenians to be engraved on a tablet: granting them, among other favours, a three years' remission of taxes, in order that the damage done to their territory should fall upon the Achaeans equally with the Messenians. But when Bippus and his colleagues arrived from Rome, and reported that the letter in regard to the exiles was not due to any strong feeling on the part of the Senate, but to the importunity of the exiles themselves, the Achaeans voted to make no change. . . .

Terms granted to the Messenians

The request of the Spartan exiles refused.

3. Mount Haemus is close to the Pontus, the most extensive and loftiest of the ranges in Thrace, which it divides into two nearly equal parts, from which a view of both seas may be obtained. . . .[1]

M. Haemus. Livy, 46, 21.

4. In Crete there was the beginning of great troubles set in motion, if one should speak of "a beginning of troubles" in Crete: for owing to the persistency of civil wars and the acts of savagery practised against each other, beginning and end are much the same in Crete; and what appears to some people to be an incredible story is a spectacle of everyday occurrence there. . . .

Crete in B.C. 182. See bk. 22, ch. 19.

5. Having come to terms with each other, Pharnaces, Attalus, and the rest returned home. While this was going on, Eumenes had recovered from his illness, and was staying at Pergamus; and when his brother arrived to announce the arrangements that had been made, he approved of what had been done, and resolved to send

End of the war between Eumenes and Pharnaces, which the former had undertaken to support his father-in-law Ariarathes. See

[1] From Strabo (vii. 5, 13), who adds: "But this is not true, for the distance from the Adriatic is immense, and there are many obstacles in the way to obscure the view."

Livy, 38, 39. B.C. 182-181.

his brothers to Rome: partly because he hoped to put an end to the war with Pharnaces by means of their mission, and partly because he wished to introduce his brothers to his own private friends at Rome, and officially to the Senate. Attalus and his brother were eager for this tour; and when they arrived in Rome the young men met with a cordial reception from everybody in private society, owing to the intimacies which they had formed during the Roman wars in Asia, and a still more honourable welcome from the Senate, which made liberal provision for their entertainment and maintenance, and treated them with marked respect in such conferences as it had with them. Thus, when the young men came formally before the Senate, and, after speaking at considerable length of the renewal of their ancient ties of friendship with Rome and inveighing against Pharnaces, begged the Senate to adopt some active measures to inflict on him the punishment he deserved, the Senate gave them a favourable hearing, and promised in reply to send legates to use every possible means of putting an end to the war. . . .

Ptolemy Epiphanes sends a present to the Achaeans. Lycortas, Polybius, and Aratus sent to return thanks, B.C. 181.

6. About the same time king Ptolemy, wishing to make friends with the Achaean league, sent an ambassador to them with an offer of a fleet of ten penteconters fully equipped; and the Achaeans, thinking the present worthy of their thanks, for the cost could not be much less than ten talents, gladly accepted the offer. Having come to this resolution, they selected Lycortas, Polybius, and Aratus, son of Aratus of Sicyon, to go on a mission to the king, partly to thank him for the arms which he had sent on a former occasion, and partly to receive the ships and make arrangements for bringing them across. They appointed Lycortas, because, as Strategus at the time that Ptolemy renewed the alliance, he had worked energetically on the king's side; and Polybius, though below the legal age for acting as ambassador,[1] because his father has been ambassador at the renewal of the alliance

Bk. 22, ch. 12.

[1] Perhaps thirty, which seems to have been the legal age for admission to political functions. See 29, 24.

with Ptolemy, and had brought the present of arms and of money to the Achaeans; and Aratus, similarly, on account of his former intercourse with the king. However, this mission never went after all, as Ptolemy died just at this time. . . .

Ptolemy Epiphanes poisoned in B.C. 181.

7. There was at this time in Sparta a man named Chaeron, who in the previous year had been on an embassy to Rome, a man of ready wit and great ability in affairs, but still young, in a humble position of life, and without the advantages of a liberal education. By flattering the mob, and starting questions which no one else had the assurance to move, he soon acquired a certain notoriety with the people. The first use he made of his power was to confiscate the land granted by the tyrants to the sisters, wives, mothers, and children of the exiles, and to distribute it on his own authority among the poor without any fixed rule or regard to equality. He next squandered the revenue, using the public money as though it were his own, without the authority of law, public decree, or magistrate. Annoyed at these proceedings, certain men managed to get themselves appointed auditors of the treasury in accordance with the laws. Seeing this, and conscious of his mal-administration of the government, Chaeron sent some men to attack Apollonides, the most illustrious of the auditors, and the most able to expose his embezzlements, who stabbed him to death in broad daylight as he was coming from the bath. Upon this being reported to the Achaeans, and the people expressing great indignation at what had been done, the Strategus at once started for Sparta; and when he arrived there he brought Chaeron to trial for the murder of Apollonides, and having condemned him, threw him into prison. He then incited the remaining auditors to make a real investigation into the public funds, and to see that the relations of the exiles got back the property of which Chaeron had shortly before deprived them. . . .

Chaeron's malversations at Sparta.

Assassination of Apollonides.

8. In Asia king Pharnaces, once more treating the reference to Rome with contempt, sent Leocritus in the course of the winter with ten thousand men to ravage Galatia, while he himself at the begin-

Winter of B.C. 181-180.

ning of spring collected his forces and invaded Cappadocia. When Eumenes heard of it, he was much enraged at Pharnaces thus breaking through the terms of the agreement to which he was pledged, but was compelled to retaliate by acting in the same way. When he had already collected his forces, Attalus and his brother landed from their voyage from Rome, and the three brothers, after meeting and interchanging views, marched out at once with the army. But on reaching Galatia they found Leocritus no longer there; and when Carsignatus and Gaesotorius, who had before embraced the cause of Pharnaces, sent them a message desiring that their lives might be spared, and promising that they would do anything that might be required of them, they refused the request on the ground of the treachery of which they had been guilty, and advanced with their full force against Pharnaces; and having performed the distance from Calpitus to the river Halys in five days, they reached Parnassus in six more, and being there joined by Ariarathes, the king of the Cappadocians, with his own army, they entered the territory of the Mocissians. Just as they had pitched their camp, news came that the ambassadors from Rome had arrived to effect a pacification. When he heard this, Eumenes sent his brother Attalus to receive them; while he devoted himself to doubling the number of his troops, and improving them to the utmost: partly with a view to prepare them for actual service, and partly to impress the Romans with the belief that he was able to defend himself against Pharnaces, and beat him in war.

Spring of B.C. 180.

Eumenes enters Cappadocia.

Two Galatian chiefs.

Calpitus in Galatia (?).

Parnassus, a town on the Halys.

Mocissus, N. of the Halys.

9. When the Roman legates arrived and urged the putting an end to the war, Eumenes and Ariarathes professed to be ready to obey; but begged the Romans to bring them, if possible, to an interview with Pharnaces, that they might see fully from what was said in their own presence how faithless and cruel a man Pharnaces was; and, if this proved to be impossible, to take a fair and impartial view of the controversy and

The Roman legates arrive and undertake to negotiate.

decide it themselves. The legates replied that they would do everything that was in their power and was consistent with honour; but they required the kings to remove their army from the country: for it was inconsistent that, when they were there with proposals for a peace, operations of war should be going on and mutual acts of hostility be committed. Eumenes and his ally yielded to this representation, and immediately marched off in the direction of Galatia. The Roman legates then visited Pharnaces, and first demanded that he should meet Eumenes and Ariarathes in a conference, as that would be the surest way of settling the affair; but when he expressed repugnance to that measure, and absolutely refused to do so, the Romans at once perceived that he plainly thought himself in the wrong, and distrusted his own cause; but, being anxious in any and every way to put an end to the war, they continued to press him until he consented to send plenipotentiaries to the coast, to conclude a peace on such terms as the legates might command. When these plenipotentiaries, the Roman legates, and Eumenes and Ariarathes met, the latter showed themselves ready to consent to any proposal for the sake of concluding a peace. But the envoys of Pharnaces disputed every point, and did not hold even to what they had once accepted, but continually brought forward some fresh demand, and altered their mind again and again. The Roman legates, therefore, quickly came to the conclusion that they were wasting their labour, as Pharnaces could not be induced to consent to the pacification. The conference accordingly having come to nothing, and the Roman legates having left Pergamum, and the envoys of Pharnaces having gone home, the war went on, Eumenes and his allies proceeding in their preparations for it. Meanwhile, however, the Rhodians earnestly requested Eumenes to help them; and he accordingly set out in great haste to carry on a war against the Lycians. . . .

The negotiation fails.

The Rhodians engaged in putting down a rising of the Lycians. See Bk. 22, ch. 5.

10. This year the Achaean Strategus Hyperbatus brought before the assembly the question of the letter from Rome as to the recall of the Lacedaemonian exiles. Lycortas and his party recom-

B.C. 180. Debate in the Achaean assembly

on the Roman despatch.

mended that no change should be made, on the ground that "The Romans had only acted as they were bound to do in listening to the petition of men who, on the face of it, were deprived of their rights, so far as that petition seemed reasonable; but when they were convinced that of a petition some points were impossible, and others such as to inflict great disgrace and damage upon their friends, it had never been their custom to insist upon them peremptorily, or force their adoption. So in this case also, if it were shown to them that the Achaeans by obeying their letter would be breaking their oaths, their laws, and the provisions engraved on the tablets, the very bonds of our league, they will retract their orders, and will admit that we are right to hesitate and to ask to be excused from carrying out its injunctions." Such was the speech of Lycortas. But Hyperbatus and Callicrates advised submission to the letter, and that they should hold its authority superior to law or tablet or anything else. Such being the division of opinion, the Achaeans voted to send ambassadors to the Senate, to put before it the points contained in the speech of Lycortas. Callicrates of Leontium, Lydiades of Megalopolis, and Aratus of Sicyon were forthwith nominated for this mission, and were despatched with instructions to this effect. But on their arrival at Rome Callicrates went before the Senate, and, so far from addressing it in accordance with his instructions, he on the contrary entered upon an elaborate denunciation of his political opponents; and, not contented with that, he undertook to rebuke the Senate itself.

Callicrates, instead of obeying his instructions, denounces his opponents, and persuades the Senate that their interference is necessary.

11. For he said that "The Romans were themselves responsible for the Greeks neglecting their letters and orders instead of obeying them. For in all the democratic states of the day there were two parties,—one recommending obedience to the Roman rescripts, and holding neither law nor tablet nor anything else to be superior to the will of Rome; the other always quoting oaths and tablets, and exhorting the people to be careful about breaking them. Now the latter policy was by far the most popular in Achaia, and the most influential with the

multitude; consequently the Romanisers were discredited and denounced among the populace—their opponents glorified. If then the Senate would give some sign of their interest in the matter, the leaders, in the first place, would quickly change to the Romanising party, and, in the next place, would be followed by the populace from fear. But if this were neglected by the Senate, the tendency towards the latter of the two parties would be universal, as the more creditable and honourable in the eyes of the populace. Thus it came about that at that very time certain statesmen, without any other claims whatever, had obtained the highest offices in their own cities, merely from coming forward to speak against the rescripts of the Senate, with the view of maintaining the validity of the laws and decrees made in the country. If then the Senate was indifferent about having their rescripts obeyed by the Greeks, by all means let it go on as it is now doing. But if the Senate wished that its orders should be carried out, and its rescripts be despised by no one, it must give serious attention to that subject. If it did not do so, he knew only too well that the exact opposite of the Senate's wishes would come about, as in fact had already been the case. For but lately, in the Messenian disturbance, though Quintus Marcius had taken many precautions to prevent the Achaeans adopting any measures with regard to the Messenians without the consent of the Romans, they had disobeyed that order; had voted the war on their own authority; had not only wasted the whole country in defiance of justice, but had in some cases driven its noblest citizens into exile, and in others put them to death with every extremity of torture, though they had surrendered, and were guilty of no crime but that of appealing to Rome on the points in dispute. Again, too, though the Senate had repeatedly written to order the restoration of the Lacedaemonian exiles, the Achaeans were so far from obeying, that they had actually set up an engraved tablet, and made a sworn agreement with the men actually in possession of the city that these exiles should never return. With these instances before their eyes, the Romans should take measures of precaution for the future."

12. After delivering a speech in these words, or to this effect, Callicrates left the Senate-house. He was followed by

the envoys of the exiles, who retired after delivering a short address, stating their case, and containing some of the ordinary appeals to pity. The Senate was persuaded that much of what Callicrates had said touched the interests of Rome, and that it was incumbent upon it to exalt those who supported its own decrees, and to humble those who resisted them. It was with this conviction, therefore, and at this time that it first adopted the policy of depressing those who in their several states took the patriotic and honourable side, and promoting those who were for appealing to its authority on every occasion, right or wrong. The result of which was that gradually, as time went on, the Senate had abundance of flatterers, but a great scarcity of genuine friends. However, on this occasion the Senate did not write about the restoration of the exiles to the Achaeans only, but also to the Aetolians, Epirotes, Athenians, Boeotians, and Acarnanians, calling them all as it were to witness, in order to break down the power of the Achaeans. Moreover, they added to their answer, without saying a word to his colleagues, a remark confined entirely to Callicrates himself, that "everybody in the various states should be as Callicrates." This man accordingly arrived in Greece with his answer, in a great state of exultation, little thinking that he had become the initiator of great miseries to all the Greeks, but especially to the Achaeans. This nation had still at that time the privilege of dealing on something like equal terms with Rome, because it had kept faith with her from the time that it had elected to maintain the Roman cause, in the hour of her greatest danger—I mean during the wars with Philip and Antiochus. . . . The league, too, had made progress in material strength and in every direction from the period from which my history commences; but the audacious proceeding of Callicrates proved the beginning of a change for the worse. . . .

The Romans adopt the policy of raising a party in Greece against the Achaean league.

The Romans having the feelings of men, with a noble spirit and generous principles, commiserate all who have met with misfortunes, and show favour to all who fly to them for protection; but directly any one claims anything as of right, on the ground of having been faithful to their alliance, they at once draw in and correct their error to the best of their

ability. Thus then Callicrates, who had been sent to Rome to plead for the rights of the Achaeans, acted in exactly the opposite spirit; and dragging in the subject of the Messenian war, on which the Romans themselves had made no complaint, returned to Achaia to overawe the people with the threat of the hostility of Rome. Having therefore by his official report frightened and dismayed the spirits of the populace, who were of course ignorant of what he had really said in the Senate, he was first of all elected Strategus, and, to make matters worse, proved to be open to bribery; and then, having got the office, carried out the restoration of the Lacedaemonian and Messenian exiles.[1] . . .

B.C. 180-179.

13. Philopoemen and Aristaenus, the Achaeans, were unlike both in character and policy. Philopoemen was formed by nature in body and mind for the life of a soldier, Aristaenus for a statesman and debater. In politics they differed in this, that whereas during the periods of the wars with Philip and Antiochus, Roman influence had become supreme in Greece, Aristaenus directed his policy with the idea of carrying out with alacrity every order from Rome, and sometimes even of anticipating it. Still he endeavoured to keep up the appearance of abiding by the laws, and did, in fact, maintain the reputation of doing so, only giving way when any one of them proved to plainly militate against the rescripts from Rome. But Philopoemen accepted, and loyally performed, all Roman orders which were in harmony with the laws and the terms of their alliance; but when such orders exceeded these limits, he could not make up his mind to yield a willing obedience, but was wont first to demand an arbitration, and to repeat the demand a second time; and if this proved unavailing, to give in at length under protest, and so finally carry out the order. . . .

Comparison between the characters of Philopoemen and Aristaenus.

14. Aristaenus used to defend his policy before the Achaeans by some such arguments as these: "It was impossible to maintain the Roman friendship by holding out the spear and the herald's staff together. If we have the resolution to withstand them face

The view of Aristaenus on the right attitude towards Rome.

[1] See Hicks's *Greek Inscriptions*, p. 330.

to face, and can do so, well and good. But if Philopoemen himself does not venture to assert this,[1] . . . why should we lose what is possible in striving for the impossible? There are but two marks that every policy must aim at—honour and expediency. Those to whom honour is a possible attainment should stick to that, if they have political wisdom; those to whom it is not must take refuge in expediency. To miss both is the surest proof of unwisdom: and the men to do that are clearly those who, while ostensibly consenting to obey orders, carry them out with reluctance and hesitation. Therefore we must either show that we are strong enough to refuse obedience, or, if we dare not venture even to suggest that, we must give a ready submission to orders."

Philopoemen's answer in defence of his policy.

15. Philopoemen, however, said that "People should not suppose him so stupid as not to be able to estimate the difference between the Achaean and Roman states, or the superiority of the power of the latter. But as it is the inevitable tendency of the stronger to oppress the weaker, can it be expedient to assist the designs of the superior power, and to put no obstacle in their way, so as to experience as soon as possible the utmost of their tyranny? Is it not, on the contrary, better to resist and struggle to the utmost of our power? . . . And if they persist in forcing their injunctions upon us,[1] . . . and if, by reminding them of the facts we do something to soften their resolution, we shall at any rate mitigate the harshness of their rule to a certain extent; especially as up to this time the Romans, as you yourself say, Aristaenus, have always made a great point of fidelity to oaths, treaties, and promises to allies. But if we at once condemn the justice of our own cause, and, like captives of the spear, offer an unquestioning submission to every order, what will be the difference between the Achaeans and the Sicilians or Capuans, who have been notoriously slaves this long time past? Therefore it must either be admitted that the justice of a cause has no weight with the Romans, or, if we do not venture to say that, we must stand by our rights, and not abandon our own cause, especially as our position in regard to Rome is exceedingly strong and

[1] Something is lost from the text.

honourable. That the time will come when the Greeks will be forced to give unlimited obedience, I know full well. But would one wish to see this time as soon or as late as possible? Surely as late as possible! In this, then, my policy differs from that of Aristaenus. He wishes to see the inevitable arrive as quickly as possible, and even to help it to come: I wish to the best of my power to resist and ward it off."

From these speeches it was made clear that while the policy of the one was honourable, of the other undignified, both were founded on considerations of safety. Wherefore while both Romans and Greeks were at that time threatened with serious dangers from Philip and Antiochus, yet both these statesmen maintained the rights of the Achaeans in regard to the Romans undiminished; though a report found its way about that Aristaenus was better affected to the Romans than Philopoemen. . . .

BOOK XXV

1. Tiberius Gracchus destroyed three hundred cities of the Celtiberes.[1] . . .

B.C. 179. Coss. Q. Fulvius, L. Manlius.

The ex-praetors Ti. Sempronius Gracchus and L. Postumius were still in Spain, where they had been since B.C. 182. Livy, 40, 1, 44.

2. The attack upon him being sudden and formidable, Pharnaces was reduced to submit to almost any terms; and on his sending an embassy, Eumenes and Ariarathes immediately accepted his proposals, and sent ambassadors to Pharnaces in return. When this had been repeated several times, the pacification was concluded on the following terms: "Eumenes, Prusias, and Ariarathes, shall maintain perpetual peace with Pharnaces and Mithridates.

Renewed war of Eumenes and Ariarathes upon Pharnaces. See bk. 24, chs. 8, 9.

"Pharnaces shall not enter Galatia on any pretence.

"Such treaties as exist between Pharnaces and Gauls are hereby rescinded.

"Pharnaces shall likewise evacuate Paphlagonia, after restoring the inhabitants whom he had previously expelled, with their shields, javelins, and other equipment.

"Pharnaces shall restore to Ariarathes all territory of which he has deprived him, with the property thereon and the hostages.

"He shall restore Tium by the Pontus, which some time before was given freely and liberally by Eumenes to Prusias.

See bk. 5, ch. 77.

"Pharnaces shall restore, without ransom, all prisoners of war and all deserters.

[1] From Strabo 3, ch. 4, who quotes Poseidonius as criticising this statement by remarking that Polybius must count every tower as a city.

"He shall repay to Morzius and Ariarathes, in lieu of all money and treasure taken from them, the sum of nine hundred talents, and shall add thereto three hundred talents for Eumenes towards the expenses of the war.

"Mithridates, the Satrap of Armenia, shall also pay three hundred talents, because he attacked Ariarathes in defiance of the treaty with Eumenes.

"The persons included under this treaty are, of the princes in Asia, Artaxias, lord of the greater part of Armenia, and Acusilochus: of those in Europe, Gatalus the Sarmatian: of the autonomous peoples, the Heracleotes, the Mesembrians in the Chersonese, and the Cyzicenes."

The number and quality of hostages to be given by Pharnaces was also specified. The armies of the several parties then marched away, and thus was concluded the war of Eumenes and Ariarathes against Pharnaces.

Philip V. died at Amphipolis towards the end of B.C. 179. *His last days were embittered by remorse for the death of his son Demetrius, whose innocence had been demonstrated to him. He wished to leave his crown to Antigonus, the son of Echecrates and nephew of Antigonus Doson, in order to punish his elder son Perseus for his treachery in securing his brother's death. But Philip died suddenly before this could be secured, and Perseus succeeded him without opposition. See Livy*, 40, 55-57.

3. Having renewed the alliance with Rome, Perseus immediately began intriguing in Greece. He invited back into Macedonia absconding debtors, condemned exiles, and those who had been compelled to leave their country on charges of treason. He caused notices to be put up to that effect at Delos, Delphi, and the temple of Athena at Iton,[1] offering not only indemnity

The opening of the reign of Perseus.

[1] The notices are put up at the three places visited yearly by great numbers, and by many separate pilgrims. It is interesting to notice the persistence in a custom common from the earliest times, at any rate as far as Delos and Delphi are concerned. Iton was in Thessaly, and the temple and oracle of Athena there was celebrated throughout Greece, and was the central place of worship for the Thessalians. The town stood in a rich plain on the river Cuarius, and hence its name—sometimes written Siton—was connected by some with *σιτόφορος*, "corn-bearing" (Steph. *Byz.*) Homer calls it *μητέρα μήλων*, "mother of sheep." Pyrrhus hung up in this temple the spoils of

to all who returned, but also the restoration of the property lost by their exile. Such also as still remained in Macedonia he released from their debts to the Royal exchequer, and set free those who had been confined in fortresses upon charges of treason. By these measures he raised expectations in the minds of many, and was considered to be holding out great hopes to all the Greeks. Nor were other parts of his life and habits wanting in a certain royal magnificence. His outward appearance was striking, and he was well endowed with all the physical advantages requisite for a statesman. His look and mien were alike dignified and such as became his age. He had moreover avoided his father's weakness for wine and women, and not only drank moderately at dinner himself, but was imitated in this respect by his intimates and friends. Such was the commencement of the reign of Perseus. . . .

Philip V. in misfortune.

When king Philip had become powerful and had obtained supremacy over the Greeks, he showed the most utter disregard of faith and principle; but when the breeze of fortune again set against him, his moderation was as conspicuous in its turn. But after his final and complete defeat, he tried by every possible expedient to consolidate the strength of his kingdom.

B.C. 177. Coss. C. Claudius Pulcher, Ti. Sempronius Gracchus.

Embassy from Lycia against Rhodes. See bk. 24, ch. 9.

4. After despatching the consuls Tiberius and Claudius against the Istri and Agrii,[1] the Senate towards the end of summer transacted business with the ambassadors that had come from the Lycians. They had not arrived at Rome until the Lycians had been completely conquered, but they had been despatched a considerable time before. For the people of Xanthus in Lycia, when about to embark upon the war, had sent Nicostratus and others to Achaia and Rome as ambassadors: who coming to Rome at that time moved many of the Senators to pity them, by laying before them the oppressiveness of the Rhodians and their own danger; and at length induced the

Antigonus and his Gallic soldiers about B.C. 273. [Pausan. 1, 13, 2]. "Itonian Athena" had temples in other parts of Greece also, *e.g.* in Boeotia [Paus. 91, 34, 1].

[1] The war in Istria, and the mutiny of the troops against the consul Manlius, are described in Livy, 41, 8-11.

Senate to send envoys to Rhodes to declare that "On inspecting the record of the arrangements made by the ten commissioners in Asia, when settling the dominions of Antiochus, it appeared that the Lycians had been given to the Rhodians, not as a gift, but rather as friends and allies." But many were still dissatisfied with this solution of the matter. For the Romans seemed to wish, by thus pitting Rhodes against Lycia, to exhaust the accumulations and treasures of the Rhodians, because they had heard of the recent conveyance of the bride of Perseus by the Rhodians, and of their grand naval review. For shortly before this the Rhodians had been holding, with great splendour and elaboration of equipment, a review of all vessels belonging to them; the fact being that a vast quantity of timber for ship-building had been presented to them by Perseus. Moreover he had presented a gold tiara to each of the rowers on the upper bench in the ship that had brought him his bride Laodice.[1] . . .

Laodice, daughter of Seleucus IV. Livy, 42, 12.

5. When the envoys from Rome reached Rhodes and announced the decrees of the Senate, there was a great excitement in the island, and much confused discussion among the leading politicians. They were much annoyed at the allegation that the Lycians had not been given them as a gift but as allies; for having just satisfied themselves that the Lycian war was successfully concluded, they saw the commencement of fresh trouble for themselves growing up. For no sooner had the Romans arrived and made this announcement to the Rhodians, than the Lycians began a fresh revolt, and showed a determination of fighting to the last extremity for autonomy and freedom. However, after hearing the Roman envoys, the Rhodians made up their minds that the Romans had been deceived by the Lycians, and forthwith appointed Lycophron to lead an embassy to offer an explanation to the Senate. And the state of affairs was such that there was momentary expectation of a fresh rising of the Lycians. . . .

Excitement at Rhodes; and a fresh determination of the Lycians to assert independence.

[1] Besides this connexion with Seleucus of Syria, sure to be offensive to Rome, Perseus gave a sister to Prusias, another enemy of Rome and Eumenes. Livy, 42, 12.

6. When the Rhodian envoys arrived in Rome the Senate, after listening to their address, deferred its answer. Meanwhile the Dardanian envoys came with reports as to the number of the Bastarnae, the size of their men, and their courage in the field. They gave information also of the treacherous practices of Perseus and the Gauls, and said that they were more afraid of him than of the Bastarnae, and therefore begged the help of the Romans. The report of the Dardani being supported by that of the Thessalian envoys who arrived at that time, and who also begged for help, the Senators determined to send some commissioners to see with their own eyes the truth of these reports; and they accordingly at once appointed and despatched Aulus Postumius, accompanied by some young men. . .

Rhodian question deferred.

Reports of the intrigues of Perseus. See Livy, 41, 19, B.C. 176-175.

BOOK XXVI

SELEUCUS PHILOPATOR, whom we last heard of as king of Syria, was assassinated by one of his nobles—Heliodorus—in the twelfth year of his reign. Antiochus his younger brother had been a hostage at Rome, and being, according to agreement, exchanged in B.C. 175 for Philopator's son Demetrius, he was returning to Syria. At Athens, on his journey home, he heard of the death of Seleucus, and the attempt of Heliodorus to usurp the kingdom. By the help of Eumenes Heliodorus was expelled and Antiochus installed, to the satisfaction of the people, who gave him at first the surname of Epiphanes. He is the Antiochus Epiphanes whose cruelties are recorded in the books of the Maccabees. He died mad at Tabae in Persia, B.C. 164. See 31, 11. For the following extract preserved by Athenaeus, see the translation of Livy, 41, 19.

1. ANTIOCHUS EPIPHANES, nicknamed from his actions Epimanes (the Madman), would sometimes steal from the court, avoiding his attendants, and appear roaming wildly about in any chance part of the city with one or two companions. His favourite place to be found was the shops of the silversmiths or goldsmiths, chatting and discussing questions of art with the workers in relief and other artists; at another time he would join groups of the people of the town and converse with any one he came across, and would drink with foreign visitors of the humblest description. Whenever he found any young men carousing together he would come to the place without giving notice, with fife and band, like a rout of revellers, and often by his unexpected appearance cause the guests to rise and run away. He would often also lay aside his royal robes, and, putting on a tebenna,[1] go round the market-place as though a candidate for office, shaking hands and embracing various

Antiochus Epiphanes, B.C. 175-164.

[1] This word, of unknown origin, seems to be used here for the toga, or some dress equivalent to it. See 10, 4.

people whom he intreated to vote for him, sometime as aedile, and sometimes as tribune. And when he got the office and took his seat on an ivory curule chair, after the fashion of the Romans, he heard law cases which came on in the agora, and decided them with the utmost seriousness and attention. This conduct was very embarrassing to respectable people, some of whom regarded him as a good natured easy-going man, and others as a madman. In regard to making presents, too, his behaviour was on a par with this. Some he presented with dice made of gazelle horn, some with dates, others with gold. There were even instances of his making unexpected presents to men whom he met casually, and whom he had never seen before. In regard to public sacrifices and the honours paid to the gods, he surpassed all his predecessors on the throne; as witness the Olympieium at Athens and the statues placed round the altar at Delos. He used also to bathe in the public baths, when they were full of the townspeople, pots of the most expensive unguents being brought in for him; and on one occasion on some one saying, "Lucky fellows you kings, to use such things and smell so sweet!" without saying a word to the man, he waited till he was bathing the next day, and then coming into the bath caused a pot of the largest size and of the most costly kind of unguent called *stactè* to be poured over his head, so that there was a general rush of the bathers to roll themselves in it; and when they all tumbled down, the king himself among them, from its stickiness, there was loud laughter. . . .

BOOK XXVII

The events of the years B.C. 174, 173, 172, *which gradually led up to the war with Perseus, to be described in the twenty-seventh book, were briefly these :—*

In B.C. 174 Perseus forced the Dolopes, who had appealed against him to Rome, to submit to his authority. After this successful expedition he marched through Central and Northern Greece, visiting Delphi, where he stayed three days, Phthiotid Achaia, and Thessaly. He carefully abstained from inflicting any damage in the districts through which he passed, and tried to gain the confidence of the various states. In the same year he made friendly advances to the Achaeans, who had forbidden any Lacedaemonian to enter their territory, by offering to restore their fugitive slaves. But in spite of the exertions of Xenarchus the Strategus, the Achaeans refuse to make any change (Livy, 41, 22-24).

The same year saw also commotions in Aetolia, which were settled by five Roman commissioners : and in Crete, on the old score of the status of the Lycians. Q. Minucius was sent to settle this also (Livy, 41, 25).

In B.C. 173 Perseus entered on still more active intrigues in Greece, and in spite of the wildest scandals that were afloat as to his tyranny, he gained a powerful hold in Aetolia, Thessaly, and Perrhaebia. The Senate accordingly sent Marcellus to Aetolia and Achaia, and App. Claudius to Thessaly, to inquire into the facts ; and a commission of five into Macedonia, with directions to proceed afterwards to Alexandria (Livy, 42, 5, 6).

In B.C. 172 king Eumenes visited Rome and urged the Senate to take measures in time to counteract the attempts of Perseus ; warning them that he had already obtained strong hold upon the Boeotians and Aetolians, and had an inexhaustible recruiting ground in Thrace. That everywhere he had secured the death or exile of the partisans of Rome, and was overrunning in arms Thessaly and Perrhaebia (Livy, 42, 11-13).

The Senate, already inclined to listen to these representations, was still more inclined to do so by the defiant tone of Harpalus, the representative of king Perseus ; by the attempted assassination of Eumenes by emissaries of Perseus at Delphi on his home journey ; by receiving a report from Greece from C. Valerius confirming the speech of Eumenes ; and lastly by the confession of one L. Rammius of Brundisium, that he had been requested to poison certain Roman envoys who were accustomed to stay at his house on their journeys to and from Macedonia and Greece (Livy, 42, 15-17).

War was now determined on for the next year, and the praetor ordered to enroll troops. And Eumenes also, now recovered from the wounds of the assassins, made preparations to join in the struggle (Livy, 42, 18-27).

In B.C. 171, fresh legions having been enrolled, and an army of sixteen thousand infantry and eight hundred cavalry ordered to Macedonia, envoys appeared from Perseus demanding the reason. The Senate would not allow them to enter the Pomoerium, but received them in the temple of Bellona : and after listening to a report from Sp. Cavilius that Perseus had, among other acts of hostility, taken cities in Thessaly and entered Perrhaebia in arms, the Senate answered the Macedonian envoys that any complaint they had to make must be made to the consul, P. Licinius, who would presently be in Macedonia, but that they must not come into Italy again (Livy, 42, 36).

A few days afterwards five commissioners were sent into Greece, who distributed the districts to be visited among themselves : Servius and Publius Lentulus and Lucius Decimius were to go to Cephallenia, the Peloponnese, and the west coast generally ; Q. Marcius and Aulus Atilius to Epirus, Aetolia, Thessaly, and thence to Boeotia and Euboea, where they were to meet the Lentuli. Meanwhile a letter from Perseus, demanding the cause of their coming and of the presence of troops in Macedonia, was received and left unanswered. After visiting the districts assigned to them, in the course of doing which Marcius and Atilius had met Perseus on the river Peneus, and granted him a truce to enable him to send envoys to Rome (Marcius knowing well that the Romans were not yet fully prepared for war[1]), the commissioners reached their destination at Chalcis, where the earlier events narrated in the following extracts occurred (Livy, 42, 36-43).

THE WAR WITH PERSEUS

1. At this time Lases and Callias arrived at the head of an embassy from the Thespians, and Ismenias[2] from Neon. Lases and his colleagues offered to put their city wholly into the hands of the Romans ; Ismenias proposed to submit all the

B.C. 171. Coss. P. Licinius Crassus C. Cassius Longinus.

[1] Marcius on his return to Rome gloried in having thus deceived the king and gained time for preparations at Rome, but his action was repudiated by the Senate. Livy, 42, 47.

[2] Ismenias had just been elected Strategus of Boeotia ; but the party who had supported a rival candidate had in revenge obtained a decree of the league banishing the Boeotarchs from all the Boeotian cities. They had, however been received at Thespiae, whence they were recalled to Thebes and reinstated by a reaction in popular feeling. Then they obtained another decree banishing the twelve men who, though not in office, had convened the league assembly ; and Ismenias as Strategus sentenced them to the loss of all rights in their absence. These are the "exiles" here meant (Livy, 42, 43). Who Neon was is not certain ; but we find in the next chapter that he had been a leader in the Macedonising party at Thebes, perhaps a son of Brachylles, whose father's name was Neon (see 20, 5). He was captured in B.C. 167 and put to death by the Romans (Livy, 45, 31).

cities of Boeotia as one nation to the discretion of the commissioners. But this latter proposal was diametrically opposed to the policy of Marcius and his colleagues. What suited that policy best was to split up Boeotia into separate cities: and they therefore received Lases and his party, as well as the envoys from Chaeronea and Lebadea, and all who came from single cities, with great favour and lavish courtesy; but treated Ismenias with ostentatious neglect and coldness. Some of the exiles[1] also attacked Ismenias and were very near stoning him to death, and would have done so if he had not saved himself by taking refuge through the door[2] of the chamber where the commissioners were sitting. At the same period there were disturbances and party contests at Thebes. One party were for committing the town unconditionally to Rome; but the Coroneans and Haliartians flocked to Thebes and vehemently maintained that they ought to maintain the alliance with Perseus. For a time neither of the two parties showed any disposition to give in to each other; but when Olympichus of Coronea set the example of changing sides and asserting that they ought to cleave to the Romans, a great change and revolution came over the feelings of the populace. First, they compelled Dicetas to go on an embassy to Marcius and the other commissioners to excuse them for their alliance with Perseus. Next, they expelled Neon and Hippias, crowding to their houses, and bidding them go and make their own defence for the terms that they had made; for they were the men who had negotiated the alliance. When these men had left the town, the people immediately collected into the assembly and first voted honours and gifts to the Romans, and then ordered the magistrates to push on the alliance. Last of all they appointed ambassadors to hand over the city to the Romans and to restore their exiles.

The Roman commissioners at Chalcis: ambassadors from Thespiae and Neon of Boeotia.

Thebes.

[1] See note 2, page 356.

[2] τὰ δίθυρα, Livy (42, 44) says in *tribunal legatorum*, and Casaubon contents himself with the same word. Schweighaeuser translates it *podium*, as if a "raised platform" on which the commissioners sat was meant. I think it is used in the natural sense of a "door" leading into the hall in which they were sitting, and into which Ismenias fled for refuge. Livy used *tribunal* from the ideas of his age as to the construction of such a building.

2. Whilst these things were being accomplished at Thebes, the exiles in Chalcis appointed Pompides to state their grievances against Ismenias, Neon, and Dicetas. The bad policy of these men being manifest, and the Romans lending their support to the exiles, Hippias and his party were rendered so odious that they were in danger of falling victims to the fury of the populace, until the Romans, by checking the assaults of the mob, secured them a certain degree of safety.

The cause of the exiles' triumph at Chalcis.

When the Theban envoys arrived, bringing with them to the commissioners the decrees and honours I have mentioned, a rapid change passed over the face of things in each of the towns, for they were separated by a very narrow interval from each other. The commissioners with Marcius received the Theban envoys, complimented their town and counselled them to restore the exiles, and bade the several towns send embassies to Rome submitting themselves individually and unreservedly to the protection of the Romans. Their policy, therefore, of splitting up the league of the Boeotian towns, and of destroying the popularity of the Macedonian royal house with the Boeotian populace having thus completely succeeded, the commissioners sent for Servius Lentulus from Argos, and leaving him in charge at Chalcis went themselves to the Peloponnese; while Neon a few days afterwards retired to Macedonia; and Ismenias and Dicetas, being thrown at once into prison, shortly afterwards put an end to their lives. Thus it came about that the Boeotians, who had for a long period of years, and through many strange vicissitudes, maintained a national league, by now rashly and inconsiderately adopting the cause of Perseus, and giving way to an outburst of unreasoning excitement, were entirely disintegrated and split up into separate cities.

Dissolution of the Boeotian league, B.C. 171.

When Aulus and Marcius arrived at Argos, after communication with the council of the Achaean league, they called upon Archon the Strategus to despatch a thousand men to Chalcis, to garrison the town until the arrival of the Romans; an order which Archon readily obeyed. Having thus settled affairs in Greece

The Commissioners in the Peloponnese.

during the winter, and met Publius Lentulus and his two colleagues, the commissioners sailed back to Rome. . . .

The Rhodians prepare to co-operate with Rome.

3. Meanwhile Tiberius Claudius and Aulus Postumius had been engaged on a visitation of the islands and Greek cities in Asia, and had spent the longest time in Rhodes; though the Rhodians at that time did not require any supervision, for the prytanis that year was Agesilochus, a man of high rank, who had once been on an embassy to Rome. Even before the legates came, as soon as it became clear that the Romans intended to go to war with Perseus he had urged his people to throw in their fortunes with those of Rome; and, among other things, had counselled them to repair forty ships, in order that, if any occasion for using them should arise, it should not find them still in the midst of preparations, but ready to answer to the call and to carry out their resolve at once. By stating these facts to the Roman envoys, and showing them the preparations visibly progressing, he let them return to Rome in a high state of satisfaction with Rhodes. . . .

Perseus sends a circular despatch to the Greek States.

4. After the conferences had been held between the Roman envoys and the Greeks, Perseus drew up a despatch containing a statement of his case, and the arguments employed on either side; partly from an idea that he would thus be shown to have the superiority of right on his side, and partly because he wished to test the feelings of the several states. Copies of this despatch he sent to the other states by his ordinary letter-carriers; but to Rhodes he sent also Antenor and Philip as ambassadors, who, on their arrival in the island, handed over the document to the magistrates, and a few days afterwards entered the Council chamber and urged the Rhodians "To remain neutral for the present and watch what happened; and, if the Romans attacked Perseus in violation of the treaty, to endeavour to mediate. For this was the interest of all, and pre-eminently of the Rhodians, who more than most peoples desired equality and freedom of speech, and were ever the protectors, not only of their own liberty, but of that of the rest of Greece also; and therefore ought to be proportionally careful to provide and

The reply of the Rhodians.

guard against a policy of an opposite tendency." These and similar arguments of the envoys found favour with the Rhodian people. But, as they were already pledged to an attitude of friendship to Rome, the influence of the upper classes so far prevailed that, though a friendly reception was given to the Macedonian envoys, they demanded in their formal answer that Perseus should not ask them to take any measure which would involve the appearance of hostility to Rome. Antenor and his colleagues would not accept this reply, but with thanks for the kindness of their general reception, sailed back to Macedonia. . . .

5. Being informed that some of the cities of Boeotia remained faithful to him, Perseus sent Alexander on a mission to them. On his arrival in Boeotia, Alexander was obliged to abstain from visiting any of the cities except Coronea, Thisbae,[1] and Haliartus, finding that they offered him no facilities for securing close relations. But he entered those three towns and exhorted their inhabitants to cling to their loyalty to the Macedonians. They received his words with enthusiasm, and voted to send ambassadors to Macedonia. Alexander accordingly returned to the king and reported the state of things in Boeotia. A short time afterwards the ambassadors arrived, desiring the king to send aid to the cities which favoured the Macedonian cause; for the Thebans were oppressing them severely, because they would not agree with them and side with Rome. But Perseus replied that he was precluded by the truce from sending any aid to any one; but he begged them to resist the Thebans to the best of their power, and yet not to go to war with the Romans, but to remain neutral. . . .

Mission of Perseus to Boeotia.

Truce made with Q. Marcius. See Livy, 42, 43, B.C. 171.

6. When the report of the commissioners from Asia concerning Rhodes and the other states had been made at Rome, the Senate called in the ambassadors of Perseus, Solon and Hippias: who endeavoured to argue the whole case and to deprecate the anger

War is decided upon at the expiration of the truce.

[1] The text has Θήβας, which is inconsistent with what follows as to the Thebans. An inscription found on the site of Thisbae supplies the correction of an error as old as Livy (42, 46, 47). See Hicks's, *G. I.* p. 330.

of the Senate ; and particularly to defend their master on the subject of the attempt upon the life of Eumenes. When they had finished all they had to urge, the Senate, which had all the while been resolved on war, bade them depart forthwith from Rome ; and ordered all other Macedonians also that happened to be staying in the country to quit Italy within thirty days. The Senate then called upon the Consuls to act at once and see that they moved in good time. . . .

Attempted assassination of Eumenes at Delphi. Livy, 42, 16, B.C. 172.

7. Caius Lucretius[1] being at anchor off Cephallenia, wrote a letter to the Rhodians, requesting them to despatch some ships, and entrusted the letter to a certain trainer named Socrates. This letter arrived at Rhodes in the second six months of the Prytany of Stratocles. When the question came on for discussion, Agathagetus, Rhodophon, Astymedes, and many others were for sending the ships and taking part in the war from the first, without any further pretence; but Deinon and Polyaratus, though really displeased at the favour already shown to Rome, now for the present used the case of Eumenes as their pretext, and began by that means to alienate the feelings of the populace. There had in fact been a long standing feeling of suspicion and dislike in the minds of the Rhodians against Eumenes, dating from the time of his war with Pharnaces; when, upon king Eumenes blockading the entrance of the Hellespont to prevent ships sailing into the Pontus, the Rhodians had interfered with his design and thwarted him. This ill-feeling had again been recently exasperated during the Lycian war on the question of certain forts, and a strip of territory on the frontier of the Rhodian Peraea, which was being damaged by some of Eumenes's subjects. These incidents taken together made the Rhodians ready to listen to anything against the king. Seizing on this pretext, the party of Deinon tried to discredit the despatch, asserting that it did not come from the

Politics at Rhodes.

The Romanising party.

The Macedonian party.

Jealousy of Eumenes.

[1] Gaius Lucretius had seen naval service as *duumvir navalis* on the coast of Liguria in B.C. 181. Livy, 40, 26. He was now (B.C. 171) Praetor, his *provincia* being the fleet, and commanded 40 quinqueremes. *Id.* 42, 48.

Romans but from Eumenes, who wished to involve them on any possible pretext in a war, and bring expense and perfectly unnecessary suffering upon the people. In support of their contention they put forward the fact that the man who brought the letter was some obscure trainer or another; and asserted that the Romans were not accustomed to employ such messengers, but were rather inclined to act with unnecessary care and dignity in the despatch of such missives. When they said this they were perfectly aware that the letter had really been written by Lucretius: their object was to persuade the Rhodian people to do nothing for the Romans readily, but rather to perpetually make difficulties, and thus give occasions for offence and displeasure to crop up between the two nations. For their deliberate purpose was to alienate Rhodes from the Roman friendship, and to join it to that of Perseus, by every means in their power. Their motives for thus clinging to Perseus were that Polyaratus, who was ostentatious and vain, had become heavily in debt; and that Deinon, who was avaricious and unscrupulous, had from the first relied on increasing his wealth by getting presents from princes and kings. These speeches having been delivered, the Prytanis Stratocles rose, and, after inveighing at some length against Perseus, and speaking with equal warmth in praise of the Romans, induced the people to confirm the decree for the despatch of the ships. Forthwith six quadriremes were prepared, five of which were sent to Chalcis under the command of Timagoras, and the other under the command of another Timagoras to Tenedos. This latter commander fell in at Tenedos with Diophanes, who had been despatched by Perseus to Antiochus, and captured both him and his crew. All such allies as arrived with offers of help by sea Lucretius thanked warmly, but excused from taking part in this service, observing that the Romans had no need of naval support. . . .

Perseus now collected a large army at Citium, thirty-nine thousand foot and four thousand horse, and advanced through the north of Thessaly taking many towns, and finally taking up his quarters at Sicyrium, at the foot of Mount Ossa. The Roman consul, P. Licinius, marched from the south-west through Gomphi,

and thence to Larisa, where he crossed the river Peneus. After some cavalry skirmishes, which were generally favourable to the king, Perseus advanced nearer to the Roman camp, and a more important battle was fought, in which the king again scored a considerable success with his cavalry and light-armed troops. The Romans lost two hundred cavalry killed and as many prisoners and two thousand infantry, while Perseus only had twenty cavalry and forty infantry killed. He did not, however, follow up the victory sufficiently to inflict a crushing blow upon the Roman army; and though the Consul withdrew to the south of the Peneus, after some days' reflection the king made proposals of peace. See Livy, 42, 51-62. B.C. 171 (*summer*).

8. After the Macedonian victory Perseus summoned his Council, when some of his friends expressed an opinion that he ought to send an embassy to the Roman general, to signify his readiness even now to pay the Romans the same amount of tribute as his father had formerly undertaken to pay when beaten in war, and to evacuate the same places. "For if," they argued, "the Romans accept the terms the war will be ended in a manner honourable to the king after his victory in the field; and the Romans, after this taste of Macedonian valour, will be much more careful in the future not to impose an unjust or harsh burden upon the Macedonians. And if, on the other hand, in spite of the past, they prove obstinate and refuse to accept them, the anger of heaven will with justice fall on them; while the king by his moderation will gain the support of Gods and men alike." The majority of his friends held this view, and Perseus expressing his assent to it, Pantauchus, son of Balacrus, and Midon of Beroea, were forthwith sent as ambassadors to Licinius. On their arrival, Licinius summoned his Council, and the ambassadors having stated their proposals in accordance with their instructions, Pantauchus and his colleague were requested to withdraw, and they deliberated on the proposition thus made to them. They decided unanimously to return as stern an answer as possible. For this is a peculiarity

After beating the Roman cavalry on the Peneus, and obliging Licinius to retire south of the river, Perseus endeavours to make terms.

The Romans are inexorable.

of the Romans, which they have inherited from their ancestors, and are continually displaying,—to show themselves most peremptory and imperious in the presence of defeat, and most moderate when successful: a very noble peculiarity, as every one will acknowledge; but whether it be feasible under certain circumstances may be doubted. However that may be, on the present occasion they made answer that Perseus must submit without reserve himself, and give the Senate full power to take whatever measures it might think good concerning Macedonia and all in it. On this being communicated to Pantauchus and Midon, they returned and informed Perseus and his friends; some of whom were roused to anger at this astonishing display of haughtiness, and advised Perseus to send no more embassies or messages about anything whatever. Perseus, however, was not the man to take such a line. He sent again and again to Licinius, with continually enhanced offers, and promising a larger and larger sum of money. But as nothing that he could do had any effect, and as his friends found fault with him, and told him that, though he had won a victory, he was acting like one who had been defeated and lost all, he was at length compelled to renounce the sending of embassies, and remove his camp back to Sicyrium. Such was the position of the campaign. . . .

Perseus returns to Sicyrium.

9. When the report of the favourable result for Perseus of the cavalry engagement, and of the victory of the Macedonians, spread through Greece, the inclination of the populace to the cause of Perseus blazed out like a fire, most of them having up to that time concealed their real feelings. Their conduct, to my mind, was like what one sees at gymnastic contests. When some obscure and far inferior combatant descends into the arena with a famous champion reputed to be invincible, the spectators immediately bestow their favour upon the weaker of the two, and try to keep up his spirits by applause, and eagerly second his efforts by their enthusiasm. And if he succeeds so far as even to touch the face of his opponent, and make a mark to prove the blow, the whole of the spectators again show themselves on his side. Sometimes they even jeer at his antagonist: not because they dislike or

The effect of the success of Perseus upon the Greeks.

undervalue him, but because their sympathies are roused by the unexpected, and they are naturally inclined to take the weaker side. But if any one checks them at the right moment, they are quick to change and see their mistake. And this is what Cleitomachus is said to have done. He had the character of being an invincible athlete, and, as his reputation was spread all over the world, King Ptolemy is said to have been inspired with the ambition of putting an end to it. He therefore had Aristonicus the boxer, who was thought to have unusual physical capabilities for that kind of thing trained with extraordinary care, and sent to Greece. When he appeared on the arena at Olympia a great number of the spectators, it seems, immediately showed their favour for him, and cheered him on, being rejoiced that some one should have had the courage to make some sort of stand against Cleitomachus. But when, as the fight went on, he showed that he was a match for his antagonist, and even gave him a well-placed wound, there was a general clapping of hands, and the popular enthusiasm showed itself loudly on his side, the spectators calling out to Aristonicus to keep up his spirits. Thereupon they say that Cleitomachus stepped aside, and after waiting a short time to recover his breath, turned to the crowd and asked them "Why, they cheered Aristonicus, and supported him all they could? Had they detected him in playing foul in the combat? Or were they not aware that Cleitomachus was at that moment fighting for the honour of Greece, Aristonicus for that of king Ptolemy? Would they prefer an Egyptian to carry off the crown by beating Greeks, or that a Theban and Boeotian should be proclaimed victor in boxing over all comers?" Upon this speech of Cleitomachus, they say that such a revulsion of feeling came over the spectators, that Aristonicus in his turn was conquered more by the display of popular feeling than by Cleitomachus.

A scene at Olympia.

10. What happened in the case of Perseus in regard to the feeling of the multitude was very similar to this. For if any one had pulled them up and asked them plainly, in so many words, whether they wished such great power to fall to one man, and were desirous of trying the effect of an utterly irresponsible des-

potism, I presume that they would have promptly bethought themselves, recanted all they had said, and gone to the other extreme of feeling. Or if some one had briefly recalled to their recollection all the tyrannical acts of the royal house of Macedonia from which the Greeks had suffered, and all the benefits they had received from the Romans, I imagine they would have at once and decisively changed their minds. However, for the present, at the first burst of thoughtless enthusiasm, the people showed unmistakable signs of joy at the news, being delighted at the unlooked-for appearance of a champion able to cope with Rome. I say this much to prevent any one, in ignorance of human nature, from bringing a rash charge of ingratitude against the Greeks for the feelings which they displayed at that time. . . .

A new kind of missile used in the army of Perseus.

11. The *cestros* was a novel invention, made during the war with Perseus. This weapon consisted of an iron bolt two palms long, half of which was spike, and half a tube for the reception of the wooden shaft which was fixed into the tube, and measured a span in length and a finger-breadth in diameter. At the middle point of the shaft three wooden "plumes" were morticed in. The sling had thongs of unequal length, and on the leather between them the missile was loosely set. When the sling was being swung round, with the two thongs taut, the missile kept its place; but when the slinger let go one of the thongs, it flew from the leather like a leaden bullet, and was projected from the sling with such force as to inflict a very grievous wound upon any one whom it hit.[1]

Character of Cotys, king of the Odrysae, an ally of Perseus.

12. Cotys was a man of distinguished appearance and of great ability in military affairs, and besides, quite unlike a Thracian in character. For he was of sober habits, and gave evidence of a gentleness of temper and a steadiness of disposition worthy of a man of gentle birth. . . .

A prudent governor of Cyprus. See above, bk. 18, ch. 55.

13. Ptolemy, the general serving in Cyprus, was by no means like an Egyptian, but was a man of sense and administrative ability. He received the governorship of the island when the king of Egypt was quite a child, and devoted himself

[1] Livy, who translates this passage, calls the missile a *cestrosphendona* (42, 65).

with great zeal to the collection of money, refusing payments of any kind to any one, though he was often asked for them by the king's agents, and subjected to bitter abuse for refusing to part with any. But when the king came of age he made up a large sum and sent it to Alexandria, so that both king Ptolemy himself and his courtiers expressed their approval of his previous parsimony and determination not to part with any money. . . .

The battle on the Peneus was followed by other engagements of no great importance; and finally Perseus returned to Macedonia, and the Romans went into winter quarters in various towns in Thessaly, without a decisive blow having been struck on either side. Winter of B.C. 171-170. *Livy*, 42, 64-67.

14. Just about the time when Perseus retired for the winter from the Roman war, Antenor arrived at Rhodes from him, to negotiate for the ransom of Diophanes and those who were on board with him. Thereupon there arose a great dispute among the statesmen as to what course they ought to take. Philophron, Theaetetus, and their party were against entering into such an arrangement on any terms; Deinon and Polyaratus and their party were for doing so. Finally they did enter upon an arrangement with Perseus for their redemption. . . .

Winter of B.C. 171-170. Dispute at Rhodes as to the release of Diophanes, the envoy of Perseus, captured at Tenedos. See ch. 7.

15. Cephalus came [to Pella] from Epirus. He had long been connected by friendship with the royal house of Macedonia, but was now compelled by the force of circumstances to embrace the side of Perseus, the cause of which was as follows: There was a certain Epirote named Charops, a man of high character, and well disposed to Rome, who, when Philip was holding the passes into Epirus, was the cause of his being driven from the country, and of Titus Flamininus conquering Epirus and Macedonia. Charops had a son named Machatus, who had a son also named Charops. Machatus having died when this son was quite a youth, the elder Charops sent his grandson with a suitable retinue to Rome to learn to speak and read Latin. In the course of

What induced the leading men in Epirus to join Perseus.

time the young man returned home, having made many intimate friendships at Rome. The elder Charops then died, and the young man, being of a restless and designing character, began giving himself airs and attacking the distinguished men in the country. At first he was not much noticed, Antinous and Cephalus, his superiors in age and reputation, managing public affairs as they thought right. But when the war with Perseus broke out, the young man at once began laying information against these statesmen at Rome, grounding his accusations on their former intimacy with the Macedonian royal family; and by watching everything they said or did, and putting the worst construction on it, suppressing some facts and adding others, he succeeded in getting his accusations against them believed. Now Cephalus had always shown good sense and consistency, and at the present crisis had adhered to a course of the highest wisdom. He had begun by praying heaven that the war might not take place, or the question come to the arbitrament of arms; but when the war was actually begun, he was for performing all treaty obligations towards Rome, but for not going a step beyond this, or showing any unbecoming subservience or officiousness. When Charops then vehemently accused Cephalus at Rome, and represented everything that happened contrary to the wishes of the Romans as malice prepense on his part, at first he and others like him thought little of the matter, being not conscious of entertaining any designs hostile to Rome. But when they saw Hippolochus, Nicander, and Lochagus arrested without cause, and conveyed to Rome after the cavalry battle, and that the accusations made against them by Lyciscus were believed,—Lyciscus being a leader of the same party in Aetolia as Charops was in Epirus,—they at length began to be anxious about what would happen, and to consider their position. They resolved therefore to try every possible means to prevent themselves from being similarly arrested without trial and carried to Rome, owing to the slanders of Charops. It was thus that Cephalus and his friends were compelled, contrary to their original policy, to embrace the cause of Perseus. . . .

Charops.

Aetolian leaders arrested.

16. Theodotus and Philostratus committed an act of

flagrant impiety and treachery. They learnt that the Roman consul Aulus Hostilius was on his way to Thessaly to join the army; and thinking that, if they could deliver Aulus to Perseus, they would have given the latter the strongest possible proof of their devotion, and have done the greatest possible damage to the Romans at this crisis, they wrote urgently to Perseus to make haste. The king was desirous of advancing at once and joining them; but he was hindered by the fact that the Molossians had seized the bridge over the Aous, and was obliged to give them battle first. Now it chanced that Aulus had arrived at Phanota,[1] and put up at the house of Nestor the Cropian,[2] and thus gave his enemies an excellent opportunity; and had not fortune interfered on his behalf, I do not think that he would have escaped. But, in fact, Nestor providentially suspected what was brewing, and compelled him to change his quarters for the night to the house of a neighbour. Accordingly he gave up the idea of going by land through Epirus, and, having sailed to Anticyra,[3] thence made his way into Thessaly. . . .

Coss. A. Hostilius, Mancinus, A. Atilius Serranus, B.C. 170.

Attempt of two Molossian leaders to seize the consul.

17. Pharnaces was the worst of all his predecessors on the throne. . . .

Pharnaces, king of Pontus.

18. While Attalus was spending the winter in Elateia (in Phocis), knowing that his brother Eumenes was annoyed in the highest possible degree at the splendid honours which had been awarded to him having been annulled by a public decree of the Peloponnesians, though he concealed his annoyance from every one,—he took upon himself to send messages to certain of the Achaeans, urging that not only the statues of honour, but the complimentary inscriptions

Attalus desires that his brother Eumenes should be restored to honour in the Peloponnese.

[1] In Phocis. The name was variously given as Phanoteis, Phanote, Phanota (Steph. *Byz.*)

[2] Schweighaeuser seems to regard this as a second name. But the Greeks seldom had such, and it is more likely the designation of some unknown locality. There was an Attic deme named Cropia, and therefore the name is a recognised one (Steph. *Byz.*) Gronovius conjectured Ὠρωπίῳ "of Oropus."

[3] Apparently the Anticyra on the Sperchius, on the borders of Achaia Phthiotis.

also, which had been placed in his brother's honour, should be restored. His motive in acting thus was the belief that he could give his brother no greater gratification, and at the same time would display to the Greeks by this act his own brotherly affection and generosity.[1] . . .

Preparations for the attack upon Coele-Syria by the ministers of Ptolemy Philometor.

19. When Antiochus saw that the government of Alexandria was openly making preparations for a war of annexation in Coele-Syria, he sent Meleager at the head of an embassy to Rome, with instructions to inform the Senate of the fact, and to protest that Ptolemy was attacking him without the least justification. . . .

The need of promptness,

20. In all human affairs perhaps one ought to regulate every undertaking by considerations of time; but this is especially true in war, in which a moment makes all the difference between success and failure, and to miss this is the most fatal of errors. . . .

and of persistency.

Many men desire honour, but it is only the few who venture to attempt it; and of those who do so, it is rare to find any that have the resolution to persevere to the end. . . .

[1] Hence Attalus obtained the name of Philadelphus. The origin of Eumenes's loss of popularity in the Peloponnese is referred to in 28, 7, but no adequate cause is alleged. A reference to Achaia in his speech at Rome was not perhaps altogether friendly (Livy, 42, 12), and we shall see that he was afterwards suspected of intriguing with Perseus; but if this extract is rightly placed, it can hardly be on this latter ground that the Achaeans had renounced him.

BOOK XXVIII

1. When the war between the kings Antiochus and Ptolemy[1] for the possession of Coele-Syria had just begun, Meleager, Sosiphanes, and Heracleides came as ambassadors from Antiochus, and Timotheos and Damon from Ptolemy. The one actually in possession of Coele-Syria and Phoenicia was Antiochus; for ever since his father's victory over the generals of Ptolemy at Panium[2] all those districts had been subject to the Syrian kings. Antiochus, accordingly, regarding the right of conquest as the strongest and most honourable of all claims, was now eager to defend these places as unquestionably belonging to himself: while Ptolemy, conceiving that the late king Antiochus had unjustly taken advantage of his father's orphan condition to wrest the cities in Coele-Syria from him, was resolved not to acquiesce in his possession of them. Therefore Meleager and his colleagues came to Rome with instructions to protest before the Senate that Ptolemy had, in breach of all equity, attacked him first; while Timotheos and Damon came to renew their master's friendship with the Romans, and to offer their mediation for putting an end to the war with Perseus; but, above all, to watch the communications made by Meleager's embassy. As to putting an end to the war, by the advice of Marcus Aemilius they did not venture to speak of it; but after formally renewing the friendly relations between Ptolemy and Rome, and receiving a favourable answer, they returned to Alexandria. To Meleager and his colleagues the Senate answered that Quintus Marcius should be commissioned to write to

B.C. 169, Antiochus and Ptolemy both appeal to Rome on the subject of Coele-Syria.

[1] Antiochus IV. Epiphanes, B.C. 175-164; Ptolemy VI. Philometor, B.C. 181-146.

[2] See 16, 18.

Ptolemy on the subject, as he should think it most to the interest of Rome and his own honour. Thus was the business settled for the time. . . .

The Rhodians ask for license to import corn.

2. About this time there came also ambassadors from the Rhodians towards the end of summer, Agesilochus, Nicagoras, and Nicander. The objects of their mission were to renew the friendship of Rhodes and Rome; to obtain a license for importing corn from the Roman dominions; and to defend their state from certain charges that had been brought against it. For there were most violent party contests going on in Rhodes: Agathagetus, Philophron, Rhodophon, and Theaetetus resting all their hopes on the Romans, and Deinon and Polyaratus on Perseus and the Macedonians; and as these divisions gave rise to frequent debates in the course of their public business, and many contradictory expressions were used in their deliberations, plenty of opportunities were afforded to those who wished to make up stories against the state. On this occasion, however, the Senate affected to be ignorant of all this, though perfectly acquainted with what went on in the island, and granted them a license to import one hundred thousand medimini of corn from Sicily. This answer was given by the Senate to the Rhodians separately. Audience was then given collectively to all the envoys from the rest of Greece that were united in the same policy. . . .

B.C. 169. Aulus Hostilius, in Greece with proconsular authority, sends Popilius and Octavius to visit the Greek towns and read the decree of the Senate.

3. Aulus being thus Proconsul, and wintering in Thessaly with the army, sent Gaius Popilius and Gnaeus Octavius to visit certain places in Greece. They first came to Thebes, where, after speaking in complimentary terms of the Thebans, they exhorted them to maintain their good disposition towards Rome. They then went a round of the cities in the Peloponnese, and endeavoured to convince the people of the clemency and humanity of the Senate by producing the[1] de-

[1] The decree referred to is given in Livy, 43, 17. "No one shall supply any war material to the Roman magistrates other than that which the Senate has decreed." This had been extracted from the Senate by vehement complaints reaching Rome of the cruel extortions of the Roman officers in the previous two years.

cree which I recently mentioned. At the same time they made it clearly understood that the Senate was aware who in the several states were hanging back and trying to evade their obligations, and who were forward and zealous; and they let it be seen that they were as much displeased with those who thus hung back as with those who openly took the opposite side. This brought hesitation and doubt to the minds of the people at large, as to how to frame their words and actions so as to exactly suit the necessities of the times. Gaius and Gnaeus were reported to have resolved, as soon as the Achaean congress was assembled, to accuse Lycortas, Archon, and Polybius, and to point out that they were opposed to the policy of Rome; and were at the present moment refraining from active measures, not because that was their genuine inclination, but because they were watching the turn of events, and waiting their opportunity. They did not, however, venture to do this, because they had no well-founded pretext for attacking these men. Accordingly, when the council[1] met at Aegium, after delivering a speech of mingled compliments and exhortation, they took ship for Aetolia.

They visit the Peloponnese, and express some dissatisfaction at the backward policy of certain Achaeans.

Lycortas, Archon, and Polybius are supposed to be particularly aimed at.

4. The Aetolian congress being summoned to meet them at Thermum, they came before the assembled people, and again delivered a speech in which expressions of benevolence were mixed with exhortations. But the real cause of summoning the congress was to announce that the Aetolians must give hostages. On their leaving the speakers' platform, Proandrus stood forward and desired leave to mention certain services performed by himself to the Romans, and to denounce those who accused him. Gaius thereupon rose; and, though he well knew that Proandrus was opposed to Rome, he paid him some compliments, and acknowledged the truth of everything he had said. After this, Lyciscus stood forward, and, without accusing any one person by name,

The legates in Aetolia.

Various Aetolians accuse each other.

Proandrus.

Lyciscus.

[1] Polybius seems to mean the smaller council, not the public assembly, though Livy evidently understood the latter (43, 47).

yet cast suspicion on a great many. For he said that "The Romans had been quite right to arrest the ringleaders and take them to Rome" (whereby he meant Eupolemus, Nicander, and the rest): "but members of their party still remained in Aetolia, all of whom ought to meet with the same correction, unless they gave up their children as hostages to the Romans." In these words he meant to point especially to Archedamus and Pantaleon; and, accordingly, when he retired, Pantaleon stood up, and, after a brief denunciation of Lyciscus for his shameless and despicable flattery of the stronger side, turned to Thoas, conceiving him to be the man whose accusations of himself obtained the greater credit from the fact that he had never been supposed to be at enmity with him. He reminded Thoas first of the events in the time of Antiochus; and then reproached him for ingratitude to himself, because, when he had been surrendered to Rome, he obtained an unexpected release at the intercession of Nicander and himself. He ended by calling upon the Aetolians, not only to hoot Thoas down if he tried to speak, but to join with one accord in stoning him. This was done; and Gaius, after administering a brief reproof to the Aetolians for stoning Thoas, departed with his colleague to Acarnania, without any more being said about hostages. Aetolia, however, was filled with mutual suspicions and violent factions.

Pantaleon.

Thoas stoned.

5. In Acarnania the assembly was held at Thurium, at which Aeschrion, Glaucus, and Chremes, who were all partisans of Rome, begged Gaius and Gnaeus to place a garrison in Acarnania; for they had among them certain persons who were for putting the country in the hands of Perseus and the Macedonians. The advice of Diogenes was the opposite. "A garrison," he said, "ought not to be put into any of their cities, for that was what was done to those who had been at war with Rome and had been beaten; whereas the Acarnanians had done no wrong, and did not deserve in any respect to have a garrison thrust upon them. Chremes and Glaucus and their partisans were slandering their political opponents, and desired to bring in a garrison which would support their self-

Acarnania.

seeking policy, in order to establish their own tyrannical power." After these speeches, Gaius and his colleague, seeing that the populace disliked the idea of having garrisons, and wishing to follow the line of policy marked out by the Senate, expressed their adherence to the view of Diogenes; and departed to join the Proconsul at Larisa, after paying some compliments to the Acarnanians. . . .

6. The Greeks made up their minds that this embassy required much consideration on their part. They therefore called to council such men as were of one mind in other political questions,— Arcesilaus and Ariston of Megalopolis, Stratius of Tritaea, Xenon of Patrae and Apollonides of Sicyon. But Lycortas stood firm to his original view: which was that they should send no help to either Perseus or Rome in any way, nor, on the other hand, take part against either. For he held that co-operation with either would be disadvantageous to the Greeks at large, because he foresaw the overwhelming power which the successful nation would possess; while active hostility, he thought, would be dangerous, because they had already in former times been in opposition to many of the most illustrious Romans in their state policy. Apollonides and Stratius did not recommend open and avowed hostility to Rome, but thought that "Those who were for plunging headlong into the contest, and wished to use the action of the nation to secure their own personal favour at Rome, ought to be put down and boldly resisted." Archon said that "They must yield to circumstances, and not give their personal enemies a handle for accusations; nor allow themselves to fall into the same misfortune as Nicander, who, before he had learnt what the power of Rome really was, had met with the gravest calamities." With this last view, Polyaenus, Arcesilaus, Ariston, and Xenon agreed. It was thereupon decided that Archon should go without delay to his duties as Strategus, and Polybius to those of Hipparch.

Meeting of Achaean statesmen to consider their policy, B.C. 169.

Lycortas is for complete neutrality.

Apollonides and Stratius for suppressing rash declarations for Rome, and yet not openly opposing her.

The Strategus Archon is for bending to the storm, and acting frankly for Rome.

Polybius Hipparch.

7. Very soon after these events, and when Archon had made up his mind that the Achaeans must take active part with Rome and her allies, it happened most conveniently that Attalus made his proposal to him and found him ready to accept it. Archon at once eagerly promised his support to Attalus's request: and when thereupon that prince's envoys appeared at the next congress, and addressed the Achaeans about the restoration of king Eumenes's honours, begging them to do this for the sake of Attalus, the people did not show clearly what their feeling was, but a good many rose to speak against the proposal from many various motives. Those who were originally the advisers of the honours being paid to the king were now desirous to confirm the wisdom of their own policy; while those who had private reasons for animosity against the king thought this a good opportunity for revenging themselves upon him; while others again, from spite against those who supported him, were determined that Attalus should not obtain his request. Archon, however, the Strategus, rose to support the envoys,—for it was a matter that called for an expression of opinion from the Strategus,—but after a few words he stood down, afraid of being thought to be giving his advice from interested motives and the hope of making money, because he had spent a large sum on his office. Amidst a general feeling of doubt and hesitation, Polybius rose and delivered a long speech. But that part of it which best fell in with the feelings of the populace was that in which he showed that "The original decree of the Achaeans in regard to these honours enacted that such honours as were *improper and contrary to law* were to be abolished, but not *all* honours by any means. That Sosigenes and Diopeithes and their colleagues, however, who were at the time judges, and for private reasons personally hostile to Eumenes, seized the opportunity of overturning all the erections put up in honour of the king; and in doing so had gone beyond the meaning of the decree of the Achaeans, and beyond the powers entrusted to them, and, what was worst of all, beyond the demands of justice and right. For the Achaeans had not resolved upon doing away with the honours of

Embassy from Attalus to the Achaeans desiring the restoration of the honours formally decreed to his brother Eumenes, See 27, 18.

Speech of Polybius.

Eumenes on the ground of having received any injury at his hands; but had taken offence at his making demands beyond what his services warranted, and had accordingly voted to remove everything that seemed excessive. As then these judges had overthrown these honours, because they had a greater regard for the gratification of their private enmity than for the honour of the Achaeans, so the Achaeans, from the conviction that duty and honour must be their highest consideration, were bound to correct the error of the judges, and the unjustifiable insult inflicted upon Eumenes: especially as, in doing so, they would not be bestowing this favour on Eumenes only, but on his brother Attalus also." The assembly having expressed their agreement with this speech, a decree was written out ordering the magistrates to restore all the honours of king Eumenes, except such as were dishonourable to the Achaean league or contrary to their law. It was thus, and at this time, that Attalus secured the reversal of the insult to his brother Eumenes in regard to the honours once given him in the Peloponnese. . . .

8. Perseus sent Pleuratus the Illyrian, an exile living at his court, and Adaeus of Beroea on a mission to king Genthius, with instructions to inform him of what he had achieved in his war with the Romans, Dardani, Epirotes, and Illyrians up to the present time; and to urge him to make a friendship and alliance with him in Macedonia. These envoys journeyed beyond Mount Scardus, through Illyria Deserta, as it is called,—a region a short time back depopulated by the Macedonians, in order to make an invasion of Illyria and Macedonia difficult for the Dardani. Their journey through this region was accompanied by much suffering; but they reached Scodra, and being there informed that Genthius was at Lissus, they sent a message to him. He promptly responded: and having been admitted to an interview with him, they discussed the business to which their instructions referred. Genthius had no wish to forfeit the friendship of Perseus;

Early in B.C. 169,[1] after taking Hyscana in Illyria, Perseus advances to Stubera, and thence sends envoys to king Genthius at Lissus. Livy, 43, 19.

Genthius temporises.

[1] The expedition of Perseus into Illyricum apparently took place late in the year B.C. 170 and in the first month of B.C. 169. Livy, 43, 18-20.

but he alleged want of means as an excuse for not complying with the request at once, and his inability to undertake a war with Rome without money. With this answer, Adaeus and his colleagues returned home. Meanwhile Perseus arrived at Stubera, and sold the booty and gave his army a rest while waiting for the return of Pleuratus and Adaeus. On their arrival with the answer from Genthius, he immediately sent another mission, consisting again of Adaeus, Glaucias, one of his body-guards, and the Illyrian (Pleuratus) also, because he knew the Illyrian language, with the same instructions as before: on the ground that Genthius had not stated distinctly what he wanted, and what would enable him to consent to the proposals. When these envoys had started the king himself removed with his army to Hyscana.[1] . . .

A second mission to Genthius.

Perseus goes back to Hyscana in Illyria.

9. The ambassador sent to Genthius returned without having accomplished anything more than the previous envoys, and without any fresh answer; for Genthius remained of the same mind,—willing to join with Perseus in his war, but professing to be in want of money. Perseus disregarded the hint, and sent another mission under Hippias to conclude the treaty, without taking any notice of the main point, while professing a wish to do whatever Genthius wished. It is not easy to decide whether to ascribe such conduct to mere folly, or to a spiritual delusion. For my part, I am inclined to regard it as a sheer spiritual delusion when men aim at bold enterprises, and risk their life, and yet neglect the most important point in their plans, though they see it all the time and have the power to execute it. For I do not think it will be denied by any man of reflection that, had Perseus at that time been willing to make grants of money either to states as such, or individually to kings and statesmen, I do not say on a great scale, but even to a moderate extent, they would all—Greeks and kings alike—have yielded to the temptation. As it was, he happily did not take that course, which would have given him, if successful, an

Genthius being unpersuaded by the second mission, Perseus sends a third, but still without offering money.

The dislike of Perseus to give money turned out happily for Greece.

[1] Hyscana, or Uscana, a town of the Illyrian tribe Penestae.

overweening supremacy; or, if unsuccessful, would have involved many others in his disaster. But he took the opposite course: which resulted in confining the numbers of the Greeks who adopted the unwise policy at this crisis to very narrow limits. . . .

[Perseus now returned from Stubera to Hyscana, and after a vain attempt upon Stratus in Aetolia, retired into Macedonia for the rest of the winter. In the early spring of B.C. 169 Q. Marcius Philippus began his advance upon Macedonia from his permanent camp in Perrhaebia. Perseus stationed Asclepiodotus and Hippias to defend two passes of the Cambunian mountains, while he himself held Dium, which commanded the coast road from Thessaly into Macedonia. Marcius however, after only a rather severe skirmish with the light-armed troops of Hippias, effected the passage of the mountains and descended upon Dium. The king was taken by surprise: he had not secured the pass of Tempe, which would have cut off the Romans from retreat; and he now hastily retired to Pydna. Q. Marcius occupied Dium, but after a short stay there retired upon Phila, to get provisions and secure the coast road. Whereupon Perseus reoccupied Dium, and contemplated staying there to the end of the summer. Q. Marcius took Heracleum, which was between Phila and Dium, and made preparations for a second advance on Dium. But the winter (B.C. 169-168) was now approaching, and he contented himself with seeing that the roads through Thessaly were put in a proper state for the conveyance of provisions. Livy, 43, 19-23; 44, 1-9.]

10. Having been completely worsted on the entrance of the Romans into Macedonia, Perseus found fault with Hippias. But in my opinion it is easy to find fault with others and to see their mistakes, but it is the hardest thing in the world to do everything that can be done one's self, and to be thoroughly acquainted with one's own affairs. And Perseus was now an instance in point. . . .

Perseus lays the blame of his failure on his generals. Livy, 44, 8.

11. The capture of Heracleum was effected in a very peculiar manner. The city wall at one part and for a short distance was low. The Romans attacked with three picked maniples: and the first made a protection for their heads by locking their shields together over them so closely, that they presented the appearance of a sloping tiled roof. . . .

The testudo. Livy, 44, 9.

This manœuvre the Romans used also in mock fights. . . .

While C. Marcius Figulus, the praetor, was engaged in

Chalcidice, Q. Marcius sent M. Popilius to besiege Meliboea in Magnesia. Perseus sent Euphranor to relieve it, and, if he succeeded, to enter Demetrias. This he did, and was not attacked at the latter place by Popilius or Eumenes—scandal saying that the latter was in secret communication with Perseus. Livy, 44, 10-13, B.C. 169.

12. Upon Perseus designing to come into Thessaly and there decide the war by a general engagement, as he probably would have done, Archon and his colleagues resolved to defend themselves against the suspicions and slanders that had been thrown upon them, by taking some practical steps. They therefore brought a decree before the Achaean congress, ordering an advance into Thessaly, with the full force of the league, to co-operate energetically with the Romans. The decree being confirmed, the Achaeans also voted that Archon should superintend the collection of the army and the necessary preparations for the expedition, and should also send envoys to the Consul in Thessaly, to communicate to him the decree of the Achaeans, and to ask when and where their army was to join him. Polybius and others were forthwith appointed, and strictly instructed that, if the Consul approved of the army joining him, they should at once send some messengers to communicate the fact, that they might not be too late on the field; and meanwhile, that Polybius himself should see that the whole army found provisions in the various cities through which it was to pass, and that the soldiers should have no lack of any necessaries. With these instructions the envoys started. The Achaeans also appointed Telocritus to conduct an embassy to Attalus, bearing the decree concerning the restoration of the honours of Eumenes. And as news arrived about the same time that king Ptolemy had just celebrated his *anacleteria*, the usual ceremony when the kings come of age, they voted to send some ambassadors to confirm the friendly relations existing between the league and the kingdom of Egypt, and thereupon appointed Alcithus and Pasiadas for this duty.

The Achaeans decide to co-operate actively with the Romans in Thessaly.

Polybius sent to the Consul.

Ptolemy Physcon celebrates his anacleteria.

13. Polybius and his colleagues found the Romans moved from Thessaly, and encamped in Perrhaebia, between Azorium and Doliche. They therefore postponed communication with the Consul, owing to the critical nature of the occasion, but shared in the dangers of the invasion of Macedonia. When the Roman army at length reached the district of Heracleum, it seemed the right moment for their interview with Q. Marcius, because he considered that the most serious part of his undertaking was accomplished. The Achaean envoys therefore took the opportunity of presenting the decree to Marcius, and declaring the intention of the Achaeans, to the effect that they wished with their full force to take part in his contests and dangers. In addition to this they demonstrated to him that every command of the Romans, whether sent by letter or messenger, had been during the present war accepted by the Achaeans without dispute. Marcius acknowledged with great warmth the good feeling of the Achaeans, but excused them from taking part in his labours and expenses, as there was no longer any need for the assistance of allies. The other ambassadors accordingly returned home; but Polybius stayed there and took part in the campaign, until Marcius, hearing that Appius Cento asked for five thousand Achaean soldiers to be sent to Epirus, despatched Polybius with orders to prevent the soldiers being granted, or such a heavy expense being causelessly imposed on the Achaeans; for Appius had no reason whatever for asking for these soldiers. Whether he did this from consideration for the Achaeans, or from a desire to prevent Appius from obtaining any success, it is difficult to say. Polybius, however, returned to the Peloponnese and found that the letter from Epirus had arrived, and that the Achaean congress had been soon afterwards assembled at Sicyon. He was therefore in a situation of great embarrassment. When Cento's demand of soldiers was brought before the Congress he did not think it by any means proper to reveal the charge which Q. Marcius had given him privately: and on the other hand to oppose the demand, without some clear pretext, was exceedingly

Summer of B.C. 169.

Autumn of B.C. 169.

Q. Marcius declines the offered army of Achaeans.

Appius Claudius Cento defeated at Hyscana in B.C. 170. Livy, 43, 10.

dangerous. In this difficult and delicate position he called to his aid the decree of the Roman Senate, forbidding compliance with the written demands of commanders unless made in accordance with its own decree. Now, no mention of such a decree occurred in the despatch from Appius. By this argument he prevailed with the people to refer the matter to the Consul, and by his means to get the nation relieved of an expense which would amount to over a hundred and twenty talents. Still he gave a great handle to those who wished to denounce him to Appius, as having thwarted his design of obtaining a reinforcement. . . .

See above, p. 372.

14. The people of Cydon at this time committed a shocking act of indisputable treachery. Though many such have occurred in Crete, yet this appeared to go beyond them all. For though they were bound to Apollonia, not only by the ties of friendship, but by those of common institutions also, and in fact by everything which mankind regard as sacred, and though these obligations were confirmed by a sworn treaty engraved and preserved in the temple of Idaean Zeus, yet they treacherously seized Apollonia, put the men to the sword, plundered the property, and divided among themselves the women, children, city, and territory. . . .

Crete. The Cydonians attack and take Apollonia near Cnossus.

15. Afraid of the Gortynians, because they had narrowly escaped losing their city in the previous year by an attack led by Nothocrates, the Cydonians sent envoys to Eumenes demanding his assistance in virtue of their alliance with him. The king selected Leon and some soldiers, and sent them in haste to Crete; and on their arrival the Cydonians delivered the keys of their city to Leon, and put the town entirely in his hands. . . .

The Cydonians ask help from Eumenes.

16. The factions in Rhodes kept continually becoming more and more violent. For when the decree of the Senate, directing that they should no longer conform to the demands of the military magistrates but only to those contained in the Senate's decrees, was communicated to them, and the people at large expressed satisfaction at the care of the Senate for their interests; Philophron and Thaeetetus seized the occasion to carry

The Rhodians determine to send a mission to Rome, B.C. 170.

out their policy further, declaring that they ought to send envoys to the Senate, and to Q. Marcius Philippus the Consul, and Gaius Marcius Figulus, the commander of the fleet. For it was by that time known to everybody which of the magistrates designate in Rome were to come to Greece. The proposal was loudly applauded, though some dissent was expressed: and at the beginning of the summer B.C. 169. Agesilochus, son of Hegesias, and Nicagoras, son of Nicander, were sent to Rome; Agepolis, Ariston, and Pancrates to the Consul and commander of the fleet, with instructions to renew the friendship of the Cretans with Rome, and to make their defence against the accusations that were being uttered against their state; while Agesilochus and his colleagues were at the same time to make a proposal about a license to export corn from the Roman dominions. The speech made by these envoys to the Senate, and the reply made by the Senate, and the successful termination of their mission, I have already mentioned in the section devoted to Italian affairs. See *supra*, ch. 2. But it is useful to repeat such points, as I am careful to do, because I am obliged frequently to record the actual negotiations of ambassadors before mentioning the circumstances attending their appointment and despatch. For since I am recording under each year the contemporary events in several countries, and endeavouring to take a summary review of them all together at the end, this must of necessity form a feature in my history.

17. Agepolis and his colleagues found Q. Marcius himself encamped near Heracleum in Macedonia, and delivered their commission to him there. In answer, he said that "He himself paid no attention to those calumnies, and advised them not to pay any to those who ventured to speak against Rome." He added many other expressions of kindness, and even wrote them in a despatch to the people of Rhodes. Agepolis was much charmed by his whole reception; and observing this, the Consul took him aside and said to him privately that "He wondered at the Rhodians not trying to put an end to the war,[1] which it would be eminently in

The envoys visit Q. Marcius Philippus at Heracleum.

Why do not the Rhodians stop

[1] That is, the war between Antiochus and Ptolemy.

the war between Antiochus and Ptolemy?

their interests to do." Did the Consul act thus because he was suspicious of Antiochus, and was afraid, if he conquered Alexandria, that he would prove a formidable second enemy to themselves, seeing that the war with Perseus was becoming protracted, and the war for Coele-Syria had already broken out? Or was it because he saw that the war with Perseus was all but decided, now that the Roman legions had entered Macedonia, and because he had confident hopes of its result; and therefore wished, by instigating the Rhodians to interfere between the kings, to give the Romans a pretext for taking any measures they might think good concerning them? It would not be easy to say for certain; but I am inclined to believe that it was the latter, judging from what shortly afterwards happened to the Rhodians. However, Agepolis and his colleagues immediately afterwards proceeded to visit Gaius Marcius Figulus: and, having received from him still more extraordinary marks of favour than from Quintus Marcius, returned with all speed to Rhodes. When they received the report of the embassy, and knew that the two commanders had vied with each other in warmth, both by word of mouth and in their formal answers, the Rhodians were universally elated and filled with pleasing expectation. But not all in the same spirit: the sober-minded were delighted at the good feeling of the Romans towards them; but the restless and fractious calculated in their own minds that this excessive complaisance was a sign that the Romans were alarmed at the dangers in which they found themselves, and at their success not having answered to their expectations. But when Agepolis communicated to his friends that he had a private message from Q. Marcius to the Cretan Council about putting an end to the war (in Syria), then Deinon and his friends felt fully convinced that the Romans were in a great strait; and they accordingly sent envoys also to Alexandria to put an end to the war then existing between Antiochus and Ptolemy. . . .

Effect of the warm reception of their ambassadors on the Rhodians.

They endeavour to make peace between Antiochus Epiphanes and Ptolemy Physcon.

Ptolemy Epiphanes, who died B.C. 181, *left two sons, Ptolemy Philometor and Ptolemy Physcon, and a daughter, Cleopatra, by his wife Cleopatra, sister of Antiochus Epiphanes. After the death of Ptolemy's mother Cleopatra, his ministers, Eulaeus and Lenaeus, engaged in a war with Antiochus for the recovery of Coele-Syria and Phoenicia, which had been taken by Antiochus the Great, and which they alleged had been assigned as a dower to the late Cleopatra. Their war was singularly unsuccessful. Antiochus Epiphanes defeated their troops at Pelusium, took young Ptolemy Philometor captive, and advanced as far as Memphis. Thereupon Ptolemy Physcon assumed the royal title at Alexandria as Euergetes II., and sent envoys to Antiochus at Memphis. Antiochus, however, treated Ptolemy Philometor with kindness, established him as king at Memphis, and advanced to Naucratis, and thence to Alexandria, which he besieged on the pretext of re-establishing Philometor.* B.C. 171. See *infra*, bk. 29. ch. 23.

Character of Antiochus IV. (Epiphanes).

18. King Antiochus was a man of ability in the field and daring in design, and showed himself worthy of the royal name, except in regard to his manœuvres at Pelusium. . . .

Comanus and Cineas, Physcon's ministers, determine to send embassies to Antiochus, B.C. 169.

19. When Antiochus was actually in occupation of Egypt, Comanus and Cineas, after consultation with king Ptolemy Physcon, determined upon summoning a conference of the most distinguished Egyptian nobles to consult about the danger which threatened them. The first resolution the conference came to was to send the Greek envoys who were then at Alexandria as envoys to Antiochus to conclude a pacification. There were at that time in the country two embassies from the Achaean league, one which had been sent to renew the alliance between the league and Egypt, and which was composed of Alcithus of Aegium, son of Xenephon, and Pasiodes, and another sent to give notice of the festival of the Antigoneia.[1] There was also an embassy

[1] The Antigoneia was a festival established in honour of Antigonus Doson, who had been a benefactor of the Achaeans. In 30, 23, it is mentioned as being celebrated in Sicyon. The benefactions of this Macedonian king to the Achaeans are mentioned by Pausanias (8, 8, 12).

from Athens led by Demaratus on the subject of some present, and two sacred embassies, one in connexion with the Panathenaea under the presidency of Callias the pancratiast, and the other on the subject of the mysteries, of which Cleostratus was the active member and spokesman. There were also there Eudemus and Hicesius from Miletus, and Apollonides and Apollonius from Clazomenae. The king also sent with them Tlepolemus and Ptolemy the rhetorician as envoys. These men accordingly sailed up the river to meet Antiochus. . . .

The Greek envoys visit Antiochus and endeavour to make peace.

20. While Antiochus was occupying Egypt,[1] he was visited by the Greek envoys sent to conclude terms of peace. He received them courteously, devoted the first day to giving them a splendid entertainment, and on the next granted them an interview, and bade them deliver their instructions. The first to speak were the Achaeans, the next the Athenian Demaratus, and after him Eudemus of Miletus. And as the occasion and subject of their speeches were the same, the substance of them was also nearly identical. They all laid the blame of what had occurred on Eulaeus, and referring to Ptolemy's youth and his relationship to himself, they intreated the king to lay aside his anger. Thereupon Antiochus, after acknowledging the general truth of their remarks, and even supporting them by additional arguments of his own, entered upon a defence of the justice of his original demands. He attempted to establish the claim of the king of Syria on Coele-Syria, "Insisting upon the fact that Antigonus, the founder of the Syrian kingdom, exercised authority in that country; and referring to the formal cession of it to Seleucus,[2] after the death of Antigonus, by the sovereigns of Macedonia. Next he dwelt on the last conquest of it by his father Antiochus; and finally he denied that any such agreement was made between the late king Ptolemy and his father as the Alexandrian ministers asserted, to the effect that Ptolemy was to take Coele-Syria as a dowry when he married Cleopatra,

Their arguments.

Reply of Antiochus.

[1] See 27, 19; 18, 1, 17.
[2] Seleucus Nicanor, B.C. 306-280.

the mother of the present king." Having by these arguments not only persuaded himself, but the envoys also, of the justice of his claim, he sailed down the river to Naucratis. There he treated the inhabitants with humanity, and gave each of the Greeks living there a gold piece, and then advanced towards Alexandria. He told the envoys that he would give them an answer on the return of Aristeides and Thesis, whom he had sent on a mission to Ptolemy; and he wished, he said, that the Greek envoys should all be cognisant and witnesses of their report. . . .

Antiochus occupies Naucratis and thence advances to Alexandria.

21. The eunuch Eulaeus persuaded Ptolemy to collect his money, give up his kingdom to his enemies, and retire to Samothrace. This will be to any one who reflects upon it a convincing proof of the supreme mischief done by evil companions of boyhood. That a monarch so entirely out of reach of personal danger and so far removed from his enemies, should not make one effort to save his honour, while in possession too of such abundant resources, and master over such wide territory and such numerous subjects, but should at once without a blow surrender a most splendid and wealthy kingdom,—is not this the sign of a spirit utterly effeminate and corrupted? And if this had been Ptolemy's natural character, we must have laid the blame upon nature and not upon any external influence. But since by his subsequent achievements his natural character has vindicated itself, by proving Ptolemy to be sufficiently resolute and courageous in the hour of danger, we may clearly, without any improbability, attribute to this eunuch, and his companionship with the king in his boyhood, the ignoble spirit displayed by him on that occasion, and his idea of going to Samothrace. . . .

The evil influence of Eulaeus upon Ptolemy Philometor. He advises him to yield to Antiochus and retire to Samothrace.

22. After raising the siege of Alexandria, Antiochus sent envoys to Rome, whose names were Meleager, Sosiphanes, and Heracleides, agreeing to pay one hundred and fifty talents, fifty as a complimentary present to the Romans, and the rest as a gift to be divided among certain cities in Greece. . . .

Antiochus leaves Alexandria for a time, being met by some Roman envoys. See 29, 25.

Envoys from Rhodes visit Antiochus in his camp not far from Alexandria.

23. In the course of these same days envoys sailed in from Rhodes to Alexandria, headed by Pration, to negotiate a pacification; and a few days afterwards presented themselves at the camp of Antiochus. Admitted to an interview, they argued at considerable length, mentioning their own country's friendly feelings to both kingdoms, and the ties of blood existing between the two kings themselves, and the advantage which a peace would be to both. But the king interrupted the envoy in the middle of his speech by saying that there was no need of much talking, for the kingdom belonged to the elder Ptolemy, and with him he had long ago made terms, and they were friends, and if the people wished now to recall him Antiochus would not prevent them. And he kept his word. . . .

1. "Their one idea, expressed at parties or conversations in the street, was, that they should manage the war in Macedonia while remaining quietly at home in Rome, sometimes by criticising what the generals were doing, at others what they were leaving undone. From this the public interests never got any good, and often a great deal of harm. The generals themselves were at times greatly hampered by this ill-timed loquacity. For as it is the invariable nature of slander to spread rapidly and stop at nothing, the people got thoroughly infected by this idle talk, and the generals were consequently rendered contemptible in the eyes of the enemy." . . .

B.C. 168. Coss. L. Aemilius Paullus, C. Licinius Crassus. A fragment of the speech of L. Aemilius before starting for Macedonia. See Livy, 44, 22.

2. The Senate being informed that Antiochus had become master of Egypt, and all but taken Alexandria, and conceiving that the aggrandisement of that king was a matter affecting themselves, appointed Gaius Popilius and others to go as ambassadors to put an end to the war, and generally to inspect the state of affairs. . . .

In answer to an embassy from Ptolemy Physcon and his sister Cleopatra, the Senate sends Gaius Popilius Laenas to Alexandria. Livy, 44, 19.

3. Hippias, and the other ambassadors sent by Perseus, to Genthius to make an alliance with him, returned before the winter, and reported that Genthius would undertake to join in the war with Rome if he was paid three hundred talents and received proper securities. Thereupon Perseus sent Pantauchus, one of his chief friends, with the following instructions: He was to agree to pay Genthius the money; to interchange oaths of alliance; to take from Genthius such hostages as he himself

Genthius joins Perseus on being supplied with 300 talents;

might select, and send them at once to Macedonia ; and to allow Genthius to have such hostages from Perseus as he might name in the text of the treaty ; further, he was to make arrangements for the transport of the three hundred talents. Pantauchus immediately started and met Genthius at Mebeōn, in the country of the Labeates, and quickly bought the young monarch over to join in the projects of Perseus. The treaty having been sworn to and reduced to writing, Genthius at once sent the hostages whose names Pantauchus had caused to be entered in the text of the treaty ; and with them he despatched Olympion to receive the oaths and hostages from Perseus, with others who were to have charge of the money. Pantauchus persuaded him to send also some ambassadors to join in a mission to Rhodes with some sent by Perseus, in order to negotiate a mutual alliance between the three states. For if this were effected, and the Rodians consented to embark upon the war, he showed that they would be easily able to conquer the Romans. Genthius listened to the suggestion, and appointed Parmenio and Marcus to undertake the mission ; with instructions that, as soon as they had received the oaths and hostages from Perseus, and the question of the money had been settled, they were to proceed on the embassy to Rhodes.

and also consents to join in a mission to Rhodes.

4. So these various ambassadors started together for Macedonia. But Pantauchus stayed by the side of the young king, and kept reminding him of the necessity of making warlike preparations, and urging him not to be too late with them. He was especially urgent that he should prepare for a contest at sea ; for, as the Romans were quite unprepared in that department on the coasts both of Epirus and Illyria, any purpose he might form would be easily accomplished by himself and the forces he might despatch. Genthius yielded to the advice and set about his preparations, naval and military alike : and Perseus, as soon as the ambassadors and hostages from Genthius entered Macedonia, set off from his camp on the River Elpeius,[1] with his whole cavalry, to meet them at Dium. His first act on meeting them was to take the oaths to the alliance

Perseus meets the envoys from Genthius ;

[1] Livy (44, 8) calls it the Enipeus (*Fersaliti*), a tributary of the Peneus.

in the presence of the whole body of cavalry; for he was very anxious that the Macedonians should know of the adhesion of Genthius, hoping that this additional advantage would have the effect of raising their courage: and next he received the hostages and handed over his own to Olympion and his colleagues, the noblest of whom were Limnaeus, the son of Polemocrates, and Balacrus, son of Pantauchus. Lastly, he sent the agents who had come for the money to Pella, assuring them that they would receive it there: and appointed the ambassadors for Rhodes to join Metrodorus at Thessalonica, and hold themselves in readiness to embark.

This embassy succeeded in persuading the Rhodians to join in the war. And, having accomplished this, Perseus next sent Herophon, who had been similarly employed before, on a mission to Eumenes; and Telemnastos of Crete to Antiochus to urge him "Not to let the opportunity escape; nor to imagine that Perseus was the only person affected by the overbearing and oppressive conduct of Rome: but to be quite sure that, if he did not now assist Perseus, if possible by putting an end to the war, or, if not, by supporting him in it, he would quickly meet with the same fate himself." . . .

and sends others to Eumenes and Antiochus.

5. In venturing upon a narrative of the intrigues of Perseus and Eumenes, I have felt myself in a position of great embarrassment. For to give full and accurate details of the negotiations, which these two kings conducted in secret between themselves, appeared to me to be an attempt open to many obvious criticisms and exceedingly liable to error: and yet to pass over in complete silence what seemed to have exercised the most decisive influence in the war, and which alone can explain many of the subsequent events, seemed to me to wear the appearance of a certain sluggishness and entire want of enterprise. On the whole, I decided to state briefly what I believed to be truth, and the probabilities and surmises on which I founded that opinion; for I was, in fact, during this period more struck than most people at what happened.

The intrigues of Perseus and Eumenes.

6. I have already stated[1] that Cydas of Crete, while, serving

[1] In a previous part of the book now lost. See Livy, 44, 25.

EUMENES

in the army of Eumenes and held in especial honour by him, had in the first place had interviews with Cheimarus, one of the Cretans in the army of Perseus, and again had approached the walls of Demetrias, and conversed first with Menecrates, and then with Antimachus. Again, that Herophon had been twice on a mission from Perseus to Eumenes, and that the Romans on that account began to have reasonable suspicions of king Eumenes, is rendered clear from what happened to Attalus. For they allowed this prince to come to Rome from Brundisium, and to transact the business he had on hand, and finally gave him a favourable answer and dismissed him with every mark of kindness, although he had done them no service of any importance in the war with Perseus; while Eumenes, who had rendered them the most important services, and had assisted them again and again in their wars with Antiochus and Perseus, they not only prevented from coming to Rome, but bade him leave Italy within a certain number of days, though it was mid-winter. Therefore it is quite plain that some intriguing had been taking place between Perseus and Eumenes to account for the alienation of the Romans from the latter. What this was, and how far it went, is our present subject of inquiry.

The Romans become suspicious of Eumenes, and ostentatiously transfer their favour to his brother Attalus.

7. We can easily satisfy ourselves that Eumenes cannot have wished Perseus to be the victor in the war and become supreme in Greece. For to say nothing of the traditional enmity and dislike existing between these two, the similarity of their respective powers was sufficient to breed distrust, jealousy, and, in fact, the bitterest animosity between them. It was always open to them to intrigue and scheme against each other secretly, and that they were both doing. For when Eumenes saw that Perseus was in a bad way, and was hemmed in on every side by his enemies, and would accept any terms for the sake of putting an end to the war, and was sending envoys to the Roman generals year after year with this view; while the Romans also were uneasy about the

The origin of the intrigue between Eumenes and Perseus was the idea of the former that, both sides being tired of the war, he might intervene with profit to himself.

result, because they made no real progress in the war until Paulus took the command, and because Aetolia was in a dangerous state of excitement, he conceived that it would not be impossible that the Romans would consent to some means of ending the war and making terms: and he looked upon himself as the most proper person to act as mediator and effect the reconciliation. With these secret ideas in his mind, he began sounding Perseus by means of Cydas of Crete, the year before, to find out how much he would be inclined to pay for such a chance. This appears to me to be the origin of their connexion with each other. B.C. 168.

8. Two kings, one of whom was the most unprincipled and the other the most avaricious in the world, being now pitted against each other, their mutual struggles presented a spectacle truly ridiculous. Eumenes held out every kind of hope, and threw out every species of bait, believing that he would catch Perseus by such promises. Perseus, without waiting to be approached, rushed to the bait held out to him, and made for it greedily; yet he could not make up his mind to swallow it, to such an extent as to give up any money. The sort of huckstering contest that went on between them was as follows. Eumenes demanded five hundred talents as the price of his abstention from co-operating with the Romans by land and sea during the fourth year of the war, and fifteen hundred for putting an end to the war altogether, and promised to give hostages and securities for his promise at once. Perseus accepted the proposal of hostages, named the number, the time at which they were to be sent, and the manner of their safe custody at Cnosus. But as to the money, he said that it would be disgraceful to the one who paid, and still more to the one who received it, to be supposed to remain neutral for hire; but the fifteen hundred talents he would send in charge of Polemocrates and others to Samothrace, to be held as a deposit there. Now Perseus was master of Samothrace; but as Eumenes, like a poor physician, preferred a retaining-fee to a payment after work, he finally gave up the attempt, when he found that his own craftiness was no

The bargain attempted between Eumenes and Perseus.

match for the meanness of Perseus. They thus parted on equal terms, leaving, like good athletes, the battle of avarice a drawn one. Some of these details leaked out at the time, and others were communicated subsequently to Perseus's intimate friends; and he has taught us by them that every vice is clinched, so to speak, by avarice.

Reflexions on the blindness of the avaricious kings.

9. I add the further question from my own reflexions, whether avarice is not also short-sighted? For who could fail to remark the folly of both the kings? How could Eumenes on the one hand expect to be trusted by a man with whom he was on such bad terms; and to get so large a sum of money, when he was able to give Perseus absolutely no security for recovering it, in case of his not carrying out his promises? And how could he expect not to be detected by the Romans in taking so large a sum? If he had concealed it at the time he certainly would not have done so long. Moreover, he would have been bound at any rate, in return for it, to have adopted the quarrel with Rome; in which he would have been certain to have lost the money and his kingdom together, and very probably his life also, by coming forward as an enemy of the Romans. For if, even as it was, when he accomplished nothing, but only imagined it, he fell into the gravest dangers, what would have happened to him if this design had been brought to perfection? And again, as to Perseus—who could fail to be surprised at his thinking anything of higher importance, or more to his advantage, than to give the money and allow Eumenes to swallow the bait? For if, on the one hand, Eumenes had performed any part of his promises, and had put an end to the war, the gift would have been well bestowed; and if, on the other hand, he had been deceived of that hope, he could at least have involved him in the certain enmity of Rome; for he would have had it entirely in his own power to make these transactions public. And one may easily calculate how valuable this would have been to Perseus, whether he succeeded or failed in the war: for he would have regarded Eumenes as the guilty cause of all his misfortunes, and could in no way have retaliated upon him more effectually than by making him an enemy of Rome. What

then was the root of all this blind folly? Nothing but avarice. It could have been nothing else; for, to save himself from giving money, Perseus was content to suffer anything, and neglect every other consideration. On a par too with this was his conduct to the Gauls and Genthius. . . .

See Plutarch, *Aemilius*, ch. 12.

10. The question being put to the vote at Rhodes, it was carried to send envoys to negotiate a peace; and this decree thus decided the relative strength of the opposite political parties at Rhodes [as has been stated in my essay on public speaking], showing that the party for siding with Perseus was stronger than that which was for preserving their country and its laws. The Prytanies immediately appointed ambassadors to negotiate the cessation of the war: Agepolis, Diocles, and Cleombrotus were sent to Rome; Damon, Nicostratus, Agesilochus, and Telephus to Perseus and the consul. The Rhodians went on in the same spirit to take further steps, so that they eventually committed themselves past all excuse. For they at once sent ambassadors to Crete, to renew their friendly relations with the entire Cretan people, and to urge that, in view of the dangers that threatened them, they should throw in their lot with the people of Rhodes, and hold the same people to be friends and enemies as they did, and also to address the separate cities to the same effect. . . .

The Rhodians take active steps to form a confederation against Rome, in case their intervention fails.

11. When the embassy led by Parmenio and Morcus from Genthius, accompanied by those led by Metrodorus, arrived in Rhodes, the assembly summoned to meet them proved very turbulent, the party of Deinon venturing openly to plead the cause of Perseus, whilst that of Theaetetus was quite overpowered and dismayed. For the presence of the Illyrian galleys, the number of the Roman cavalry that had been killed, and the fact of Genthius having changed sides, quite crushed them. Thus it was that the result of the meeting of the assembly was as I have described it. For the Rhodians voted to return a favourable answer to both kings, to state that they had resolved to put an end to the war, and to

The manner in which this vote of the Rhodians was carried, B.C. 168.

exhort the kings themselves to make no difficulty about the terms. They also received the ambassadors of Genthius at the common altar-hearth or Prytaneum of the city with every mark of friendship. . . .

12. Other historians [have spoken in exaggerated terms][1] of the Syrian war. And the reason is one which I have often mentioned. Though their subjects are simple and without complications, they seek the name and reputation of historians not from the truth of their facts, but the number of their books; and accordingly they are obliged to give petty affairs an air of importance, and fill out and give rhetorical flourishes to what was originally expressed briefly; dress up actions and achievements which were originally quite secondary; expatiate on struggles; and describe pitched battles, in which sometimes ten or a few more infantry fell, and still fewer cavalry. As for sieges, local descriptions, and the like, one cannot say that their treatment is adequate, because they have no facts to give. But a writer of universal history must pursue a different plan; and therefore I ought not to be condemned for minimising the importance of events, if I sometimes pass over affairs that have met with wide fame and laboured description, or for mentioning them with brevity; but I ought to be trusted to give to each subject the amount of discussion which it deserves. Such historians as I refer to, when they are describing in the course of their work the siege, say of Phanoteia, or Coroneia, or [Haliartus], are forced to display all the contrivances, bold strokes, and other features of a siege; and when they come to the capture of Tarentum, the sieges of Corinth, Sardis, Gaza, Bactra, and, above all, of Carthage, they must draw on their own resources to prolong the agony and heighten the picture, and are not at all satisfied with me for giving a more truthful relation of such events as they really occurred. Let this statement hold good also as to my description of pitched battles and public harangues, as well as other departments of history; in all of which I might fairly claim considerable indulgence, as also in what is now about to

A digression on Polybius's method in writing history, and his avoidance of imaginary details.

[1] The extract begins in the middle of a sentence at the top of a page. I have supplied these words at a guess, giving what seems the sense.

be narrated, if I am detected in some inconsistency in the substance of my story, the treatment of my facts, or the style of language; and also if I make some mistakes in the names of mountains or rivers, or the special features of localities: for indeed the magnitude of my work is a sufficient excuse in all these points, unless, indeed, I am ever detected in deliberate or interested misstatements in my writings: for such I ask no indulgence, as I have repeatedly and explicitly remarked in the course of my history. . . .

13. Genthius, king of the Illyrians, disgraced himself by many abominable actions in the course of his life from his addiction to drink, in which he indulged continually day and night. Among other things he killed his brother Plastor, who was about to marry the daughter of Monunius, and married the girl himself. He also behaved with great cruelty to his subjects. . . .

Intemperance and brutality of Genthius.

In the spring of B.C. 168 *Genthius was forced to surrender to the praetor L. Anicius Gallus* (*Livy*, 44, 30-31). *The consul L. Aemilius Paulus found Perseus on the left bank of the Macedonian river Enipeus in a very strong position, which was however turned by a gallant exploit of Nasica and Q. Fabius Maximus, who made their way with a considerable force over the mountains, thus getting on the rear of Perseus.* *Livy*, 44, 30-35. *Plutarch*, Aemil. 15.

14. The first man to volunteer to make the outflanking movement was Scipio Nasica, son-in-law of Scipio Africanus, who afterwards became the most influential man in the Senate,[1] and who now undertook to lead the party. The second was Fabius Maximus, the eldest of the sons of the consul Aemilius Paulus,[2] still quite a young man, who stood forward and offered to join with great

Nasica, Fabius, and others volunteer to cross the mountains into Macedonia by Gytheum.

[1] P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica Corculum was afterwards Pontifex Maximus (B.C. 150). See Cic. *de Sen.* 3, 50.

[2] Of the two eldest sons of Aemilius, the elder was adopted by Quintus Fabius Maximus, the second by P. Cornelius Scipio, son of the elder Africanus, his maternal uncle.

enthusiasm. Aemilius was therefore delighted and assigned them a body of soldiers.[1] . . .

Struggle in the bed of the Enipeus. Livy, 44, 35.

15. The Romans offered a gallant resistance by aid of their strong targets or Ligurian shields. . . .

The Romans force the heights by way of Gytheum.

Perseus saw that Aemilius had not moved, and did not reckon on what was taking place, when suddenly a Cretan, who had deserted from the Roman army on its march, came to him with the information that the Romans were getting on his rear. Though thrown into the utmost panic he did not strike his camp, but despatched ten thousand mercenaries and two thousand Macedonians under Milo, with orders to advance with speed and seize the heights. The Romans fell upon these as they were lying asleep.[2] . . .

16. An eclipse of the moon occurring, the report went abroad, and was believed by many, that it signified an eclipse of the king. And this circumstance raised the spirits of the Romans and depressed those of the Macedonians. So true is the common saying that "war has many a groundless scare."[3] . . .

Perseus finding himself thus on the point of being outflanked retired on Pydna, near which town Aemilius Paulus, after considerable delay, about midsummer inflicted a crushing defeat upon him. Perseus fled to Amphipolis, and thence to Samothrace, where he was captured by Paulus and taken to Rome to adorn his triumph, and afterwards allowed to live as a private person at Alba. This was the end of the Macedonian kingdom. (*Livy*, 44, 36-43; 45, 1-8. *Plutarch*, Aemil. 16-23.)

[1] From Plutarch, *Aemilius*, 15, who adds that Polybius made a mistake as to the number of soldiers told off for this service, which to judge from Livy, 44, 35, Polybius probably stated at 5000. Plutarch got his correction from an extant letter of Nasica (8000 Roman infantry, with 120 horse, and 200 Thracians and Cretans).

[2] From Plutarch, who again contradicts this last statement, on the authority of Nasica, who said that there was a sharp engagement on the heights.

[3] The Roman was saved from a scare by the eclipse being foretold by Gaius Sulpicius Gallus, famous for his knowledge of Greek literature and astronomy. He is represented by Cicero as explaining the celestial globe (*sphaera*) which Marcellus brought from Syracuse. He was consul in B.C. 166. Livy, 44, 37; Cicero, *Brut.* § 78; *de Repub.* 1, § 21.

17. The consul Lucius Aemilius had never seen a phalanx until he saw it in the army of Perseus on this occasion; and he often confessed to some of his friends at Rome subsequently, that he had never beheld anything more alarming and terrible than the Macedonian phalanx: and yet he had been, if any one ever had, not only a spectator but an actor in many battles. . . .

The phalanx at the battle of Pydna, B.C. 168.

Many plans which look plausible and feasible, when brought to the test of actual experience, like base coins when brought to the furnace, cease to answer in any way to their original conceptions. . . .

When Perseus came to the hour of trial his courage all left him, like that of an athlete in bad training. For when the danger was approaching, and it became necessary to fight a decisive battle, his resolution gave way. . . .

As soon as the battle began, the Macedonian king played the coward and rode off to the town, under the pretext of sacrificing to Hercules,—who certainly does not accept craven gifts from cravens, nor fulfil unworthy prayers. . . .

18. He was then very young, and it was his first experience of actual service in the field, and having but recently begun to taste the sweets of promotion, he was keen, ambitious, and eager to be first. . . .

Scipio Africanus the younger, cf. Livy, 44, 44 (?)

19. Just when Perseus had been beaten and was trying to save himself by flight, the Senate determined to admit the ambassadors, who had come from Rhodes to negotiate a peace, to an audience: Fortune thus appearing designedly to parade the folly of the Rhodians on the stage,—if we may say "of the Rhodians," and not rather "of the individuals who were then in the ascendant at Rhodes." When Agesipolis and his colleagues entered the Senate, they said that "They had come to arrange an end to the war; for the people of Rhodes,—seeing that the war was become protracted to a considerable length of time, and seeing that it was disadvantageous to all the Greeks, as well as to the Romans themselves, on account of its enormous expenses,—had come to that conclusion. But as the war was already ended, and the wish of the Rhodians was thus fulfilled, they had only to congratulate the Romans." Such was the

The Rhodian mission deliver their message too late.

brief speech of Agesipolis. But the Senate seized the opportunity of making an example of the Rhodians, and produced an answer of which the upshot was that "They did not regard this embassy as having been sent by the Rhodians in the interests either of the Greeks or themselves, but in those of Perseus. For if they had meant to send an embassy in behalf of the Greeks, the proper time for doing so was when Perseus was plundering the territory and cities of Greece, while encamped for nearly two years in Thessaly. But to let that time pass without notice, and to come now desiring to put an end to the war, at a time when the Roman legions had entered Macedonia, and Perseus was closely beleagured and almost at the end of his hopes, was a clear proof to any one of observation that the Rhodians had sent their embassy, not with the desire of ending the war, but to rescue and save Perseus to the best of their ability. Therefore they deserved no indulgence at the hands of the Romans at this time, nor any favourable reply." Such was the Senate's answer to the Rhodians. . . .

Uncompromising answer of the Senate.

20. Then Aemilius Paulus speaking once more in Latin bade the members of his council, "With such a sight before their eyes,"—pointing to Perseus,—"not to be too boastful in the hour of success, nor to take any extreme or inhuman measures against any one, nor in fact ever to feel confidence in the permanence of their present good fortune. Rather it was precisely at the time of greatest success, either private or public, that a man should be most alive to the possibility of a reverse. Even so it was difficult for a man to exhibit moderation in good fortune. But the distinction between fools and wise was that the former only learnt by their own misfortunes, the latter by those of others." . . .

Perseus, being brought a prisoner before Aemilius Paulus and his council, refuses to reply to his questions, Paulus addresses the king in Greek and then his council in Latin. Livy, 45, 8.

21. One is often reminded of the words of Demetrius of Phalerum. In his treatise on Fortune, wishing to give the world a distinct view of her mutability, he fixed upon the period of Alexander, when that monarch destroyed the Persian dynasty, and thus expresses himself: "If you will take, I don't say unlimited time or many

Demetrius of Phalerum on mutability.

generations, but only these last fifty years immediately preceding our generation, you will be able to understand the cruelty of Fortune. For can you suppose, if some god had warned the Persians or their king, or the Macedonians or their king, that in fifty years the very name of the Persians, who once were masters of the world, would have been lost, and that the Macedonians, whose name was before scarcely known, would become masters of it all, that they would have believed it? Nevertheless it is true that Fortune, whose influence on our life is incalculable, who displays her power by surprises, is even now I think, showing all mankind, by her elevation of the Macedonians into the high prosperity once enjoyed by the Persians, that she has merely lent them these advantages until she may otherwise determine concerning them." And this has now come to pass in the person of Perseus; and indeed Demetrius has spoken prophetically of the future as though he were inspired. And as the course of my history brought me to the period which witnessed the ruin of the Macedonian kingdom, I judged it to be right not to pass it over without proper remark, especially as I was an eye-witness of the transaction. It was a case I thought both for enlarging on the theme myself, and for recalling the words of Demetrius, who appeared to me to have shown something more than mere human sagacity in his remarks; for he made a true forecast of the future almost a hundred and fifty years before the event. . . .

22. After the conclusion of the battle between Perseus and the Romans, king Eumenes found himself in what people call an unexpected and extraordinary trouble, but what, if we regard the natural course of human concerns, was quite an everyday affair. For it is quite the way of Fortune to confound human calculations by surprises; and when she has helped a man for a time, and caused her balance to incline in his favour, to turn round upon him as though she repented, throw her weight into the opposite scale, and mar all his successes. And this was the case now with Eumenes. He imagined that at last his own kingdom was safe, and that he might look forward to a time of ease, now that Perseus and the whole kingdom of Macedonia

The unexpected always happens.

Eumenes disappointed of his hope of quiet by a rising in Galatia,

were utterly destroyed; yet it was then that he was confronted with the gravest dangers, by the Gauls in Asia seizing the opportunity for an unexpected rising. . . .

After reigning in Memphis for a time Philometor made terms with his brother and sister, returned to Alexandria, and there all three were being besieged by Antiochus. *See above*, 28, 18.

23. In the Peloponnesus a mission arrived before the end of the winter from the two kings, Ptolemy (Philometor) and Ptolemy (Physcon), asking for help. This gave rise to repeated and animated discussions. The party of Callicrates and Diophanes were against granting the help; while Archon, Lycortas, and Polybius were for sending it to the kings in accordance with the terms of their alliance. For by this time it had come to pass that the younger Ptolemy had been proclaimed king by the people (at Alexandria), owing to the danger which threatened them; and that the elder had subsequently returned from Memphis, and was reigning jointly with his sister. As they stood in need of every kind of assistance, they sent Eumenes and Dionysodorus to the Achaeans, asking a thousand foot and two hundred horse, with Lycortas to command the foot and Polybius the horse. They sent a message also to Theodoridas of Sicyon, urging him to hire them a thousand mercenaries. For the kings chanced to have become intimately acquainted with these particular men, owing to the transactions I have related before. The ambassadors arrived when the Achaean congress was in session in Corinth. They therefore came forward, and after recalling the many evidences of friendship shown by the Achaeans to the kingdom of Egypt, and describing to them the danger in which the kings then were, they entreated them to send help. The Achaeans generally were ready enough to go to the help of the kings (for both now wore the diadem and exercised regal functions), and not only with a detachment, but with their full levy. But Callicrates and his party spoke against it; alleging that they ought not to meddle in such affairs at all, and certainly not at that time, but should reserve their undivided

Autumn of B.C. 169.

Winter of B.C. 169-168.

forces for the service of Rome. For there was a general expectation just then of a decisive battle being fought, as Q. Philippus was wintering in Macedonia.

24. The people were alarmed lest they should be thought to fail the Romans in any way: and accordingly Lycortas and Polybius rose in their turn, and, among other advice which they impressed upon them, argued that "When in the previous year the Achaeans had voted to join the Roman army with their full levy, and sent Polybius to announce that resolution, Quintus Marcius, while accepting the kindness of their intention, had yet stated that the assistance was not needed, since he had won the pass into Macedonia. Their opponents therefore were manifestly using the need of helping the Romans merely as a pretext for preventing this aid being sent to Alexandria. They entreated the Achaeans, in view of the greatness of the danger surrounding the king of Egypt, not to neglect the right moment for acting; but keeping in mind their mutual agreement and good services, and above all their oaths, to fulfil the terms of their agreement."

Polybius advocates the cause of the Ptolemies.

The people were once more inclined to grant the aid when they heard this: but Callicrates and his party managed to prevent the decree being passed, by staggering the magistrates with the assertion that it was unconstitutional to discuss the question of sending help abroad in public assembly.[1] But a short time afterwards a meeting was summoned at Sicyon, which was attended not only by the members of the council, but by all citizens over thirty years of age; and after a lengthened debate, Polybius especially dwelling on the fact that the Romans did not require assistance,—in which he was believed not to be speaking without good reason, as he had spent the previous summer in Macedonia at the headquarters

Callicrates defeats the motion, but at a smaller meeting at Sicyon Polybius prevails.

[1] ἐν ἀγορᾷ. The objection, though it served to divert the magistrates from going on with the proposition at the time, seems to have been got over before the meeting at Sicyon; unless, indeed, the latter was considered to be of a different nature in regard to the age of those attending. But we have no information as to this restriction of thirty years of age,—whether it was universal, or confined to particular occasions. This passage would seem to point to the latter alternative.

of Marcius Philippus,—and also alleging that, even supposing the Romans did turn out to require their active support, the Achaeans would not be rendered incapable of furnishing it by the two hundred horse and one thousand foot which were to be despatched to Alexandria,—for they could, without any inconvenience, put thirty or forty thousand men into the field,—the majority of the meeting were convinced, and were inclined to the idea of sending the aid. Accordingly, on the second of the two days on which, according to the laws, those who wished to do so were bound to bring forward their motions, Lycortas and Polybius proposed that the aid should be sent. Callicrates, on the other hand, proposed to send ambassadors to reconcile the two Egyptian kings with Antiochus. So once more, on these two motions being put, there was an animated contest; in which, however, Lycortas and Polybius got a considerable majority on their side. For there was a very wide distinction between the claims of the two kingdoms. There were very few instances to be found in past times of any act of friendship on the part of Syria to the Greeks,—though the liberality of the present king was well known in Greece,—but from Egypt the acts of kindness in past times to the Achaeans had been as numerous and important as any one could possibly expect. By dwelling on this point Lycortas made a great impression, because the distinction between the two kingdoms in this respect was shown to be immense. For it was as difficult to count up all the benefactions of the Alexandrine kings, as it was impossible to find a single act of friendship done by the dynasty of Antiochus to the Achaeans. . . .

The measure is again defeated by a trick of Callicrates.

25. For a time Andronidas and Callicrates kept on arguing in support of the plan of putting an end to the war: but as no one was persuaded by them, they employed a stratagem. A letter-carrier came into the theatre (where the meeting was being held), who had just arrived with a despatch from Quintus Marcius, urging those Achaeans who were of the pro-Roman party to reconcile the kings; for it was a fact that the Senate had sent a mission under T. Numisius to do so. But this really made against their argument: for Titus Numisius and his colleagues had been unable to effect the pacification, and

had returned to Rome completely unsuccessful in the object of their mission. However, as Polybius and his party did not wish to speak against the despatch, from consideration for Marcius, they retired from the discussion: and it was thus that the proposal to send an aid to the kings fell through. The Achaeans voted to send ambassadors to effect the pacification: and Archon of Aegeira, and Arcesilaus and Ariston of Megalopolis were appointed to the duty. Whereupon the envoys of Ptolemy, being disappointed of obtaining the help, handed over to the magistrate the despatch from the kings, in which they asked that they would send Lycortas and Polybius to take part in the war. . . .

The kings ask for Lycortas and Polybius.

26. Forgetful of all he had written and said Antiochus began preparing for a renewal of the war against Ptolemy. So true are the words of Simonides,—"'Tis hard to be good." For to have certain impulses towards virtue, and even to hold to it up to a certain point, is easy; but to be uniformly consistent, and to allow no circumstances of danger to shake a resolute integrity, which regards honour and justice as the highest considerations, is indeed difficult. . . .

Annoyed by the two Ptolemies thus joining each other, Antiochus renews the war, B.C. 168.

27. When Antiochus had advanced to attack Ptolemy in order to possess himself of Pelusium, he was met by the Roman commander Gaius Popilius Laenas. Upon the king greeting him from some distance, and holding out his right hand to him, Popilius answered by holding out the tablets which contained the decree of the Senate, and bade Antiochus read that first: not thinking it right, I suppose, to give the usual sign of friendship until he knew the mind of the recipient, whether he were to be regarded as a friend or foe. On the king, after reading the despatch, saying that he desired to consult with his friends on the situation, Popilius did a thing which was looked upon as exceedingly overbearing and insolent. Happening to have a vine stick in his hand, he drew a circle round Antiochus with it, and ordered him to give his answer to the letter before he stepped out of

Antiochus is met near Alexandria (Livy, 45, 12) by C. Popilius Laenas, who forces him to abstain from the war.

that circumference. The king was taken aback by this haughty proceeding. After a brief interval of embarrassed silence, he replied that he would do whatever the Romans demanded. Then Popilius and his colleagues shook him by the hand, and one and all greeted him with warmth. The contents of the despatch was an order to put an end to the war with Ptolemy at once. Accordingly a stated number of days was allowed him, within which he withdrew his army into Syria, in high dudgeon indeed, and groaning in spirit, but yielding to the necessities of the time.

Popilius goes on to Cyprus and forces the army of Antiochus to evacuate it.

Popilius and his colleagues then restored order in Alexandria; and after exhorting the two kings to maintain peaceful relations with each other, and charging them at the same time to send Polybius to Rome, they took ship and sailed towards Cyprus, with the intention of promptly ejecting from the island the forces that were also gathered there. When they arrived, they found that Ptolemy's generals had already sustained a defeat, and that the whole island was in a state of excitement. They promptly caused the invading army to evacuate the country, and remained there to keep watch until the forces had sailed away for Syria. Thus did the Romans save the kingdom of Ptolemy, when it was all but sinking under its disasters. Fortune indeed so disposed of the fate of Perseus and the Macedonians, that the restoration of Alexandria and the whole of Egypt was decided by it; that is to say, by the fate of Perseus being decided previously: for if that had not taken place, or had not been certain, I do not think that Antiochus would have obeyed these orders.

The previous defeat of Perseus really secured the salvation of Egypt.

BOOK XXX

1. Attalus, brother of king Eumenes, came to Rome this year, pretending that, even if the disaster of the Gallic rising had not happened to the kingdom, he should have come to Rome, to congratulate the Senate, and to receive some mark of its approval for having been actively engaged on their side and loyally shared in all their dangers; but, as it happened, he had been forced to come at that time to Rome owing to the danger from the Gauls. Upon finding a general welcome from everybody, owing to the acquaintance formed with him on the campaign, and the belief that he was well disposed to them, and meeting with a reception that surpassed his expectation, the young man's hopes were extraordinarily raised, because he did not know the true reason of this friendly warmth. The result was that he narrowly escaped ruining his own and his brother's fortunes, and indeed the entire kingdom. The majority at Rome were thoroughly angry with king Eumenes, and believed that he had been playing a double game during the war, keeping up communications with Perseus, and watching his opportunity against them: and accordingly some men of high rank got Attalus under their influence, and urged him to lay aside the character of ambassador for his brother, and to speak in his own behalf; as the Senate was minded to secure a separate kingdom and royal government for him, because of their displeasure with his brother. This excited the ambition of Attalus still more, and in private conversation he signified his assent to those who advised this course. Finally, he arranged with some men of position that he would actually appear before the Senate and deliver a speech on the subject.

B.C. 167. Coss. Q. Aelius Paetus, M. Junius Pennus.

Attalus at Rome, is persuaded to try by the Roman help to supplant his brother.

Stratius is sent to dissuade Attalus from his meditated treason.

2. While Attalus was engaged on this intrigue, Eumenes, fearing what would happen, sent his physician Stratius to Rome, putting him in possession of the facts, and charging him to employ every means to prevent Attalus from following the advice of those who wished to ruin their kingdom. On arriving at Rome and getting Attalus by himself, he used a great variety of arguments to him (and he was a man of great sense and powers of persuasion), and at length, with much trouble, succeeded in his object, and in recalling him from his mad project. He represented to him that "he was already practically joint-king with his brother, and only differed from him in the fact that he wore no diadem, and was not called king, though in everything else he possessed an equal and identical authority: that in the future he was the acknowledged heir to the crown, and with no very distant prospect of possession; as the king, from the weak state of his health, was in constant expectation of his departure, and being childless could not, even if he wished it, leave the crown to any one else." (For in fact that natural son of his, who afterwards succeeded to the crown, had not as yet been acknowledged.) "Above all, he was surprised at the hindrance Attalus was thus interposing to the measures necessary at that particular crisis. For they ought to thank heaven exceedingly if they proved able, even with hearty co-operation and unanimity, to repel the threatened attack of the Gauls; but if he should at such a time quarrel with and oppose his brother, it was quite clear that he would ruin the kingdom, and deprive himself both of his present power and his future expectations, and his other brothers also of the kingdom and the power they possessed in it." By these and similar arguments Stratius dissuaded Attalus from taking any revolutionary steps.

3. Accordingly, when Attalus appeared before the Senate, he congratulated it on what had happened; expatiated on the loyalty and zeal shown by himself in the war with Perseus; and urged at some length that the Senate should send envoys to restrain the audacity of the Gauls, and compel them to confine themselves once more to their original boundaries. He also said something about the cities of Aeneus and Maronea, desiring

that they might be given as a free gift to himself. But he said not a single word against the king, or about the partition of the kingdom. The senators, supposing that he would interview them privately on a future occasion upon these points, promised to send the envoys, and loaded him lavishly with the customary presents, and, moreover, promised him these cities. But when, after receiving these marks of favour, he at once left Rome without fulfilling any of its expectations, the Senate, though foiled in its hopes, had nothing else which it could do; but before he had got out of Italy it declared Aeneus and Maronea free cities,—thus rescinding its promise,—and sent Publius Licinius at the head of a mission to the Gauls. And what instructions these ambassadors had given to them it is not easy to say, but it may be guessed without difficulty from what subsequently happened. And this will be rendered clear from the transactions themselves.

Embassy to Galatia.

4. There also came embassies from Rhodes, the first headed by Philocrates, the second by Philophron and Astymedes. For when the Rhodians received the answer given to the embassy of Agesipolis immediately after the battle of Pydna, they understood the anger and threatening attitude of the Senate towards them, and promptly despatched these embassies. Astymedes and Philophron, observing in the course of public and private conversations the suspicions and anger entertained towards them at Rome, were reduced to a state of great discouragement and distress. But when one of the praetors mounted the Rostra and urged the people to declare war against Rhodes, then indeed they were beside themselves with terror at the danger that threatened their country. They assumed mourning garments, and in their various interviews with their friends dropped the tone of persuasion or demand, and pleaded instead, with tears and prayers, that they would not adopt any measure of supreme severity towards them. A few days afterwards Antony, one of the tribunes, introduced them to the Senate, and dragged the praetor who advised the war down from the Rostra. Philophron spoke first, and was

Fresh embassies from Rhodes, B.C. 167.

See 29, 27.

Terror of the Rhodian envoys at the threat of war.

followed by Astymedes; and, having thus uttered the proverbial "swan's song," they received an answer which, while freeing them from actual fear of war, conveyed a bitter and stern rebuke from the Senate for their conduct. Now Astymedes considered himself to have made a good speech on behalf of his country, but did not at all satisfy the Greeks visiting or residing at Rome. For he afterwards published the speech containing his argument in defence, which, to all those into whose hands it fell, appeared absurd and quite unconvincing. For he rested his plea not alone on the merits of his country, but still more on an accusation of others. Comparing the good services done and the co-operation undertaken by the others, he endeavoured to deny or minimise them; while he exaggerated those of Rhodes as far above their actual amount as he could. The errors of others, on the contrary, he inveighed against in bitter and hostile terms, while those of the Rhodians he attempted to cloak and conceal, in order that, by this comparison, those of his own country might appear insignificant and pardonable, those of others grave and beyond excuse, "all of whom," he added, "had already been pardoned before." But this sort of pleading can in no circumstances be considered becoming to a statesman. Take the case of the betrayal of secrets. It is not those who, for fear or gain, turn informers that we commend; but those who endure any torture and punishment rather than involve an accomplice in the same misfortune. These are the men whom we approve and consider noble. But a man who, from some undefined alarm, exposes to the view of the party in power all the errors of others, and who recalls what time had obliterated from the minds of the ruling people, cannot fail to be an object of dislike to all who hear of it.

A criticism on the speech of the Rhodian Astymedes.

5. After receiving the above answer Philocrates and his colleagues immediately started home; but Astymedes and his fellows stayed where they were and kept on the watch, that no report or observation against their country might be made unknown to them. But when this answer of the Senate was reported at Rhodes, the people, considering

Dismayed by this answer the Rhodians endeavour to propitiate the Senate. Livy, 45, 25.

themselves relieved of the worst fear—that, namely, of war—made light of the rest, though extremely unfavourable. So true it ever is that a dread of worse makes men forget lighter misfortunes. They immediately voted a complimentary crown worth ten thousand gold pieces[1] to Rome, and appointed Theaetetus at once envoy and navarch to convey it at the beginning of summer, accompanied by an embassy under Rhodophon, to attempt in every possible way to make an alliance with the Romans. They acted thus because they wished that, if the embassy failed by an adverse answer at Rome, the failure might take place without the people having passed a formal decree, the attempt being made solely on the initiative of the navarch, and the navarch having by the law power to act in such a case. For the fact was that the republic of Rhodes had been administered with such consummate statesmanship, that, though it had for nearly a hundred and forty years been engaged in conjunction with Rome in actions of the greatest importance and glory, it had never yet made an alliance with her. Nor ought I to omit stating the reason of this policy of the Rhodians. They wished that no ruler or prince should be entirely without hope of gaining their support or alliance; and they therefore did not choose to bind or hamper themselves beforehand with oaths and treaties; but, by remaining uncommitted, to be able to avail themselves of all advantages as they arose. But on this occasion they were much bent upon securing this mark of honour from Rome, not because they were anxious for the alliance, or because they were afraid of any one else at the time except the Romans, but because they wished, by giving an air of special importance to their design, to remove the suspicions of such as were inclined to entertain unfavourable thoughts of their state. For immediately after the return of the ambassadors under Theaetetus, the Caunians revolted and the Mylassians seized on the cities in Eurōmus. And about the same time the Roman Senate published a decree declaring all

The astuteness of the Rhodian policy.

Caunus, in Peraea, and Mylassa, in Caria, revolt.

[1] Livy says *viginti millia*. By χρυσοῦς Polybius appears to mean "staters," worth about 20 drachmae (20 francs). This would give a rough value of the present as £8000, or on Livy's computation twice that amount.

Carians and Lycians free who had been assigned to the Rhodians after the war with Antiochus. The Caunian and Mylassian revolts were speedily put down by the Rhodians; for they compelled the Caunians, by sending Lycus with a body of soldiers, to return to their allegiance, though the people of Cibyra had come to their assistance; and in an expedition into Eurōmus they conquered the Mylassians and Alabandians in the field, these two peoples having combined their forces to attack Orthosia. But when the decree concerning the Lycians and Carians was announced they were once more in a state of dismay, fearing that their gift of the crown had proved in vain, as well as their hopes of an alliance. . . .

The Senate declare Caria and Lycia free. See 22, 5.

6. I have already directed my readers' attention to the policy of Deinon and Polyaratus. For Rhodes was not the only place which experienced grave danger and important changes. Nearly all the states suffered in the same way. It will therefore be instructive to take a review of the policy adopted by the statesmen in the several countries, and to ascertain which of them will be proved to have acted with wisdom, and which to have done otherwise: in order that posterity in similar circumstances of danger may, with these examples as models, so to speak, before their eyes, be able to choose the good and avoid the bad with a genuine insight; and may not in the last hour of their lives dishonour their previous character and achievements, from failing to perceive where the path of honour lies. There were, then, three different classes of persons who incurred blame for their conduct in the war with Perseus. One consisted of those who, while displeased at seeing the controversy brought to a decisive end, and the control of the world fall into the power of one government, nevertheless took absolutely no active steps for or against the Romans, but left the decision entirely to Fortune. A second consisted of those who were glad to see the question settled, and wished Perseus to win, but were unable to convert the citizens of their own states or the members of their race to their sentiments. And a third class consisted of those who actually succeeded in inducing their several states

The three classes of men who in the various states got into trouble for their conduct during the Macedonian war.

to change round and join the alliance of Perseus. Our present task is to examine how each of these conducted their respective policies.

7. In the last class were Antinous, Theodotus, and Cephalus, who induced the Molossians to join Perseus. These men, when the results of the campaign went completely against them, and they found themselves in imminent danger of the worst consequences, put a bold face upon it and met an honourable death in the field. These men deserve our commendation for their self-respect, in refusing to allow themselves to lapse into a position unworthy of their previous life.

Antinous, Theodotus, and Cephalus of the Molossi are instances of the third class.

Again, in Achaia and Thessaly and Perrhaebia several persons incurred blame by remaining neutral, on the ground that they were watching their opportunity, and were in heart on the side of Perseus; and yet they never let a word to that effect get abroad, nor were ever detected in sending letter or message to Perseus on any subject whatever, but conducted themselves with unexceptionable discretion. Such men as these therefore very properly determined to face judicial inquiry and stand their judgment, and to make every effort to save themselves. For it is quite as great a sign of cowardice to abandon life voluntarily when a man is conscious of no crime, from fear of the threats of political opponents or of the power of the conquerors, as it is to cling to life to the loss of honour.

Several instances of the first class in Achaia Phiotis, Thessaly, and Perrhaebia.

Again, in Rhodes and Cos, and several other cities, there were men who favoured the cause of Perseus, and who were bold enough to speak in behalf of the Macedonians in their own cities, and to inveigh against the Romans, and to actually advise active steps in alliance with Perseus, but who were not able to induce their states to transfer themselves to alliance with the king. The most conspicuous of such men were in Cos the two brothers Hippias and Diomedon, and in Rhodes Deinon and Polyaratus.

Instances of the second class in Rhodes, Cos, and other places.

8. And it is impossible not to view the policy of these men with disapproval. To begin with, all their fellow-

citizens were aware of everything they had done or said; in the next place, the letters were intercepted and made public which were coming from Perseus to them, and from themselves to Perseus, as well as the messengers from both sides: yet they could not make up their minds to yield and put themselves out of the way, but still disputed the point. The result of this persistence and clinging to life, in the face of a desperate position, was that they quite ruined their character for courage and resolution, and left not the least ground for pity or sympathy in the minds of posterity. For being confronted with their own letters and agents, they were regarded as not merely unfortunate, but rather as shameless. One of those who went on these voyages was a man named Thoas. He had frequently sailed to Macedonia on a mission from these men, and when the decisive change in the state of affairs took place, conscious of what he had done, and fearing the consequences, he retired to Cnidos. But the Cnidians having thrown him into prison, he was demanded by the Rhodians, and on coming to Rhodes and being put to the torture, confessed his crime; and his story was found to agree with everything in the cipher of the intercepted letters, and with the despatches from Perseus to Deinon, and from Deinon and Polyaratus to him. Therefore it was a matter of surprise that Deinon persuaded himself to cling to life and submit to so signal an exposure.

The vain attempts of Polyaratus to escape,

9. But in respect to folly and baseness of spirit, Polyaratus surpassed Deinon. For when Popilius Laenas charged king Ptolemy to send Polyaratus to Rome, the king, from a regard both to Polyaratus himself and his country, determined not to send him to Rome but to Rhodes, this being also what Polyaratus himself asked him to do. Having therefore caused a galley to be prepared, the king handed him over to Demetrius, one of his own friends, and despatched him, and wrote a despatch to the Rhodians notifying the fact. But touching at Phaselis in the course of the voyage, Polyaratus, from some notion or another which he had conceived, took suppliant branches in his hand, and fled for safety to the city altar. If any one had asked him his intention in thus

at Phaselis,

acting, I am persuaded that he could not have told it. For if he wanted to go to his own country, where was the need of suppliant branches? For his conductors were charged to take him there. But if he wished to go to Rome, that was sure to take place whether he wished it or no. What other alternative was there? Other place that could receive him with safety to himself there was none. However, on the people of Phaselis sending to Rhodes to beg that they would receive Polyaratus, and take him away, the Rhodians came to the prudent resolution of sending an open vessel to convoy him; but forbade the captain of it to actually take him on board, on the ground that the officers from Alexandria had it in charge to deliver the man in Rhodes. When the vessel arrived at Phaselis, and its captain, Epichares, refused to take the man on board, and Demetrius, who had been deputed by the king for that business, urged him to leave the altar and resume his voyage; and when the people of Phaselis supported his command, because they were afraid they would incur some blame from Rome on that account, Polyaratus could no longer resist the pressure of circumstances, but once more went on board Demetrius's galley. But in the course of the voyage he seized an opportunity of doing the same again at Caunus, flying for safety there in the same way, and begging the Caunians to save him. Upon the Caunians rejecting him, on the grounds of their being leagued with Rhodes, he sent messages to Cibyra, begging them to receive him in their city, and to send him an escort. He had some claim upon this city, because the sons of its tyrant, Pancrates, had been educated at his house; accordingly, they listened to his request, and did what he asked. But when he got to Cibyra, he placed himself and the Cibyratae into a still greater difficulty than that which he caused before when at Phaselis. For they neither dared to retain him in their town for fear of Rome, nor had the power of sending him to Rome, because of their ignorance of the sea, being an entirely inland folk. Eventually they were reduced to send envoys to Rhodes and the Roman proconsul in Macedonia, begging them to take over the man. Lucius Aemilius wrote to the Cibyratae, ordering

at Caunus,

and at Cibyra.

them to keep Polyaratus in safe custody; and to the Rhodians to make provision for his conveyance by sea and his safe delivery upon Roman territory. Both peoples obeyed the despatch: and thus Polyaratus eventually came to Rome, after making a spectacle of his folly and cowardice to the best of his ability; and after having been, thanks to his own folly, four times surrendered—by king Ptolemy, the people of Phaselis, the Cibyratae, and the Rhodians.

The reason of my having dwelt at some length on the story of Polyaratus and Deinon is not that I have any desire to trample upon their misfortunes, for that would be ungenerous in the last degree; but in order that, by clearly showing their folly, I might instruct those who fall into similar difficulties and dangers how to take a better and wiser course. . . .

10. The most striking illustration of the mutability and capriciousness of Fortune is when a man, within a brief period, turns out to have been preparing for the use of his enemies the very things which he imagined that he was elaborating in his own honour. Thus Perseus was having some columns made, which Lucius Aemilius, finding unfinished, caused to be completed, and placed statues of himself on them. . . .

The columns constructed at Delphi for statues of Perseus used by Aemilius.

Autumn of B.C. 167. Livy, 45, 27.

He admired the situation of the city, and the excellent position of the acropolis for commanding the districts on both sides of the Isthmus. . . .

Aemilius at Corinth.

Having been long anxious to see Olympia, he set out thither. . .

At Olympia.

Aemilius entered the sacred enclosure at Olympia, and was struck with admiration at the statue of the god, remarking that, to his mind, Pheidias was the only artist who had represented the Zeus of Homer; and that, though he had had great expectations of Olympia, he found the reality far surpassed them. . . .

11. The Aetolians had been accustomed to get their livelihood from plundering and such like lawless occupations; and as long as they were permitted to plunder and loot the Greeks, they got all they required from them, regarding every country as that of

The disturbed state of Aetolia,

an enemy. But subsequently, when the Romans obtained the supremacy, they were prevented from this means of support, and accordingly turned upon each other. Even before this, in their civil war, there was no horror which they did not commit; and a little earlier still they had had a taste of mutual slaughter in the massacres at Arsinoe;[1] they were, therefore, ready for anything, and their minds were so infuriated that they would not allow their magistrates to have even a voice in their business. Aetolia, accordingly, was a scene of turbulence, lawlessness, and blood: nothing they undertook was done on any calculation or fixed plan; everything was conducted at haphazard and in confusion, as though a hurricane had burst upon them. . . .

and of Epirus. See 27, 15.

12. The state of Epirus was much the same. For in proportion as the majority of its people are more law-abiding than those of Aetolia, so their chief magistrate surpassed every one else in wickedness and contempt for law. For, I think, there never was and never will be a character more ferocious and brutal than that of Charops. . . .

The selection of suspected Greeks, especially Achaeans, to be sent to Italy, B.C. 167.

13. After the destruction of Perseus, immediately after the decisive battle, embassies were sent on all sides to congratulate the Roman commanders on the event. And as now all power tended towards Rome, in every city those who were regarded as of the Romanising party were in the ascendant, and were appointed to embassies and other services. Accordingly they flocked into Macedonia—from Achaia, Callicrates, Aristodamus, Agesias, and Philippus; from Boeotia, Mnasippos; from Acarnania, Chremas; from Epirus, Charops and Nicias; from Aetolia, Lyciscus

[1] Called by Polybius in previous books Conope, 4, 64; 5, 6. Its name was changed to Arsinoe, from its having been rebuilt and enlarged by Arsinoe, sister and wife of Ptolemy Philadelphus (Strabo, 10, 2, 22). It was on the east bank of the Achelous. Its modern name is *Angelokastro*. The civil war in Aetolia alluded to here is mentioned in Livy, 41, 25 (B.C. 174). This particular massacre appears to have taken place in B.C. 168-167. Livy (45, 28) narrates that Aemilius was met during his Greek tour in B.C. 167 by a crowd of Aetolians, in a miserable state of destitution, who informed him that five hundred and fifty Aetolian nobles had been massacred by Lyciscus and Tisippus, besides many driven into exile, and that the goods of both had been confiscated.

and Tisippus. These all having met, and eagerly vieing with each other in attaining a common object; and there being no one to oppose them, since their political opponents had all yielded to the times and completely retired, they accomplished their purpose without trouble. So the ten commissioners issued orders to the other cities and leagues through the mouths of the strategi themselves as to what citizens were to go to Rome. And these turned out to be, for the most part, those whom the men I have named had made a list of on party grounds, except a very few of such as had done something conspicuous. But to the Achaean league they sent two men of the highest rank of their own number, Gaius Claudius and Gnaeus Domitius. They had two reasons for doing so: the first was that they were uneasy lest the Achaeans should refuse to obey the written order, and lest Callicrates and his colleagues should be in absolute danger from being reputed to be the authors of the accusations against all the Greeks,—which was about true; and in the second place, because in the intercepted despatches nothing distinct had been discovered against any Achaean. Accordingly, after a while, the proconsul sent the letter and envoys with reference to these men, although in his private opinion he did not agree with the charges brought by Lyciscus and Callicrates, as was afterwards made clear by what took place. . . .

14. Lucius Anicius, who had been praetor, after his victory over the Illyrians, and on bringing Genthius prisoner to Rome with his children, while celebrating his triumph, did a very ridiculous thing. He sent for the most famous artists from Greece, and having constructed an immense theatre in the circus, he brought all the flute-players on the stage together first. Their names were Theodorus the Boeotian, Theopompus and Hermippus of Lysimacheia, the most celebrated of the day. He placed them on the proscenium with the chorus, and bid them all play at once. But on their beginning to play the tune, accompanied by appropriate movements, he sent to them to say that they were not playing well, and must put more excitement into it. At first they

Triumph of L. Anicius Gallus over the Illyrians at the Quirinalia, February 17, B.C. 167.

A scene in a Roman theatre.

did not know what to make of this, until one of the lictors showed them that they must form themselves into two companies, and facing round, advance against each other as though in a battle. The fluteplayers caught the idea at once, and, adopting a motion suitable to their own wild strains, produced a scene of great confusion. They made the middle group of the chorus face round upon the two extreme groups, and the fluteplayers, blowing with inconceivable violence and discordance, led these groups against each other. The members of the chorus meanwhile rushed, with a violent stamping which shook the stage, against those opposite them, and then faced round and retired. But when one of the chorus, whose dress was closely girt up, turned round on the spur of the moment and raised his hands, like a boxer, in the face of the fluteplayer who was approaching him, then the spectators clapped their hands and cheered loudly. Whilst this sort of sham fight was going on, two dancers were brought into the orchestra to the sound of music; and four boxers mounted upon the stage, accompanied by trumpeters and clarion players. The effect of these various contests all going on together was indescribable. But if I were to speak about their tragic actors, I should be thought by some to be jesting.[1] . . .

15. It requires the same sort of spirit to arrange public games well, and to set out great banquets and wine with fitting splendour, as it does to draw up an army in presence of the enemy with strategic skill. . . .

16. Aemilius Paulus took seventy cities in Epirus after the conquest of the Macedonians and Perseus, most of which were in the country of the Molossi; and enslaved one hundred and fifty thousand men. . . .

Aemilius in Epirus.

17. In Egypt the first thing the kings did after being

[1] From Athenaeus, xiv. 4, p. 615. It seems to be part of some strictures of Polybius on the coarseness of the amusements of the Romans. This noisy and riotous scene in a theatre would strike a Greek as barbarous and revolting; and may remind us of the complaints of the noise and interruption to their actors so often found in the prologues to the plays of Plautus and Terence. Though the substance of this extract is doubtless from Polybius, Athenaeus has evidently told the anecdote in his own language.

relieved from the war with Antiochus was to send Numenius, one of their friends, as an envoy to Rome to return thanks for the favours received; and they next released the Lacedaemonian Menalcidas, who had made active use of the occasion against the kingdom for his own advantage; Gaius Popilius Laenas asked the king for his release as a favour to himself.[1] . . .

Release of Menalcidas.

18. At this period Cotys, king of the Odrysae, sent ambassadors to Rome, asking for the restoration of his son, and pleading his defence for having acted on the side of Perseus. The Romans, considering that they had effected their purpose by the successful issue of the war against Perseus, and that they had no need to press their quarrel with Cotys any further, allowed him to take his son back—who, having been sent as a hostage to Macedonia, had been captured with the children of Perseus, —wishing to display their clemency and magnanimity, and with the idea at the same time of binding Cotys to themselves by so great a favour. . . .

Cotys, king of the Odrysae, cp. bk. 27, ch. 12.

19. About the same time king Prusias also came to Rome to congratulate the Senate and the generals on their success. This Prusias was in no sense worthy of the royal title, as we may judge from the following facts: When the Roman envoys first appeared at his court, he met them with shorn head and wearing a cap, toga, and shoes, and in fact exactly in the garb worn by those recently manumitted at Rome, whom they call *liŏerti:* and greeting the envoys respectfully, he exclaimed, "Behold your freedman, who is willing to obey you in all things and to imitate your fashions!" than which a more contemptible speech it would be difficult to imagine. And now, again, when he reached the entrance of the Senate-house he stopped at the door facing the senators, and, dropping both his hands he paid reverence to the threshold and the seated Fathers, exclaiming, "Hail, ye gods my preservers!" seeming bent on surpassing all who might come after him in meanness of

The abject conduct of king Prusias.

[1] Menalcidas was one of the Romanising party, who appears to have been Strategus of the league in B.C. 153 [Pausan. 7, 11, 7], and to have committed suicide in B.C. 148-147, in despair at his failure to wrest Sparta from the league.

spirit, unmanliness, and servility. And his behaviour in the conference which he held when he had entered the Senate-house was on a par with this; and was such as might make one blush even to write. However this contemptible display served in itself to secure him a favourable answer.

20. Just as he had got his answer, news came that Eumenes was on his way. This caused the Senators much embarrassment. They were thoroughly incensed with him, and were entirely fixed in their sentiments towards him; and yet they did not wish to betray themselves. For having proclaimed to all the world that this king was their foremost and most esteemed friend, if they now admitted him to an interview and allowed him to plead his cause, they must either, by answering as they really thought and in harmony with their sentiments, signalise their own folly in having marked out such a man in past times for special honour; or if, in deference to appearances, they gave him a friendly answer, they must disregard truth and the interests of their country. Therefore, as both these methods of proceeding could have consequences of a disagreeable nature, they hit upon the following solution of the difficulty. On the ground of a general dislike of the visits of kings, they published a decree that "no king was to visit Rome." Having been informed subsequently that Eumenes had landed at Brundisium in Italy, they sent the quaestor to convey the decree to him, and to bid him to communicate with himself if he wanted anything from the Senate; or, if he did not want anything, to bid him depart at the earliest possible opportunity from Italy. When the quaestor met the king and informed him of the decree, the latter, thoroughly understanding the intention of the Senate, said not a single word, except that "he wanted nothing."

To prevent a visit from Eumenes the Senate pass a decree forbidding all kings to visit Rome.

Eumenes stopped at Brundisium.

This is the way in which Eumenes was prevented from coming to Rome. And it was not the only important result of this decree. For the Gauls were at that time threatening the kingdom of Eumenes; and it was soon made apparent that by this repulse the king's allies were all greatly depressed, while the Gauls were doubly encouraged to press

on the war. And it was in fact their desire to humiliate him in every possible way that induced the Senate to adopt this resolution. These things were going on at the beginning of the winter: but to all other ambassadors who arrived—and there was no city or prince or king who had not at that time sent an embassy of congratulation—the Senate returned a gracious and friendly answer, except to the Rhodians; and these they dismissed with displeasure, and with ambiguous declarations as to the future. As to the Athenians again the Senate hesitated. . . .

Winter of B.C. 167-166.

21. The first object of the Athenian embassy was the restoration of Haliartus;[1] but when they met with a refusal on that point, they changed the subject of their appeal and put forward their own claim to the possession of Delos, Lemnos, and the territory of Haliartus. No one could properly find fault with them for this, as far as Delos and Lemnos were concerned, for they had of old laid claim to them; but there is good reason for reproaching them in respect to the territory of Haliartus. Haliartus was nearly the most ancient city in Boeotia; had met with a heavy misfortune: instead of endeavouring in every possible way to restore it,—to contribute to its utter annihilation, and to deprive its dispossessed inhabitants of even their hopes for the future, was an act which would be thought worthy of no Greek nation, and least of all of the Athenians. They open their own territory to all comers; and to take away that of others can never appear consonant with the spirit of their State. However, the Senate granted them Delos and Lemnos. Such was the decision in the Athenian business. . . .

The Athenians ask for the restoration of Haliartus; failing that, to have its territory, with Delos and Lemnos themselves.

As to Lemnos and Delos they had, according to the proverb, "got the wolf by the ears:" for they suffered much ill fortune from their quarrels with the Delians; and from the

The possession of these places a misfortune to Athens. See 32, 17.

[1] Haliartus had been taken by the praetor L. Lucretius Gallus in B.C. 171, its inhabitants sold into slavery, and its houses and walls entirely destroyed. Its crime was siding with Perseus. Livy, 42, 63. *Supra* bk. 27, ch. 5; 29, 12.

territory of Haliartus they reaped shame rather than profit. . . .

22. At this time Theaetetus being admitted into the Senate spoke on the subject of the alliance. The Senate, however, postponed the consideration of the proposal, and in the meantime Theaetetus died in the course of nature, for he was more than eighty years old. But on the arrival in Rome of exiles from Caunus and Stratoniceia, and their admission to the Senate, a decree was passed ordering the Rhodians to withdraw their garrisons from Caunus and Stratoniceia. And the embassy of Philophron and Astymedes having received this answer sailed with all speed home, alarmed lest the Rhodians should disregard the order for withdrawing the garrisons, and so give a fresh ground for complaints. . . .

Death of Theaetetus of Rhodes.

Caunus and Stratoniceia in Caria.

23. In the Peloponnese, when the ambassadors arrived and announced the answers from Rome, there was no longer mere clamour, but downright rage and hatred against Callicrates and his party. . . .

The effect of the message from the Romans in the Achaean league. *Supra* ch. 13.

An instance of the hatred entertained for Callicrates and Adronidas, and the others who agreed with them, was this. The festival of the Antigoneia was being held at Sicyon,—the baths being all supplied with large public bathing tubs, and smaller ones placed by them used by bathers of the better sort,—if Adronidas or Callicrates entered one of these, not a single one of the bystanders would get into it any more, until the bathman had let every drop of water run out and filled it with fresh. They did this from the idea that they would be polluted by entering the same water as these men. Nor would it be easy to describe the hissing and hooting that took place at the public games in Greece when any one attempted to proclaim one of them victor. The very children in the streets as they returned from school ventured to call them traitors to their faces. To such height did the anger and hatred of these men go. . . .

Unpopularity of Callicrates, Adronidas, and their party.

24. The inhabitants of Peraea were like slaves unexpectedly

released from chains, who are scarcely able to believe their present good fortune, thinking it a change almost too great to be natural; and cannot believe that those they meet can understand or fully see that they are really released, unless they do something strange and out of the ordinary course. . . .

Joy of the people of Peraea at the Roman decree emancipating them from Rhodes.

BOOK XXXI

1. At this time the Cnosians, in alliance with the Gortynians, made war upon the Rhaucians, and swore a mutual oath that they would not end the war until they had taken Rhaucus. B.C. 165. War in Crete of Cnosus and Gortyn against Rhaucus.

But when the Rhodians received the decree regarding Caunus, and saw that the anger of the Romans was not abating, after having scrupulously carried out the orders contained in the Senate's replies, they forthwith sent Aristotle at the head of an embassy to Rome, with instructions to make another attempt to secure the alliance. They arrived in Rome at the height of summer, and, having been admitted to the Senate, at once declared how their people had obeyed the Senate's orders, and pleaded for the alliance, using a great variety of arguments in a speech of considerable length. But the Senate returned them a reply in which, without a word about their friendship, they said that, as to the alliance, it was not proper for them to grant the Rhodians this favour at present. . . . The Rhodians are again refused an alliance.

2. To the ambassadors of the Gauls in Asia they granted autonomy, on condition that they remained within their dwellings, and went on no warlike expeditions beyond their own frontiers. . . . Autonomy to Galatia on conditions.

3. When this same king (Antiochus Epiphanes) heard of the games in Macedonia held by the Roman proconsul Aemilius Paulus, wishing to out-do Paulus by the splendour of his liberality, he sent envoys to the several cities announcing games to be held by him at Daphne; and it became the rage in Greece to attend them. The public ceremonies began with a procession composed as follows: first The grand festival held by Antiochus Epiphanes at Daphne, a suburb of Antioch, sacred to Apollo.

came some men armed in the Roman fashion, with their coats made of chain armour, five thousand in the prime of life. Next came five thousand Mysians, who were followed by three thousand Cilicians armed like light infantry, and wearing gold crowns. Next to them came three thousand Thracians and five thousand Gauls. They were followed by twenty-thousand Macedonians, and five thousand armed with brass shields, and others with silver shields, who were followed by two hundred and forty pairs of gladiators. Behind these were a thousand Nisaean cavalry and three thousand native horsemen, most of whom had gold plumes and gold crowns, the rest having them of silver. Next to them came what are called "companion cavalry," to the number of a thousand, closely followed by the corps of king's "friends" of about the same number, who were again followed by a thousand picked men; next to whom came the *Agema* or guard, which was considered the flower of the cavalry, and numbered about a thousand. Next came the "cataphract" cavalry, both men and horses acquiring that name from the nature of their panoply; they numbered fifteen hundred. All the above men had purple surcoats, in many cases embroidered with gold and heraldic designs. And behind them came a hundred six-horsed, and forty four-horsed chariots; a chariot drawn by four elephants and another by two; and then thirty-six elephants in single file with all their furniture on.

The rest of the procession was almost beyond description, but I must give a summary account of it. It consisted of eight hundred young men wearing gold crowns, about a thousand fine oxen, foreign delegates to the number of nearly three hundred, and eight hundred ivory tusks. The number of images of the gods it is impossible to tell completely: for representations of every god or demigod or hero accepted by mankind were carried there, some gilded and others adorned with gold-embroidered robes; and the myths, belonging to each, according to accepted tradition, were represented by the most costly symbols. Behind them were carried representations of Night and Day, Earth, Heaven, Morning and Noon. The best idea that I can give of the amount of gold and silver plate is this: One of the king's friends, Dionysius his secretary, had a thousand

boys in the procession carrying silver vessels, none of which weighed less than a thousand drachmae ;[1] and by their side walked six hundred young slaves of the king holding gold vessels. There were also two hundred women sprinkling unguents from gold boxes ; and after them came eighty women sitting in litters with gold feet, and five hundred in litters with silver feet, all adorned with great costliness. These were the most remarkable features of the procession.

4. The festival, including the gladiatorial shows and hunting, lasted thirty days, in the course of which there was continual round of spectacles. During the first five of these everybody in the gymnasium anointed himself with oil scented with saffron in gold vessels, of which there were fifteen, and the same number scented with cinnamon and nard. On the following days other vessels were brought in scented with fenugreek, marjoram, and lily, all of extraordinary fragrancy. Public banquets were also given, at which couches were prepared, sometimes for a thousand and sometimes for fifteen hundred, with the utmost splendour and costliness.

The whole of the arrangements were made personally by the king. He rode on an inferior horse by the side of the procession, ordering one part to advance, and another to halt, as occasion required ; so that, if his diadem had been removed, no one would have believed that he was the king and the master of all ; for his appearance was not equal to that of a moderately good servant. At the feasts also he stood himself at the entrance, and admitted some and assigned others their places ; he personally ushered in the servants bringing the dishes ; and walking about among the company sometimes sat down and sometimes lay down on the couches. Sometimes he would jump up, lay down the morsel of food or the cup that he was raising to his lips, and go to another part of the hall ; and walking among the guests acknowledge the compliment, as now one and now another pledged him in wine, or jest at any recitations that might be going on. And when the festivity had gone on for a long time, and a good many of the guests had departed, the king was carried in by the mummers, completely shrouded in a robe, and laid upon the ground, as though he

[1] A drachma may be taken as between a sixth and a seventh of an ounce.

were one of the actors; then, at the signal given by the music, he leapt up, stripped, and began to dance with the jesters; so that all the guests were scandalised and retired. In fact every one who attended the festival, when they saw the extraordinary wealth which was displayed at it, the arrangements made in the processions and games, and the scale of the splendour on which the whole was managed, were struck with amazement and wonder both at the king and the greatness of his kingdom: but when they fixed their eyes on the man himself, and the contemptible conduct to which he condescended, they could scarcely believe that so much excellence and baseness could exist in one and the same breast.[1] . . .

5. After the completion of the festival, the envoys with Tiberius Gracchus arrived, who had been sent from Rome to investigate the state of affairs in Syria. Antiochus received them with such tact and with so many expressions of kindness, that Tiberius not only had no suspicion that he was meditating any active step, or cherishing any sinister feeling on account of what had happened at Alexandria, but was even induced by the extraordinary kindness of his reception to discredit those who made any such suggestion. For, besides other courtesies, the king gave up his own hall for the use of the envoys, and almost his crown in appearance; although his true sentiments were not at all of this kind, and he was on the contrary profoundly incensed with the Romans. . . .

Roman envoys at Antioch.

Antiochus affects extreme cordiality.

6. A large number of ambassadors from various quarters having arrived at Rome, the most important of which were those with Astymedes from Rhodes, Eureus Anaxidamus and Satyrus from the Achaeans, and those with Pytho from Prusias,—the Senate gave audience to these last. The ambassadors from Prusias complained of king Eumenes, alleging that he had taken certain places belonging to their country, and had not in any sense evacuated Galatia, or obeyed the decrees of the Senate; but had been supporting all who

B.C. 164. Complaints against Eumenes at Rome from Prusias of Bithynia, and other parts of Asia.

[1] Hultsch prints in parallel columns the text of this fragment as it appears in Athenaeus and Diodorus. The English translation attempts to combine them.

favoured himself, and depressing in every possible way those who wished to shape their policy in accordance with the Senate's decrees. There were also some ambassadors from certain towns in Asia, who accused the king on the grounds of his intimate association with Antiochus. The Senate listened to the accusers, and neither rejected their accusations nor openly expressed its own opinion; but acted with close reserve, thoroughly distrusting both Eumenes and Antiochus: and meanwhile contented itself by continually supporting Galatia and contriving some fresh security for its freedom. But the envoys under Tiberius Gracchus, on their return from their mission, had no clearer idea themselves in regard to Eumenes and Antiochus than before they left Rome, nor could they give the Senate one either. So completely had the kings hoodwinked them by the cordiality of their reception.

The Senate's policy in Galatia.

Failure of the mission of Gracchus.

7. The Senate next called in the Rhodians and heard what they had to say. When Astymedes entered, he adopted a more moderate and more effective line of argument than on his former embassy. He omitted the invectives against others, and took the humble tone of men who are being flogged, begging to be forgiven, and declaring that his country had suffered sufficient punishment, and a more severe one than its crime deserved. And then he went briefly through the list of the Rhodian losses. "First, they have lost Lycia and Caria, which had already cost them a large sum of money, having been forced to support three wars against them; while at the present moment they have been deprived of a considerable revenue which they used to draw from those countries. But perhaps," he added, "this is as it should be: you gave them to our people as a free gift, because you regarded us with favour; and in now recalling your gift, because you suspect and are at variance with us, you may seem only to be acting reasonably. But Caunus, at any rate, we purchased from Ptolemy's officers for two hundred talents; and Stratoniceia we received as a great favour from Antiochus, son of Seleucus; and from those two towns our people had a revenue of a hundred and twenty talents a year. All these sources of revenue

Rhodians appeal against the injury done to their trade, B.C. 165.

Speech of Astymedes.

we have surrendered, in our submission to your injunctions. From which it appears that you have imposed a heavier penalty on the Rhodians for one act of folly, than on the Macedonians that have been continually at war with you. But the greatest disaster of all to our State is that the revenue from its harbour has been abolished by your making Delos a free port; and by your depriving our people of that independence by which the harbour, as well as other interests of the States, were maintained in suitable dignity.[1] And it is easy to satisfy yourselves of the truth of my words. Our revenue from harbour dues amounted in past years to one million drachmae, from which you have now taken one hundred and fifty thousand; so that it is only too true, gentlemen of Rome, that your anger has affected the resources of the country. Now, if the mistake committed, and the alienation from Rome, had been shared in by the entire people, you might perhaps have seemed to be acting rightly in maintaining a lasting and irreconcilable anger against us; but if the fact is made clear to you that it was an exceedingly small number who shared in this foolish policy, and that these have all been put to death by this very people itself, why still be irreconcilable to those who are in no respect guilty? Especially when to every one else you are reputed to exhibit the highest possible clemency and magnanimity. Wherefore, gentlemen, our people having lost their revenues, their freedom of debate, and their position of independence, in defence of which in time past they have been ever willing to make any sacrifices, now beg and beseech you all, as having been smitten sufficiently, to relax your anger, and to be reconciled and make this alliance with them: that it may be made manifest to all the world that you have put away your anger against Rhodes, and have returned to your old feelings and friendship towards them." Such among others were the words of Astymedes. He was thought to have spoken much to the point in the circumstances; but what helped the Rhodians to the alliance

The Senate is mollified by this speech and by

[1] He means that, they being no longer able to decide in mercantile affairs independently of Rome, the prestige (*προστασία*), and consequently the popularity, of this harbour is destroyed.

more than anything else was the recent return of the embassy under Tiberius Gracchus. For he gave evidence, in the first place, that the Rhodians had obeyed all the decrees of the Senate; and in the next place, that the men who were the authors of their hostile policy had all been condemned to death; and by this testimony overcame all opposition, and secured the alliance between Rome and Rhodes. . . .

the report of Gracchus, and grants the alliance.

8. After an interval the envoys of the Achaeans were admitted with instructions conformable to the last reply received, which was to the effect that "The Senate were surprised that they should apply to them for a decision on matters which they had already decided for themselves." Accordingly another embassy under Eureas now appeared to explain that "The league had neither heard the defence of the accused persons, nor given any decision whatever concerning them; but wished the Senate to take measures in regard to these men, that they might have a trial and not perish uncondemned. They begged that, if possible, the Senate should itself conduct the investigation, and declare who are the persons guilty of those charges; but, if its variety of business made it impossible to do this itself, that it should intrust the business to the Achaeans, who would show by their treatment of the guilty their detestation of their crime." The Senate recognised that the tone of the embassy was in conformity with its own injunctions, but still felt embarrassed how to act. Both courses were open to objection. To judge the case of the men was, it thought, not a task it ought to undertake; and to release them without any trial at all evidently involved ruin to the friends of Rome. In this strait the Senate, wishing to take all hope from the Achaean people of the restitution of the men who were detained, in order that they might obey without a murmur Callicrates in Achaia, and in the other states those who sided with Rome, wrote the following answer: "We do not consider it advisable either for ourselves or for your nationalities that these men should return home." The publication of this answer not only reduced the men who

B.C. 165. Embassy from Achaia asking for the trial or release of the Achaean *détenus*, who to the number of over 1000 had been summoned to Italy in B.C. 167. See 30, 13. Pausan. 7, 10, 11.

had been summoned to Italy to complete despair and dejection, but was regarded by all Greeks as a common sorrow, for it seemed to take away all hope of restoration from these unfortunate men. When it was announced in Greece the people were quite crushed, and a kind of desperation invaded the minds of all; but Charops and Callicrates, and all who shared their policy, were once more in high spirits. . . .

Reduction of the Cammani in Cappadocia.

9. Tiberius Gracchus, partly by force and partly by persuasion, reduced the Cammani to obedience to Rome. . . .

A large number of embassies having come to Rome, the Senate gave a reply to Attalus and Athenaeus. For Prusias, not content with earnestly pressing his accusations himself against Eumenes and Attalus, had also instigated the Gauls and Selgians (in Pisidia), and many others in Asia, to adopt the same policy; consequently king Eumenes had sent his brothers to defend him against the accusations thus brought. On their admission to the Senate they were thought to have made a satisfactory defence against all accusers; and finally returned to Asia, after not only rebutting the accusations, but with marks of special honour. The Senate, however, did not altogether cease to be suspicious of Eumenes and Antiochus. They sent Gaius Sulpicius and Manius Sergius as envoys to investigate the state of Greece; to decide the question of territory that had arisen between Megalopolis and the Lacedaemonians; but, above all, to give attention to the proceedings of Antiochus and Eumenes, and to discover whether any warlike preparations were being made by either of them, or any combination being formed between them against Rome. . . .

The mission, Sulpicius Gallus in Asia; he collects facts against Eumenes.

10. Besides his other follies, Gaius Sulpicius Gallus, on arriving in Asia, put up notices in the most important cities, ordering any one who wished to bring any accusation against king Eumenes to meet him at Sardis within a specified time. He then went to Sardis, and, taking his seat in the Gymnasium, gave audience for ten days to those who had such accusations to make: admitting every kind of foul and abusive language against the king, and, generally, making the

most of every fact and every accusation; for he was frantic and inveterate in his hatred of Eumenes. . . .

But the harder the Romans appeared to bear upon Eumenes, the more popular did he become in Greece, from the natural tendency of mankind to feel for the side that is oppressed. . . .

11. In Syria king Antiochus, wishing to enrich himself, determined on an armed attack upon the temple of Artemis, in Elymais. But having arrived in this country and failed in his purpose, because the native barbarians resisted his lawless attempt, he died in the course of his return at Tabae, in Persia, driven mad, as some say, by some manifestations of divine wrath in the course of his wicked attempt upon this temple. . . .

B.C. 164. Death of Antiochus Epiphanes on his return from Susiana. See 26, 1.

Antiochus Epiphanes left a son and daughter; the former, nine years old, was called Antiochus Eupator, and succeeded to the kingdom, Lysias acting as his guardian. Demetrius, his cousin, son of Seleucus Philopator, being at Rome as a hostage in place of the late Antiochus Epiphanes, endeavoured to persuade the Senate to make him king of Syria instead of the boy.

12. Demetrius, son of Seleucus, who had been long detained at Rome as an hostage, had been for some time past of opinion that his detention was unjust. He had been given by his father Seleucus as a pledge of his good faith; but, when Antiochus (Epiphanes) succeeded to the throne, he considered that he ought not to be a hostage in behalf of that monarch's children. However, up to this time he kept quiet, especially as he was unable, being still a mere boy, to do anything. But now, being in the very prime of youthful manhood, he entered the Senate and made a speech: demanding that the Romans should restore him to his kingdom, which belonged to him by a far better right than to the children of Antiochus. He entered at great length upon arguments to the same effect, affirming that Rome was his country and the nurse of his youth; that the sons of the Senators were all to him as brothers, and the Senators as fathers, because he had come to Rome a child, and was then

Demetrius, son of Seleucus, and grandson of Antiochus the Great, wishes to be restored to the kingdom of Syria.

twenty-three years old.[1] All who heard him were disposed in their hearts to take his part: the Senate however, as a body voted to detain Demetrius, and to assist in securing the crown for the boy left by the late king. Their motive in thus acting was, it seems to me, a mistrust inspired by the vigorous time of life to which Demetrius had attained, and an opinion that the youth and weakness of the boy who had succeeded to the kingdom were more to their interest. And this was presently made manifest. For they appointed Gnaeus Octavius, Spurius Lucretius, and Lucius Aurelius as commissioners to arrange the affairs of the kingdom in accordance with the will of the Senate, on the ground that no one would resist their injunctions, the king being a mere child, and the nobles being quite satisfied at the government not being given to Demetrius, for that was what they had been most expecting. Gnaeus and his colleagues therefore started with instructions, first of all to burn the decked ships, next to hamstring the elephants, and generally to weaken the forces of the kingdom. They were also charged with the additional task of making an inspection of Macedonia; for the Macedonians, unaccustomed to democracy and a government by popular assembly, were splitting up into hostile factions.[2] Gnaeus and his colleagues were also to inspect the state of Galatia and of the kingdom of Ariarathes. After a time the further task was imposed on them, by despatch from the Senate, of reconciling as well as they could the two kings in Alexandria. . . .

A Syrian commission appointed.

The commissioners are also to visit Galatia, Cappadocia, and Alexandria.

13. While this was going on at Rome, envoys from the city, under Marcus Junius, had arrived to arbitrate on the disputes between the Gauls

Missions to Ariarathes, king of

[1] Demetrius had been exchanged for his uncle Antiochus Epiphanes in B.C. 175, just eleven years before.

[2] The *Senatus Consultum de Macedonibus* (Livy, 45, 29) had declared all Macedonians free; each city to enjoy its own laws, create its own annual magistrates, and pay a tribute to Rome—half the amount that it had paid to the king. Macedonia was divided into four regions, at the respective capitals of which—Amphipolis, Thessalonica, Pella, and Pelagonia—the district assemblies (concilia) were to be held, the revenue of the district was to be collected, and the district magistrates elected; and there was to be no inter-marriage or mutual rights of owning property between the regions.

and king Ariarathes. For the Trocmi, having found themselves unable to annex any portion of Cappadocia by their unaided efforts, and having been promptly foiled in their audacious attempts,[1] sought refuge with the Romans, and endeavoured to bring Ariarathes into discredit there. On this account an embassy under M. Junius was sent to Cappadocia. The king gave them a satisfactory account of the affair, treated them with great courtesy, and sent them away loud in his praises. And when subsequently Gnaeus Octavius and Spurius Lucretius arrived, and again addressed the king on the subject of his controversies with the Gauls, after a brief conversation on that subject, and saying that he would acquiesce in their decision without difficulty, he directed the rest of his remarks to the state of Syria, being aware that Octavius and his colleagues were going thither. He pointed out to them the unsettled state of the kingdom and the unprincipled character of the men at the head of affairs there; and added that he would escort them with an army, and remain on the watch for all emergencies, until they returned from Syria in safety. Gnaeus and his colleagues acknowleged the king's kindness and zeal, but said that for the present they did not need the escort: on a future occasion, however, if need should arise, they would let him know without delay; for they considered him as one of the true friends of Rome. . . .

Cappadocia, in regard to the encroachments of the Gauls.

Ariarathes warns Octavius of the dangerous state of Syria.

Ariarathes died soon after this embassy, and was succeeded by his son Ariarathes Philopator. B.C. 164. *Livy*, Ep. 46.

14. About this time ambassadors arrived from Ariarathes, who had recently succeeded to the kingdom of Cappadocia, to renew the existing friendship and alliance with Rome, and in general to exhort the Senate to accept the king's affection and goodwill, which he entertained, both in their private and public capacity, for all the Romans. The Senate, on hearing this, acceded to the request for the renewal of the friendship and alliance, and graciously acknow-

B.C. 163. Ariarathes Philopator continues his father's policy of friendship with Rome.

[1] The Greek of this sentence is certainly corrupt, and no satisfactory sense can be elicited from it.

ledged the general amity of the king. The chief reason for this warmth on the part of the Senate was the report of the envoys under Tiberius, who, when sent to inspect the state of Cappadocia, had returned full of the praises of the late king and of his kingdom generally. It was on the credit of this report that the Senate received the ambassadors of Ariarathes graciously, and acknowledged the goodwill of the king. . . .

15. Having somewhat recovered from their previous disaster, the Rhodians sent Cleagoras with ambassadors to Rome to ask that Calynda should be ceded to them, and to petition the Senate that those of their citizens who had properties in Lycia and Caria might be allowed to retain them as before. They had also voted to raise a colossal statue of the Roman people, thirty cubits high, to be set up in the temple of Athene. . . .

The Rhodians ask for Calynda in Caria, and for the retention of private property in Caria and Lycia.

A colossal statue of Rome.

16. The Calyndians having broken off from Caunus, and the Caunians being about to besiege Calynda, the Calyndians first called in the aid of the Cnidians; and, on their sending the required support, they held out against their enemies for a time: but becoming alarmed as to what would happen, they sent an embassy to Rhodes, putting themselves and their city in its hands. Thereupon the Rhodians sent a naval and military force to their relief, forced the Caunians to raise the siege, and took over the city. . . .

The Rhodians undertake the protection of Calynda.

17. When Ariarathes, king of Cappadocia, had received his ambassadors on their return from Rome, judging from the answers they brought that his kingdom was secured, because he had gained the goodwill of Rome, he offered a thank-offering to the gods for what had happened, and entertained his nobles at a feast. He then sent ambassadors to Lysias in Antioch, desiring to be allowed to bring away the bones of his sister and mother. He determined not to say a word of blame as to the crime that had been committed, lest he should irritate Lysias, and so fail to effect his present object, though he was in fact greatly

Ariarathes's joy at the favourable answer from Rome.

He recovers the ashes of his mother and sister from Antioch.

incensed at it. He gave his envoys therefore instructions couched in terms of courteous request. Lysias and his friends acceded to his wishes; and the bones having been conveyed to Cappadocia, the king received them in great state, and buried them next the tomb of his father with affectionate reverence. . . .[1]

Artaxias wished to kill a man, but on the remonstrances of Ariarathes did not do so, and held him on the contrary in higher respect than ever. So decisive is the influence of justice, and of the opinions and advice of good men, that they often prove the salvation of foes as well as of friends, and change their whole characters for the better. . . .

The influence of good men, Artaxias of Armenia. See 25, 2.

Good looks are a better introduction than any letter. . . .

The quarrels of the two kings of Egypt, Ptolemy VI. Philometor and Euergetes II. (or Ptolemy VII.) Physcon. The former had been expelled by the latter, and had taken refuge in Cyprus, but had been restored by a popular outbreak in his favour, and under the authority of Commissioners sent from Rome, B.C. 164. (*Livy*, Ep. 46. *Diod.* Sic. *fr. xi.*) *Fresh quarrels however broke out, in the course of which Physcon was much worsted by his brother*, (*Diod.* Sic. *fr. of* 31), *and at length it was arranged that one should reign in Egypt the other in Cyrene.* B.C. 162. (*Livy*, Ep. 47.)

18. After the Ptolemies had made their partition of the kingdom, the younger brother arrived in Rome desiring to set aside the division made between himself and his brother, on the ground that he had not acceded to the arrangement voluntarily, but under compulsion, and yielding to the force of circumstances. He therefore begged the Senate to assign Cyprus to his portion; for, even if that were done, he should still have a much poorer share than his brother. Canuleius and Quintus supported

B.C. 162. Euergetes II. (Ptolemy Physcon), who had Cyrene as his share, asks for Cyprus.

The members of the Commission

[1] Ariarathes, the elder, had been in alliance with Antiochus the Great, and had apparently given him one of his daughters in marriage, who had been accompanied by her mother to Antioch, where both had now fallen victims to the jealousy of Eupator's minister, Lysias. See 21, 43.

who had been in Egypt support the elder brother.

Menyllus, the ambassador of the elder Ptolemy, by protesting that "the younger Ptolemy owed his possession of Cyrene and his very life to them, so deep was the anger and hatred of the common people to him[1]; and that, accordingly, he had been only too glad to receive the government of Cyrene, which he had not hoped for or expected; and had exchanged oaths with his brother with the customary sacrifices." To this Ptolemy gave a positive denial: and the Senate, seeing that the division was clearly an unequal one, and at the same time wishing that, as the brothers themselves were the authors of the division being made at all, it should be effected in a manner advantageous to Rome, granted the petition of the younger Ptolemy with a view to their own interest. Measures of this class are very frequent among the Romans, by which they avail themselves with profound policy of the mistakes of others to augment and strengthen their own empire, under the guise of granting favours and benefiting those who commit the errors. On this principle they acted now. They saw how great the power of the Egyptian kingdom was; and fearing lest, if it ever chanced to obtain a competent head, he would grow too proud, they appointed Titus Torquatus and Gnaeus Merula to establish Ptolemy Physcon in Cyprus, and thus to carry out their own policy while satisfying his. These commissioners were accordingly at once despatched with instructions to reconcile the brothers to each other, and to secure Cyprus to the younger. . . .

The Senate decide in favour of Physcon.

The object of the Senate is to divide and weaken Egypt.

When the Roman commissioners (*see ch.* 12) *arrived in Syria, and began carrying out their orders, by burning the ships and killing the elephants, the popular fury could not be restrained; and Gnaeus Octavius was assassinated in the gymnasium at Laodicea by a man named Leptines. Lysias did his best to appease the anger of the Romans, by giving Octavius honourable*

[1] The anger of the Alexandrians had been excited against Ptolemy Physcon by his having, for some unknown reason, caused the death of Timotheus, who had been Ptolemy Philometor's legate at Rome. See 28, 1. Diodor. *Sic.* fr. xi.

burial, and by sending an embassy to Rome to protest his innocence. Appian, Syr. 46.

19. News having come to Rome of the disaster by which Gnaeus Octavius lost his life, ambassadors also arrived from king Antiochus, sent by Lysias, who vehemently protested that the king's friends had had no part in the crime. But the Senate showed scant attention to the envoys, not wishing to make any open declaration on the subject or to allow their opinion to become public in any way.

B.C. 162. The Senate pay little attention to Lysias's excuses.

But Demetrius was much excited by the news, and immediately summoned Polybius to an interview, and consulted him as to whether he should once more bring his claims before the Senate. Polybius advised him "not to stumble twice on the same stone," but to depend upon himself and venture something worthy of a king; and he pointed out to him that the present state of affairs offered him many opportunities. Demetrius understood the hint, but said nothing at the time; but a short while afterwards consulted Apollonius one of his intimate friends, on the same subject. This man, being simple minded and very young, advised him to make another trial of the Senate. "He was convinced," he said, "that, since it had deprived him of his kingdom without any just excuse, it would at least release him from his position of hostage; for it was absurd that, when the boy Antiochus had succeeded to the kingdom in Syria, Demetrius should be a hostage for him." Persuaded by these arguments he once more obtained a hearing of the Senate, and claimed to be relieved of his obligations as a hostage, since they had decided to secure the kingdom to Antiochus. But, though he pleaded his cause with many arguments, the Senate remained fixed in the same resolve as before. And that was only what was to be expected. For they had not, on the former occasion, adjudged the continuance of the kingdom to the child on the ground that the claim of Demetrius was not just, but because it was

Demetrius thinks there is again a chance for him.

Polybius advises, "act for yourself."

He however again appeals to the Senate,

and is again refused.

advantageous to Rome that it should be so; and as the circumstances remained precisely the same, it was only natural that the policy of the Senate should remain unchanged also.

20. Demetrius having thus delivered himself in vain of his swan's song, his last appeal, and becoming convinced that Polybius had given him good advice, repented of what he had done. But he was naturally of a lofty spirit, and possessed sufficient daring to carry out his resolutions. He promptly called Diodorus, who had recently arrived from Syria, to his aid, and confided his secret purpose to him. Diodorus had had the charge of Demetrius as a child, and was a man of considerable adroitness, who had besides made a careful inspection of the state of affairs in Syria. He now pointed out to Demetrius that "The confusion caused by the murder of Octavius,—the people mistrusting Lysias, and Lysias mistrusting the people, while the Senate was convinced that the lawless murder of their envoy really originated with the king's friends,—presented a most excellent opportunity for his appearing on the scene: for the people there would promptly transfer the crown to him, even though he were to arrive attended by but one slave; while the Senate would not venture to give any further assistance or support to Lysias after such an abominable crime. Finally, it was quite possible for them to leave Rome undetected, without any one having any idea of his intention." This course being resolved upon, Demetrius sent for Polybius, and telling him what he was going to do, begged him to lend his assistance, and to join him in contriving to manage his escape.

Demetrius resolves to escape from Rome, and again consults Polybius.

There happened to be at Rome a certain Menyllus of Alabanda, on a mission from the elder Ptolemy to confront and answer the younger before the Senate. Between this man and Polybius there was a strong friendship and confidence, and Polybius therefore thought him just the man for the purpose in hand. He accordingly introduced him with all speed to Demetrius, and with warm expressions of regard. Being trusted with the secret, Menyllus undertook to have the necessary ship in readiness, and to see that everything required for the

Menyllus of Alabanda (in Caria) helps him by hiring a vessel.

voyage was prepared. Having found a Carthaginian vessel anchored at the mouth of the Tiber, which had been on sacred service, he chartered it. (These vessels are carefully selected at Carthage, to convey the offerings sent by the Carthaginians to their ancestral gods at Tyre.) He made no secret about it, but chartered the vessel for his own return voyage; and therefore was able to make his arrangements for provisions also without exciting suspicion, talking openly with the sailors and making an appointment with them.

21. When the shipmaster had everything ready, and nothing remained except for Demetrius to do his part, he sent Diodorus to Syria to gather information, and to watch the disposition of the people there. His foster-brother Apollonius took part in this expedition; and Demetrius also confided his secret to the two brothers of Apollonius, Meleager and Menestheus, but to no one else of all his suite, though that was numerous. These three brothers were the sons of the Apollonius who occupied so important a position at the court of Seleucus, but who had removed to Miletus at the accession of Antiochus Epiphanes. As the day agreed upon with the sailors approached, it was arranged that one of his friends should give an entertainment to serve as an excuse for Demetrius going out. For it was impossible that he should sup at home; as it was his constant habit, when he did so, to invite all his suite. Those who were in the secret were to leave the house after supper and go to the ship, taking one slave each with them; the rest they had sent on to Anagnia, saying that they would follow next day. It happened that at this time Polybius was ill and confined to his bed; but he was kept acquainted with all that was going on by constant communications from Menyllus. He was therefore exceedingly anxious, knowing Demetrius to be fond of conviviality and full of youthful wilfulness, lest, by the entertainment being unduly prolonged, some difficulty should arise from over-indulgence in wine to prevent his getting away. He therefore wrote and sealed a small tablet; and just as it was getting dusk sent a servant of his own, with orders to ask for Demetrius's cupbearer and give him the tablet, without saying who he was or from whom he

Preparations for the flight.

Polybius sends a warning to Demetrius.

came, and to bid the cupbearer to give it to Demetrius to read at once. His orders were carried out, and Demetrius read the tablet, which contained the following apophthegms [1]:—

"The ready hand bears off the sluggard's prize."

"Night favours all, but more the daring heart."

"Be bold: front danger: strike! then lose or win,
Care not, so you be true unto yourself."

"Cool head and wise distrust are wisdom's sinews."

Demetrius takes the hint, and the voyage is safely begun.

22. As soon as Demetrius had read these lines, he understood their purport, and from whom they came; and at once pretending that he felt sick, he left the banquet escorted by his friends. Arrived at his lodging, he sent away those of his servants who were not suited to his purpose to Anagnia, ordering them to take the hunting nets and hounds and meet him at Cerceii, where it had been his constant custom to go boar hunting, which, in fact, was the origin of his intimacy with Polybius. He then imparted his plan to Nicanor and his immediate friends, and urged them to share his prospects. They all consented with enthusiasm; whereupon he bade them return to their own lodgings, and arrange with their servants to go before daybreak to Anagnia and meet them at Cerceii, while they got travelling clothes and returned to him, telling their domestics that they would join them, accompanied by Demetrius, in the course of the next day at Cerceii. Everything having been done in accordance with this order, he and his friends went to Ostia, at the mouth of the Tiber, by night. Menyllus preceded them and had a conversation with the sailors; telling them that orders had arrived from the king which made it necessary for him to remain at Rome for the present, and to send some of the most trustworthy of his young men to his Majesty, to inform him of what had been done about his brother. He should not, therefore, he said, go on board himself; but the young men who were to sail would come about midnight. The shipmasters made no difficulty about it, as the passage money for which they had originally bargained was in their hands;

[1] The first line is of unknown authorship. The second is from Euripides, *Phoeniss.* 633. The third apophthegm is again unknown. The last is from Epicharmus, see 18, 40.

and they had long made all their preparations for sailing, when Demetrius and his friends arrived about the third watch. There were altogether eight of them, besides five slaves and three boys. Menyllus entered into conversation with them, showed them the provisions in store for the voyage, and commended them earnestly to the care of the shipmaster and crew. They then went on board, and the pilot weighed anchor and started just as day was breaking, having absolutely no idea of the real state of the case, but believing that he was conveying some soldiers from Menyllus to Ptolemy.

23. At Rome, during the whole of the following day, no one was likely to make any inquiry for Demetrius or those who had gone with him. For those of his household who stayed in the city supposed him to have gone to Cerceii; and those at Anagnia were expecting him to come there too. The flight from Rome, therefore, was entirely unremarked; until one of his slaves, having been flogged at Anagnia, ran off to Cerceii, expecting to find Demetrius there; and not finding him, ran back again to Rome, hoping to meet him on the road. But as he failed to meet him anywhere, he went and informed his friends in Rome and the members of his household who had been left behind in his house. But it was not until the fourth day after his start that, Demetrius being looked for in vain, the truth was suspected. On the fifth the Senate was hastily summoned to consider the matter, when Demetrius had already cleared the Straits of Messina. The Senate gave up all idea of pursuit: both because they imagined that he had got a long start on the voyage (for the wind was in his favour), and because they foresaw that, though they might wish to hinder him, they would be unable to do so. But some few days afterwards they appointed Tiberius Gracchus, Lucius Lentulus, and Servilius Glaucia as commissioners: first to inspect the state of Greece; and, next, to cross to Asia and watch the result of Demetrius's attempt, and examine the policy adopted by the other kings, and arbitrate on their controversies with the Gauls. Such were the events in Italy this year. . . .

The absence of Demetrius is not ascertained in Rome until the fourth day.

The Senate is summoned, but decides not to attempt pursuit.

Commissioners appointed for Greece and Asia, B.C. 162.

Demetrius expecting the arrival of the commissioner who was to be sent to him. . . .

Cato on the growth of luxury.

24. The dissoluteness of the young men in Rome had grown to such a height, and broke out in such extravagances, that there were many instances of men purchasing a jar of Pontic salt-fish for three hundred drachmae.[1] In reference to which Marcus Porcius Cato once said to the people in indignation, that no better proof could be shown of the degeneracy of the state than that good-looking slaves[2] should fetch more than a farm, and a jar of salt-fish more than a carter. . . .

The Rhodians accept money to pay their schoolmasters, B.C. 162.

25. The Rhodians, though in other respects maintaining the dignity of their state, made in my opinion a slight lapse at this period. They had received two hundred and eighty thousand medimni of corn from Eumenes, that its value might be invested and the interest devoted to pay the fees of the tutors and schoolmasters of their sons. One might accept this from friends in a case of financial embarrassment, as one might in private life, rather than allow children to remain uneducated for want of means; but where means are abundant a man would rather do anything than allow the schoolmaster's fee to be supplied by a joint contribution from his friends. And in proportion as a state should hold higher notions than an individual, so ought governments to be more jealous of their dignity than private men, and above all a Rhodian government, considering the wealth of the country and its high pretensions. . . .

Ptolemy Physcon returning with the commissioners, collects mercenaries in Greece, but is persuaded to disband them, B.C. 162.

26. After this the younger Ptolemy arrived in Greece with the Roman commissioners, and began collecting a formidable army of mercenaries, among whom he enlisted Damasippus the Macedonian, who, after murdering the members of the council at Phacus, fled with his wife and children from Macedonia, and after reaching Peraea, opposite Rhodes, and being entertained by the people there, determined to sail to Cyprus. But when Torquatus and his

[1] About £12.

[2] In his Censorship (B.C. 184) Cato imposed a tax on slaves under twenty sold for more than ten sestertia (about £70.) Livy, 39, 44.

colleagues saw that Ptolemy had collected a formidable corps of mercenaries, they reminded him of their commission, which was to restore him "without a war," and at last persuaded him to go as far as Side (in Pamphylia), and there disband his mercenaries, give up his idea of invading Cyprus, and meet them on the frontiers of Cyrene. Meanwhile, they said that they would sail to Alexandria, and induce the king to consent to their demands, and would meet him on the frontiers, bringing the other king with them. The younger Ptolemy was persuaded by these arguments, gave up the attack upon Cyprus, dismissed the mercenaries, and first sailed to Crete, accompanied by Damasippus and Gnaeus Merula, one of the commissioners; and, after enlisting about a thousand soldiers in Crete, put to sea and crossed to Libya, landing at Apis.

He, however, takes about 100 Cretans back with him to Africa.

ch. 18.

27. Meanwhile Torquatus had crossed to Alexandria and was trying to induce the elder Ptolemy to be reconciled to his brother, and yield Cyprus to him. But Ptolemy, by alternate promises and refusals and the like, managed to waste the time, while the younger king lay encamped with his thousand Cretans at Apis in Libya, according to his agreement. Becoming thoroughly irritated at receiving no intelligence, he first sent Gnaeus Merula to Alexandria, hoping by this means to bring Torquatus and those with him to the place of meeting. But Merula was like the others in protracting the business: forty days passed without a word of intelligence, and the king was in despair. The fact was that the elder king, by using every kind of flattery, had won the commissioners over, and was keeping them by him, rather against their will than with it. Moreover, at this time the younger Ptolemy was informed that the people of Cyrene had revolted, that the cities were conspiring with them, and that Ptolemy Sympetesis had also taken their side. This man was an Egyptian by birth, and had been left by the king in charge of his whole kingdom when he was going on his journey to Rome. When the king was informed of this, and learned presently that the Cyreneans were encamped in the open country, afraid lest, in his desire to add

Ptolemy Physcon invades the dominions of his brother.

Cyprus to his dominions, he might lose Cyrene also, he threw everything else aside and marched towards Cyrene. When he came to what is called the Great Slope, he found the Libyans and Cyreneans occupying the pass. Ptolemy was alarmed at this: but, putting half his forces on board boats, he ordered them to sail beyond the difficult ground, and show themselves on the rear of the enemy; while with the other half he marched up in their front and tried to carry the pass. The Libyans being panic-stricken at this double attack on front and rear, and abandoning their position, Ptolemy not only got possession of the pass, but also of Tetrapyrgia, which lay immediately below it, in which there was an abundant supply of water. Thence he crossed the desert in seven days, the forces under Mochyrinus coasting along parallel to his line of march. The Cyreneans were encamped eight thousand five hundred strong, eight thousand infantry and five hundred cavalry: for having satisfied themselves as to the character of Ptolemy from his conduct at Alexandria, and seeing that his government and policy generally were those of a tyrant rather than a king, they could not endure the idea of becoming his subjects, but were determined to venture everything in their desire for freedom. And at last he was beaten. . . .

The Roman commission fails to secure peace between the brothers.

28. At this time Gnaeus Merula also came from Alexandria, informing the king (Physcon) that his brother would consent to none of the proposals, but maintained that they ought to abide by the original agreements. On hearing this, Physcon selected the brothers Comanus and Ptolemy[1] to go as ambassadors to Rome with Gnaeus, and inform the Senate of his brother's selfish and haughty behaviour. At the same time the elder Ptolemy sent away Titus Torquatus also without having attained the object of his mission. Such was the state of things in Alexandria and Cyrene. . . .

[1] Called Ptolemy the Orator in 28, 19.

BOOK XXXII

1. This year Comanus and his brother arrived at Rome on their mission from the younger Ptolemy, and Menyllus of Alabanda from the elder. Their interview with the Senate was the occasion of many mutual recriminations expressed with great bitterness; and when Titus Torquatus and Gnaeus Merula gave evidence in favour of the younger king, and supported him with great earnestness, the Senate voted that Menyllus and his colleagues should leave Rome within five days, and that the treaty of alliance with the elder Ptolemy should be annulled; but that they should send envoys to the younger to inform him of the decree of the Senate. Publius Apustius and Gaius Lentulus were appointed to this service, who immediately sailed to Cyrene, and with great despatch announced to Physcon the decree of the Senate. Greatly elated by this, Ptolemy began collecting mercenaries, and devoted his whole attention and energies to the acquisition of Cyprus. This was what was going on in Italy. . . .

B.C. 161. The Senate break off relations with Ptolemy Philometor, and encourage Ptolemy Physcon in his claim on Cyprus.

2. Not long before this period Massanissa resolved to try his strength with the Carthaginians. He saw how numerous the cities built along the lesser Syrtis were, and noticed the excellence of the district which they call Emporia, and he had long been casting an envious eye upon the revenues which those places produced. He quickly possessed himself of the open part of the country, because the Carthaginians were always averse from service in the field, and were at that time completely enervated by the long peace. But he

Between the second and third Punic wars Massanissa constantly encroached on Carthaginian territory. Both sides refer to Rome,

was unable to get possession of the towns, because they were carefully guarded by the Carthaginians. Both parties then referring their case to the Roman Senate, and frequent embassies coming to Rome from both sides, it always happened that the Carthaginians got the worst of it in the judgment of the Romans, not on the merits of the case, but because the judges were convinced that such a decision was in their interests. For instance, not many years before this Massanissa was himself at the head of an army in pursuit of Aphther, who had revolted from him, and asked permission of the Carthaginians to go through this territory, which they refused on the ground that it had nothing to do with him. Owing, however, to the decisions given at Rome during this period, the Carthaginians were put into such difficulties that they not only lost the cities and territory, but had to pay besides five hundred talents as mesne profits from the district. And this was the origin of the present controversy.[1] . . .

and the Romans invariably support Massanissa.

B.C. 193, cp. Livy, 34, 62.

3. Prusias sent envoys to Rome with some Gauls to accuse Eumenes; and Eumenes in his turn sent his brother Attalus to rebut the accusations. Ariarathes sent a present of ten thousand gold pieces, and envoys to inform the Senate of the reception given to Tiberius Gracchus; and generally to ask for their commands, and to assure them that he would do anything they told him. . . .

Further complaints against Eumenes by Prusias and the Gauls. See 31, 4, B.C. 161.

4. When Menochares arrived in Antioch to visit Demetrius, and informed the king[2] of the conversation he had had with the commission under Tiberius Gracchus in Cappadocia, the king, thinking it a matter of the most urgent necessity to get these men on his side as much as he could, devoted himself, to the exclusion of every other business, to sending

Demetrius induces Tiberius Gracchus to salute him as king.

[1] A more detailed statement of the controversies between Carthage and Massanissa, fostered and encouraged by the Romans, is found in Appian, *Res Punicae*, 67 *sq.*

[2] Demetrius was now king. On his escape from Rome, described in bk. 31, chs. 20-23, he had met with a ready reception in Syria, had seized the sovereign power, and put the young Antiochus and his minister Lysias to death; this was in B.C. 162. Appian, *Syriac.* ch. 47,

messages to them, first to Pamphylia, and then to Rhodes, undertaking to do everything the Romans wished; till at last he extracted their acknowledgment of him as king. The fact was that Tiberius was very favourably disposed to him; and, accordingly, materially contributed to the success of his attempt, and to his acquisition of the royal power. Demetrius took advantage of this to send envoys to Rome, taking with them a complimentary crown, the murderer of Gnaeus Octavius, and with them Isocrates the critic. . . .

Surrenders the murderer of Octavius.

5. At this time came ambassadors from Ariarathes, bringing a complimentary present of ten thousand gold pieces, and announcing the king's faithful attachment to Rome; and of this they appealed to Tiberius and his colleagues as witnesses. Tiberius and his colleagues confirmed their statements: whereupon the Senate accepted the present with warm thanks, and sent back in return presents, which with them are the most honourable they can give—a sceptre and ivory chair. These ambassadors were dismissed at once by the Senate before the winter. But after them arrived Attalus when the new Consuls had already entered on their office; as well as the Gauls who had accusations against him, and whom Prusias had sent, with as many more from Asia. After giving all a hearing, the Senate not only acquitted Attalus of all blame, but dismissed him with additional marks of their favour and kindness: for their friendship for and active support of Attalus was in the same proportion as their hostility and opposition to king Eumenes. . . .

Ambassadors from Ariarathes.

Attalus again in Rome early in B.C. 160. Coss. L. Anicius Gallus, M. Cornelius Cathegus.

6. The ambassadors with Menochares arrived in Rome from Demetrius, bringing the present of ten thousand gold pieces, as well as the man who had assassinated Gnaeus Octavius. The Senate was for a long time doubtful what to do about these matters. Finally they received the ambassadors and accepted the present, but declined to receive the men who were thus brought prisoners. Yet Demetrius had sent not only Leptines, the actual assassin of Octavius, but Isocrates as well. The latter was a grammarian

Reception of the ambassadors of Demetrius.

and public lecturer; but being by nature garrulous, boastful, and conceited, he gave offence even to the Greeks, Alcaeus and his friends being accustomed to direct their wit against him and hold him up to ridicule in their scholastic discussions.[1] When he arrived in Syria, he displayed contempt for the people of the country; and not content with lecturing on his own subjects, he took to speaking on politics, and maintained that "Gnaeus Octavius had been rightly served; and that the other ambassadors ought to be put to death also, that there might be no one left to report the matter to the Romans; and so they might be taught to give up sending haughty injunctions and exercising unlimited power." By such random talk he got into this trouble.

Previous career of Isocrates.

His conduct in Syria.

7. And there is a circumstance connected with both these men that is worth recording. After assassinating Gnaeus, Leptines immediately went openly about Laodicea, asserting that what he had done was just, and that it had been effected in accordance with the will of the gods. And when Demetrius took possession of the government, he went to the king exhorting him to have no fear about the murder of Gnaeus, nor to adopt any measures of severity against the Laodiceans; for that he would himself go to Rome and convince the Senate that he had done this deed in accordance with the will of the gods. And finally, thanks to his entire readiness and even eagerness to go, he was taken without chains or a guard. But directly Isocrates found himself included under this charge, he went entirely beside himself with terror; and, after the collar and chain were put on his neck, he would rarely touch food, and completely neglected all care of his body. He accordingly arrived at Rome a truly astonishing spectacle, sufficient to convince us that nothing can be more frightful than a man, in body and soul alike, when once divested of his humanity. His aspect was

The boldness of Leptines.

Extraordinary conduct of Isocrates.

[1] ἐν ταῖς συγκρίσεσιν. But it is very doubtful what the exact meaning of this word is. Alcaeus seems to be the Epicurean philosopher who, among others, was expelled from Rome in B.C. 171. See Athenaeus, xii. 547, who however calls him Alcios. See also Aelian, *V. Hist.* 9, 12.

beyond all measure terrifying and savage, as might be expected in a man who had neither washed the dirt from his body, nor pared his nails, nor cut his hair, for a year. The wild glare and rolling of his eyes also showed such inward horror, that any one who saw him would have rather approached any animal in the world than him. Leptines, on the contrary, maintained his original view: was ready to appear before the Senate; owned plainly to all who conversed with him what he had done; and asserted that he would meet with no severity at the hands of the Romans. And eventually his expectation was fully justified. For the Senate, from the idea, I believe, that, if it received and punished the guilty men, the populace would consider that full satisfaction had been taken for the murder, refused almost outright to receive them; and thus kept the charge in reserve, that they might have the power of using the accusation whenever they chose. They therefore confined their answer to Demetrius to these words: "He shall find all favour at our hands, if he satisfy the Senate in accordance with the obedience which he owed to it before." . . .

The Senate decide to keep the question of the murder open.

There came also ambassadors from the Achaeans, headed by Xenon and Telecles, in behalf of their accused compatriots, and especially in behalf of Polybius and Stratius; for lapse of time had now brought an end to the majority, or at any rate to those of any note. The ambassadors came with instructions couched in a tone of simple entreaty, in order to avoid anything like a contest with the Senate. But when they had been admitted and delivered their commission in proper terms, even this humble tone failed to gain their end, and the Senate voted to abide by their resolve. . . .

Fruitless embassy from Achaia on behalf of Polybius and the other Achaean detenus, B.C. 160.

8. The strongest and most honourable proof of the integrity of Lucius Aemilius Paulus was made public after his death. For the character which he enjoyed while alive was found to be justified at his death, than which there can be no clearer proof of virtue. No one of his contemporaries brought home more gold from Iberia than he; no one captured such enormous treasures as he did in Macedonia;

The small property left by Aemilius Paulus at his death is a proof of his disinterestedness.

and yet, though in both these countries he had the most unlimited authority, he left so small a private fortune, that his sons could not pay his wife's jointure wholly from the sale of his personalty, and were obliged to sell some of his real estate also to do so, a fact of which I have already spoken in some detail. This forces us to acknowledge that the fame of the men who have been admired in Greece in this respect suffers by a comparison. For if to abstain from appropriating money, entrusted to a man for the benefit of the depositor, deserves our admiration,—as is said to have happened in the case of the Athenian Aristeides and the Theban Epaminondas,—how much more admirable is it for a man to have been master of a whole kingdom, with absolute authority to do with it as he chose, and yet to have coveted nothing in it! And if what I say appears incredible to any of my readers, let them consider that the present writer was fully aware that Romans, more than any other people, would take his books into their hands,—because the most splendid and numerous achievements recorded therein belong to them; and that with them the truth about the facts could not possibly be unknown, nor the author of a falsehood expect any indulgence. No one then would voluntarily expose himself to certain disbelief and contempt. And let this be kept in mind throughout the whole course of my work, when I seem to be making a startling assertion about the Romans.

See 18, 35.

Polybius has the fear of Roman critics before his eyes.

9. As the course of my narrative and the events of the time have drawn our attention to this family, I wish to carry out fully, for the sake of students, what was left as a mere promise in my previous book. I promised then that I would relate the origin and manner of the rise and unusually early glory of Scipio's reputation in Rome; and also how it came about that Polybius became so attached to and intimate with him, that the fame of their friendship and constant companionship was not merely confined to Italy and Greece, but became known to more remote nations also. We have already shown that the acquaintance began in a loan of some books and the conversation about them. But as the intimacy went on, and the Achaean

The origin of the friendship between Scipio Aemilianus and Polybius.

detenus were being distributed among the various cities, Fabius and Scipio, the sons of Lucius Aemilius Paulus,[1] exerted all their influence with the praetor that Polybius might be allowed to remain in Rome. This was granted: and the intimacy was becoming more and more close, when the following incident occurred. One day, when they were all three coming out of the house of Fabius, it happened that Fabius left them to go to the Forum, and that Polybius went in another direction with Scipio. As they were walking along, in a quiet and subdued voice, and with the blood mounting to his cheeks, Scipio said, "Why is it, Polybius, that though I and my brother eat at the same table, you address all your conversation and all your questions and explanations to him, and pass me over altogether? Of course you too have the same opinion of me as I hear the rest of the city has. For I am considered by everybody, I hear, to be a mild effete person, and far removed from the true Roman character and ways, because I don't care for pleading in the law courts. And they say that the family I come of requires a different kind of representative, and not the sort that I am. That is what annoys me most."

Young Scipio opens his heart to Polybius.

10. Polybius was taken aback by the opening words of the young man's speech (for he was only just eighteen), and said, "In heaven's name, Scipio, don't say such things, or take into your head such an idea. It is not from any want of appreciation of you, or any intention of slighting you, that I have acted as I have done: far from it! It is merely that, your brother being the elder, I begin and end my remarks with him, and address my explanations and counsels to him, in the belief that you share the same opinions. However, I am delighted to hear you say now that you appear to yourself to be somewhat less spirited than is becoming to members of your family: for you show by this that you have a really high spirit, and I should gladly devote myself to helping you to speak or act in any way worthy of your ancestors. As for learning, to which I see you and your brother devoting yourselves at present with so much earnestness and zeal, you will find plenty of people

Scipio Aemilianus, b. B.C. 185.

[1] See note on p. 456.

to help you both; for I see that a large number of such learned men from Greece are finding their way into Rome at the present time. But as to the points which you say are just now vexing you, I think you will not find any one more fitted to support and assist you than myself." While Polybius was still speaking the young man seized his right hand with both of his, and pressing it warmly, said, "Oh that I might see the day on which you would devote your first attention to me, and join your life with mine. From that moment I shall think myself worthy both of my family and my ancestors." Polybius was partly delighted at the sight of the young man's enthusiasm and affection, and partly embarrassed by the thought of the high position of his family and the wealth of its members. However, from the hour of this mutual confidence the young man never left the side of Polybius, but regarded his society as his first and dearest object.

Polybius is somewhat alarmed at the responsibility.

11. From that time forward they continually gave each other practical proof of an affection which recalled the relationship of father and son, or of kinsmen of the same blood. The first impulse and ambition of a noble kind with which he was inspired was the desire to maintain a character for chastity, and to be superior to the standard observed in that respect among his contemporaries. This was a glory which, great and difficult as it generally is, was not hard to gain at that period in Rome, owing to the general deterioration of morals. Some had wasted their energies on favourite youths; others on mistresses; and a great many on banquets enlivened with poetry and wine, and all the extravagant expenditure which they entailed, having quickly caught during the war with Perseus the dissoluteness of Greek manners in this respect. And to such monstrous lengths had this debauchery gone among the young men, that many of them had given a talent for a young favourite. This dissoluteness had as it were burst into flame at this period: in the first place, from the prevalent idea that, owing to the destruction of the Macedonian monarchy, universal dominion was now secured to them beyond dispute; and in the second place, from the immense difference made, both in public and

Scipio's high character for continence as a young man.

The deterioration in Roman morals and its causes.

private wealth and splendour, by the importation of the riches of Macedonia into Rome. Scipio, however, set his heart on a different path in life; and by a steady resistance to his appetites, and by conforming his whole conduct to a consistent and undeviating standard, in about the first five years after this secured a general recognition of his character for goodness and purity.

12. His next object was to cultivate lofty sentiments in regard to money, and to maintain a higher standard of disinterestedness than other people. In this respect he had an excellent start in his association with his natural father (L. Aemilius): but he also had good natural impulses towards the right; and chance contributed much to his success in this particular aim. For he first lost the mother of his adoptive father, who was the sister of his natural father Lucius, and wife of his adoptive grandfather, Scipio the Great. She left a large fortune, to which he was heir, and which gave him the first opportunity of giving a proof of his principles. Aemilia, for that was this lady's name, was accustomed to attend the women's processions in great state, as sharing the life and high fortune of Scipio. For besides the magnificence of her dress and carriage, the baskets, cups, and such implements for the sacrifice, which were carried in her train, were all of silver or gold on great occasions; and the number of maid-servants and other domestics that made up her train was in proportion to this splendour.

Scipio's liberality to his mother.

All this establishment, immediately after Aemilia's funeral, Scipio presented to his own mother, who had long before been divorced by his father Lucius, and was badly off considering the splendour of her birth.[1] She had therefore in previous years refrained from taking part in grand public processions; but now, as there chanced to be an important state sacrifice, she appeared surrounded with all the splendour and wealth which had once been Aemilia's, using among other things the same muleteers, pair of mules, and carriage. The ladies, therefore, who saw it were much impressed by the kindness and liberality of Scipio, and all raised their hands to heaven and prayed for blessings upon him. This act, indeed, would be

[1] She was the daughter of C. Papirius Carbo, Coss. B.C. 231.

thought honourable anywhere, but at Rome it was quite astonishing: for there no one ever thinks of giving any of his private property to any one if he can help it. This was the beginning of Scipio's reputation for nobility of character, and it spread very widely,—for women are talkative and prone to exaggeration whenever they feel warmly.

Scipio's liberality to his cousins, sisters to his adoptive father.

13. The next instance was his conduct to the daughters of the Great Scipio, sisters to his adoptive father.[1] When he took the inheritance he was bound to pay them their portion. For their father covenanted to give each of his two daughters a marriage portion of fifty talents. Half of this their mother paid down at once to their husbands, but left the other half undischarged when she died. Now, the Roman law enjoins the payment of money due to women as dowry in three annual instalments, the personal outfit having been first paid within ten months according to custom.[2] But Scipio instructed his banker at once to pay the twenty-five talents to each within the ten months. When, therefore, Tiberius Gracchus and Scipio Nasica, for they were the husbands of these ladies, called on the banker at the expira-

[1] The following pedigree will show the various family connexions here alluded to :—


Publius Cornelius Scipio
ob. in Spain B.C. 212.
P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus = Aemilia, sister of Lucius Aemilius Paulus = Papiria
ob. B.C. 187.
ob. B.C. 162.
ob. B.C. 160.
Quintus Fabius Maximus adopted by Q. F. M.
Scipio Aemilianus b. B.C. 185.
two daughters.
P. Scipio Nasica = Cornelia (1).
Cornelia (2) = Tib. Sempronius Gracchus.
Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus ob. s. p. adopted his cousin who became Publius Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus Africanus ob. B.C. 129.

[2] τῶν ἐπίπλων, the *ornamenta* of a bride, consisting of clothes, jewels, slaves, and other things, in accordance with her station. See Horace, *Sat.* 2, 3, 214. For the three instalments in which it was necessary to pay dowries, see Cicero *ad Att.* ii. 23 ; 2 *Phil.* § 113.

tion of the ten months, and asked whether Scipio had given him any instructions as to the money, he told them they might have it at once, and proceeded to enter the transfer of twenty-five talents to each.[1] They then said that he had made a mistake, for they had no claim for the whole as yet, but only took a third according to the law; and upon the banker answering that such were his instructions from Scipio, they could not believe him, and went to call on the young man, supposing him to have made a mistake. And, indeed, their feelings were natural: for at Rome, so far from paying fifty talents three years in advance, no one will pay a single talent before the appointed day; so excessively particular are they about money, and so profitable do they consider time. However, when they reached Scipio and asked him what instructions he had given his banker, on his replying, "To pay both sisters the whole sum due to them," they told him he had made a mistake; and with a show of friendly regard pointed out to him that, according to the laws, he had the use of the money for a considerable time longer. But Scipio replied that he was quite aware of all that; but that close reckoning and legal exactness were for strangers; with relations and friends he would do his best to behave straightforwardly and liberally. He therefore bade them draw on the banker for the whole sum. When Tiberius and Nasica heard this they returned home in silence, quite confounded at the magnanimity of Scipio, and condemning themselves for meanness, though they were men of as high a character as any at Rome.

14. Two years afterwards, when his natural father, Lucius Aemilius, died, and left him and his brother Fabius joint heirs to his property, he did an act honourable to himself and worthy to be recorded. Lucius died without children in the eyes of the law, for the two elder had been adopted into other families, and the other sons, whom he was bringing up to be the successors to himself and to continue his family, all died;[2]

The liberality of Scipio to his brother and sisters, B.C. 160.

[1] ποιοῦντος τὴν διαγραφὴν seems a banker's term for "paying," *i.e.* by striking off or cancelling a debt entered against a man. The only other instance of such a use seems to be Dionys. Hal. 5, 28.

[2] Of his two younger sons one died five days before his Macedonian triumph, the other three days after it. See Livy, 45, 40.

he therefore left his property to these two. But Scipio, perceiving that his brother was worse off than himself, renounced the whole of his share of the inheritance, though the property was valued altogether at over sixty talents, with a view of thus putting Fabius on an equality with himself in point of wealth. This was much talked about; but he afterwards gave a still clearer proof of his liberality. For when his brother wished to give some gladiatorial games in honour of his father, but was unable to support the expense, because of the enormous costliness of such things, Scipio contributed half of this also from his own pocket. Now the cost of such an exhibition, if it is done on a large scale, does not amount in all to less than thirty talents. While the fame of his liberality to his mother was still fresh, she died; and so far from taking back any part of the wealth he had recently bestowed on her, of which I have just spoken, Scipio gave it and the entire residue of his mother's property to his sisters,[1] though they had no legal claim at all upon it. Accordingly his sisters again adopted the splendour and retinue which Aemilia had employed in the public processions; and once more the liberality and family affection of Scipio were recalled to the minds of the people.

With such recommendations dating from his earliest years, Publius Scipio sustained the reputation for high morality and good principles, which he had won by the expenditure of perhaps sixty talents, for that was the sum which he bestowed from his own property. And this reputation for goodness did not depend so much on the amount of the money, as on the seasonableness of the gift and the graciousness with which

[1] The two sisters were both named Aemilia; the elder was married to Q. Aelius Tubero, the younger to M. Porcius Cato, elder son of the Censor. The daughters were prevented from taking the inheritance of their mother's property by the lex Voconia (B.C. 174), in virtue of which a woman could not be a haeres, nor take a legacy greater than that of the haeres, or of all the haeredes together. The object of the law was to prevent the transference of the property of one gens to another on a large scale. It was evaded (1) by trusteeships, Gaius, 2, 274; Plutarch, *Cic.* 41: (2) by the assent of the haeres, Cic. *de Off.* 2, § 55. And it was relaxed by Augustus in favour of mothers of three children, *Dio Cass.* 56, 10. See also Cicero *de Sen.* § 14; *de legg.* 2, 20; *de Rep.* 3, 10; *Verr.* 2, 1, 42; Pliny, *Panegyr.* 42; Livy, *Ep.* 41.

it was bestowed. By his strict chastity, also, he not only saved his purse, but by refraining from many irregular pleasures he gained sound bodily health and a vigorous constitution, which accompanied him through the whole of his life and repaid him with many pleasures, and noble compensations for the immediate pleasures from which he had formerly abstained.

15. Courage, however, is the most important element of character for public life in every country, but especially in Rome: and he therefore was bound to give all his most serious attention to it. In this he was well seconded by Fortune also. For as the Macedonian kings were especially eager about hunting, and the Macedonians devoted the most suitable districts to the preservation of game, these places were carefully guarded during all the war time, as they had been before, and yet had not been hunted the whole of the four years owing to the public disturbances: the consequence was that they were full of every kind of animal. But when the war was decided, Lucius Aemilius, thinking that hunting was the best training for body and courage his young soldiers could have, put the royal huntsmen under the charge of Scipio, and gave him entire authority over all matters connected with the hunting. Scipio accepted the duty, and, looking upon himself as in a quasi-royal position, devoted his whole time to this business, as long as the army remained in Macedonia after the battle of Pydna. Having then ample opportunity for following this kind of pursuit, and being in the very prime of his youth and naturally disposed to it, the taste for hunting which he acquired became permanent. Accordingly when he returned to Rome, and found his taste supported by a corresponding enthusiasm on the part of Polybius, the time that other young men spent in law courts and formal visits,[1] haunting the Forum and endeavouring thereby to ingratiate themselves with the people, Scipio devoted to hunting; and, by continually displaying brilliant and memorable acts of prowess, won a greater

Scipio's physical strength and courage were confirmed by the exercise of hunting in Macedonia,

and his taste continued after his return to Rome, and was encouraged by Polybius.

[1] That is, the morning from daybreak till about ten or eleven. The *salutationes* came first, and the law business in the third hour.

reputation than others, whose only chance of gaining credit was by inflicting some damage on one of their fellow-citizens,—for that was the usual result of these law proceedings. Scipio, on the other hand, without inflicting annoyance on any one, gained a popular reputation for manly courage, rivalling eloquence by action. The result was that in a short time he obtained a more decided superiority of position over his contemporaries, than any Roman is remembered to have done; although he struck out a path for his ambition which, with a view to Roman customs and ideas, was quite different from that of others.

Scipio's subsequent success, therefore, was the natural result of his early conduct, and not the offspring of chance.

16. I have spoken somewhat at length on the character of Scipio, because I thought that such a story would be agreeable to the older, and useful to the younger among my readers. But especially because I wished to make what I have to tell in my following books appear credible; that no one may feel any difficulty because of the apparent strangeness of what happened to this man; nor deprive him of the credit of achievements which were the natural consequences of his prudence, and attribute them to Fortune and chance. I must now return from this digression to the regular course of my history. . . .

The Delians having been allowed to leave their island with "all their property," found many occasions of legal disputes with the Athenians, to whom the island was granted. See 30, 21. They remove to Achaia, and sue the Athenians under the Achaean convention. Roman decision against Athens.

17. Thearidas and Stephanus conducted a mission from Athens and the Achaeans on the matter of the reprisals. For when the Delians were ordered, in answer to an embassy to Rome after Delos had been granted to Athens, to depart from the island, but to take all their goods with them, they removed to Achaia; and having been enrolled as citizens of the league, wished to have their claims upon the Athenians decided, according to the convention existing between the Achaeans and Athens. But, on the Athenians denying that they had any right to plead under that agreement, the Delians demanded from the Achaeans license to make reprisals on the Athenians. The latter, therefore, sent an embassy to Rome on these points, and were answered that decisions

made by the Achaeans according to their laws concerning the Delians were to be binding. . . .

18. The people of Issa having often sent embassies to Rome, complaining that the Dalmatians damaged their territory and the cities subject to them,—meaning thereby Epetium and Tragyrium,—and the Daorsi also bringing similar complaints, the Senate sent a commission under Gaius Fannius to inspect the state of Illyria, with special reference to the Dalmatians. This people had been subject to Pleuratus as long as he was alive; but when he died, and was succeeded on the throne by Genthius, they revolted, overran the bordering territories, and reduced the neighbouring cities, some of which even paid them a tribute of cattle and corn. So Fannius and his colleague started on their mission. . . .

Piracies of the Dalmatians on the island of Issa, B.C. 158.

20a Sch.

19. Lyciscus the Aetolian was a factious turbulent agitator, and directly he was killed the Aetolians from that hour lived harmoniously and at peace with each other, simply from the removal of one man. Such decisive influence has character in human affairs, that we find not only armies and cities, but also national leagues and whole divisions of the world, experiencing the greatest miseries and the greatest blessings through the vice or virtue of one man. . . .

Death of Lyciscus.

Though he was a man of the worst character, Lyciscus ended his life by an honourable death; and accordingly, most people with some reason reproach Fortune for sometimes giving to the worst of men what is the prize of the good—an easy death. . . .

20. There was a great change for the better in Aetolia when the civil war was stopped after the death of Lyciscus; and in Boeotia when Mnasippus of Coronea died; and similarly in Acarnania when Chremas was got out of the way. Greece was as though purified by the removal from life of those accursed pests of the country. For in the same year Charops of Epirus chanced to die at Brundisium. Affairs in Epirus had been still in disorder and confusion as before, owing to the cruelty and tyranny of Charops, ever

Death of Charops, B.C. 157.

The tyranny of Charops in Epirus

after the battle of Pydna, B.C. 168-157.

since the end of the war with Perseus. For Lucius Anicius having condemned some of the leading men in the country to death, and transported all others to Rome against whom there was the slightest suspicion, Charops at once got complete power to do what he chose; and thereupon committed every possible act of cruelty, sometimes personally, at others by the agency of his friends: for he was quite a young man himself, and was quickly joined by a crowd of the worst and most unprincipled persons, who gathered round him for the sake of plunder from other people. But what protected him and inclined people to believe that he was acting on a fixed design, and in accordance with the will of the Romans, was his former intimacy with them, and the support of the old man Myrton and his son Nicanor. These two had the character of being men of moderation and on good terms with the Romans; but though up to that time they had been widely removed from all suspicion of injustice, they now gave themselves up wholly to support and share in the lawless acts of Charops. This man, after murdering some openly in the market-place, others in their own houses, others by sending secret assassins to waylay them in the fields or on the roads, and selling the property of all whom he had thus killed, thought of another device. He put up lists of such men and women as were rich, condemning them to exile; and having held out this threat, he extracted money out of them, making the bargain himself with the men, and by the agency of his mother Philotis with the women; for this lady was well suited to the task, and for any act of violence was even more helpful than could have been expected in a woman.

He extorts money from the rich under threat of exile.

21. When he and his mother had thus got all the money they could out of these persons, they none the less caused all the proscribed to be impeached before the people; and the majority in Phoenice, partly from fear and partly induced by the baits held out by Charops and his friends, condemned all thus impeached, for being ill-disposed to Rome, to death instead of banishment. These men, however, fled while

The people of Phoenice terrified or cajoled into supporting him.

Charops visited Rome, whither he went with money, and accompanied by Myrton and Nicanor, wishing to get a seal of approval put to his wickedness by means of the Senate. On that occasion a very honourable proof was given of Roman principles; and a spectacle was displayed exceedingly gratifying to the Greeks residing in Rome, especially the detenus. Marcus Aemilius Lepidus, who was Pontifex Maximus and Princeps Senatus, and Lucius Aemilius, the conqueror of Perseus, a man of the highest credit and influence, learning what had been done by Charops in Epirus, refused to admit him into their houses. This becoming much talked about, the foreign residents in Rome were exceedingly rejoiced, and observed with pleasure that the Romans discountenanced evil. And on Charops being afterwards admitted to the Senate-house, the Senate refused to consent to his demands, but answered that "They would give instructions to commissioners to examine into what had taken place." But when Charops returned home he entirely suppressed this reply; and having written one to suit his own ideas, gave out that the Romans approved of what had been done by him. . . .

Charops goes to Rome, but is forbidden by the leading nobles to enter their houses, and repudiated by the Senate.

He suppresses the reply of the Senate.

22. King Eumenes was entirely broken in bodily strength, but still maintained his brilliancy of mind. He was a man who in most things was the equal of any king of his time; and in those which were the most important and honourable, was greater and more illustrious than them all. First, he succeeded his father in a kingdom reduced to a very few insignificant cities; and he raised it to the level of the largest dynasties of his day. And it was not chance which contributed to this, or a mere sudden catastrophe, it was his own acuteness, indefatigable industry, and personal labour. Again, he was exceedingly ambitious of establishing a good reputation, and showed it by doing good services to a very large number of cities, and enriching privately a great many men. And in the third place, he had three brothers grown

Death and character of Eumenes, B.C. 159.

He raised his kingdom to the first rank; was exceedingly bountiful;

up and active, and he kept all four of them loyal to himself,

and was loyally served by four brothers.

and acting as guards of his person and preservers of the kingdom: and that is a thing of which there are very rare instances in history. . . .

On succeeding his brother Eumenes on the throne, Attalus

Attalus restores Ariarathes.

at once gave a specimen of his principles and activity by restoring Ariarathes to his kingdom.[1] . . .

23. When the envoys under Fannius returned from Illyria,

Fannius and his colleagues roughly treated by the Dalmatians, B.C. 157.

and reported that, so far from the Dalmatians making any restitution to those who asserted that they were being continually wronged by them, they refused even to listen to the commissioners at all, saying that they had nothing to do with the Romans. Besides, they reported that no lodging or entertainment of any sort had been supplied to them; but that the very horses, which they had procured from another city, the Dalmatians had forcibly taken from them; and would have laid violent hands upon themselves, if they had not yielded to necessity and retired as quietly as they could. The Senate listened attentively to the report; they were exceedingly angry at the disobedience and rudeness of the Dalmatians,

The Senate decide on declaring war with the Dalmatians.

but their prevailing feeling was that the present time was a suitable one for declaring war against this people for more reasons than one. For, in the first place, the coasts of Illyria towards Italy had been entirely neglected by them ever since they had expelled Demetrius of Pharos; and, in the next place, they did not wish their own citizens to become enervated by a long-continued peace; for it was now the twelfth

B.C. 168-157.

year since the war with Perseus and the campaigns in Macedonia. They therefore planned that, by declaring war against the Dalmatians, they would at once renew as it were the warlike spirit and enterprise of their own people, and terrify the Illyrians into obedience to their injunctions. Such were the motives of the Romans for going

[1] Ariarathes V. had been expelled his kingdom by Demetrius, who, in consideration of one thousand talents, had assisted his reputed brother Orophernes, who had been palmed off on Ariarathes IV. by his wife, to displace him. The Senate, when eventually appealed to, decided that the two brothers should share the kingdom. Livy, *Ep.* 47; Appian, *Syr.* 47.

to war with the Dalmatians. But to the world at large they gave out that they had determined on war owing to the insults offered to their legates. . . .

24. King Ariarathes arrived in Rome in the course of the summer.[1] And when Sextus Julius Caesar and his colleague had entered on their consulship, the king visited them privately, presenting in his personal appearance a striking picture of the dangers with which he was surrounded. B.C. 157. Coss. Sext. Julius Caesar, L. Aurelius Orestes.

Ambassadors also arrived from Demetrius, headed by Miltiades, prepared to act in two capacities—to defend the conduct of Demetrius in regard to Ariarathes, and to accuse that king with the utmost bitterness. Orophernes also had sent Timotheus and Diogenes to represent him, conveying a crown for Rome, and charged to renew the friendship and alliance of Cappadocia with the Romans; but, above all, to confront Ariarathes, and both to answer his accusations and bring their own against him. In these private interviews Diogenes and Miltiades and their colleagues made a better show, because they were many to one in the controversy; besides their personal appearance was better than that of Ariarathes, for they were at present on the winning side and he had failed. They had also the advantage of him, in making their statement of the case, that they were entirely unscrupulous, and cared nothing whatever about the truth of their words; and what they said could not be confuted, because there was no one to take the other side. So their lying statements easily prevailed, and they thought everything was going as they wished. . . .

25. After reigning for a short time in Cappadocia in utter contempt of the customs of his country, Orophernes introduced the organised debaucheries of Ionia.[2] . . . The evil rule of Orophernes.

[1] Ariarathes arrived in the summer of B.C. 158.

[2] *τὴν Ἰακὴν καὶ τεχνητικὴν ἀσωτίαν.* The translation given above is in accordance with the explanation of Casaubon, who quoted Horace (*Odes* 3, 6, 21), *Motus doceri gaudet Ionicos matura virgo.* Orophernes had been sent to Ionia, when Antiochis had a real son (Ariarathes V.), that he might not set up a claim to the throne. He had been imposed by Antiochis on her husband Ariarathes IV. before she had a real son.

It has happened to not a few, from the desire for increasing their wealth, to lose their life along with their money. It was from being captivated by such passions that Orophernes, king of Cappadocia, perished and was expelled from his kingdom. But having briefly narrated the restoration of this king (Ariarathes), I will now bring back my narrative to its regular course; for at present I have, to the exclusion of Greek affairs, selected from those of Asia the events connected with Cappadocia out of their proper order, because it was impossible to separate the voyage of Ariarathes from Italy from his restoration to his kingdom.[1] I will therefore now go back to the history of Greece during this period, in which a peculiar and extraordinary affair took place in regard to the city of Oropus, of which I will give the whole story from beginning to end, going both backward and forward in point of time, that I may not render the history of an episode which was made up of separate events, and was not on the whole important, still more insignificant and indistinct by relating it under different years. For when an event as a whole does not appear to readers to be worth attention, I cannot certainly expect a student to follow its details scattered at intervals through my history.[2] . . .

For the most part when things go well men generally get on together; but in times of failure, in their annoyance at events, they become sore and irritable with their friends. And this is what happened to Orophernes, when his affairs began

[1] Orophernes was soon deposed, and Ariarathes V. restored, but we have no certain indication when this happened. See 3, 5.

[2] The episode of Oropus here referred to, Polybius's account of which is lost, was made remarkable by the visit of the three philosophers to Rome as ambassadors from Athens. The story, as far as Athens was concerned, is told by Pausanias, 7, 11, 4-7. The Athenians had been much impoverished by the events of the war with Perseus (B.C. 172-168), and had made a raid or raids of some sort upon Oropus. The Oropians appealed to Rome. The Romans referred the assessment of damages to an Achaean court at Sicyon. The Athenians failed to appear before the court at Sicyon, and were condemned by default to a fine of five hundred talents. Thereupon Carneades the Academician, Diogenes the Stoic, and Critolaus the Peripatetic were sent to plead for a remission of a fine which the Athenians were wholly unable to pay. They made a great impression on the Roman youth by their lectures, and Cato urged that they should get their answer and be sent away as soon as possible. The Senate reduced the fine to one hundred talents: but even that the Athenians could not collect; and they seem to have managed to induce the

to take a wrong turn in his relations with Theotimus,—both indulging in mutual recriminations. . . .

26. Ambassadors having arrived from Epirus about this time, sent both from those who were in actual possession of Phoenice and from those who had been banished from it; and both parties having made their statement in presence of each other, the Senate answered that they would give instructions on this point to the commissioners that were about to be sent into Illyria with Gaius Marcius the Consul.[1] . . .

B.C. 156. Coss. L. Cornelius Lentulus, C. Marcius Figulus II.

27. After defeating Attalus, and advancing to Pergamum, Prusias prepared a magnificent sacrifice and brought it to the sacred enclosure of Asclepius, and after offering the victims, and having obtained favourable omens, went back into his camp for that day; but on the next he directed his forces against the Nicephorium, and destroyed all the temples and sacred enclosures, and plundered all the statues of men and the marble images of the gods. Finally he carried off the statue of Asclepius also, an admirably executed work of Phyromachus, and transferred it to his own country,—the very image before which the day before he had poured libations and offered sacrifice; desiring, it would seem, that the god might in every way be propitious and favourable to him. I have spoken of such proceedings before, when discoursing on Philip, as sheer

Prusias, king of Bithynia, attacks Attalus of Pergamum.

5, 11

Oropians to allow an Athenian garrison to hold Oropus, and to give hostages for their fidelity to the Athenian government. This led to fresh quarrels and an appeal to the Achaean government. The Achaean Strategus, Menalcidas of Sparta, was bribed by a present of ten talents to induce an interference in behalf of Oropus. Thereupon the Athenians withdrew their garrison from Oropus, after pillaging the town, and henceforth took no part in the quarrels which ensued, arising from the demands of Menalcidas for his ten talents; which the Oropians refused to pay, on the ground that he had not helped them as he promised; quarrels which presently centred round the question of the continuance of Sparta in the Achaean league. The date of the original quarrel between Athens and Oropus is not fixed, but the mission of the philosophers was in B.C. 155. See Plutarch, *Cato*, 22; Pliny, *N. H.* 7, 112-113; Aulus Gellius, 6, 14; Cic. *ad Att.* 12, 23; *Tusc.* 4, § 5.

[1] *C. Marcius consul adversus Dalmatas parum prospere primum, postea feliciter pugnavit.* The war was continued in the next year (B.C. 155), and the Dalmatians subdued for the time by the consul P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica. Livy, *Ep.* 47.

insanity. For at one time to offer sacrifice, and endeavour to propitiate heaven by their means, worshipping and uttering the most earnest prayers before holy tables and altars, as Prusias was wont to do, with bendings of the knee and effeminate prostrations, and at the same time to violate these sacred objects and to flout heaven by their destruction,—can we ascribe such conduct to anything but a mind disordered and a spirit lost to sober reason? I am sure this was the case with Prusias: for he led his army off to Elaea, without having performed a single act of manly courage in the course of his attempts on Pergamum, and after treating everything human and divine with petty and effeminate spite. He attempted to take Elaea, and made some assaults upon it; but being unable to effect anything, owing to Sosander, the king's foster-brother, having thrown himself into the town with an army and repelling his assaults, he marched off towards Thyateira. In the course of his march, he plundered the temple of Artemis in the Holy village; and the sacred enclosure of Apollo Cynneius at Temnus[1] likewise he not only plundered but destroyed by fire. After these achievements he returned home, having waged war against the gods as well as against men. But Prusias's infantry also suffered severely from famine and dysentery on their return march, so that the wrath of heaven appears to have quickly visited him for these crimes.[2] . . .

Elaea on the Casius, the port of Pergamum.

28. After his defeat by Prusias Attalus appointed his brother Athenaeus to accompany Publius Lentulus to Rome to inform the Senate of what had happened. At Rome they had not paid much attention when a previous messenger named Andronicus had come from Attalus, with news of the original invasion;

Attalus sends his brother to Rome.

[1] Temnus was in Mysia, s. of the river Hermus. Cynneius or Cyneius Apollo seems to mean Apollo guardian of the shepherd dogs. There was, according to Suidas (s.v. κυνήειος), a temple to Apollo at Athens with that title, said to have been the work of Cynnis, a son of Apollo and a nymph Parnethia.

[2] The battle, in which Prusias is here said to have conquered Attalus, was a treacherous attack upon Attalus who was waiting, in accordance with an arrangement made by Roman envoys Hortensius and Arunculeius, to meet Prusias on his frontier, accompanied by only one thousand cavalry. The Roman envoys even had to fly for their lives. Appian, *Mithridates*, 3.

because they suspected that Attalus wished to attack Prusias himself, and was therefore getting up a case against him beforehand, and trying to prejudice him in their eyes by these accusations; and when Nicomedes and some ambassadors from Prusias, headed by Antiphilus, arrived and protested that there was not a word of truth in the statement, the Senate was still more incredulous of what had been said about Prusias. But when after a time the real truth was made known, the Senate still felt uncertain, and sent Lucius Apuleius and Gaius Petronius to investigate what was the state of the case in regard to these two kings.

Prusias had sent his son Nicomedes and some ambassadors to represent his case at Rome.

The Senate send fresh commissioners to investigate.

BOOK XXXIII

1. BEFORE spring this year the Senate, after hearing the report of Publius Lentulus and his colleagues, who had just reached Rome from Asia, in the business of king Prusias, called in Athenaeus also, brother of king Attalus. The matter, however, did not need many words: the Senate promptly appointed Gaius Claudius Cento, Lucius Hortensius, and Gaius Arunculeius, to accompany Athenaeus home, with instructions to prevent Prusias from waging war against Attalus.

B.C. 155. The Roman legate Publius Lentulus, and Athenaeus, brother of Attalus, reach Rome and declare the truth.

Also Xeno of Aegium and Telecles of Tegea arrived as ambassadors from the Achaeans in behalf of the Achaean detenus. After the delivery of their speech, on the question being put to the vote, the Senators only refused the release of the accused persons by a very narrow majority. The man who really prevented the release from being carried was Aulus Postumius, who was praetor, and as such presided in the Senate on that occasion. Three alternatives were proposed — one for an absolute release, another for an absolute refusal, and a third for a postponement of the release for the present. The largest numbers were for the first of these three; but Postumius left out the third, and put the two first to the vote together, release or no release; the result was that those who were originally for the postponement transferred their votes to the party that were against the release, and thus gave a majority against release. . . .

Another embassy in behalf of the Achaean detenus.

It fails by the action of the praetor, who, by putting the question simply "yes" or "no" for release, forced the party who were for postponing it to vote "no."

3.[1] When the ambassadors returned to Achaia with the news

[1] Hultsch places an extract from Aulus Gellius (6, 14, 8) relating to the

that the restoration of all the detenus had been only lost in the Senate by a narrow majority, the people becoming hopeful and elated sent Telecles of Megalopolis and Anaxidamus on a fresh mission at once. That was the state of things in the Peloponnese. . . .

The Achaeans are encouraged to try again.

4. Aristocrates, the general of the Rhodians, was in appearance a man of mark and striking ability; and the Rhodians, judging from this, believed that they had in him a thoroughly adequate leader and guide in the war.[1] But they were disappointed in their expectations: for when he came to the test of experience, like spurious coin when brought to the furnace, he was shown to be a man of quite a different sort. And this was proved by actual facts. . . .

Aristocrates proves a failure in the war with Crete.

5. [Demetrius] offered him five hundred talents if he would surrender Cyprus to him, with other similar advantages and honours from himself if he would do him this service. . . .

Archias, therefore, wishing to betray Cyprus to Demetrius, and being caught in the act and led off to stand his trial, hanged himself with one of the ropes of the awnings in the court. For it is a true proverb that led by their desires "the reckonings of the vain are vain." This man, for instance, imagining that he was going to get five hundred talents, lost what he had already, and his life into the bargain. . . .

6. About this time an unexpected misfortune befell the people of Priene. They had received a deposit of four hundred talents from Orophernes when he got possession of the kingdom; and subsequently when Ariarathes recovered his dominion he demanded the money of them. But they acted like honest men, in my opinion, in declaring that they would deliver it to no one as long as Orophernes was alive, except to the person who deposited it with them; while Ariarathes was thought by many to be committing a breach of equity in demanding a deposit made by another.

Honesty of the people of Priene (in Caria) in preserving the money deposited by Orophernes.

mission of the three philosophers as ch. 2 of this book. The substance is given in the note on p. 466. It is more in place there, as Polybius expressly said that he would give the whole story together (32, 25).

[1] This war appears to have arisen from a treacherous attack of the Cretans upon the island of Siphnos. *Exc. de Virt. et Vit.* p. 588.

However, up to this point, one might perhaps pardon his making the attempt, because he looked upon the money as belonging to his own kingdom; but to push his anger and imperious determination as much farther as he did seems utterly unjustifiable. At the period I refer to, then, he sent troops to pillage the territory of Priene, Attalus assisting and urging him on from the private grudge which he entertained towards the Prienians. After losing many slaves and cattle, some of them being slaughtered close to the city itself, the Prienians, unable to defend themselves, first sent an embassy to the Rhodians, and eventually appealed for protection to Rome. . . .

But he would not listen to the proposal. So it came about that the Prienians, who had great hopes from the possession of so large a sum of money, found themselves entirely disappointed. For they repaid Orophernes his deposit, and, thanks to this same deposit, were unjustly exposed to severe damage at the hands of Ariarathes. . . .

7. This year there came ambassadors also from the people of Marseilles, who had long been suffering from the Ligurians, and at that time were being closely invested by them, while their cities of Antipolis and Nicaea were also subjected to a siege. They, therefore, sent ambassadors to Rome to represent the state of things and beg for help. On their being admitted, the Senate decided to send legates to see personally what was going on, and to endeavour by persuasion to correct the injurious proceedings of the barbarians. . . .

B.C. 155. The Ligurians harass Marseilles and besiege Antibes and Nice.

The peaceful mission failed, and the consul Opimius subdued the Oxybii, a Ligurian tribe, in arms, B.C. 154. *Livy,* Ep. 47.

8. At the same time as the Senate despatched Opimius to the war with the Oxybii, Ptolemy the younger arrived at Rome; and being admitted to the Senate brought an accusation against his brother, laying on him the blame of the attack against his life. He showed the scars of his wounds, and speaking with all the bitterness which they seemed to suggest, moved his hearers

B.C. 154. Coss. Q. Opimius, L. Postumius Albinus. Ptolemy Physcon charges his brother with inciting a plot against his life.

to pity him; and when Neolaidas and Andromachus also came on behalf of the elder Ptolemy, to answer the charges brought by his brother, the Senate refused even to listen to their pleas, having been entirely prepossessed by the accusations of the younger. They commanded them to leave Rome at once; while they assigned five commissioners to the younger, headed by Gnaeus Merula and Lucius Thermus, with a quinquereme for each commissioner, and ordered them to restore Ptolemy (Physcon) to Cyprus; and at the same time sent a circular to their allies in Greece and Asia, granting permission to them to assist in the restoration of Ptolemy. . . .

The Senate refuses to hear the ambassadors of Ptolemy Philometor, and send commissioners to restore Physcon to Cyprus.

9. When the commissioners under Hortensius and Arunculeius returned from Pergamum, and reported Prusias's disregard of the orders of the Senate; and how by an act of treachery he had besieged them and Attalus in Pergamum,[1] and had given rein to every kind of violence and lawlessness: the Senate, enraged and offended at what had happened, immediately appointed ten commissioners, headed by Lucius Anicius, Gaius Fannius, and Quintus Fabius Maximus, and sent them out with instructions to put an end to the war, and compel Prusias to indemnify Attalus for the injuries received by him during the war. . . .

Prusias having refused obedience to the former commission (see *supra*, ch. 1), a new commission is sent out with peremptory orders.

10. On the complaint of the ambassadors of Marseilles as to their injuries sustained at the hands of the Ligurians, the Senate at once appointed a commission, consisting of Flaminius, Popilius Laenas, and Lucius Pupius, who sailed with the envoys of Marseilles, and landed in the territory of the Oxybii at the town of Aegitna. The Ligurians, hearing that they were come to bid them raise the siege, descended upon them as they lay at anchor, and prevented the rest from disembarking; but finding Flaminius already disembarked and his baggage landed, they began by

The Ligurians prevent the commissioners from landing, and wound Flaminius who had already landed, and drive him to his ship.

[1] See 32, 27, note.

ordering him to leave the country, and on his refusal they began to plunder his baggage. His slaves and freedmen resisting this, and trying to prevent them, they began to use violence and attacked them with their weapons. When Flaminius came to the rescue of his men they wounded him, and killed two of his servants, and chased the rest down to their ship, so that Flaminius only escaped with his life by cutting away the hawsers and anchors. He was conveyed to Marseilles and his wound attended to with all possible care; but when the Senate was informed of the transaction, it immediately ordered one of the consuls, Quintus Opimius, to lead an army against the Oxybii and Deciatae.[1]

War ordered with the Oxybii and Deciatae, B.C. 154.

11. Having collected his army at Placentia, Quintus Opimius marched over the Apennines and arrived in the territory of the Oxybii; and, pitching his camp on the river Apro, awaited the enemy, being informed that they were mustering their forces and were eager to give him battle. Meanwhile, he advanced to Aegitna, where the ambassadors had been outraged, took the city by assault, and sold its inhabitants as slaves, sending the ringleaders in the outrage to Rome in chains. Having done this, he went to meet the enemy. The Oxybii, convinced that their violence to the ambassadors admitted of no terms being granted them, with all the courage of desperation, and excited to the highest pitch of furious enthusiasm, did not wait to be joined by the Deciatae, but, having collected to the number of about four thousand, rushed to the attack upon their enemy. Quintus was somewhat dismayed at the boldness of their attack, and at the desperate fury of the barbarians; but was encouraged by observing that the enemy were advancing in complete disorder, for he was an experienced soldier and a man of great natural sagacity. He therefore drew out his men, and, after a suitable harangue, advanced at a slow pace towards the enemy. His charge was delivered with great vigour: he quickly repulsed the enemy, killed a great many of them, and forced the rest into headlong flight. Meanwhile,

Opimius orders his soldiers to join at Placentia, and marches into Gaul,

takes Aegitna,

and defeats the Oxybii and Deciatae.

[1] Ligurian tribes between Nice and Marseilles. Pliny, *N. H.* 3, § 47.

the Deciatae had mustered their forces, and appeared on the ground intending to fight side by side with the Oxybii; but finding themselves too late for the battle, they received the fugitives in their ranks, and after a short time charged the Romans with great fury and enthusiasm; but being worsted in the engagement, they immediately all surrendered themselves and their city at discretion to the Romans. Having thus become masters of these tribes, Opimius delivered over their territory on the spot to the people of Marseilles, and for the future forced the Ligurians to give hostages at certain fixed intervals to the Marsilians. He then deprived the tribes that had fought with them of their arms, and divided his army among the cities there for the winter, and himself took up his winter quarters in the country. Thus the war had a conclusion as rapid as its commencement. . . .

Opimius winters in Gaul, B.C. 154-153.

12. All the previous winter Attalus had been busy collecting a large army, Ariarathes and Mithridates having sent him a force of cavalry and infantry, in accordance with the terms of their alliance with him. While he was still engaged in these preparations the ten commissioners arrived from Rome: who, after meeting and conferring with him at Cadi about the business, started to visit Prusias, to whom on meeting him they explained the orders of the Senate in terms of serious warning. Prusias at once yielded to some of the injunctions, but refused to submit to the greater part. The Romans grew angry, renounced his friendship and alliance, and one and all started to return to Attalus. Thereupon Prusias repented; followed them a certain distance with vehement entreaties; but, failing to gain any concession, left them in a state of great doubt and embarrassment. The Romans, on their return to Attalus, bade him station himself with his army on his own frontier, and not to begin the war himself, but to provide for the security of the towns and villages in his territory: while they divided themselves, one party sailing home with all speed to announce to the Senate the disobedience of Prusias; another

The commissioners visit Attalus and Prusias early in B.C. 154.

Prusias will not yield till too late.

The Romans promote a combination against Prusias.

departing for Ionia; and a third to the Hellespont and the ports about Byzantium, all with one and the same purpose, namely, to detach the inhabitants from friendship and alliance with Prusias, and to persuade them to adhere to Attalus and assist him to the best of their power. . . .

Summer of B.C. 154. Attalus's brother Athenaeus harasses the coast of Prusias's kingdom.

13. At the same time Athenaeus set sail with eighty decked ships, of which five were quadriremes sent by the Rhodians for the Cretan war, twenty from Cyzicus, twenty-seven Attalus's own, and the rest contributed by the other allies. Having sailed to the Hellespont, and reached the cities subject to Prusias, he made frequent descents upon the coast, and greatly harassed the country. But when the Senate heard the report of the commissioners who had returned from Prusias, they immediately despatched three new ones, Appius Claudius, Lucius Oppius, and Aulus Postumius: who, on arriving in Asia, put an end to the war by bringing the two kings to make peace, on condition of Prusias at once handing over to Attalus twenty decked ships, and paying him five hundred talents in twenty years, both retaining the territory which they had at the commencement of the war. Farther, that Prusias should make good the damage done to the inhabitants of Methymna, Aegae, Cymae, Heracleia, by a payment of a hundred talents to those towns. The treaty having been drawn out in writing on those terms, Attalus withdrew his army and navy to his own country. Such are the particulars of the events which took place in the quarrel between Attalus and Prusias. . . .

B.C. 153. Another fruitless embassy from Achaia.

14. An embassy again coming to Rome from Achaia in behalf of the detenus, the Senate voted to make no change. . . .

Heracleides brings to Rome Laodice, daughter of Antiochus Epiphanes, and his supposed son Alexander Balas.

15. Heracleides came to Rome in the middle of summer, bringing Laodice and Alexander, and stayed there a long time, employing all the arts of cunning and corruption to win the support of the Senate. . . .

Astymedes of Rhodes being appointed ambassador and

navarch at the same time, came forward immediately and addressed the Senate on the war with Crete. The Senate listened with attention, and immediately appointed Quintus at the head of a commission to put an end to the war. . . .

The quarrel of Rhodes and Crete.

16. This year the Cretans sent Antiphatas, son of Telamnestus of Gortyn, with envoys to the Achaeans asking for help, and the Rhodians sent Theophanes with a similar mission. The Congress of the Achaeans was that year at Corinth : and on each body of ambassadors pleading their respective causes, the assembled people were more inclined towards the Rhodians, from respect to the reputation of their state, and the general character of their policy and statesmen. When Antiphatas saw this, he wished to come forward to make another speech ; and, having obtained permission from the Strategus to do so, he spoke in weightier and more exalted terms than might be expected from a Cretan ; for, in fact, the young man was in no way of the ordinary Cretan type, but had shunned the characteristic principles of his countrymen. Accordingly the Achaeans received his plain speaking with favour ; and still more for the sake of his father Telamnestus, who had taken a spirited part with them at the head of five hundred Cretans in their war against Nabis. However, none the less for that, after listening to him they were still inclined to aid the Rhodians, until Callicrates of Leontium stood up and said that they ought not to go to war in favour of either, or to send aid to either of the two peoples without the consent of the Romans. This argument decided them in favour of non-intervention. . . .

The Achaeans decline to help either Rhodes or Crete, although inclined to support Rhodes.

17. Dispirited with the course things were taking, the Rhodians entered upon some measures and designs which were strange and unreasonable. In fact, they were much in the same state as men suffering from chronic diseases. It frequently happens that such men, when, in spite of following all the rules of medicine and obeying the prescriptions of the doctors, they are unable to make any advance towards improvement, give up all such efforts in despair, and either listen wholly to priests and seers, or try every sort of charm or

amulet. So it was with the Rhodians. When their hopes were baffled in every direction, they were reduced to listen to every kind of suggestion, and to magnify and accept every kind of chance. Nor was this unnatural. For when nothing dictated by reason proves successful, and yet some action or another must necessarily be pushed on, there is no alternative but to try something which does not depend on reason. The Rhodians, having come to this dilemma, acted accordingly; and, among other things that were in defiance of reason, re-elected as their archon a man of whom they disapproved. . . .

B.C. 152. Visit of the young Attalus, son of the late king Eumenes.

18. Many different embassies having come to Rome, the Senate admitted Attalus,[1] son of king Eumenes I. For he had arrived at Rome at this time, still quite a young boy, to be introduced to the Senate, and to renew in his person the ancestral friendship and connexion with the Romans. After a kindly reception by the Senate and his father's friends, and after receiving the answer which he desired, and such honours as suited his time of life, he returned to his native land, meeting with a warm and liberal reception in all the Greek cities through which he passed on his return journey. Demetrius also came at this time, and, after receiving a fairly good reception for a boy, returned home.

Demetrius, son of Ariarathes VI.

Then Heracleides entered the Senate, bringing Laodice and Alexander with him. The youthful Alexander first addressed the Senate, and begged the Romans "to remember their friendship and alliance with his father Antiochus, and if possible to assist him to recover his kingdom; or if they could not do that, at least to give him leave to return home, and not to hinder those who wished to assist him in recovering his ancestral crown." Heracleides then took up the word, and, after delivering a lengthy encomium on Antiochus, came to the same point, namely, that they ought in justice to grant the young prince and Laodice leave to return and claim their own, as they were the true-born children of Antiochus. Sober-

Laodice and Alexander Balas. See ch. 15.

[1] Surnamed Philometor. He succeeded his uncle Attalus Philadelphus in B.C. 138, and at his death in B.C. 133 left his dominions to Rome.

minded people were not all attracted by any of these arguments. They understood the meaning of this theatrical exhibition, and made no secret of their distaste for Heracleides. But the majority had fallen under the spell of Heracleides's cunning, and were induced to pass the following decree: "Alexander and Laodice, children of a king, our friend and ally, appeared before the Senate and stated their case; and the Senate gave them authority to return to the kingdom of their forefathers; and help, in accordance with their request, is hereby decreed to them." Seizing on this pretext, Heracleides immediately began hiring mercenaries, and calling on some men of high position to assist him. He accordingly went to Ephesus and devoted himself to the preparations for his attempt.[1] . . .

The Senate's decree in favour of Alexander and Laodice.

19. Demetrius, who, when residing as a hostage at Rome, had fled and become king in Syria, was a man so much addicted to drunkenness that he spent the greater part of the day in drinking. . . .

Demetrius's intemperance.

20. When once the multitude feel the impulse to violent love or hatred of any one, any pretext is good enough for indulging their feelings. . . .

However, I am afraid I may fall under the common dilemma, "Which is the greater fool, the man who milks a he-goat, or the man who holds a sieve to catch the milk?" For I seem to be doing something of this sort in arguing and writing an essay on what every one acknowledges to be false. It is, then, waste time to speak of such things, unless one cares to write down dreams, or look at dreams with one's eyes open. . . .

[1] Alexander Balas was an impostor of low origin set up by Heracleides as a son of Antiochus Epiphanes. He entered Syria in B.C. 152, defeated and killed Demetrius in B.C. 150, and was himself defeated in B.C. 146 by Ptolemy Philometor (who also fell) in favour of a son of Demetrius, and was shortly afterwards murdered. Livy, *Ep.* 52. Appian, *Syr.* 67; Joseph. *Antiq.* 13, 2, 4.

BOOK XXXIV

GEOGRAPHICAL FRAGMENTS

Polybius devoted one book of his history to a separate treatise on the geography of the continents. Strabo, 9, 1, 1.

1. In their Greek histories Eudoxus gave a good, but Ephorus the best, account of the foundations, blood connexions, migrations, and founders of states; but I shall now give some information on the position of countries and their distances, which are the subjects most properly belonging to the science of Geography. . . .

Homer true to nature.

2. It is not Homer's manner to indulge in mere mythological stories founded on no substratum of truth. For there is no surer way of giving an air of verisimilitude to fiction than to mix with it some particles of truth. And this is the case with the tale of the wanderings of Odysseus. . . .

For instance, Aeolus, who taught the way of getting through the straits, where there are currents setting both ways, and the passage is rendered difficult by the indraught of the sea, came to be called and regarded as the dispenser and king of the winds; just as Danaus, again, who discovered the storages of water in Argos, and Atreus, who discovered the fact of the sun's revolution being in the opposite direction to that of the heaven, were called seers and priest-kings. So the priests of the Egyptians, the Chaldeans, and the Magi, being superior to the rest of the world in wisdom, obtained rule and honour in former generations. And on this principle, too, each one of the gods is honoured as the inventor of something useful to man. I do not allow therefore that Aeolus is wholly mythical, nor the wanderings of Odysseus generally. Some mythical elements have been undoubtedly added, as they have in the War of

Ilium; but the general account of Sicily given by the poet agrees with that of other historians who have given topographical details of Italy and Sicily. I cannot agree therefore with the remark of Eratosthenes that "we shall discover where Odysseus wandered, when we find the cobbler who sewed up the leather bag of the winds." See for instance how Homer's description of Scylla agrees with what really happens at the Scyllaean rock, and the taking of the sword fish :[1]

> "And there she fishes, roaming round the rock,
> For dog-fish and for dolphins, or what else
> Of huger she may take that swims the sea."

For the fact is that tunnies swimming in great shoals along the Italian coast, if they are drifted from their course and are prevented from reaching Sicily, fall a prey to the larger fish, such as dolphins, dog-fish, or other marine monsters ; and from hunting these the sword-fish (called also xiphiae, or sometimes sea-dogs) are fattened. The same thing happens at a rise of the Nile, and other rivers, as in the case of a fire or a burning forest ; the animals crowd together, and, in their effort to escape the fire or the water, fall a prey to stronger animals.

Fishing for sword-fish.

3. Fishing for sword-fish at the Scyllaean rock is carried on in this way. A number of men lie in wait, two each in small two-oared boats, and one man is set to look out for them all. In the boat one man rows, while the other stands on the prow holding a spear. When the look-out man signals the appearance of a sword-fish (for the animal swims with one-third of its body above water), the boat rows up to it, and the man with the spear strikes it at close quarters, and then pulls the spear-shaft away leaving the harpoon in the fish's body ; for it is barbed and loosely fastened to the shaft on purpose, and has a long rope attached to it. They then slacken the rope for the wounded fish, until it is wearied out with its convulsive struggles and attempts to escape, and then they haul it on to land, or, if its size is not too great, into the boat. And if the spear-shaft falls into the sea it is not lost ; for being made of two pieces, one oak and the other pine, the oak end as the heavier dips under water, the

[1] *Odyss.* 12, 95.

other end rises above it and is easily got hold of. But sometimes it happens that the man rowing is wounded, right through the boat, by the immense size of the animal's sword; for it charges like a boar, and hunting the one is very like hunting the other.

This would lead us to conjecture that the wandering described by Homer was near Sicily, because he has assigned to Scylla the kind of fishing which is indigenous to the Scyllaean rock; and because what he says of Charybdis correctly describes what does happen in the Straits. But the

"Thrice sends she up the darksome tide,"

Island of Meninx, off the lesser Syrtis. See 1, 39.

instead of twice "a day," is an error to be ascribed to the copyist or the geographer.[1] So also Meninx answers to his description of the Lotophagi.

4. Or if there are some points which do not answer, we must lay the blame on ignorance or poetic licence, which uses real history, picturesque detail, and mythological allusion. The object of history is truth, as when in the catalogue of ships the poet describes the features of the several localities, calling one city "rocky," another "frontier-placed," another "with wealth of doves," or "hard by the sea." But the object of picturesque detail is vividness, as when he introduces men fighting; and that of mythological allusion is to give pleasure or rouse wonder. But a narrative wholly fictitious creates no illusion and is not Homeric. For all look upon his poetry as a philosophical work; and Eratosthenes is wrong in bidding us not judge his poems with a view to having any serious meaning, or to seek for history in them.

It is better, again, to take the line[2]

"Thence for nine days the foul winds drave us on,"

to mean that he made but a short distance—for foul winds do not favour a straight course—than to imagine him to have got into the open ocean as running before favouring winds. The distance from Malea to the Pillars is twenty-two thousand five hundred stades. If we suppose this to have been accomplished

[1] *Odyss.* 12, 105. [2] *Odyss.* 9, 82.

at an even speed in the nine days, he would make two thousand five hundred stades a day. Now, who has ever asserted that any one made the voyage from Lycia or Rhodes to Alexandria in four days, a distance of four thousand stades?

To those who ask how it was that Odysseus, though he came to Sicily three times, never once went through the straits, I answer that all subsequent sailors avoided that passage also. . . .

5. In treating of the geography of Europe I shall say nothing of the ancient geographers, but shall confine my attention to their modern critics, Dicaearchus, Eratosthenes, who is the most recent writer on geography, and Pytheas, who has misled many readers by professing to have traversed on foot the whole of Britain, the coastline of which island, he says, is more than forty thousand stades. And again by his stories of Thule and the countries in its neighbourhood, "in which," he says, "there is neither unmixed land or sea or air, but a kind of compound of all three (like the jelly-fish or Pulmo Marinus), in which earth and sea and everything else are held in suspense, and which forms a kind of connecting link to the whole, through which one can neither walk nor sail." This substance, which he says is like the Pulmo Marinus, he saw with his own eyes, the rest he learnt by report. Such is Pytheas's story, and he adds that, on his return thence, he traversed the whole of the coast of Europe from Gades to the Tanais. But we cannot believe that a private person, who was also a poor man, should have made such immense journeys by land and sea. Even Eratosthenes doubted this part of his story, though he believed what he said about Britain, and Gades, and Iberia. I would much rather believe the Messenian (Euhemerus) than him. The latter is content with saying that he sailed to one country which he calls Panchaia;[1] while the former asserts that he has actually seen the whole northern coast of Europe up to the

Cadiz to the Don.

[1] Panchaia or Panchēa, the fabulous island or country in the Red Sea or Arabian gulf, in which Euhemerus asserted that he had discovered the inscriptions which proved the reputed gods to have been famous generals or kings. Plutarch, *Is. et Osir.* 23, Diodor. fr. 6, 1. The Roman poets used the word as equivalent to "Arabian." See Verg. *Georg.* 2, 139.

very verge of the world, which one would hardly believe of Hermes himself if he said it. Eratosthenes calls Euhemerus a Bergaean,[1] yet believes Pytheas, though Dicaearchus himself did not.[2] . . . Eratosthenes and Dicaearchus give mere popular guesses as to distances.

6. For instance, Dicaearchus says that the distance from the Peloponnese to the Pillars is ten thousand stades and still further to the head of the Adriatic; and from the Peloponnesus to the Sicilian straits three thousand; and therefore the remainder, from the Straits to the Pillars, is seven thousand stades. I say nothing about the three thousand stades, whether they are right or wrong; but the seven thousand cannot be made out, whether you measure along the coast or straight across the sea. The coast route is a kind of obtuse angle, contained by two lines resting on the straits and the pillars respectively; so that we have a triangle, of which the apex is Narbo, and the base the straight line representing the course by the open sea; of the two sides of the triangle which contain the obtuse angle, that which extends from the straits to Narbo is more than eleven thousand two hundred stades, the other from Narbo to the Pillars is a little under eight thousand. The longest distance from Europe to Libya across the Tuscan sea is allowed to be not more than three thousand stades, that by the Sardinian sea is somewhat less; but let us call it three thousand stades. Now suppose a perpendicular let down through the gulf of Narbo to the base of the triangle, that is to the straight sea-course, measuring two thousand stades; it requires only a schoolboy's geometry to prove that the coasting voyage is longer than the direct sea voyage by nearly five hundred stades.[3] And when the three thousand stades from the

[1] That is "as great a liar as Antiphanes of Berga." See below. Strabo classes Antiphanes with Pytheas and Euhemerus more than once (see 2, 3, 5). Hence came the verb *βεργάζειν*, "to tell travellers' tales" (Steph. *Byz.*). But there is considerable doubt as to the identification of the traveller Antiphanes, some confounding him with a comic poet of the same name, and others with the author of an essay *περὶ ἑταιρῶν*. Berga was in the valley of the Strymon.

[2] Strabo here protests against Dicaearchus being treated as a standard of geographical truth. For Pytheas see Appendix.

[3] Polybius proves his point by the demonstration of the proposition "The

Peloponnese to the straits are added, the whole number of the stades even of the straight sea course will be more than double Dicaearchus's reckoning. And if we measure to the head of the Adriatic we must add still more by his own admission; that is to say, from the Peloponnese to Leucas is seven hundred stades, from Leucas to Corcyra seven hundred, from Corcyra to Ceraunia seven hundred, and from Ceraunia along the Illyrian coast six thousand one hundred and fifty.[1]

In talking such nonsense he might well be regarded as having gone beyond even Antiphanes of Berga, and, in fact, to have left no folly for his successors to commit. . . .

7. From Ithaca to Corcyra is more than nine hundred stades; from Epidamnus to Thessalonica more than two thousand. From Marseilles to the Pillars is more than nine thousand; from the Pyrenees, rather less than eight thousand. . . . The Pagus from source to mouth is eight thousand, not following its windings, but taking a direct line. . . . Eratosthenes is quite ignorant of the geography of Iberia, and sometimes makes statements about it entirely contradictory. He says, for instance, that its western coast as far as Gades is inhabited by Gauls, since the whole western side of Europe, as far south as Gades, is occupied by that

square of the hypotenuse of a right-angled-triangle is equal to the squares of the sides containing the right angle."



By applying this principle AD = 7745.9 . . and DC = 11019.9 . ., and the whole AC = 18765.8; whereas AB + BC (*i.e.* the coasting voyage) = 19200 stades (a difference of 434.2 stades, not 500). Add to this the 3000 from the Peloponnese to the Straits, the total coast voyage is 22,200 stades, as against Dicaearchus's 10,000.

[1] Strabo quotes this reckoning of the distance from the Peloponnese to the head of the Adriatic to prove that Polybius, on his own showing, is wrong in admitting that this distance (8250 stades) is greater than that from the Peloponnese to the Pillars, which Dicaearchus said was 10,000 stades, and which Polybius showed to be 18,765 stades by the shortest route.

people: and then, quite forgetting he has said this, when taking a survey of the whole of Spain, he nowhere mentions the Gauls. . . . The length of Europe is less than that of Libya and Asia put together by the distance between the sunrise in summer and at the point of the equinox; for the source of the Tanais is at the former, and the Pillars are at the western equinox, and between them lies Europe, while Asia occupies the northern semicircle between the Tanais and equinoctial sunrise. . . .

Polybius's fivefold division of the European peninsulas, as opposed to the threefold division of Eratosthenes.

Southern Europe is divided into five peninsulas—Iberia; Italy; a third ending in the Capes Malea and Sunium, in which are included Greece and Illyria, and a part of Thrace; a fourth called the Thracian Chersonese, bounded by the strait between Sestos and Abydos; and a fifth along the Cimmerian Bosphorus and the entrance to the Maeotis. . . .

8. In the sea off Lusitania acorn-bearing oaks grow, upon which the tunnies feed and fatten themselves, which may, therefore, well be called sea-hogs, as they feed like hogs on acorns. . . .

These acorns are sometimes carried by the tide as far as the coast of Latium, unless they may be thought to be the produce of Sardinia or neighbouring islands. . . .

In Lusitania both animals and man are extraordinarily productive, owing to the excellent temperature of the air; the fruits never wither; there is not more than three months in the year in which roses, white violets (or gilly-flowers), and asparagus do not grow; while the fish caught in its sea is far superior to what is found in our waters for quantity, quality, and beauty. There, too, a Sicilian medimnus of barley is sold for a drachma, and one of wheat for nine Alexandrine obols. A metreta of wine costs a drachma, and a good kid or hare an obol, and a lamb from three to four obols; a fat pig weighing a hundred minae costs five drachmae, and a sheep two. A talent of figs is sold for three obols, a calf for five drachmae, a draught-ox for ten. The flesh of wild animals is not thought worth fixing a price upon at all, but the people give it to each other for nothing and as a present.[1] . . .

[1] To enable the reader to follow this list of prices, a short table is here sub-

9. The Turduli live on the immediate north of the Turdetani. . . . Tribes in Boetica.

The fertility of their country has had a civilising influence on the Turditani and on their Celtic kinsfolk, and taught them the art of social life. . . .

The Pillars are at either side of the straits. . . .

There is a fountain in the Heracleum at Gades, the water of which is sweet and is reached by steps. This fountain has a tide which rises and falls exactly in the reverse order of the sea tide. When it is high tide at sea it is low tide in the fountain, and high in the fountain when it is low at sea. The explanation of this is that the wind, which rises from the bowels of the earth to the surface, is prevented from finding its natural egress when the earth is covered with water at the rise of the tide, and being thus turned back into the interior of the earth, it stops up the underground channels of the fountain and produces a deficiency of water; but when the earth is again uncovered, the wind having once more found an easy egress, sets the veins of the fountain free again, and the water spurts up freely. . . . A tidal spring at Gades.

There are very large silver mines about twenty stades from New Carthage, extending to a circuit of four hundred stades, in which forty thousand men are continually employed, who produce for the benefit of the Roman people twenty-five thousand drachmae a day. It would take too long to describe the whole process of working them, but I may mention that the alluvial soil containing the silver ore is first broken up, and sifted in sieves held in water; that then the deposit is again broken, and being again filtered with running The process of producing silver in the mines near New Carthage.

joined of Greek weights and money,—though he must be warned that values varied at different times and places,—with approximate values in English weights and money.

1 obol	$= \frac{1}{60}$ oz.	$= \frac{1}{8}$ shilling.	
6 obols	= 1 drachma	$= \frac{3}{20}$ oz. . . .	9d.
100 drachmae	= 1 mina	$= 15\frac{1}{2}$ oz. . . .	£3 : 18 : 6.
60 minae	= 1 talent	= 57 lbs. . . .	£235.

A medimnus = 11 gals. 4 pts. (dry measure).
A metreta = 8 gals. 5 pts. (liquid measure).

water, is broken a third time. This is done five times; the fifth deposit is smelted, and, the lead having been run off, pure silver remains. . . .

The Guadiana and Guadalquivir.

The Anas and Boetis both flow from Celtiberia, their streams being about nine hundred stades apart. . . .

Among other cities of the Vaccaei and Celtiberians are Segesama and Intercatia. . . .

Homer, *Odyss.* 8, 248.

One of the Iberian kings had such a magnificent and richly furnished palace, that he rivalled the luxury of the Phaeacians, except that the vessels standing in the interior of the house, though made of gold and silver, were full of barley-wine. . . .

10. From the Pyrenees to the river Narbo the country is flat; and through it flow the Illeberis and Ruscinus, past some cities of the same name inhabited by Celts. In this plain there are found what are called underground fish. The soil is light, and produces a quantity of grass called *agrostis*; and below this soil the earth is sandy for a depth of two or three cubits, through which the overflow of the river percolates; and with this water, as it makes its way, the fish also get below the soil to feed, for they are exceedingly fond of the root of the *agrostis*, and have thus made the whole plain full of subterranean fish, which people dig up and take. . . .

River Aude. The Tech and the Ruscino or Tet.

A mistake of Timaeus as to the Rhone.

The Rhone has not five, but two mouths. . . .

The Liger discharges itself between the Pictŏnes and Namnitae. There was in ancient times an emporium on this river called Corbilo, but none of its inhabitants, nor those of Massalia or Narbo, could give Scipio [1] any information worth mentioning on the subject of Britain when questioned by him, though they were the most important cities in that part of the country; and yet Pytheas has ventured on all those stories about it. . . .

The Loire between Poitou and Nantes. Coiron.

Britain is quite unknown to the southern Gauls.

[1] Which member of the Cornelian gens this was is unknown. He appears to have been at Marseilles in the 4th century B.C. inquiring as to centres of trade open to Rome in rivalry with Carthage.

An animal is produced on the Alps of a peculiar form; its shape is that of a stag except its neck and coat, which resemble that of a he-goat. Beneath its chin it has an excrescence about a span long, hairy at the end, about as thick as a colt's tail. . . . The Elk.

Near Aquileia, in the territory of the Noric Taurisci, in my own time a gold mine was discovered, so easy to work, that by scraping away the surface soil for two feet, gold could be found immediately. The seam of gold was not more than fifteen feet; some of it was found unmixed with alloy in nuggets of the size of a bean or lupine, only an eighth of it disappearing in the furnace; and some wanted more elaborate smelting, but would still pay thoroughly well. Accordingly, on the Italians joining the barbarians in working this mine, in two months the price of gold went down a third throughout Italy: and when the Taurisci found out that, they expelled their Italian fellow-workers and kept the monopoly themselves. . . . A gold mine near Aquileia.

If we compare the mountains in Greece—Taygetus, Lycaeus, Parnassus, Olympus, Pelion, Ossa, and those in Thrace—Haemus, Rhodope, Dunax, with the Alps, we may state the case thus. Each one of the former may be ascended or skirted by an active traveller in a single day; but no one could ascend the Alps even in five days, the distance from the plain being two thousand two hundred stades. There are but four passes, one through Liguria, nearest the Tyrrhenian Sea; the next through the Taurini, which was the one used by Hannibal; the third through the Salassi; and the last by the Rhaeti,[1] all of them excessively precipitous. The four passes of the Alps,—the Cornice, Argentière, Genèvre (Val d'Aosta), Cenis.

There are several lakes in the mountains, three of great size, the Benacus, five hundred by one hundred and thirty stades, out of which the Mincius flows; the Larius, four hundred stades long, and somewhat narrower than the Benacus, discharging the Addua; and thirdly, the Verbanus, about three hundred stades by thirty, from which comes a con- Lago di Garda, Lago di Como. Lago Maggiore.

[1] Varro (*Serv. ad Æn.* 10, 13) adds a fifth by the Graian Alps, *i.e.* Little St. Bernard.

siderable river—the Ticinus. All these three rivers discharge themselves into the Padus. . . .

11. There is an excellent wine made at Capua called *Anadendrites*, or the "wine of the climbing vine," with which no other can compare. . . .

Capuan wine.

The length of the coast from Iapygia to the straits is three thousand stades by land, and it is washed by the Sicilian sea. Sailing, however, the distance is less than five hundred stades. . . .

The largest distance of the Etrurian coast is from Luna to Ostia, a distance of one thousand three hundred and thirty stades.[1] . . .

The island Lemnos is called Aethaleia. . . .

The bay between the two promontories of Misenum and Minerva is called the Crater (the Bowl). Above this coast lies the whole of Campania, the most fertile plain in the country. Round the Bowl live the Opici and the Ausones. . . .

The Bay of Naples.

Eastern coast-road from S. to N. of Italy.

The north road from Iapygia has been marked out with miles, five hundred and sixty to Sena, and one hundred and seventy thence to Aquileia. . . .

Then comes Lacinium . . . from the straits to this place is a distance of one thousand three hundred stades, and thence to the Iapygian promontory seven hundred. . . .

The Lacinian promontory.

Of the three craters one has partly fallen in, the other two remain perfect. The largest has a circular orifice with a circumference of five stades, but it gradually contracts to a diameter of fifty feet; it runs right down to the sea for a stade, so that the sea is visible in clear weather. When a south wind is about to blow, a thick mist envelopes the little island, so that even Sicily is invisible from it: but if there is going to be a north wind, bright flames rise from the crater and shoot up high, and louder rumblings are emitted; but a west wind causes a medium display of both. The other two craters are of the same shape, but their eruptions are less violent. From the

The craters in the volcanic Holy Island one of the Lipari group.

[1] Strabo corrects this, saying that the distance is 3000 stades.

difference in the sound of the rumbling, and by observing from what point the eruptions and flames and smoke begin, the wind which is to blow on the third day from that time can be foretold. At least, some men in the Lipari Islands when weather-bound have foretold what wind was coming and have not been deceived. Therefore, it appears that Homer did not speak without meaning, but was stating a truth allegorically when he called Aeolus [1] "steward of the winds." . . .

12. The road from Apollonia to Macedonia is called the *Via Egnatia*, which has been measured in miles and marked out with milestones as far as Cypselus and the River Hebrus, a distance of five hundred and thirty-five miles. Reckoning eight and one-third stades to a mile, the number of stades will be four thousand four hundred and fifty-eight.[2] The distance is exactly the same whether you start from Apollonia or Epidamnus. The whole road is called the Egnatia, but its first part has got a name from Candavia, a mountain of Illyria, and leads through the town of Lycnidus, and through Pylon, which is the point on the road where Illyria and Macedonia join. Thence it leads over Mount Barnūs, through Heracleia, Lyncestia, and Eordea, to Edessa and Pella, and finally to Thessalonica; and the number of miles is altogether two hundred and sixty-seven. . . . And the whole distance from the Ionian Gulf at Apollonia to Byzantium is seven thousand five hundred stades. . . .

The *Via Egnatia*.

Thessalonica half-way to the Hebrus from Apollonia.

The circumference of the Peloponnesus, if you do not follow the indentations, is four thousand stades. . . .

The Peloponnesus.

The distance from Cape Malea to the Ister is ten thousand stades.[3] . . .

From C. Malea to the Danube.

[1] The islands were called also *Vulcaniae* and *Aeoliae*.

[2] Strabo reckons 8 stades to a mile, thus making the number of stades 4280. The exact calculation by Polybius's reckoning is 4458⅓ stades. The miles are Roman miles of 5000 feet; therefore, by Strabo's calculation, the stade is 625 feet, by Polybius's 600 feet.

[3] Strabo, however, supports the measurement of Artemidorus—6500, explaining that Polybius is taking some practical measurement of a voyage, not the shortest.

13. On matters concerning the country between the Euphrates and India, Eratosthenes is a better authority than Artemidorus. . . .

State of Alexandria.

14. A personal visit to Alexandria filled me with disgust at the state of the city. It is inhabited by three distinct races,—native Egyptians, an acute and civilised race; secondly, mercenary soldiers (for the custom of hiring and supporting men-at-arms is an ancient one), who have learnt to rule rather than obey owing to the feeble character of the kings; and a third class, consisting of native Alexandrians, who have never from the same cause become properly accustomed to civil life, but who are yet better than the second class; for though they are now a mongrel race, yet they were originally Greek, and have retained some recollection of Greek principles. But this last class has become almost extinct, thanks to Euergetes Physcon, in whose reign I visited Alexandria; for that king being troubled with seditions, frequently exposed the common people to the fury of the soldiery and caused their destruction. So that in this state of the city the poet's words only expressed the truth—[1]

"To Egypt 'tis a long and toilsome road."

[1] Homer, *Odyss.* 4, 485.

BOOK XXXV

SPAIN, the eastern and southern parts of which were, since the 2d Punic war, governed by the Romans under a kind of military occupation without being reduced to the form of regular provinces, was always in a disturbed state, partly from sudden uprisings of various tribes against the Roman authority, and partly from numerous bodies of banditti, who seized strongholds or fortified towns and carried on their depredations from these centres. Hence it had been the policy of the Roman praetors and consuls to insist on the demolition of fortresses and city walls, as we learn from the accounts of Cato in B.C. 195 and others. In B.C. 177 Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus had inflicted a severe defeat upon the Celtiberians, and had made a settlement of the country, which for a few years produced comparative quiet and content. But in B.C. 154 an outbreak of the Lusitani led to a considerable disaster to the Roman army under Lucius Mummius; and when the consul Q. Fulvius Nobilior arrived in B.C. 153, he found that the war had accordingly spread to the Celtiberian tribes, the Belli and Titthi, who attempted to build the walls of Segeda. On Nobilior ordering them to desist, in accordance with Gracchan settlement, most of them obeyed after some resistance, but some of them fled to the Arevacae (near the sources of the Douro and Tagus); and this powerful tribe, after defeating the Roman army, entrenched themselves in Numantia, under the walls of which Nobilior sustained further losses. He was superseded in B.C. 152 by Marcus Claudius Marcellus, who, partly by strategy, and partly by administrative skill and conciliation, restored the Roman fortunes to a better position. The Belli and Titthi became allies of Rome, and the Arevacae at least thought it worth while to ask for a truce to enable them to send envoys to Rome to arrange peace.—Appian, *Hispan.* 44-50.

B.C. 153-151. The war with the Celtiberian Arevacae conducted by Q. Fulvius Nobilior and M. Claudius Marcellus.

1. The war between the Romans and Celtiberians was called the "fiery war;" for it was of a peculiarly fierce kind and remarkable for the frequency of its battles. The wars in Greece and Asia were as a rule settled by one battle, or in rare cases by two; and the battles themselves were decided by the result of the first charge and shock of the two armies. But in this war

things were quite different. As a rule the battles were only stopped by the fall of night; the men neither lost heart nor would yield to bodily fatigue; but returned again and again with fresh resolution to renew the combat. The whole war, and its series of pitched battles, was at length interrupted for a time by the winter. One therefore could hardly conceive a war more nearly answering to our notion of a "fiery war" than this. . . .

M. Claudius Marcellus winters at Cordova, B.C. 152-151.

2. The Celtiberians, after making a truce with the consul M. Claudius Marcellus, had sent ambassadors to Rome who remained there quietly waiting for the answer of the Senate. Meanwhile M. Claudius went on an expedition against the Lusitani, took Nercobrica by assault, and then went into winter quarters at Corduba. Of the ambassadors who came to Rome the Senate admitted those from the Belli and Titthi, who were on the side of Rome, to enter the city; but ordered those from the Arevacae to lodge on the other side of the Tiber, as being at war with Rome, until such time as the Senate should have decided the whole question. When the time for the interview was come,[1] the praetor introduced the envoys from their allies first. Barbarians as they were, they made a set speech, and endeavoured to explain clearly the causes of all the dissension prevailing in their country: pointing out that "Unless those who had broken out into war were reduced to tranquillity and punished as they deserved, the very moment the Roman legions left Iberia, they would inflict punishment upon the Belli and Titthi as traitors; and that if they escaped unpunished for their first act of hostility, they would make all the tribes in Iberia ripe for an outbreak from the belief that they were capable of coping with Rome. They begged, therefore, that the legions should remain in Iberia, and that each year a consul should come thither[2] to protect the allies of Rome and punish the

The envoys from Spain.

Speech of the Belli and Titthi.

[1] Probably in February, the month usually devoted by the Senate to *legationes*.

[2] Since B.C. 195 up to B.C. 154 the two divisions of Spain had been entrusted to Praetors.

depredations of the Arevacae; or, if they wished to withdraw the legions, they should first take signal vengeance for the outbreak of this tribe, that no one might venture to do the like again." Such, or to this effect, was the speech of the envoys of the Belli and Titthi who were in alliance with Rome. The envoys of the hostile tribe were then introduced. On coming forward the Arevacae assumed a feigned tone of submission and humility in the language of their answer, without being, as was evident, at all yielding in their hearts or acknowledging themselves beaten. On the contrary, they continually hinted at the uncertainty of fortune; and speaking of the battles that had taken place as undecided, they conveyed the impression that they had had the best of the contest in them all. The upshot of their speech was this: "If they must submit to some definite mulct for their error, they were ready to do so: but, when that was completed, they demanded that things should revert to the position fixed by their treaty made with the Senate in the time of Tiberius Gracchus."

The Arevacae demand the settlement of Tiberius Gracchus, B.C. 177.

3. The Senators having thus heard both sides called in the legates from Marcellus; and when they saw that they also were inclined to a pacification, and that Marcellus was more inclined to favour the enemy than the allied tribes, they answered the Arevacae that Marcellus would declare in Iberia to both parties the decision of the Senate. However, they were convinced in their own minds that their true interests were such as the envoys of the allied tribes suggested, and that the Arevacae were still inclined to haughty independence, and that their own commander was afraid of them: they therefore gave secret instructions to the legates of Marcellus to carry on the war with spirit, and as the honour of the country demanded. But when they had thus determined on a continuance of the war, feeling no confidence in Marcellus, they determined first of all to send a commander to relieve him in Iberia, as the new consuls Aulus Postumius and Lucius

The Senate refer both the deputations to Marcellus, but secretly determine to go on with the war and to supersede Marcellus.

B.C. 151. Coss. Lucius

Licinius Lucullus, Aulus Postumius Albinus.

Licinius Lucullus had just taken up their office. They then entered with spirit and vigour on their preparations, because they believed that the Iberian question would be decided by the result of this campaign: if these enemies were beaten, they assumed that all others would accept the orders of Rome; but that, if the Arevacae proved able to ward off the punishment that threatened them, not only would their spirits be again raised, but those of all the other Iberian tribes besides.

4. The more determined however the Senate was to carry on the war, the greater became their embarrassment. For the report brought to Rome by Q. Fulvius Nobilior, the commander in Iberia in the previous year (B.C. 153), and those who had served under him, of the perpetual recurrence of the pitched battles, the number of the fallen, and the valour of the Celtiberians, combined with the notorious fact that Marcellus shrank in terror from the war, caused such a panic in the minds of the new levies as the old men declared had never happened before. To such an extent did the panic go, that sufficient men were not found to come forward for the office of military tribune, and these posts were consequently not entirely filled up; whereas heretofore a larger number than were wanted had been wont to volunteer for the duty: nor would the men nominated by the Consuls as *legati* to accompany the commanders consent to serve; and, worst of all, the young men tried to avoid the levies, and put forward such excuses as were disgraceful for them to allege, and beneath the investigation of the Consuls, and yet impossible to refute. But at length, in this embarrassment of the Senate and magistrates, when they were wondering what was to be the end of this shameless conduct of the young men, for they could call it nothing else, Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus, who, though still a young man, had been one of those to advise the war, and who, though he had already acquired a reputation for high principle and pure morality, had not been known for his personal courage, seeing the Senate was in a difficulty, stood up and bade them send him to Iberia, either as military

The terror of the Celtiberians at Rome made men use every pretext for avoiding service in the army.

Scipio volunteers to act as legatus or tribune.

tribune or legatus, for he was ready to serve in either capacity. "Though, as far as I am concerned," he said, "my mission to Macedonia would be safer and more appropriate"—for it happened that at that time Scipio was personally and by name invited by the Macedonians to come and settle the disputes which were raging among them—"yet the needs of my own country are the more pressing of the two, and imperatively summon to Iberia all who have a genuine love of honour." This offer was unexpected by all, both from the youth of Scipio and his general character for caution, and consequently he became exceedingly popular on the spot, and still more so on subsequent days. For those who had before shrunk from the danger of the service, now, from dislike of the sorry figure they made in comparison with him, began volunteering to serve. Some offered to go as *legati* to the generals, and others in groups and clubs entered their names on the muster rolls. . . .

This offer shames others into doing the same.

Lucius Lucinius Lucullus, consul for B.C. 151, *is sent to Spain, Scipio Aemilianus acting as his legatus. They found that the Arevacae had already submitted to Marcellus; but being in want of money Lucullus was determined not to be deprived of a campaign. He therefore attacked the next tribe, the Vaccaei, who lived on the other side of the Tagus, nominally on the pretext of their having injured the Carpetani. The war which followed was marked by signal acts of cruelty and treachery on the part of Lucullus, as on that of the praetor Servius Sulpicius Galba among the Lusitani. Appian,* Hisp. 49-55.

5. In Scipio's mind there rose a contest of feelings, and a hesitation as to whether he ought to meet the barbarian and fight him in single combat.[1] . . .

Incidents in Scipio's Spanish campaign.

Scipio's horse was much distressed by the blow, but did not come down entirely, and accordingly Scipio managed to light on his feet. . . .

6. Cato was consulted by Scipio, at the request of Polybius, on behalf of the Achaeans; and when the debate in the Senate, between the party who wished to grant it and the

[1] Livy, *Ep.* 48. *Provocatorem barbarum tribunus militum occidit.*

party that opposed it, was protracted to a considerable length, Cato stood up and said: "As though we had nothing else to do, we sit here the whole day debating whether some old Greek dotards should be buried by Italian or Achaean undertakers!" Their restoration being voted, Polybius and his friends, after a few days' interval, were for appearing before the Senate again, with a petition that the exiles should enjoy the same honours in Achaia as they had before. Cato, however, remarked with a smile that Polybius, like another Odysseus, wanted to go a second time into the cave of the Cyclops, because he had forgotten his cap and belt. . . .

Restoration of the Achaean detenus, B.C. 151.

BOOK XXXVI

THE THIRD PUNIC WAR

1. It may occur to some to ask why I have not given a dramatic turn to my narrative, now that I have so striking a theme and a subject of such importance, by recording the actual speeches delivered; a thing which the majority of historians have done, by giving the appropriate arguments used on either side. That I do not reject this method altogether I have shown in several parts of my work, in which I have recorded popular harangues and expositions delivered by statesmen; but that I am not inclined to employ it on every occasion alike will now be made clear; for it would not be easy to find a subject more remarkable than this, nor material more ample for instituting a comparison of such a character. Nor indeed could any form of composition be more convenient to me. Still, as I do not think it becoming in statesmen to be ready with argument and exposition on every subject of debate without distinction, but rather to adapt their speeches to the nature of the particular occasion, so neither do I think it right for historians to practise their skill or show off their ability upon their readers: they ought on the contrary to devote their whole energies to discover and record what was really and truly said, and even of such words only those that are the most opportune and essential. . . .

The dramatic representation of debates though convenient is not history.

2. This idea having been firmly fixed in the minds of all, they looked out for a suitable opportunity and a decent pretext to justify them in the eyes of the world. For indeed the Romans were quite rightly very careful on this point. For

The Romans were careful to have a fair pretext for war.

instance, the general impression that they were justified in entering upon the war with Demetrius enhances the value of their victories, and diminishes the risks incurred by their defeats; but if the pretext for doing so is lame and poor the contrary effects are produced. Accordingly, as they differed as to the sentiments of the outer world on the subject, they were very nearly abandoning the war. . . .

32, 20.

The policy of Rome in Africa of constantly supporting Massanissa against Carthage was mentioned in 32, 2. *Frequent complaints came to Rome from the Numidian king, and the Carthaginians were said to be collecting an army contrary to treaty. Commissioners were sent over in* 154 B.C. *on the advice of Cato, who were roughly treated at Carthage; and when, in* B.C. 151, *Massanissa sent his son Gulussa with similar complaints to Rome, Cato urged immediate war. The Senate, however, again sent commissioners, among whom was Cato himself, to examine into the matter. They reported that the Carthaginians had an army and navy. An ultimatum was therefore sent, that the army and navy were to be broken up within the year, or that the next consuls should bring the question of war before the Senate* (B.C. 150). *Just at this crisis Utica, in enmity with Carthage, placed itself under the protection of Rome. Livy,* Ep. 48; *Appian,* Pun. 75.

3. When the Carthaginians had been some time deliberating how they should meet the message from Rome they were reduced to a state of the utmost embarrassment by the people of Utica anticipating their design by putting themselves under the protection of Rome. This seemed their only hope of safety left: and they imagined that such a step must win them favour at Rome: for to submit to put themselves and their country under control was a thing which they had never done even in their darkest hour of danger and defeat, with the enemy at their very walls. And now they had lost all the fruit of this resolve by being anticipated by the people of Utica; for it would appear nothing novel or strange to the Romans if they only did the same as that people. Accordingly, with a choice of two evils only

B.C. 149. Utica puts itself under the protection of Rome.

Carthaginian plenipotentiaries at Rome.

left, to accept war with courage or to surrender their independence, after a long and anxious discussion held secretly in the Senate-house, they appointed two ambassadors with plenary powers, and instructed them, that, in view of the existing state of things, they should do what seemed for the advantage of their country. The names of these envoys were Gisco Strytanus, Hamilcar, Misdes, Gillimas, and Mago. When they reached Rome from Carthage, they found war already decreed and the generals actually started with their forces. Circumstances, therefore, no longer giving them any power of deliberating, they offered an unconditional surrender.

4. I have spoken before about what this implies, but I must in this place also briefly remind my readers of its import. Those who thus surrender themselves to the Roman authority, surrender all territory and the cities in it, together with all men and women in all such territory or cities, likewise rivers, harbours, temples, and tombs, so that the Romans should become actual lords of all these, and those who surrender should remain lords of nothing whatever. On the Carthaginians making a surrender to this effect, they were summoned into the Senate-house and the Praetor delivered the Senate's decision, which was to this effect: "They had been well advised, and therefore the Senate granted them freedom and the enjoyment of their laws; and moreover, all their territory and the possession of their other property, public or private." The Carthaginian envoys were much relieved when they heard this; thinking that, where the alternatives were both miserable, the Senate had treated them well in conceding their most necessary and important requirements. But presently the Praetor went on to state that they would enjoy these concessions on condition of sending three hundred hostages to Lilybaeum within thirty days, sons of members of the Hundred[1] or the Senate, and obeying such commands as should be imposed on them by the

What is implied by their surrender. See 20, 9-10.

The Senate regrant their liberty and territory to the Carthaginians,

but on condition of giving 300 hostages, and obeying certain orders not yet expressed.

[1] *τῶν ἐκ συγκλήτου καὶ τῆς γερουσίας.* The same distinction occurs in 10, 18, and seems to refer to the two bodies known as the Hundred and the Gerusia. See Bosworth Smith's *Carthage and the Carthaginians*, p. 27.

consuls. This dashed their satisfaction for a time, because they had no means of knowing what orders were to be given them through the consuls; however, they started at once, being anxious to report what had occurred to their countrymen with all speed. When they arrived in Carthage and stated the facts, the citizens considered that the envoys had in all respects acted with proper caution; but they were greatly alarmed and distressed by the fact that in the answer no mention was made of the city itself.

5. At this juncture they say that Mago Brettius delivered a manly and statesmanlike speech. He said: "The Carthaginians had two opportunities of taking counsel in regard to themselves and their country, one of which they had let pass; for in good truth it was no use now to question what was going to be enjoined on them by the consuls, and why it was that the Senate had made no mention of the city: they should have done that when they made the surrender. Having once made that, they must clearly make up their mind to the necessity of submitting to every possible injunction, unless it should prove to be something unbearably oppressive or beyond what they could possibly expect. If they would not do this, they must now consider whether they preferred to stand an invasion and all its possible consequences, or, in terror of the attack of the enemy, accept without resistance every order they might impose upon them." But as the imminence of war and the uncertainty of the future made every one inclined to submit to these injunctions, it was decided to send the hostages to Lilybaeum. Three hundred young men were forthwith selected and sent to Lilybaeum amidst loud expressions of sorrow and tears, each of them being escorted by his nearest friends and relations, the whole scene being made especially moving by the lamentations of the women. On landing at Lilybaeum the hostages were at once handed over by the consuls to Quintus Fabius Maximus, who had been appointed to the command in Sicily at that time. By him they were safely conveyed to Rome and confined in the dockyard of the six-benched ships.

Speech of Mago Brettius.

The hostages are sent to Lilybaeum.

6. The hostages being thus disposed of, the consuls

brought their fleet to the citadel of Utica. When news of this reached Carthage, the city was in the utmost excitement and panic, not knowing what to expect next. However, it was decided to send envoys to ask the consuls what they were to do, and to state that they were all prepared to obey orders.

The Consuls, L. Marcius Censorinus, M'. Manilius, land in Africa. B.C. 149.

The envoys arrived at the Roman camp: the general's council was summoned: and they delivered their commission. The senior Consul thereupon, after complimenting them on their policy and readiness to obey, bade them hand over all arms and missiles in their possession without subterfuge or concealment. The envoys answered that they would carry out the directions, but begged the Consul to consider what would happen if the Carthaginians surrendered all their arms, and the Romans took them and sailed away from the country. However, they gave them up. . . .

They demand the total disarming of the Carthaginians.

It was clearly shown that the resources of the city were enormous, for they surrendered to the Romans more than two hundred thousand stands of arms and two thousand catapults. . . .

This was followed by a second injunction of the consuls that the whole people of Carthage should remove to some other spot, to be not less than ten miles from the sea, and there build a new city. *Livy*, Ep. 49.

7. The people had no idea what the announcement was going to be, but suspecting it from the expression of the envoys' countenances, they immediately burst into a storm of cries and lamentations. . . .

Return of the envoys with the last orders from the Consuls.

Then all the Senators,[1] uttering a cry of horror, remained as though paralysed by the shock. But the report having quickly spread among the people, the general indignation at once found expression. Some made an attack on the envoys, as the guilty authors of their misfortunes, while others wreaked their wrath upon all Italians caught within the city, and others rushed to the town gates. . . .

The popular fury.

[1] The envoys first report to the Gerusia. Appian, *Pun.* 91.

The Carthaginians determine to resist, and the consuls, who had not hurried themselves, because they believed that resistance from an unarmed populace was impossible, found, when they approached Carthage, that it was prepared to offer a vigorous resistance. The scene which followed the announcement of the Consul's orders, and the incidents of the siege, are chiefly known to us from Appian, Pun. 91 sq. *Livy*, Ep. 49. *Scipio was serving as military Tribune*, B.C. 149-148; *consul*, B.C. 147.

HamilcarPhameas, the commander of the Punic cavalry. Appian, *Pun.* 100.

8. Hamilcar Phameas[1] was the general of the Carthaginians, a man in the very prime of life and of great physical strength. What is of the utmost importance too for service in the field, he was an excellent and bold horseman. . . .

When he saw the advanced guard, Phameas, though not at all deficient in courage, avoided coming to close quarters with Scipio: and on one occasion when he had come near his reserves, he got behind the cover of the brow of a hill and halted there a considerable time. . . .

The Roman maniples fled to the top of a hill; and when all had given their opinions, Scipio said, "When men are consulting what measures to take at first, their object should be to avoid disaster rather than to inflict it." [2] . . .

Polybius's personal knowledge of Scipio.

It ought not to excite surprise that I am more minute than usual in my account of Scipio and that I give in detail everything which he said. . . .

When Marcius Porcius Cato heard in Rome of the glorious achievements of Scipio he uttered a palinode to his criticisms of him: "What have you heard? He alone has the breath of wisdom in him: the rest are but flitting phantoms." [3]

[1] Phameas was afterwards persuaded by Massanissa to join the Romans. Livy, *Ep.* 50.

[2] The incident referred to is narrated in Appian, *Punica*, 103. Scipio relieved this body of men, who were beleaguered on the top of a hill, by a rapid and bold movement of his cavalry.

[3] *Odyssey*, 20, 495. Cato had always been opposed to the Scipios, but Livy seems to attribute his former criticisms of the younger Africanus to his general habit of caustic disparagement (*vir promptioris ad vituperandum linguae*), and we know that his elder son had married a daughter of Paulus, sister to the younger Africanus.

BOOK XXXVII

1. THERE was a great deal of talk of all sorts in Greece, first as to the Carthaginians when the Romans conquered them, and subsequently as to the question of the pseudo-Philip. The opinions expressed in regard to the Carthaginians were widely divided, and indicated entirely opposite views. Some commended the Romans for their wise and statesmanlike policy in regard to that kingdom. For the removal of a perpetual menace, and the utter destruction of a city which had disputed the supremacy with them, and could even then if it got an opportunity have still been disputing it,—thus securing the supremacy for their own country,—were the actions of sensible and far-sighted men. Others contradicted this, and asserted that the Romans had no such policy in view when they obtained their supremacy; and that they had gradually and insensibly become perverted to the same ambition for power, which had once characterised the Athenians and Lacedaemonians; and though they had advanced more slowly than these last, that they would from all appearances yet arrive at the same consummation. For in old times they had only carried on war until their opponents were beaten, and induced to acknowledge the obligation of obedience and acceptance of their orders; but that nowadays they had given a foretaste of their policy by their conduct to Perseus, in utterly destroying the Macedonian dynasty root and branch, and had given the finishing stroke to that policy by the course adopted in regard to the Carthaginians; for though this latter people had committed no act of irretrievable outrage, they had taken measures of irretrievable severity against them, in spite of their offering to accept any terms, and submitting to any injunctions that might be placed upon them. Others

The various views held in Greece as to the Roman policy.

again said that the Romans were generally a truly civilised people; and that they had this peculiarity, on which they prided themselves, that they conducted their wars openly and generously, not employing night surprises or ambuscades, but scorning every advantage to be gained by stratagem and deceit, and regarding open and face-to-face combats as alone becoming to their character: but that in the present instance their whole campaign against the Carthaginians had been conducted by means of stratagem and deceit. Little by little,—by holding out inducements here, and practising concealment there,—they had deprived them of all hopes of assistance from their allies. This was a line of conduct more appropriate by rights to the intriguing chicanery of a monarchy, than to a republican and Roman policy. Again, there were some who took the opposite line to these. They said that if it were really true that, before the Carthaginians had made the surrender, the Romans had behaved as alleged, holding out inducements here, and making half revelations there, they would be justly liable to such charges; but if, on the contrary, it was only after the Carthaginians had themselves made the surrender,—ackowledging the right of the Romans to take what measures they chose concerning them,—that the latter in the exercise of their undoubted right had imposed and enjoined what they determined upon, then this action must cease to be looked on as partaking of the nature of impiety or treachery. And some denied that it was an impiety at all: for there were three ways in which such a thing could be defined, none of which applied to the conduct of the Romans. An impiety was something done against the gods, or one's parents, or the dead; treachery was something done in violation of oaths or written agreements; an injustice something done in violation of law and custom. But the Romans could not be charged on any one of these counts: they had offended neither the gods, their parents, nor the dead; nor had they broken oaths or treaties, but on the contrary charged the Carthaginians with breaking them. Nor again had they violated laws, customs, or their own good faith; for having received a voluntary surrender, with the full power of doing what they pleased in the event of the submitting party not obeying their injunc-

tions, they had, in view of that eventuality having arisen, applied force to them.

2. Such were the criticisms commonly made on the dealings of the Romans with the Carthaginians. But as to the Pseudo-Philip, the report at first appeared quite beneath consideration. A Philip suddenly appears in Macedonia, as though he had dropped from the skies, in contempt of Macedonians and Romans alike, without having the least reasonable pretext for his claim, as every one knew that the real Philip had died in Alba in Italy two years after Perseus himself. But when, three or four months afterwards, a report arrived that he had conquered the Macedonians in a battle in the territory of the Odomanti beyond the Strymon, some believed it, but the majority were still incredulous. But presently, when news came that he had conquered the Macedonians in a battle on this side of the Strymon, and was master of all Macedonia; and when letters and envoys came from the Thessalians to the Achaeans imploring help, as though the danger were now affecting Thessaly, it seemed an astonishing and inexplicable event; for there was nothing to give it the air of probability, or to supply a rational explanation of it.

The pretended Philip, son of Perseus, B.C. 149.

Such was the view taken of these things in Greece. . . .

3. A despatch from Manius Manilius to the Achaeans having reached the Peloponnese, saying that they would oblige him by sending Polybius of Megalopolis with all speed to Lilybaeum, as he was wanted on account of certain public affairs, the Achaeans decided to send him in accordance with the letter of the consul. And as I felt bound to obey the Romans, I put everything else aside, and sailed at the beginning of summer. But when we arrived at Corcyra, we found another despatch from the consul to the Corcyreans had come, announcing that the Carthaginians had already surrendered all the hostages to them, and were prepared to obey them.[1] Thinking, therefore, that the war was at an end, and that there was no more occasion for our services, we sailed back to the Peloponnese. . . .

Polybius sent for to negotiate with Carthage, B.C. 149.

[1] Livy, *Ep.* 49.

4. It should not excite surprise that I sometimes designate myself by my proper name, and at other times by the common forms of expression—for instance, "when *I* had said this," or "we had agreed to this." For as I was much personally involved in the transactions about to be related, it becomes necessary to vary the methods of indicating myself; that I may not weary by continual repetition of my own name, nor again by introducing the words "of me," or "through me," at every turn, fall insensibly into an appearance of egotism. I wished, on the contrary, by an interchangeable use of these terms, and by selecting from time to time the one which seemed most in place, to avoid, as far as could be, the offensiveness of talk about one's self; for such talk, though naturally unacceptable, is frequently inevitable, when one cannot in any other way give a clear exposition of the subjects. I am somewhat assisted in this point by the accident that, as far as I know, no one up to our own time has ever had the same name as myself.[1] . . .

5. The statues of Callicrates[2] were carried in under the cover of darkness, while those of Lycortas were brought out again by broad daylight, to occupy their original position: and this coincidence drew the remark from every one, that we ought never to use our opportunities against others in a spirit of presumption, knowing that it is extremely characteristic of Fortune to subject those who set a precedent to the operation of their own ideas and principles in their turn. . . .

The mere love of novelty inherent in mankind is a sufficient incentive to any kind of change. . . .

Mission to Bithynia to investigate the quarrel between Nicomedes (II.) and his

6. The Romans sent envoys to restrain the impetuosity of Nicomedes and to prevent Attalus from going to war with Prusias. The men appointed were Marcus Licinius, who was suffering from gout, and was quite lamed by it, and with him Aulus

[1] He seems to have forgotten his namesake mentioned in 11, 15.

[2] For Callicrates, the author of the Romanising policy, see 26, 1-3. One of the statues raised to him by the Spartan exiles was at Olympia, the base of which has been discovered. See Hicks's *Greek Inscriptions*, p. 330. To what the fragment refers is not clear, but evidently to something connected with the popular movement against Sparta, and a recurrence to the policy of Philopoemen as represented by Lycortas, which eventually brought down the vengeance of Rome.

Mancinus, who, from a tile falling on his head, had so many and such great scars on it, that it was a matter of wonder that he escaped with his life, and Lucius Malleolus who was reputed the stupidest man in Rome. As the business required speed and boldness, these men seemed the least suitable possible for the purpose that could be conceived; and accordingly they say that Marcus Porcius Cato remarked in the Senate that "Not only would Prusias perish before they got there, but that Nicomedes would grow old in his kingdom. For how could a mission make haste, or if it did, how could it accomplish anything, when it had neither feet, head, nor intelligence?" . . .

father Prusias II. See *supra*, 32, 28, B.C. 148.

7. King Prusias was exceedingly repulsive in personal appearance, though his reasoning powers were somewhat superior: but externally he seemed only half a man, and was cowardly and effeminate in all matters pertaining to war. For not only was he timid, but he was averse to all hardships, and in a word was utterly unmanned in mind and body throughout his whole life; qualities which all the world object to in kings, but the Bithynians above all people. Moreover, he was also exceedingly dissolute in regard to sensual pleasures; was completely without education or philosophy, or any of the knowledge which they embrace; and had not the remotest idea of what virtue is. He lived the barbaric life of a Sardanapallus day and night. Accordingly, directly his subjects got the least hope of being able to do so, they conceived an implacable resolution not only to throw off allegiance to the king, but to press for vengeance upon him.[1] . . .

Character of Prusias II.

8. Museium is a place near Olympus in Macedonia. . . .

9. As I blame those who assign fortune and destiny as the moving causes in common events and catastrophes, I wish now to enter as minutely on the discussion of this subject as the nature of an historical work will admit. Those things of which it is impossible or difficult for a mere

Limits to the belief of the direct interference of Providence in human affairs.

[1] Prusias was killed at Pergamum by his son Nicomedes with the connivance of Attalus (Livy, *Ep.* 50).

man to ascertain the causes, such as a continuous fall of rains and unseasonable wet, or, on the contrary, droughts and frosts, one may reasonably impute to God and Fortune, in default of any other explanation; and from them come destruction of fruits, as well as long-continued epidemics, and other similar things, of which it is not easy to find the cause. On such matters then, we, in default of a better, follow the prevailing opinions of the multitude, attempting by supplications and sacrifices to appease the wrath of heaven, and sending to ask the gods by what words or actions on our part a change for the better may be brought about, and a respite be obtained for the evils which are afflicting us. But those things, of which it is possible to find the origin and cause of their occurrence, I do not think we should refer to the gods. I mean such a thing as the following. In our time all Greece was visited by a dearth of children and generally a decay of population, owing to which the cities were denuded of inhabitants, and a failure of productiveness resulted, though there were no long-continued wars or serious pestilences among us. If, then, any one had advised our sending to ask the gods in regard to this, what we were to do or say in order to become more numerous and better fill our cities,—would he not have seemed a futile person, when the cause was manifest and the cure in our own hands? For this evil grew upon us rapidly, and without attracting attention, by our men becoming perverted to a passion for show and money and the pleasures of an idle life, and accordingly either not marrying at all, or, if they did marry, refusing to rear the children that were born, or at most one or two out of a great number, for the sake of leaving them well off or bringing them up in extravagant luxury. For when there are only one or two sons, it is evident that, if war or pestilence carries off one, the houses must be left heirless: and, like swarms of bees, little by little the cities become sparsely inhabited and weak. On this subject there is no need to ask the gods how we are to be relieved from such a curse: for any one in the world will tell you that it is by the men themselves if possible changing their objects of ambition; or, if that cannot be done, by passing laws for the preservation of infants. On this subject there is no need of

seers or prodigies. And the same holds good of all similar things. But in regard to events of which the causes are impossible or difficult to discover, it is reasonable to feel a difficulty. And in this class may be reckoned the course of Macedonian history. For the Macedonians had enjoyed many important favours at the hands of the Romans, having been as a nation liberated from arbitrary government and imports, and having obtained undisputed freedom in the place of slavery; and having been individually relieved to a great extent from intestine factions and civil bloodshed.[1] . . . They had been worsted by the Romans formerly when fighting on the side of Demetrius[2] and again on that of Perseus; yet when engaged on the side of a man of odious character,[3] and in support of his claims to the throne, they displayed great courage and conquered a Roman army. These facts may well seem a puzzle to us, for it is difficult to discover their cause. And accordingly one would be inclined to say in such matters that what had happened was a heaven-sent infatuation, and that the wrath of God had fallen upon the Macedonians. And this will be rendered evident from what remains to be told. . . .

The inexplicable conduct of the Macedonians.

10. Massanissa, king of the Numidians in Africa, was the best man of all the kings of our time, and the most completely fortunate; for he reigned more than sixty years in the soundest health and to extreme old age,—for he was ninety when he died. He was, besides, the most powerful man physically of all his contemporaries: for instance, when it was necessary to stand, he would do so without moving a foot all day long; and again, when he had once sat down to business he remained there the whole day; nor did it distress him the least to remain in the saddle day and night continuously; and at ninety years old, at which age he died, he left a son only four years old, called Sthembanus, who was

Death of Massanissa B.C. 148. His fortunate career and physical vigour.

[1] A considerable passage is here lost, with the exception of a few words, insufficient to ground a conjectural translation upon.

[2] Demetrius II., son of Antigonus Gonatas.

[3] Pseudophilippus, after cutting to pieces a Roman legion under the praetor Juventius, was conquered and captured by Q. Caecilius Metellus in B.C. 148 (Livy, *Ep.* 50; Eutrop. 4, 6).

afterwards adopted by Micipses, and four sons besides. Owing, again, to the affection existing between these sons, he kept his whole life free from any treasonable plot and his kingdom unpolluted by any family tragedy. But his greatest and most divine achievement was this: Numidia had been before his time universally unproductive, and was looked upon as incapable of producing any cultivated fruits. He was the first and only man who showed that it could produce cultivated fruits just as well as any other country whatever, by cultivating farms to the extent of ten thousand plethra for each of his sons in different parts of it. On this man's death, then, so much may reasonably and justly be said. Scipio arrived at Cirta on the third day after his departure, and settled everything properly and fairly.[1] . . .

A little while before his death he was seen, on the day following a great victory over the Carthaginians, sitting outside his tent eating a piece of dirty bread, and on those who saw it expressing surprise at his doing so, he said.[2] . . .

[1] Massanissa, feeling himself to be dying, had asked Scipio to come to him. He left his sons strict injunctions to submit the arrangements of the succession and division of his kingdom to Scipio. Appian, *Punica*, 105; Livy, *Ep.* 50. Livy has adopted the statement of Polybius as to the age of Massanissa at his death; and Cicero (*de Sen.* § 34) has made Cato take the same reckoning, perhaps from Polybius also. But it does not agree with another statement of Livy himself, who (24, 49) speaks of him as being seventeen in B.C. 213, in which case he would be in his eighty-second year in B.C. 148. It is, however, proposed to read xxvii. for xvii. in this passage of Livy.

[2] Livy (*Ep.* 48) in speaking of this victory says that Massanissa was ninety-two, and ate and enjoyed his bread without anything to flavour it (*sine pulpamine*).

BOOK XXXVIII

1. HASDRUBAL, the general of the Carthaginians, was a vain ostentatious person, very far from possessing real strategic ability. There are numerous proofs of his want of judgment. In the first place he appeared in full armour in his interview with Gulussa, king of the Numidians, with a purple dyed robe over his armour fastened by a brooch, and attended by ten bodyguards armed with swords; and in the next place, having advanced in front of these armed attendants to a distance of about twenty feet, he stood behind the trench and palisade and beckoned the king to come to him, whereas it ought to have been quite the other way. However, Gulussa, after the Numidian fashion, being not inclined to stand on ceremony, advanced towards him unattended, and when he got near him asked him "Whom he was afraid of that he had come in full armour?" And on his answering, "The Romans," Gulussa remarked: "Then you should not have trusted yourself to the city, when there was no necessity for your doing so. However, what do you want, and what do you ask me to do?" To which Hasdrubal replied: "I want you to go as our ambassador to the Roman commander, and to undertake for us that we will obey every injunction; only I beg of you both to abstain from harming this wretched city." Then said Gulussa: "Your demand appears to me to be quite childish! Why, my good sir, what you failed to get by your embassies from the Romans, who were then quietly encamped at Utica, and before a blow had been struck,—how can you expect to have granted you now, when you have been completely invested by sea and land, and have almost given up every hope

The siege of Carthage, B.C. 147. Coss. P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus Aemilianus, C. Livius Donsus.

Interview between Hasdrubal and King Gulussa.

of safety?" To which Hasdrubal replied that "Gulussa was ill informed; for they still had good hopes of their outside allies,"—for he had not yet heard about the Mauretani, and thought that the forces in the country were still unconquered,[1] —"nor were they in despair as to their own ultimate safety. And above all, they trusted in the support of the gods, and in what they might expect from them; for they believed that they would not disregard the flagrant violation of treaty from which they were suffering, but would give them many opportunities of securing their safety. Therefore he called on the Roman commander in the name of the gods and of Fortune to spare the city; with the distinct understanding that, if its inhabitants failed to obtain this grace, they would be cut to pieces to the last man sooner than evacuate it." After some more conversation of the same sort, these men separated for the present, having made an appointment to meet again on the third day from that time.

2. On Gulussa communicating to him what had been said, Scipio remarked with a laugh: "Oh, then, it was because you intended to make this demand that you displayed that abominable cruelty to our prisoners![2] And you trust in the gods, do you, after violating even the laws of men?" The king went on to remind Scipio that above all things it was necessary to finish the business speedily; for, apart from unforeseen contingencies, the consular elections were now close at hand, and it was only right to have regard to that, lest, if the winter found them just where they were, another Consul would come to supersede him, and without any trouble get all the credit of his labours. These words induced Scipio to give directions to offer Hasdrubal safety for himself, his wife and children, and ten families of his friends and relations, and permission to take ten talents of

Scipio's scorn of the proposal, B.C. 147.

He offers Hasdrubal personal security for delivering the town.

[1] The task of subduing the country in B.C. 147 was entrusted to the proconsul Culpurnius Piso, while Scipio was engaged in completing the investment of Carthage. Appian, *Pun.* 113-126.

[2] After the capture of Megara, the suburban district of Carthage, by Scipio, Hasdrubal withdrew into the Byrsa, got made commander-in-chief, and bringing all Roman prisoners to the battlements, put them to death with the most ghastly tortures. Appian, *Pun.* 118.

his private property and to bring out with him whichever of his slaves he chose. With these concessions therefore Gulussa went to his meeting with Hasdrubal on the third day, who again came forward with great pomp and at a dignified step, clothed in his purple robe and full suit of armour, so as to cast the tyrants of tragedy far into the shade. He was naturally fat, but at that time he had grown extremely corpulent, and had become more than usually red from exposure to the sun, so that he seemed to be living like fat oxen at a fair; and not at all like a man to be in command at a time of such terrible miseries as cannot easily be described in words. When he met the king, and heard the offer of the Consul, he slapped his thigh again and again, and appealing to the gods and Fortune declared that "The day would never come on which Hasdrubal would behold the sun and his native city in flames; for to the nobly-minded one's country and its burning houses were a glorious funeral pile." These expressions force us to feel some admiration for the man and the nobility of his language; but when we come to view his administration of affairs, we cannot fail to be struck by his want of spirit and courage; for at a time when his fellow-citizens were absolutely perishing with famine, he gave banquets and had second courses put on of a costly kind, and by his own excellent physical condition made their misery more conspicuous. For the number of the dying surpassed belief, as well as the number who deserted every day from hunger. However, by fiercely rebuking some, and by executing as well as abusing others, he cowed the common people: and by this means retained, in a country reduced to the lowest depths of misfortune, an authority which a tyrant would scarcely enjoy in a prosperous city. Therefore I think I was justified in saying that two leaders more like each other than those who at that time directed the affairs of Greece and Carthage it would not be easy to find. And this will be rendered manifest when we come to a formal comparison of them. . . .

The selfish and tyrannical conduct of Hasdrubal.

Comparison between Hasdrubal and Diaeus.

3. My thirty-eighth book embraces the consummation of the misfortunes of Greece. For though Greece as a whole, as well as separate

The ill-luck which occasioned the fall of Greece.

parts of it, has on several occasions sustained grave disasters, yet to none of her previous defeats could the word "misfortune" be more properly applied, than to those which have befallen her in our time. For it is not only that the *sufferings* of Greece excite compassion: stronger still is the conviction, which a knowledge of the truth of the several occurrences must bring, that in all she undertook she was supremely unfortunate. At any rate, though the disaster of Carthage is looked upon as of the severest kind, yet one cannot but regard that of Greece as not less, and in some respects even more so. For the Carthaginians at any rate left something for posterity to say on their behalf; but the mistakes of the Greeks were so glaring that they made it impossible for those who wished to support them to do so. Besides, the destruction of the Carthaginians was immediate and total, so that they had no feeling afterwards of their disasters: but the Greeks, with their misfortunes ever before their eyes, handed down to their children's children the loss of all that once was theirs. And in proportion as we regard those who live in pain as more pitiable than those who lose their lives at the moment of their misfortunes, in that proportion must the disasters of the Greeks be regarded as more pitiable than those of the Carthaginians,—unless a man thinks nothing of dignity and honour, and gives his opinion from a regard only to material advantage. To prove the truth of what I say, one has only to remember and compare the misfortunes in Greece reputed to be the heaviest with what I have just now mentioned.

The fall of Greece was even more lamentable than that of Carthage.

4. Now, the greatest alarm that fortune ever brought upon the Greeks was when Xerxes invaded Europe: for at that time all were exposed to danger though an extremely small number actually suffered disaster. The greatest sufferers were the Athenians: for, with a prudent foresight of what was coming, they abandoned their country with their wives and children. That crisis then caused them damage; for the Barbarians took Athens and laid it waste with savage violence: but it brought them no shame or disgrace. On the contrary, they gained the highest

Comparison between the fall of Greece under the Romans with the Persian invasion, B.C. 480.

glory in the eyes of all the world for having regarded everything as of less importance, in comparison with taking their share in the same fortune as the other Greeks. Accordingly, in consequence of their exalted conduct, they not only immediately recovered their own city and territory, but soon afterwards disputed the supremacy in Greece with the Lacedaemonians. Subsequently, indeed, they were beaten by the Spartans in war, and forced to submit to the destruction of their own city walls: but even this one might assert to be a reproach to the Lacedaemonians, for having used the power put into their hands with excessive severity, rather than to the Athenians. Then the Spartans once more, being beaten by the Thebans, lost the supremacy in Greece, and after that defeat were deprived of their outside rule and reduced to the frontiers of Laconia. But what disgrace was there in having retired, while disputing for the most honourable objects, to the limits of their ancestral dominion? Therefore, these events we may speak of as failures, but not as misfortunes in any sense. The Mantineans again were forced to leave their city, being divided out and scattered into separate villages by the Lacedaemonians; but for this all the world blamed the folly, not of the Mantineans, but of the Lacedaemonians. The Thebans, indeed, besides the loss of their army, saw their country depopulated at the time when Alexander, having resolved on the invasion of Asia, conceived that by making an example of Thebes he should establish a terror that would act as a check upon the Greeks, while his attention was distracted upon other affairs: but at that time all the world pitied the Thebans as having been treated with injustice and harshness, and no one was found to justify this proceeding of Alexander.

The defeat of the Athenians at Aegospotami, B.C. 405,

of the Spartans at Leuctra, B.C. 371.

The destruction of Mantinea, B.C. 362,

and of Thebes, B.C. 335.

5. Accordingly after a short time they obtained assistance, and once more inhabited their country in security. For the compassion of foreigners is no small benefit to those who are unjustly dispossessed; since we often see that, with the change of feeling among the many, Fortune also changes; and even the conquerors themselves repent, and make

good the disasters of those who have fallen under undeserved misfortunes. Once more, at certain periods the Chalcidians and Corinthians and some other cities, owing to the advantages of their situation, were attacked by the kings of Macedonia, and had garrisons imposed on them: but when they were thus enslaved all the world were eager to do their best to liberate them, and loathed their enslavers and regarded them continually as their enemies. But above all, up to this time it was generally single states that were depopulated, and in single states that reverses were met with, in some cases while disputing for supremacy and empire, and in others from the treacherous attacks of despots and kings: so that, so far from their losses bringing them any reproach, they escaped even the name of misfortune. For we must look on all those who meet with incalculable disasters whether private or public as the victims of losses, and those only to be "unfortunate," to whom events through their own folly bring dishonour. Instances of this last are the Peloponnesians, Boeotians, Phocians, . . . and Locrians, some of the dwellers on the Ionian gulf, and next to these the Macedonians, . . . who all as a rule did not merely suffer loss, but were "unfortunate," with a misfortune of the gravest kind and for which they were themselves open to reproach: for they displayed at once want of good faith and want of courage, brought upon themselves a series of disgraces, lost all that could bring them honour, . . . and voluntarily admitted into their towns the Roman fasces and axes. They were in the utmost panic, in fact, owing to the extravagance of their own wrongful acts, if one ought to call them their own; for I should rather say that the peoples as such were entirely ignorant, and were beguiled from the path of right: but that the men who *acted* wrongly were the authors of this delusion.

The tyranny of the later kings of Macedonia.

But the last fall of Greece was embittered by the fact that it came from the folly of the Greeks themselves rather than of their leaders.

6. In regard to these men, it should not be a matter of surprise if we leave for a while the ordinary method and spirit of our narrative to give a clearer and more elaborate exposition of their character. I am aware that some may

be found, regarding it as their first duty to cast a veil over the errors of the Greeks, to accuse us of writing in a spirit of malevolence. But for myself, I conceive that with right-minded persons a man will never be regarded as a true friend who shrinks from and is afraid of plain speech, nor indeed as a good citizen who abandons the truth because of the offence he will give to certain persons at the time. But a writer of public history above all deserves no indulgence whatever, who regards anything of superior importance to truth. For in proportion as written history reaches larger numbers, and survives for longer time, than words spoken to suit an occasion, both the writer ought to be still more particular about truth, and his readers ought to admit his authority only so far as he adheres to this principle. At the actual hour of danger it is only right that Greeks should help Greeks in every possible way, by protecting them, veiling their errors or deprecating the wrath of the sovereign people,—and this I genuinely did for my part at the actual time: but it is also right, in regard to the record of events to be transmitted to posterity, to leave them unmixed with any falsehood: so that readers should not be merely gratified for the moment by a pleasant tale, but should receive in their souls a lesson which will prevent a repetition of similar errors in the future. Enough, however, on this subject. . . .

In the autumn of B.C. 150 *the corrupt Menalchidas of Sparta was succeeded as Achaean Strategus by Diaeus, who, to cover his share in the corruption of Menalchidas, induced the league to act in the matter of some disputed claim of Sparta in a manner contrary to the decisions of the Roman Senate. The Spartans wished to appeal again to Rome; whereupon the Achaeans passed a law forbidding separate cities to make such appeals, which were to be only made by the league. The Lacedaemonians took up arms: and Diaeus professing that the league was not at war with Sparta, but with certain factious citizens of that city, named four of its chief men who were to be banished. They fled to Rome, where the Senate ordered their restoration. Embassies went from Achaia and from Sparta to Rome to state their respective cases; and on their return gave false reports,—Diaeus*

assuring the Achaeans that the Senate had ordered the Spartans to obey the league; Menalchidas telling the Spartans that the Romans had released them from all connexion with the league. War then again broke out (B.C. 148). *Metellus, who was in Macedonia on the business of the Pseudo-Philip, sent legates to the Achaeans forbidding them to bear arms against Sparta, and announcing the speedy arrival of commissioners from Rome to settle the dispute. But the Achaean levies were already mustered under the Strategus Damocritus, and the Lacedaemonians seem to have almost compelled them to fight. The Spartans were beaten with considerable loss: and on Damocritus preventing a pursuit and a capture of Sparta, the Achaeans regarded him as traitor and fined him fifty talents. He was succeeded in his office of Strategus by Diaeus (autumn* B.C. 148–B.C. 147) *who promised Metellus to await the arrival of the commissioners from Rome. But the Spartans now assumed their freedom from the league and elected a Strategus of their own, Menalchidas; who provoked a renewal of the war by taking the town of Iasos on the Laconian frontier. In despair of resisting the attack of the Achaeans, and disowned by his fellow-citizens, he took poison. The Roman commissioners arrived, led by L. Aurelius Orestes, in* B.C. 147, *and summoning the magistrates of the Achaean towns and the Strategus Diaeus before them at Corinth, announced the decision of the Senate—separating Lacedaemon, Corinth, Argos, Heraclea near Aete, and Orchomenus in Arcadia from the Achaean league, as not being united by blood, and only being subsequent additions. The magistrates, without answering, hastily summoned the league congress. The people, on hearing the Roman decision, pillaged the houses of the Lacedaemonian residents in Corinth, and savagely attacked all who were or who looked like Spartans. The Roman envoys endeavoured to restrain the popular fury. But they were somewhat roughly handled themselves; and the people could not be persuaded to release the Spartans whom they had arrested: though they let all others go, and sent an embassy to Rome, which, however, meeting the former embassy on its return, and learning the hopelessness of support in Rome, returned home. It is this outbreak which is referred to in the next fragment. See Pausanias, vii.* 12-14; *Livy,* Ep. 51.

1 Sch.

7. When the commissioners with L. Aurelius Orestes arrived in Rome from the Peloponnese, they reported what had taken place, and declared that they had a narrow escape of actually losing their lives. They made the most of the occurrence and put the worst interpretation upon it; for they represented the violence which had been offered them as not the result of a sudden outbreak, but of a deliberate intention on the part of the Achaeans to inflict a signal insult upon them. The Senate was therefore more angry than it had ever been, and at once appointed Sextus Julius Caesar and other envoys with instructions to rebuke and upbraid the Achaeans for what had occurred, yet in terms of moderation, but to exhort them "not to listen to evil councillors, not to allow themselves to be betrayed into hostility with Rome, but even yet to make amends for their acts of folly by inflicting punishment on the authors of the crime." This was a clear proof that the Senate gave its instructions to Aurelius and his colleagues, not with the view of dismembering the league, but with the object of restraining the obstinacy and hostility of the Achaeans by terrifying and overawing them. Some people accordingly imagined that the Romans were acting hypocritically, because the Carthaginian war was still unfinished; but this was not the case. The fact is, that they had long regarded the Achaean league with favour, believing it to be the most trustworthy of all the Greek governments; and though now they were resolved to give it an alarm, because it had become too lofty in its pretensions, yet they were by no means minded to go to war or to have a serious quarrel with the Achaeans. . . .

On the report of L. Aurelius Orestes of the disturbance at Corinth, B.C. 147, the Senate send a fresh commission to warn the Achaeans.

2 Sch.

8. As Sextus Julius Caesar and his colleagues were on their way from Rome to the Peloponnese, they were met by Thearidas and the other envoys, sent by the Achaeans to make their excuse and give the Senate an explanation of the intemperate acts committed in regard to Aurelius Orestes. But Sextus Julius persuaded them to turn back to Achaia, on the ground that he and his colleagues were coming with full instructions to communicate with the Achaeans on all these points. When

Arrival of Sextus Julius and the commissioners in Achaia.

Sextus arrived in the Peloponnese, and in a conference with the Achaeans in Aegium spoke with great kindness, he made no mention of the injurious treatment of the legates, and scarcely demanded any defence at all, but took a more lenient view of what had happened than even the Achaeans themselves; and dwelt chiefly on the subject of exhorting them not to carry their error any further, in regard either to the Romans or the Lacedaemonians. Thereupon the more sober-minded party received the speech with satisfaction, and were strongly moved to obey the suggestions, because they were conscious of the gravity of what they had been doing, and had before their eyes what happened to opponents of Rome; but the majority, though they had not a word to say against the justice of the injunctions of Sextus Julius, and were quite silent, yet remained deeply tainted with disaffection. And Diaeus and Critolaus, and all who shared their sentiments,—and they consisted of all the greatest rascals in every city, men at war with the gods, and pests of the community, carefully selected,—took, as the proverb has it, with the left hand what the Romans gave with the right, and went utterly and entirely wrong in their calculations. For they supposed that the Romans, owing to the troubles in Libya and Iberia, feared a war with the Achaeans and would submit to anything and say anything. Thinking, therefore, that the hour was their own, they answered the Roman envoys politely that "They would, nevertheless, send Thearidas and his colleagues to the Senate; while they would themselves accompany the legates to Tegea, and there in consultation with the Lacedaemonians would provide for some settlement of the war that would meet the views of both parties." With this answer they subsequently induced the unhappy nation to follow the senseless course to which they had long before made up their mind. And this result was only what might have been expected from the inexperience and corruption of the prevailing party.

Conference at Aegium. The envoys are conciliatory.

Action of Diaeus and Critolaus and their party.

9. But the finishing stroke to this ruinous policy was given in the following manner. When Sextus and his colleagues arrived at Tegea, and invited the

Conference at Tegea. Critolaus

attendance of the Lacedaemonians, in order to arrange terms between them and the Achaeans, both as to the satisfaction to be given for previous complaints and for putting a stop to the war, until the Romans should send commissioners to review the whole question, Critolaus and his party, having held a conference, decided that all the rest should avoid the meeting, and that Critolaus should go alone to Tegea. When Sextus and his fellow-commissioners therefore had almost given them up, Critolaus arrived; and when the meeting with the Lacedaemonians took place, he would settle nothing,—alleging that he had no authority to make any arrangement without the consent of the people at large; but that he would bring the matter before the Achaeans at their next congress, which must be held six months from that time. Sextus and his fellow-commissioners, therefore, convinced of the ill disposition of Critolaus, and much annoyed at his conduct, dismissed the Lacedaemonians to their own country, and themselves returned to Italy with strong views as to the folly and infatuation of Critolaus.

contrives to avoid a settlement.

After their departure Critolaus spent the winter in visiting the cities and holding assemblies in them, on the pretext that he wished to inform them of what he had said to the Lacedaemonians at Tegea, but in reality to denounce the Romans and to put an evil interpretation on everything they said; by which means he inspired the common people in the various cities with feelings of hostility and hatred for them. At the same time he sent round orders to the magistrates not to exact money from debtors, nor to receive prisoners arrested for debt, and to cause loans on pledge to be held over until the war was decided. By this kind of appeal to the interests of the vulgar everything he said was received with confidence; and the common people were ready to obey any order he gave, being incapable of taking thought for the future, but caught by the bait of immediate indulgence and relief.

Winter of B.C. 147-146. Critolaus propagates his anti-Roman views;

and suspends cash payments.

10. When Quintus Caecilius Metellus heard in Macedonia of the commotion and disturbance going on in the Peloponnese, he despatched thither his le-

Fresh legates are sent from Mace-

donia to Achaia in the winter of B.C. 147-146.

gates Gneaus Papirius and the younger Popilius Laenas, along with Aulus Gabinius and Gaius Fannius; who, happening to arrive when the congress was assembled at Corinth, were introduced to the assembly, and delivered a long and conciliatory speech, much in the spirit of that of Sextus Julius, exerting themselves with great zeal to prevent the Achaeans from proceeding to an open breach with Rome, either on the pretext of their grievance against the Lacedaemonians, or from any feeling of anger against the Romans themselves. But the assembled people would not hear them; insulting words were loudly uttered against the envoys, and in the midst of a storm of yells and tumult they were driven from the assembly. The fact was that such a crowd of workmen and artisans had been got together as had never been collected before; for all the cities were in a state of drivelling folly, and above all the Corinthians *en masse;* and there were only a very few who heartily approved of the words of the envoys.

Riotous scene at Corinth.

Critolaus, conceiving that he had attained his purpose, in the midst of an audience as excited and mad as himself began attacking the magistrates, abusing all who were opposed to him, and openly defying the Roman envoys, saying that he was desirous of being a friend of the Romans, but had no taste for them as his masters. And, finally, he tried to incite the people by saying that, if they quitted themselves like men, they would have no lack of allies; but, if they betrayed womanish fears, they would not want for masters. By many other such words to the same effect, conceived in the spirit of a charlatan and huckster, he roused and excited the populace. He attempted also to make it plain that he was not acting at random in these proceedings, but that some of the kings and republics were engaged in the same policy as himself.

Critolaus makes no secret of his hostility to Rome.

11. And when some of the Gerusia wished to check him, and restrain him from the use of such expressions, he ordered the soldiers surrounding him to retire, and stood up fronting his opponents, and bade any one of them come up to him,

Critolaus carries his point, and induces the Achaeans to pro-

come near him, or venture to touch his chlamys. And, finally, he said that "He had restrained himself now for a long time; but would endure it no longer, and must speak his mind. The people to fear were not Lacedaemonians or Romans, but the traitors among themselves who co-operated with their foes: for there were some who cared more for Romans and Lacedaemonians than for their own country." He added, as a confirmation of his words, that Evagoras of Aegium and Stratius of Tritaea betrayed to Gnaeus Papirius and his fellow-commissioners all the secret proceedings in the meetings of the magistrates. And when Stratius acknowledged that he had had interviews with those men, and should do so again, as they were friends and allies, but asserted that he had told them nothing of what was said in the meetings of the magistrates, some few believed him, but the majority accepted the accusation as true. And so Critolaus, having inflamed the people by his accusations against these men, induced the Achaeans once more to decree a war which was nominally against the Lacedaemonians, but in effect was against the Romans; and he got another decree added, which was a violation of the constitution, namely, that whomsoever they should elect as Strategi should have absolute power in carrying on the war. He thus got for himself something like a despotism.

claim war against the Lacedaemonians.

Having carried these measures, he began intriguing to bring on an outbreak and cause an attack upon the Roman envoys. He had no pretext for doing this; but adopted a course which, of all possible courses, offends most flagrantly against the laws of gods and man. The envoys, however, separated; Gnaeus Papirius went to Athens and thence to Sparta to watch the turn of events; Aulus Gabinius went to Naupactus; and the other two remained at Athens, waiting for the arrival of Caecilius Metellus. This was the state of things in the Peloponnese. . . .

The Roman envoys retire from Corinth.

BOOK XXXIX

[*Including Book* XL. *of Dindorf's Text.*]

1. I AM fully aware that some will be found to criticise my work, on the ground that my narrative of events is incomplete and disconnected; beginning, for instance, the story of the siege of Carthage, and then leaving it half told, and interrupting the stream of my history, I pass over to Greek affairs, and from them to Macedonian or Syrian, or some other history; whereas students require continuity, and desire to hear the end of a subject; for the combination of pleasure and profit is thus more completely secured. But I do not think this: I hold exactly the reverse. And as a witness to the correctness of my opinion I might appeal to nature herself, who is never satisfied with the same things continuously in any of the senses, but is ever inclined to change; and, even if she is satisfied with the same things, wishes to have them at intervals and in diversity of circumstance. This may be illustrated first by the sense of hearing, which is never gratified either in music or recitations by a continuance of the same strains or subjects; it is the varied style, and, in a word, whatever is broken up into intervals and has the most marked and frequent changes, that gives it pleasurable excitement. Similarly one may notice that the palate can never remain gratified by the same meats, however costly, but grows to feel a loathing for them, and delights in changes of diet, and often prefers plain to rich food merely for the sake of variety. The same may be noticed as to the sight: it is quite incapable of remaining fixed on the same object, but it is a variety and change of objects that excites it. And this is more

A defence of the historian's method of parallel histories of several countries, each kept up to date.

than all the case with the mind; for changes in the objects of attention and study act as rests to laborious men.

2. Accordingly the most learned of the ancient historians have, as it seems to me, taken intervals of rest in this way: some by digressions on myths and tales, and others by digressions on historical facts,—not confining themselves to Greek history, but introducing disquisitions on points of foreign history as well. As, for instance, when, in the course of a history of Thessaly and the campaigns of Alexander of Pherae, they introduce an account of the attempts of the Lacedaemonians in the Peloponnese; or those made by the Athenians; or actions which took place in Macedonia or Illyria: and then break off into an account of the expedition of Iphicrates into Egypt, and the iniquitous deeds of Clearchus in the Pontus. This will show you that these historians all employ this method; but, whereas they employ it without any system, I do so on a regular system. For these men, after mentioning, for instance, that Bardylis, king of the Illyrians, and Cersobleptes, king of the Thracians, established their dynasties, neither go on continuously with the stories nor return to them after an interval to take them up where they left off, but, treating them like an episode in a poem, they go back to their original subject. But I made a careful division of all the most important countries in the world and the course of their several histories; pursued exactly the same plan in regard to the order of taking the several divisions; and, moreover, arranged the history of each year in the respective countries, carefully keeping to the limits of the time: and the result is that I have made the transition backwards and forwards between my continuous narrative and the continually recurring interruptions easy and obvious to students, so that an attentive reader need never miss anything. . . .

After various operations during the autumn of B.C. 147, *the upshot of which was to put the whole of the open country in Roman hands, in the beginning of spring* B.C. 146, *Scipio delivered his final attack on Carthage, taking first the quarter of the merchants' harbour, then the war harbour, and then the market-place. There only remained the streets leading to the Byrsa and the Byrsa itself.* *Appian*, Pun. 123-126. *Livy*, Ep. 51.

The fall of Carthage, B.C. 146 (spring).

3. Having got within the walls, while the Carthaginians still held out on the citadel, Scipio found that the arm of the sea which intervened was not at all deep; and upon Polybius advising him to set it with iron spikes or drive sharp wooden stakes into it, to prevent the enemy crossing it and attacking the mole,[1] he said that, having taken the walls and got inside the city, it would be ridiculous to take measures to avoid fighting the enemy. . . .

Scipio within the walls of Carthage.

4. The pompous Hasdrubal threw himself on his knees before the Roman commander, quite forgetful of his proud language. . . .

When the Carthaginian commander thus threw himself as a suppliant at Scipio's knees, the proconsul with a glance at those present said: "See what Fortune is, gentlemen! What an example she makes of irrational men! This is the Hasdrubal who but the other day disdained the large favours which I offered him, and said that the most glorious funeral pyre was one's country and its burning ruins. Now he comes with suppliant wreaths, beseeching us for bare life and resting all his hopes on us. Who would not learn from such a spectacle that a mere man should never say or do anything presumptuous?" Then some of the deserters came to the edge of the roof and begged the front ranks of the assailants to hold their hands for a little; and, on Scipio ordering a halt, they began abusing Hasdrubal, some for his perjury, declaring that he had sworn again and again on the altars that he would never abandon them, and others for his cowardice and utter baseness: and they did this in the most unsparing language, and with the bitterest terms of abuse. And just at this moment Hasdrubal's wife, seeing him seated in front of the enemy with Scipio, advanced in front of the deserters, dressed in noble and dignified attire herself, but holding in her hands, on either side, her two boys dressed only in short tunics and shielded under her own robes.[2] First she addressed Hasdrubal by his name, and when

[1] *τά χώματα*, that is, apparently, the mole of huge stones constructed by the Romans to block up the mouth of the harbour.

[2] *μετὰ τῶν ἰδίων ἐνδυμάτων*. The German translator Kraz gives up these words in despair. Kampe translated them *in ihrer gewöhnlicher Tracht*. Mr. Strachan-Davidson says, "*προσειληφυῖα*, etc., 'folding them in her own robe

he said nothing but remained with his head bowed to the ground, she began by calling on the name of the gods, and next thanked Scipio warmly because, as far as he could secure it, both she and her children were saved.[1] And then, pausing for a short time, she asked Hasdrubal how he had had the heart to secure this favour from the Roman general for himself alone, . . . and, leaving his fellow-citizens who trusted in him in the most miserable plight, had gone over secretly to the enemy? And how he had the assurance to be sitting there holding suppliant boughs, in the face of the very men to whom he had frequently said that the day would never come in which the sun would see Hasdrubal alive and his native city in flames. . . .

Hasdrubal's wife finally threw herself and children from the citadel into the burning streets. *Livy*, Ep. 51.

After an interview with [Scipio], in which he was kindly treated, Hasdrubal desired leave to go away from the town. . . .

5. At the sight of the city utterly perishing amidst the flames Scipio burst into tears, and stood long reflecting on the inevitable change which awaits cities, nations, and dynasties, one and all, as it does every one of us men. This, he thought, had befallen Ilium, once a powerful city, and the once mighty empires of the Assyrians, Medes, Persians, and that of Macedonia lately so splendid. And unintentionally or purposely he quoted,—the words perhaps escaping him unconsciously,—[2]

> "The day shall be when holy Troy shall fall
> And Priam, lord of spears, and Priam's folk."

And on my asking him boldly (for I had been his tutor) what he meant by these words, he did not name Rome distinctly, but was evidently fearing for her, from this sight of the mutability of human affairs. . . .

Another still more remarkable saying of his I may record. . . [When he had given the order for firing the town] he imme-

with her hands,'" which seems straining the meaning of προσειληφυῖα. The French translator says, *deux enfans suspendus à ses vêtemens.*

[1] According to Livy (*Ep.* 51) she had tried to induce her husband to accept the offer described in 38, 2.

[2] Homer, *Il.* 6, 448.

diately turned round and grasped me by the hand and said: "O Polybius, it is a grand thing, but, I know not how, I feel a terror and dread, lest some one should one day give the same order about my own native city." . . . Any observation more practical or sensible it is not easy to make. For in the midst of supreme success for one's self and of disaster for the enemy, to take thought of one's own position and of the possible reverse which may come, and in a word to keep well in mind in the midst of prosperity the mutability of Fortune, is the characteristic of a great man, a man free from weaknesses and worthy to be remembered. . . .

After the rejection of the orders conveyed by the legates of Metellus (38, 11), *Critolaus collected the Achaean levies at Corinth, under the pretext of going to war with Sparta; but he soon induced the league to declare themselves openly at war with Rome. He was encouraged by the adhesion of the Boeotarch Pytheas, and of the Chalcidians. The Thebans were the readier to join him because they had lately been ordered by Metellus, as arbiter in the disputes, to pay fines to the Phocians, Euboeans, and Amphissians. When news of these proceedings reached Rome in the spring of* B.C. 146, *the consul Mummius was ordered to lead a fleet and army against Achaia. But Metellus in Macedonia wished to have the credit of settling the matter himself; he therefore sent envoys to the Achaeans ordering them to release from the league the towns already named by the Senate viz. Sparta, Corinth, Argos, Heracleia, and Orchomenus in Arcadia, and advanced with his army from Macedonia through Thessaly by the coast road, skirting the Sinus Maliacus. Critolaus was already engaged in besieging Heraclea Oetea, to compel it to return to its obedience to the league, and when his scouts informed him of the approach of Metellus, he retreated to Scarphea on the coast of Locris, some miles south of the pass of Thermopylae. But before he could get into Scarphea Metellus caught him up, killed a large number of his men, and took one thousand prisoners. Critolaus himself disappeared; Pausanias seems to imagine that he was drowned in the salt marshes of the coast, but Livy says that he poisoned himself.* *Pausanias*, 7, 14, 15. *Livy*, Ep. 52. *Orosius*, 5, 3.

7. Pytheas was a brother of Acatidas the runner, and son of Cleomenes. He had led an evil life, and was reported to have wasted the flower of his youth in unnatural debauchery. In political life also he was audacious and grasping, and had been supported by Eumenes and Philataerus for these very reasons. . . .

Character of the Boeotarch Pytheas.

8. Critolaus the Achaean Strategus being dead, and the law providing that, in case of such an event befalling the existing Strategus, the Strategus of the previous year should succeed to the office until the regular congress of the league should meet, it fell to Diaeus to conduct the business of the league and take the head of affairs. Accordingly, after sending forward some troops to Megara,[1] he went himself to Argos; and from that place sent a circular letter to all the towns ordering them to set free their slaves who were of military age, and who had been born and brought up in their houses, and send them furnished with arms to Corinth. He assigned the numbers to be furnished by the several towns quite at random and without any regard to equality, just as he did everything else. Those who had not the requisite number of home-bred slaves were to fill up the quota imposed on each town from other slaves. But seeing that the public poverty was very great, owing to the war with the Lacedaemonians, he compelled the richer classes, men and women alike, to make promises of money and furnish separate contributions. At the same time he ordered a levy *en masse* at Corinth of all men of military age. The result of these measures was that every city was full of confusion, commotion, and despair: they deemed those fortunate who had already perished in the war, and pitied those who were now starting to take part in it; and everybody was in tears as though they foresaw only too well what was going to happen. They were especially annoyed at the insolent demeanour and neglect of their duties on the part of the slaves,—airs which they assumed as having been recently liberated, or, in the case of others, because they were excited

On the death of Critolaus (spring of B.C. 146) Diaeus succeeds as Strategus.

He orders the arming of 10,000 slaves,

a special contribution by the rich,

and a general levy of the freemen of military age.

[1] 4000 under Alcamenes, Pausan. 7, 15, 8.

by the prospect of freedom. Moreover the men were compelled to make their contribution contrary to their own views, according to the property they were reputed to possess; while the women had to do so, by taking the ornaments of their own persons or of their children, to what seemed deliberately meant for their destruction.

9. As these measures came all at once, the dismay caused by the hardship of each individually prevented people from attending to or grasping the general question; or they must have foreseen that they were all being led on to secure the certain destruction of their wives and children. But, as though caught in the rush of some winter torrent and carried on by its irresistible violence, they followed the infatuation and madness of their leader. The Eleians and Messenians indeed did not stir, in terror of the Roman fleet; for nothing could have saved them if the storm had burst when it was originally intended. The people of Patrae, and of the towns which were leagued with it, had a short time before suffered disasters in Phocis;[1] and their case was much the most pitiable one of all the Peloponnesian cities: for some of them sought a voluntary death; others fled from their towns through deserted parts of the country, with no definite aim in their wanderings, from the panic prevailing in the towns. Some arrested and delivered each other to the enemy, as having been hostile to Rome; others hurried to give information and bring accusations, although no one asked for any such service as yet; while others went to meet the Romans with suppliant branches, confessing their treason, and asking what penance they were to pay, although as yet no one was asking for any account of such things. The whole country seemed to be under an evil spell: everywhere people were throwing themselves down wells or over precipices; and so dreadful was the state of things, that as the proverb has it "even an enemy would have pitied" the disaster of Greece. For in times past the Greeks had met with reverses or indeed complete disaster, either from internal dissensions or from treacherous attacks of despots; but in the present instance it was from

The Eleians and Messenians do not move.

Dismay at Patrae.

The distracted state of Greece.

[1] In the battle with Metellus at Scarphea.

the folly of their leaders and their own unwisdom that they experienced the grievous misfortunes which befell them. The Thebans also, abandoning their city *en masse*, left it entirely empty; and among the rest Pytheas retired to the Peloponnese, with his wife and children, and there wandered about the country.[1] . . .

Thebes abandoned.

He came upon the enemy much to his surprise. But to my mind the proverb, "the reckonings of the foolish are foolishness" applies to him. And naturally to such men things clear as day come as a surprise. . . .

He was even forming plans for getting back home, acting very like a man who, not having learnt to swim and being about to plunge into the sea, should not consider the question of taking the plunge; but, having taken it, should begin to consider how he is to swim to land. . . .

Having secured Boeotia, Metellus advanced to Megara, where the Achaean Alcamenes had been posted by Diaeus with five thousand men. Alcamenes hastily evacuated Megara and rejoined Diaeus at Corinth, the latter having meanwhile been re-elected Strategus. *Pausanias*, 7, 15, 10.

10. Diaeus having recently come to Corinth after being appointed Strategus by the vote of the people, Andronidas and others came from Caecilius Metellus. Against these men he spread a report that they were in alliance with the enemy, and gave them up to the mob, who seized on them with great violence and threw them into chains. Philo of Thessaly also came bringing many liberal offers to the Achaeans. And on hearing them, certain of the men of the country attempted to secure their acceptance; among whom was Stratius, now a very old man, who clung to Diaeus's knees and entreated him to yield to the offers of Metellus. But he and his party would not listen to Philo's proposals. For the fact was that they did not believe that the amnesty would embrace them with the rest; and, as they regarded their own advantage and personal security as of

Diaeus at Corinth rejects all offers sent by Metellus, August, B.C. 146.

[1] Pausanias on the contrary says that Pytheas was caught in Boeotia and condemned by Metellus (7, 15, 10).

the highest importance, they spoke as they did, and directed all their measures on the existing state of affairs to this end: although, as a matter of fact, they failed entirely to secure these objects. For as they understood quite clearly the gravity of what they had done, they could not believe they would obtain any mercy from Rome; and as to enduring nobly whatever should befall on behalf of their country and the safety of the people, that they never once took into consideration; yet that was the course becoming men who cared for glory, and professed to be the leaders of Greece. But indeed how or whence was it likely that such a lofty idea should occur to these men? The members of this conclave were Diaeus and Damocritus, who had but recently been recalled from exile owing to the disturbed state of the times, and with them Alcamenes, Theodectes and Archicrates; and of these last I have already stated at length who they were, and have described their character, policy, and manner of life.

because he and his party do not believe that they will ever be amnestied with the rest.

11. Such being the men with whom the decision rested, the determination arrived at was what was to be expected. They not only imprisoned Andronidas and Lagius and their friends, but even the sub-Strategus Sosicrates, on the charge of his having presided at a council and given his voting for sending an embassy to Caecilius Metellus, and in fact of having been the cause of all their misfortunes. Next day they empanelled judges to try them; condemned Sosicrates to death; and having bound him racked him till he died, without however inducing him to say anything that they expected: but they acquitted Lagius, Andronidas and Archippus, partly because the people were scared at the lawless proceeding against Sosicrates, and partly because Diaeus got a talent from Andronidas and forty minae from Archippus; for this man could not relax his usual shameless and abandoned principles in this particular even "in the very pit,"[1] as the saying is. He had acted with similar cruelty a short time before also in

Cruel death of Sosicrates.

[1] The pit is the place dug out (*σκάμμα*) and prepared in the gymnasium for leapers. To be in the pit is to be on the very ground of the struggle, without possibility of escaping it.

regard to Philinus of Corinth. For on a charge of his holding communication with Menalcidas[1] and favouring the Roman cause, he caused Philinus and his sons to be flogged and racked in each other's sight, and did not desist until the boys and Philinus were all dead. When such madness and ferocity was infecting everybody, as it would not be easy to parallel even among barbarians, it would be clearly very natural to ask why the whole nation did not utterly perish. For my part, I think that Fortune displayed her resources and skill in resisting the folly and madness of the leaders; and, being determined at all hazards to save the Achaeans, like a good wrestler, she had recourse to the only trick left; and that was to bring down and conquer the Greeks quickly, as in fact she did. For it was owing to this that the wrath and fury of the Romans did not blaze out farther; that the army of Libya did not come to Greece; and that these leaders, being such men as I have described, did not have an opportunity, by gaining a victory, of displaying their wickedness upon their countrymen. For what it was likely that they would have done to their own people, if they had got any ground of vantage or obtained any success, may be reasonable inferred from what has already been said. And indeed everybody at the time had the proverb on his lips, "had we not perished quickly we had not been saved."[2] . . .

Greece is saved by the rapidity of her ruin.

12. Aulus Postumius deserves some special notice from us here. He was a member of a family and gens of the first rank, but in himself was garrulous and wordy, and exceedingly ostentatious. From his boyhood he had a great leaning to Greek studies and literature: but he was so immoderate and affected in this pursuit, that owing to him the Greek style became offensive to the elder and most respectable men at Rome. Finally he attempted to write a poem and a formal history in Greek, in the preface to which he desired his readers to excuse him if, being a Roman, he could not completely command the Greek idiom or method in the handling of the subject. To whom M. Porcius Cato made a very

Character of Aulus Postumius Albinus.

[1] See note on 30, 17.

[2] For this proverb see Plutarch, *Themist.* 29; *de Alex. Virt.* 5; *de Exil.* 7.

pertinent answer. "I wonder," said he, "on what grounds you make such a demand. If the Amphictyonic council had charged you to write the history, you might perhaps have been forced to allege this excuse and ask for this consideration. But to write it of your own accord, when there was no compulsion to do so, and then to demand consideration, if you should happen to write bad Greek, is quite unreasonable. It is something like a man entering for the boxing match or pancratium in the public games, and, when he comes into the stadium, and it is his turn to fight, begging the spectators to pardon him 'if he is unable to stand the fatigue or the blows.' Such a man of course would be laughed at and condemned at once."[1] And this is what such historiographers should experience, to prevent them spoiling a good thing by their rash presumption. Similarly, in the rest of his life, he had imitated all the worst points in Greek fashions; for he was fond of pleasure and averse from toil. And this may be illustrated from his conduct in the present campaign: for being among the first to enter Greece at the time that the battle in Phocis took place, he retired to Thebes on the pretence of illness, in order to avoid taking part in the engagement; but, when the battle was ended, he was the first to write to the Senate announcing the victory, entering into every detail as though he had himself been present at the conflict. . . .

B.C. 146. Coss. Cn. Cornelius Lentulus, L. Mummius.

On the arrival of the Consul Mummius, Metellus was sent back into Macedonia. Mummius was accompanied by L. Aurelius Orestes, who had been nearly murdered in the riot at Corinth (38, 7), *and, pitching his camp in the Isthmus, was joined by allies who raised his army to three thousand five hundred cavalry and twenty-six thousand infantry. The Achaeans made a sudden attack upon them and gained a slight success, which was a few days afterwards revenged by a signal defeat. Instead of retiring into Corinth, and*

[1] Plutarch reports the same anecdote much more briefly in *Cato Maj.* 12, as do others. Professor Freeman (*History of Federal Government*, p. 142) seems to regard it as a serious indication that the Amphictyonic council had become a body exercising some literary authority, in default of any other. I think that Cato had no such meaning. He mentioned any body of men, however unlikely to exercise such an influence, which at any rate was Greek.

from that stronghold making some terms with Mummius, Diaeus fled to Megalopolis, where he poisoned himself, after first killing his wife. The rest of the beaten Achaean army took refuge in Corinth, which Mummius took and fired on the third day after the battle with Diaeus. Then the commissioners were sent from Rome to settle the whole of Greece. Pausanias, 7, 16-17; *Livy*, Ep. 52.

13. The incidents of the capture of Corinth were melancholy. The soldiers cared nothing for the works of art and the consecrated statues. I saw with my own eyes pictures thrown on the ground and soldiers playing dice on them; among them was a picture of Dionysus by Aristeides—in reference to which they say that the proverbial saying arose, "Nothing to the Dionysus,"—and the Hercules tortured by the shirt of Deianeira. . . .

The destruction of the works of art in Corinth, September, B.C. 146.

14. Owing to the popular reverence for the memory of Philopoemen, they did not take down the statues of him in the various cities. So true is it, as it seems to me, that every genuine act of virtue produces in the mind of those who benefit by it an affection which it is difficult to efface. . . .

One might fairly, therefore, use the common saying: "He has been foiled not at the door, but in the road." . . .[1]

There were many statues of Philopoemen, and many erections in his honour, voted by the several cities; and a Roman at the time of the disaster which befell Greece at Corinth, wished to abolish them all and to formally indict him, laying an information against him, as though he were still alive, as an enemy and ill-wisher to Rome. But after a discussion, in which Polybius spoke against this sycophant, neither Mummius nor the commissioners would consent to abolish the honours of an illustrious man. . . .

Statues of Philopoemen.

Polybius, in an elaborate speech, conceived in the spirit of what has just been said, maintained the cause of Philopoemen. His arguments were that "This

Speech of Polybius defending the

[1] Seems to mean "he lost before he began," before he got even at the threshold of his enterprise. There is nothing to show to what the fragment refers.

memory of Philopoemen.

man had indeed been frequently at variance with the Romans on the matter of their injunctions, but he only maintained his opposition so far as to inform and persuade them on the points in dispute; and even that he did not do without serious cause. He gave a genuine proof of his loyal policy and gratitude, by a test as it were of fire, in the periods of the wars with Philip and Antiochus. For, possessing at those times the greatest influence of any one in Greece, from his personal power as well as that of the Achaeans, he preserved his friendship for Rome with the most absolute fidelity, having joined in the vote of the Achaeans in virtue of which, four months before the Romans crossed from Italy, they levied a war from their own territory upon Antiochus and the Aetolians, when nearly all the other Greeks had become estranged from the Roman friendship." Having listened to this speech and approved of the speaker's view, the ten commissioners granted that the complimentary erections to Philopoemen in the several cities should be allowed to remain. Acting on this pretext, Polybius begged of the Consul the statues of Achaeus, Aratus, and Philopoemen, though they had already been transported to Acarnania from the Peloponnese: in gratitude for which action people set up a marble statue of Polybius himself.[1] . . .

Polybius will have no confiscated goods.

15. After the settlement made by the ten commissioners in Achaia, they directed the Quaestor, who was to superintend the selling of Diaeus's property, to allow Polybius to select anything he chose from the goods and present it to him as a free gift, and to sell the rest to the highest bidders. But, so far from accepting any such present, Polybius urged his friends not to covet anything whatever of the goods sold by the Quaestor anywhere:—for he was going a round of the cities and selling the property of all those who had been partisans of Diaeus, as well of such as had been condemned, except those who left children or parents. Some of these friends did not take his

[1] The base of a statue of Polybius has been discovered at Olympia with the inscription ἡ πόλις ἡ τῶν Ἠλείων Πολύβιον Δυκόρτα Μεγαλοπολείτην. But the statue mentioned in the text seems to be one set up by the Achaeans. For the statues of Polybius, see Introduction, pp. xxxi. xxxii.

advice ; but those who did follow it earned a most excellent reputation among their fellow-citizens.

16. After completing these arrangements in six months, the ten commissioners sailed for Italy, at the beginning of spring, having left a noble monument of Roman policy for the contemplation of all Greece. They also charged Polybius, as they were departing, to visit all the cities and to decide all questions that might arise, until such time as they were grown accustomed to their constitution and laws. Which he did : and after a while caused the inhabitants to be contented with the constitution given them by the commissioners, and left no difficulty connected with the laws on any point, private or public, unsettled.

B.C. 145. The commissioners return in the spring, leaving instructions with Polybius to explain the new constitutions.

[Wherefore the people, who always admired and honoured this man, being in every way satisfied with the conduct of his last years and his management of the business just described, honoured him with the most ample marks of their respect both during his life and after his death. And this universal verdict was fully justified. For if he had not elaborated and reduced to writing the laws relating to the administration of justice, everything would have been in a state of uncertainty and confusion. Therefore we must look upon this as the most glorious of the actions of Polybius.] . . .

Note by a friend of Polybius as to the effect of his careful fulfilment of his commission.

17. The Roman Proconsul, after the commissioners had left Achaia, having restored the holy places in the Isthmus and ornamented the temples in Olympia and Delphi, proceeded to make a tour of the cities, receiving marks of honour and proper gratitude in each. And indeed he deserved honour both public and private, for he conducted himself with self-restraint and disinterestedness, and administered his office with mildness, although he had great opportunities of enriching himself, and immense authority in Greece. And in fact in the points in which he was thought to have at all overlooked justice, he appears not to have done it for his own sake, but for that of his friends. And the most

Mummius acted in Greece with clean hands and great moderation.

conspicuous instance of this was in the case of the Chalcidian horsemen whom he put to death.[1] . . .

Death of Ptolemy Philometor in a war in Syria in support of Demetrius the younger against Alexander Balas. See above, 33, 18.

18. Ptolemy, king of Syria,[2] died from a wound received in the war: a man who, according to some, deserved great praise and abiding remembrance, and according to others the reverse. If any king before him ever was, he was mild and benevolent; a very strong proof of which is that he never put any of his own friends to death on any charge whatever; and I believe that not a single man at Alexandria either owed his death to him. Again, though he was notoriously ejected from his throne by his brother, in the first place, when he got a clear opportunity against him in Alexandria, he granted him a complete amnesty; and afterwards, when his brother once more made a plot against him to seize Cyprus, though he got him body and soul into his hands at Lapethus, he was so far from punishing him as an enemy, that he even made him grants in addition to those which formerly belonged to him in virtue of the treaty made between them, and moreover promised him his daughter. However, in the course of a series of successes and prosperity, his mind became corrupted; and he fell a prey to the dissoluteness and effeminacy characteristic of the Egyptians: and these vices brought him into serious disasters. . . .

CONCLUSION OF THE HISTORY

19. Having accomplished these objects, I returned home from Rome, having put, as it were, the finishing-stroke to my whole previous political actions, and obtained a worthy return for my constant loyalty to the Romans. Wherefore I make my

[1] Thebae quoque et Chalcis, quae auxilio fuerant, dirutae. Ipse L. Mummius abstinentissimum virum egit; nec quidquam ex iis opibus ornamentisque, quae praedives Corinthus habuit, in domum ejus pervenit. Livy, *Ep.* 52.

[2] Ptolemy Philometor, king of Egypt, is called, by way of distinction, "King of Syria," because that title was bestowed on him by the people of Antioch during his last expedition in Syria. This was undertaken in support of Alexander Balas, who repaid him by conniving at an attempt upon his life. Whereupon Ptolemy joined Demetrius, the son of Demetrius Soter, and supported his claim against Alexander Balas. Joseph. *Ant.* 13, 3; 1 Maccabees 11, 1-13.

prayers to all the gods that the rest of my life may continue in the same course and in the same prosperity; for I see only too well that Fortune is envious of mortals, and is most apt to show her power in those points in which a man fancies that he is most blest and most successful in life.

Such was the result of my exertions. But having now arrived at the end of my whole work, I wish to recall to the minds of my readers the point from which I started, and the plan which I laid down at the commencement of my history, and then to give a summary of the entire subject. I announced then at starting that I should begin my narrative at the point where Timaeus left off, and that going cursorily over the events in Italy, Sicily, and Libya—since that writer has only composed a history of those places,—when I came to the time when Hannibal took over the command of the Carthaginian army; Philip son of Demetrius the kingdom of Macedonia; Cleomenes of Sparta was banished from Greece; Antiochus succeeded to the kingdom in Syria, and Ptolemy Philopator to that in Egypt,—I promised that starting once more from that period, namely the 139th Olympiad, I would give a general history of the world: marking out the periods of the Olympiads, separating the events of each year, and comparing the histories of the several countries by parallel narratives of each, up to the capture of Carthage, and the battle of the Achaeans and Romans in the Isthmus, and the consequent political settlement imposed on the Greeks. From all of which I said that students would learn a lesson of supreme interest and instructiveness. This was to ascertain how, and under what kind of polity, almost the whole inhabited world came under the single authority of Rome, a fact quite unparalleled in the past. These promises then having all been fulfilled, it only remains for me to state the periods embraced in my history, the number of my books, and how many go to make up my whole work. . . .

See 1, 3, and 3, 4.

I.—SHORTER FRAGMENTS

The first eight of these fragments belong to book 6, *but as they do not fall in with what remains of the text, I have placed them here. I have divided these fragments into two classes:* (*A*) *those which seem to have some distinct reference which can be recognised or guessed:* (*B*) *those which though fairly complete in themselves cannot be so classed. A good many more, generally quoted by Suidas for the sake of some one word, did not seem worth putting in an English dress. The numbers in brackets are those of Hultsch's text.*

A

I (6, 2)

I believe Rome to have been founded in the second year of the 7th Olympiad.[1] B.C. 751.

[1] Dionysius Hal. (1, 74) quotes this statement of Polybius with the remark that it is founded on a single tablet in the custody of the Pontifices. Various calculations as to the date were:—

Eratosthenes followed by Apollodorus Nepos Dionysius Lutatius	Olympus. 7, 1	B.C. 752.
Q. Fabius Pictor	Olympus. 8, 1	B.C. 748.
Timaeus	38th year before Olymp. 1	B.C. 813.
L. Cincius Alimantus	Olymp. 12, 4	B.C. 729.
M. Porcius Cato	432 years after the Trojan war.	B.C. 752.
Varro Velleius Paterculus	Olymp. 6, 2	B.C. 755.
Pomponius Atticus	Olymp. 6, 3	B.C. 754.

But even granting a definite act of foundation (on which see Mommsen, *H. of R.* vol. i. p. 4), the Olympic register before 672 B.C. is a very uncertain foundation on which to build. See *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, vol. ii. p. 164 *sq.*

II (6, 2)

Polybius, like Aristodemus of Elis, informs us that the register of the athletic victors at the Olympic games began to be kept from the 27th Olympiad, at which Coroebus of Elis was first registered as conqueror in the stadium; and this Olympiad was regarded as an era by the Greeks from which to calculate dates.[1] B.C. 672.

III (6, 2)

The Palatine was named after Pallas, who died there. He was the son of Heracles and Lavina, daughter of Evander. His maternal grandfather raised a barrow as his tomb on this hill, and called the place after him the Pallantium.

IV (6, 2)

Among the Romans women are forbidden to drink wine; and they drink what is called *passum*, which is made from raisins, and tastes very like the sweet wine of Aegosthena or Crete. This is what they drink to quench their thirst. But it is almost impossible for them to drink wine without being found out. For, to begin with, the woman has not got the charge of wine; and, in the next place, she is bound to kiss all her male relatives and those of her husband, down to his cousins, every day on seeing them for the first time; and as she cannot tell which of them she will meet, she has to be on her guard. For if she has but tasted wine, there is no occasion for any formal accusation.[2]

V (6, 2)

He also founded Ostia at the mouth of the Tiber. Ancus Marcius, Livy, 1, 33.

[1] From Eusebius. It may be noted that this statement of Polybius is an earlier evidence than any other for the existence of an Olympian register prior to B.C. 600. Pausanias also dates the register from the year of Coroebus's victory (5, 8, 6).

[2] I have translated this passage as it stands in the various editions of Polybius. But I feel convinced that none of it belongs to him except the first sentence. It comes from Athenaeus, 440 *E*.

VI (6, 2)

Lucius Tarquinius Priscus comes to Rome.

Lucius, the son of Demaratus of Corinth, came to Rome relying on his own ability and wealth, and convinced that the advantages he possessed would place him in the front rank in the state: for he had a wife who, among other useful qualities, was admirably suited by nature to assist in any political enterprise. Arrived at Rome, and admitted to citizenship, he devoted himself to flattering the king; and before very long his wealth, his natural dexterity, and, more than all, his early training, enabled him so to please the king's taste that he gained his cordial liking and confidence. As time went on his intimacy became so close that he lived with [Ancus] Marcius, and assisted him in managing his kingdom. While so engaged, he contrived to make himself useful to every one. All who were suitors for anything found in him an active supporter and friend: his wealth was spent with noble liberality and judgment on various objects of national importance; and thus he secured for himself the gratitude of many, and the goodwill and good word of all, and finally obtained the throne. . . .[1]

Every branch of virtue should be practised by those who aim at good training, from childhood, but, above all, courage. . .

(6, 1)

An impossible lie admits of no defence even.

(6, 1)

It is the act of a wise and sensible man to recognise—as Hesiod puts it—"how much greater the half is than the whole."[2]

VII (6, 1)

To learn sincerity towards the Gods is a kind of image of truthfulness towards each other.

[1] See Livy, i, 34. Dionys. Halic. 3, 46.

[2] Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 40, *νήπιοι· οὐδὲ ἴσασιν ὅσῳ πλέον ἥμισυ παντός.*

VIII (6, 1)

It generally happens in the world that men who acquire have a natural turn for keeping; while those who succeed to wealth, without any trouble to themselves, are apt to squander it.

IX (10)

The strongest fortifications are in general dangerous to both sides; which may be illustrated from what occurs in the case of citadels. These last are regarded as contributing greatly to the security of the cities in which they stand, and to the protection of their freedom; but they often turn out to be the origin of slavery and indisputable misfortunes.[1]

X (13)

Some few approved of his doing so, but the majority objected, saying, some that it was folly, and others that it was madness for a man thus to risk and hazard his life, who was quite unacquainted with the kind of fighting in use among these barbarians.[2]

XI (16)

"Secure retreat in case disaster fall."

One ought always to keep this line in mind. From failing to do so Lucius the Roman[3] met with a grave disaster. So narrow is the risk of destruction to the most powerful forces when the leaders are unwise. A sufficient illustration to thoughtful men is furnished by the headstrong invasion of Argos by Pyrrhus king of the Epirotes,[4] and the expedition through Thrace of king Lysimachus against Dorimichaites, king of Odrysae;[5] and indeed many other similar cases.

[1] Polybius is perhaps referring to the Acrocorinthus especially. But we must remember that many of the citadels in the third century B.C. were in the hands of Macedonian garrisons.

[2] This has been referred by some to the account of Scipio Aemilianus's single combat with the Spaniard. See 35, 5.

[3] Perhaps L. Postumius, Livy, 23, 24 (Hultsch).

[4] B.C. 272. Plutarch, *Pyrrh.* 31-34.

[5] See Pausan. i, 9, 6. His disaster compelled him to give up his dominions beyond the Danube. Another and more successful war in Thrace seems referred to in Diod. Sic. 18, 14.

XII (23)

Marcellus never once conquered Hannibal, who in fact remained unbeaten until Scipio's victory.[1]

XIII (25)

No darkness, no storm however violent, turned him from his purpose. He forced his way through all such obstacles; he overcame even disease by resolute labour, and never once failed in an object or experienced a variation in his uniform good fortune.

XIV (29)

In old times single combats among the Romans were conducted with good faith [but in our days many contrivances have been hit upon].

XV (31)

The horse, from the agony of the wound, first fell forward, and then galloped furiously through the middle of the camp.

XVI (42)

Seeing that the superstitious feelings of the soldiers were roused by these portents, he exerted himself to remove the scruples of the men by means of his own intelligence and strategic skill.

XVII (63)

SHIPS WITH SIX BANKS OF OARS

These vessels appear to be as swift sailers as penteconters, but to be much inferior to triremes; and their construction has been abandoned for many years past. Polybius, however, is supposed to lay down the measurements of such vessels, which the Romans and Carthaginians appear to have often employed in their wars with each other.[2]

[1] Livy, however, records more than one success of Marcellus against Hannibal, see 23, 16, 46; 27, 14. Scipio's victory of course is at Zama.

[2] From Zosimus, 5, 20, 7. See 1, 26.

XVIII (64)

Getting completely drunk, and all flung on the ground in the various tents, they neither heard any word of command nor took any thought of the future whatever.[1]

XIX (66)

In consultations of war, as in those relating to bodily sickness, one ought to take as much account of the symptoms that have since arisen as of those originally existing.

XX (90)

Cappadocia extends from Mount Taurus and Lycaonia up to the Pontic Sea. The name is Persian and arose thus. A certain Persian [named Cappadocus?] was present at a hunt with Artaxerxes, or some other king, when a lion sprang upon the king's horse. This Persian happened to be in that part of the hunting company, and drawing his sword rescued the king from his imminent danger and killed the lion. This Persian therefore ascending the highest mountain in the neighbourhood received as a gift from the king as much territory as the human eye could take in, looking east, west, north, and south.[2]

XXI (95)

The Celtiberians have a peculiar manœuvre in war. When they see their infantry hard pressed, they dismount and leave their horses standing in their places. They have small pegs attached to their leading reins, and having fixed them carefully into the ground, they train their horses to keep their places obediently in line until they come back and pull up the pegs.

XXII (96)

The Celtiberians excel the rest of the world in the construction of their swords; for their point is strong and service-

[1] Some refer this to a circumstance narrated in Livy, 41, 2. But Hultsch points out that Livy is not using Polybius in that period.

[2] From *Constantine Prophyrogenneta de thematis*, p. 18, ed. Bonnensis (Hultsch). He says that there are two Cappadocias, great and little. Great Cappadocia extending from Caesarea (Neo-Caesarea), and Mount Taurus to the Pontus, bounded on the south-west by the Halys and on the east by Melitene.

able, and they can deliver a cut with both edges. Wherefore the Romans abandoned their ancestral swords after the Hannibalian war and adopted those of the Iberians. They adopted, I say, the construction of the swords, but they can by no means imitate the excellence of the steel or the other points in which they are so elaborately finished.[1]

XXIII (102)

The Roman praetor Marcus[2] wished to get rid of the war against the Lusitani, and laying aside war altogether, to shirk—as the saying is—"the men's hall for the women's bower," because of the recent defeat of the praetor by the Lusitani.

(103)

But those of the Ligurians who fought against Mago were unable to do anything important or great.

XXIV (113)

A *mora* consisted of nine hundred men.[3]

XXV (117)

A general needs good sense and boldness; they are the most necessary qualities for dangerous and venturesome undertakings.

XXVI (154)

The second king of Egypt, called Philadelphus, when giving his daughter Berenice in marriage to Antiochus king of Syria, was careful to send her some Nile water, that the young bride might drink no other water.

XXVII (156)

I say this to point out the wisdom of the Romans, and the folly of those who despise the practice of making comparisons with the habits of foreign nations, and believe themselves competent to reform their own armies without reference to others.[4]

[1] See 6, 23. The excellence of Spanish steel has never perhaps been surpassed even to our day. [2] See 35, 2-4.

[3] Plutarch, *Pelop.* 17, who says that other authorities reckoned it at 500 and 700 men. There were originally six morae in the Spartan army. See Xenophon, *Rep. Lac.* 11, 4; *Hell.* 6, 4, 12-17. [4] See 6, 25.

XXVIII (157)

The Romans were wont to take great care not to appear to be the aggressors, or to attack their neighbours without provocation; but to be considered always to be acting in self-defence, and only to enter upon war under compulsion.[1]

XXIX (166)

When Scipio Africanus, the younger, was commissioned by the Senate to settle the kingdoms throughout the world, and see that they were put in proper hands, he only took five slaves with him; and, on one of these dying during the journey, he wrote home to his relations to buy another and send him to take the place of the dead one.[2]

XXX (184)

If one ought to speak of *Fortune* in regard to such things; for I fear she often gets credit of that sort without good reason; while the real fault lies with the men who administer public business, who sometimes act with seriousness and sometimes the reverse.

B

XXXI (1)

But not making at all a good guess at the king's mind, he acted in a most inconsiderate manner.

XXXII (2)

Want of civilisation appears to have an extraordinary influence on mankind in this direction.

XXXIII (3)

But the general being unable to endure the unfairness of those who made these assertions . . .

[1] This is referred by Nissen to the account of the origin of the third Punic war. See 36, 3-5.

[2] This moderation in the number of slaves was perhaps imitated from Cato. See Cato, *Orationum frgm.* 3. Ed. Jordan.

XXXIV (5)

But he determined to hold out to the last, trusting to the supplies from Egypt.

XXXV (6)

But having fallen in with him he gained an extremely fortunate victory.

XXXVI (7)

In all these things the Aetolians had been deceived.

XXXVII (8)

And some he honoured with gold cloths and spears, because he wished that his promises should agree with his performances.

XXXVIII (11)

He wrote in bitter and frantic terms, calling them fiends and murderers in his letter, if they abandoned the positions thus disgracefully, before they had suffered or witnessed any hardship.

XXXIX (12)

There is a courage in words too which can despise death.

XXXIX (14)

Before he had been rejoined by the stragglers of the skirmishing parties.

XL (27)

Being utterly at a loss, at last he rested his chance of escape from the difficulty which was upon him on some such hope as this.

XLI (30)

None of the citizens being aware of what was taking place owing to the distance, for the city was a large one.

XLII (32)

But trusting to them he undertook the war against Ariarathes.

XLIII (34)

Harpyia is a city in Illyria near Encheleae, to which Baton, charioteer of Amphiaraus, removed after the latter's disappearance.

XLIV (35)

And he waited for the coming of Hasdrubal.

XLV (36)

Hearing all this through the curtain the king laughed.

XLVI (39)

Foreseeing and fearing the fierce temper and obstinacy of the men.

XLVII (40)

At that time, persuaded that he was enduring a fiery test, he was released from the suspicion.

XLVIII (43)

He thought therefore that it was dangerous to have shared in their enterprise when their plan had failed and come to an end.

XLIX (44)

Having urged the soldiers to make haste, and exhorted the tribunes to engage.

L (46)

Thinking it better and safer not to be present at the hour of the enemy's opportunity, nor when they were under the influence of popular excitement and fury.

LI (47)

Whenever it is possible to obtain satisfaction from those who have wronged us either by law or by any other settled forms of justice.

LII (54)

Having drawn his army from the pass he encamped.

LII (55)

And then they took up some sort of order, as though by mutual consent, and fought the battle in regular formation.

LIII (56)

That which causes the most pain at the time involves also the most signal revulsion of joy.

LIV (57)

Having ordered the pilots to steer the ships as fast as they could to Elaea.

LV (61)

They not only drove themselves off the stage, but ruined also all Greece.

LV (62)

But he, from his long experience of war, did not all lose his presence of mind.

LVI (67)

He persuades them by reckoning all the wealth he considered they would gain in the battle.

LVII (68)

The Romans had been inspired by some divine influence, and having fortified their courage with irresistible might . . .

LVII (69)

To signalise some by favours, and others by punishments, that they might be a warning to the rest.

LVIII (72)

And they, being persuaded, and throwing themselves in the way of the enemy's charge, died gallantly.

LIX (73)

He tried to take the city by an intrigue, having long secured a party of traitors within it.

LX (74)

He brought up the transports, by lading which with rocks and sinking them at the mouth of the harbour he planned to shut out the enemy entirely from the sea.

LXI (80)

Though I have much more to say, I fear lest some of you may think that I am unnecessarily diffuse.

LXII (81)

They are reserving themselves for an opportunity, and are quite ready to meet them again.

LXIII (85)

To be eager for life and to cling to it is a sign of the greatest baseness and weakness.

LXIV (86)

He was feeling something like starters in horse races, which are started by the raising of torches.

LXV (88)

Their boldness transgresses the bounds of propriety, and their actions are a violation of duty.

LXV (91)

Seeing that the Carthaginians had obeyed all injunctions in the most honourable spirit.

LXVI (92)

To have fifty ships built entirely new, and to launch fifty of those already existing from the docks.

LXVII (100)

Lucius being appointed to go on a mission to the Lapateni and speak to them in favour of an unconditional surrender, was unprepared for the task before him.

LXVIII (101)

Of all the determining forces in war the most decisive of failure or success is the spirit of the combatants.

LXIX (104)

Having mentioned summarily the defeats they had sustained, and putting before them the successes of the Macedonians.

LXX (105)

For he perceived that the Macedonian kingdom would become contemptible, if the rebels succeeded in their first attempt.

LXXI (109)

Therefore it was intolerable that the Romans even then should make their way into Macedonia unobserved.

LXXII (110)

He, if any one of our time has done so, has examined all that has been said scientifically on tactics.

LXXIII (111)

Metrodorus and his colleagues, frightened at the threatening aspect of Philip, departed.

LXXIV (112)

The Romans made no show of bearing a grudge for what had taken place.

LXXV (113)

But putting both spurs to his horse he rode on as hard as he could.

LXXVI (114)

Being annoyed at the treaty, Nabis paid no attention to its provisions.

LXXVII (120)

It was neither possible to examine the man closely in his state of physical weakness, nor to put a question to him for fear of worrying him.

LXXVIII (122)

The Pannonians having seized the fort at the beginning of the war, had taken it as a base of operations, and had fitted it up for the reception of booty.

LXXIX (124)

But wishing to point the contrast between his policy to those who trusted and those who disobeyed him, he commenced the siege.

LXXX (126)

So that those in the assembly were thunderstruck and unable to collect their thoughts, sympathising with the poignant sorrow of those thus dispossessed of their all.

LXXXI (131)

They immediately sent a courier to Perseus to tell him what had happened. (132) It was Perseus's design to keep it close, but he could not hide the truth.

LXXXII (133)

In other respects he was well equipped for service, but his spear was limp.

LXXXIII (134)

Publius was anxious to engage and avail himself of the enthusiasm of the barbarians. (135) He put in at Naupactus in Aetolia. (136) He escorted Publius out with great respect. (137) Having received Publius and Gaius with kindness and honour.

LXXXIV (140)

It was the deliberate intention of the Romans to fight at sea.

LXXXV (141)

While they were still together and were fighting at close quarters with their swords, taking his stand behind them he stabbed him under the armpit.

LXXXVI (151)

This man presented Prusias with many silver and gold cups during the banquet.

LXXXVII (153)

Taking a wise view of the future, he came to the conclusion to get rid of the garrison sent by Ptolemy.

LXXXVIII (158)

On that occasion both Romans and Carthaginians bivouacked on the embankment.

LXXXIX (159)

Not being able to persuade him again, owing to that king's cautious and inactive character, he was forced to offer five hundred talents. And so Seleucus agreed to give the aid.

XC (161)

Chance and Fortune, so to speak, enhanced the achievements of Scipio, so that they always appeared more illustrious than was expected.

XCI (162)

One must not pass over even a minor work of his, as in the case of a famous artist.

XCII (163)

Scipio counselled him either not to try, or to do so in such a manner as to succeed at all risks. For to make an attempt on the same man twice was dangerous in itself, and was apt to make a man altogether contemptible.

XCIII (164)

But being jealous of Scipio they tried to decry his achievements.

XCIV (168)

Fixing the stocks upright in the ground in a semicircle touching each other.

XCV (170)

The important point of their resolution was that they would not admit a garrison or governor, and would not give up their constitution as established by law.

XCV (177-179)

He said that we should not let the enemy escape, or encourage their boldness by shirking a battle. . . .

Conceiving a slight hope from the besieged garrison, he made the most of it. . . .

Pretending warm friendship, he tried every manœuvre whereby he might promote the enemy's interests, and surround us by the gravest perils. . . .

XCVI (182)

As the rock caused them difficulty because they were obliged to bore a hole in it, they completed the mine which they were making by using wooden bolts.

XCVII (183)

He did not think it right to leave the war in Etruria, and give his attention to the cities in that part of the country. He feared that he should waste all the time, which was not very long to begin with, in less important details.

XCVIII (185)

And having got his boats and hemioliae dragged across the Isthmus he put to sea, being anxious to be in time for the Achaean congress.

XCIX (191)

Philip was annoyed at the request of the Corcyreans.

C (192)

Since circumstances debar Philip, the king wishes to give that man the credit of the achievement, making the proposal to him in the light of a favour.

CI (193)

Philip, having given out that he was about to serve out rations, made a proclamation that a return should be made to him of all who had not provisions for more than thirty days.

CII (195)

After two days from starting for the seat of war Philip passed the order to make two rations three, whenever he wanted an additional day, and sometimes to make two four. (? Cp. Livy, 35, 28.)

CIII (195)

A swipe (*φρεατοτόπανον*) is one of the implements mentioned by Polybius. (See 9, 43, Hultsch.)

CIV (199)

It was impossible to convey the equipments and provisions for the legions by sea or upon beasts of burden; they must carry ten days' provisions in their wallets.

II.—GEOGRAPHICAL NAMES QUOTED BY STEPHANUS AND OTHERS AS HAVING BEEN USED BY POLYBIUS

Achriane, a town in Hyrcania.
Adrane, a town in Thrace.
Aegosthena, a town in Megaris.
Allaria, a town in Crete.
Ancara, a town in Italy.
Aperanteia, a city and district in Thessaly.
Apsyrtus, an island off Illyricum.
Ares, plain of, "A desolate plain in Thrace with low trees."
Arsinoe, a town in Aetolia and in Libya.

Atella, a town of the Opici, in Campania. "The Atellani surrendered."
Badiza, a town in Bruttium.
Babrantium, a place near Chios.
Cabyle, a town in Thrace.
Calliope, a town in Parthia.
Candasa, a fort in Caria.
Carthaea, one of the four cities of Ceos.
Corax, a mountain between Callipolis and Naupactus.
Cyathus, a river in Aetolia, near Arsinoe (a tributary of the Achelous).
Dassaretae, an Illyrian tribe.
Digeri, a Thracian tribe.
Ellopium, a town in Aetolia.
Gitta, a town in Palestine (Gath).
Hella, in Asia, a port belonging to Attalus.
Hippo (Regius), a town in Libya.
Hyrtacus, a town in Crete.
Hyscana, a town in Illyria.
Ilattia, a town in Crete.
Lampeteia, a town in Bruttium.
Mantua, in N. Italy.
Massyleis, a Libyan tribe.
Melitusa, a town in Illyria.
Oricus (m.), a town in Epirus, "The first town on the right as one sails into the Adriatic."
Parthus, a town in Illyria.
Philippi, a town in Macedonia.
Phorynna, a town in Thrace.
Phytaeum, a town in Aetolia.
Rhyncus, in Aetolia.
Sibyrtus, a town in Crete.
Singa, a town in Libya.
Tabraca, a town in Libya.
Temesia, a town in Bruttium.
Volci, a town in Etruria.
Xynia, a town in Thessaly.

APPENDIX I

The Divisions of the Macedonian Empire after the death of Alexander.

Alexander the Great, ob. June B.C. 323.

Justin, 12, 16; Arrian, *An.* 7, 28.

οἱ βασιλεῖς { Philip III. (Arrhidaeus) half-brother of Alexander, ob. B.C. 317.
{ Alexander IV. (posthumous son of Alexander by Roxana).

Successive Guardians (οἱ ἐπιμεληταί) { Perdiccas, killed B.C. 321.
{ Arrhidaeus and Python (for a few months), resigned B.C. 321.

Hipparch . . . Seleucus.

Captain of the Bodyguards . . . Cassander.

First Distribution of the Provinces of the Empire. Diodorus Sic. 18, 3; Justin, 13, 4.

Macedonia and Greece.	Egypt, and parts of Libya and Asia.	Pamphylia (3). Lycia. Greater Phrygia.	Caria.	Thrace.	Paphlagonia. Cappadocia.	Media Major.	Syria.	Phrygia Hellespontiaca.	Lydia.	Cilicia.	Media Minor.	*Bactria ulterior.*	*India.*	*Indian Colonies.*	*Punjaub.*	*Paropamisos.*	*Arachosi and Cedrussi.*	*Drangae and Arei.*	*Bactria.*	*Sogdiani.*	*Parthians.*	*Hyrcani.*	*Carmani.*	*Persis.*	*Babylonians.*	*Mesopotamia.*
Antipater.	Ptolemy s. of Lagus.	Antigonus.	Cassander.	Lysimachus.	Eumenes.	Python.	Laomedon.	Leonnatus.	Meleager (1).	Philotas.	Atropatos,	Unchanged.(2)		*Pithon s. of Agenor.*	*Taxiles.*	*Oxyartes.*	*Sibyrtias.*	*Stasanor.*	*Amyntas.*	*Stasandros.*	*Philip.*	*Phrataphernes.*	*Tlepolemus.*	*Peucestes.*	*Archon.*	*Arcesilaus.*

(1) Justin calls him Menander.

(2) The provinces and governors printed in italics are not mentioned by Diodorus here, who merely says that they were unchanged. But the list given by Justin agrees with that of Diodorus in the next settlement, with certain exceptions, which may be regarded as changes arising from death or other causes.

(3) Justin gives Pamphylia and Lycia to Nearchus.

Second Arrangement, B.C. 321.

οἱ βασιλεῖς { Philip III. (Arrhidaeus) ob. 317 B.C.
{ Alexander IV. (son of Alexander by Roxana).

Regent with absolute powers . . Antipater, ob. B.C. 318.
,, ,, . . Polysperchon, B.C. 318-315.

Strategus of the Empire . . Antigonus.
Chiliarch ,, . . Cassander (s. of Antigonus).

B.C. 321. Second Arrangement of the Provinces. Diod. 18, 39.

Antipater.	Ptolemy, s. of Lagus.	Antigonus.	Cassander.	Lysimachus.	Python.	Laomedon.	Philoxenus.	Seleucus.	Nicanor.	Cheiton.	Arrhidaeus.	Amphimachus.	
(Unchanged.) Macedonia and Greece.	(Unchanged.) Egypt & parts of Libya & Asia.	Greater Phrygia, Lycia, & Susiana added.	(Unchanged.) Caria.	(Unchanged.) Thrace.	(Unchanged.) Media.	(Unchanged.) Syria.	Cilicia.	Babylonia.	Cappadocia.	Lydia.	Phrygia Hellespontiaca.	Mesopotamia and Asbelitis.	The other provinces as in the previous list.

Third Arrangement, B.C. 312-311.

King . . Alexander IV (in charge of Roxana). Strategus in Europe till the king comes of age . . Cassander.

B.C. 312-311. Third Arrangement of the Provinces of the Empire. Diod. Sic. 19, 105.

Ptolemy, s. of Lagus.	Lysimachus.	Cassander.	Antigonus.	Seleucus Nicanor.	
Egypt.	Thrace.	Macedonia.	All Asia (ἀφηγεῖσθαι).	Babylonia.	Greece nominally free, B.C. 307 Demetrius (s. of Antigonus) becomes Master of Athens.

B.C. 311. Alexander IV and Roxana murdered by order of Cassander.

B.C. 306. Fourth Arrangement. **Kingdoms** formed, after the naval victory of Demetrius over Ptolemy. Diod. 30, 53.

Ptolemy, s. of Lagus.	Antigonus.	Seleucus.	Lysimachus.	Cassander.	
King of Egypt.	King of Syria and Asia.	King of Upper Asia.	King of Thrace.	King of Macedonia.	Demetrius Poliorcetes (s. of Antigonus) also takes the title of *king*, and in B.C. 304 returns to Athens and wages war with Cassander.

B.C. 301. Settlement after the battle of Ipsus, in which Antigonus fell.
(Lysimachus and Seleucus against Antigonus and Demetrius.)

Ptolemy, s. of Lagus, ob. 283.	Seleucus Nicanor, ob. B.C. 280.	Lysimachus, ob. 281.	Cassander, ob. B.C. 297.	
King of Egypt.	King of Syria.	King of Thrace.	King of Macedonia.	Greece is nominally free, but in B.C. 295 Demetrius takes Athens, and becoming King of Macedonia in B.C. 295 to B.C. 287, he retains Greece as part of the kingdom. In the confusion which followed it was practically free.

APPENDIX II

THE KINGS OF EGYPT, SYRIA, AND MACEDONIA, TO THE END OF THE PERIOD EMBRACED IN POLYBIUS'S HISTORY

B.C.	EGYPT	B.C.	SYRIA	B.C.	MACEDONIA
		306-301	Antigonus the One-eyed		
306-285	Ptolemy, s. of Lagus	301-280	Seleucus Nicanor	323-311	Alexander IV.
283-247	Ptolemy II. Philadelphus	280-261	Antiochus I. Soter, s. of	323-317	Philip III. (Arrhidaeus)
247-222	Ptolemy III. Euergetes		Antigonus the One-eyed	311-306	Regency of Cassander
222-205	Ptolemy IV. Philopator	261-246	Antiochus II. Theos	306-296	Cassander
205-181	Ptolemy V. Epiphanes	246-226	Seleucus II. Callinicus	296	Philip IV. s. of Cassander
181-146	Ptolemy VI. Philometor	226-223	Seleucus III. Alexander	296-294	Antipater, Alexander } sons of Cassander
170-154	Ptolemy VII. Physcon,		or Ceraunus	294-287	Demetrius I. Poliercetes, ob. 283
	joint king with his	223-187	Antiochus III. the Great	287-281	Divided between Lysimachus and Pyrrhus
	brother, Ptolemy VI.	187-175	Seleucus IV. Philopator	281-280	Seleucus, Nicanor; Ptolemy Ceraunus, s. of Ptolemy of Egypt
146-117	Ptolemy VII. sole king	175-164	Antiochus IV. Epiphanes	280-277	[Various claimants]
		164-162	Antiochus V. Eupator	277-239	Antigonus Gonatas, s. of Demetrius I.
		162-150	Demetrius I. Soter	239-229	Demetrius II. s. of Gonatas
		150-147	Alexander Balas	229-179	Philip V. s. of Demetrius II.
		147-125	Demetrius II. Nicator		[Antigonus Doson, nominally his guardian assumes the crown B.C. 229-220]
				179-168	Perseus [Macedonia a Roman province]

APPENDIX III

1, 21. The capture of Cornelius Asina is ascribed by Livy (*Ep.* 17) to an act of treachery, *per fraudem velut in colloquium evocatus captus est.* He is copied by Florus (2, 2) and Eutropius (2, 10). See also Valerius Max. 6, 6, 2. This is perhaps not incompatible with the narrative of Polybius, which, however, does not suggest it. He must have been released at the time of the entrance of Regulus into Africa, for being captured in B.C. 260, we find him Consul for B.C. 254, without any account of his release being preserved.

1, 32-36.—XANTHIPPUS THE LACEDAEMONIAN

The fate of Xanthippus has been variously reported. Polybius represents him as going away voluntarily, and Mommsen supposes him to have taken service in the Egyptian army. Appian, however, asserts that he and his men were drowned on their way home to Sparta by the Carthaginian captains who were conveying them, and who were acting on secret orders from home (8, 4). Mommsen also regards the account of Polybius of the reforms introduced in the Carthaginian tactics by Xanthippus as exaggerated: "The officers of Carthage can hardly have waited for foreigners to teach them that the light African cavalry can be more appropriately employed on the plain than among hills and forests." The doubt had apparently occurred to others [Diodor. Sic. fr. bk. 23.] The mistake, however, was not an unnatural one. For other references to Xanthippus see Cicero *de Off.* 3, 26, 7; Valerius Max. 1, 1, 14; Dio Cassius, fr. 43, 24.

1, 34.—M. ATILIUS REGULUS

No more is told us of the fate of Regulus, and Mommsen says "nothing more is known with certainty." Arnold, following Niebuhr, declared the story of his cruel death to be a fabrication. The tradition, however, of his mission home to propose peace, his subsequent return after advising against it, and his death under torture, was received undoubtingly by the Roman writers of the time of Cicero and afterwards. See Cicero, *Off.* 3, § 99; *ad Att.* 16, 11; *de Sen.* § 74; *Paradox.* 2, 16; *Tusc.* 5, § 14. Horace,

Od. 3, 5; Livy, *Ep.* 18; Valerius Max. 1, 1, 14; Dio Cassius, fr. 43, 28. To Appian (8, 4) is due the additional particular of the barrel full of nails, καὶ αὐτὸν οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι καθείρξαντες ἐν γαλεάγρᾳ κέντρα πάντοθεν ἐχούσῃ διέφθειραν. Against this uniformity of tradition is to be set the silence of Polybius. But on the other hand, in this introductory part of his history, Polybius does not profess to give full particulars (see note to 1, 21); and in the case of Regulus, he has not stated what we learn from Livy (*Ep.* 18) and Valerius Max. 4, 4, 6, that his stay in Africa for the second year was against his own express wish, his private business requiring, as he thought, his presence in Italy.

1, 60.—LUTATIUS

Lutatius is represented by Polybius as directing the operations at the battle of Aegusa; but it appears that he had received some hurt a few days before, and was confined to his lectica during the action (*lectica claudum jucuisse*). The chief direction therefore devolved upon the praetor, Q. Valerius Falto, who accordingly claimed to share his triumph, but was refused on the technical ground that the victory had not been won under his *auspicia.* Valerius Max. 2, 8, 2.

1, 76.—HAMILCAR

(Vol. i. p. 85.) Dr. Warre writes on the manœuvre of Hamilcar as follows: "Hamilcar's army is in column of route; elephants leading, then cavalry, then light-armed infantry, and heavy-armed infantry in the rear. He observes the enemy bearing down hastily; gives orders to his whole force to turn about, and then forms line (ἐξέτασις) by successive wheels of his heavy-armed troops. He would thus have changed his heavy-armed from column of route into line by wheeling them while retiring to the right (or left) about. The light-armed apparently passed through the intervals; the cavalry halted when they came to the line now formed up, and at once turned to their front and faced the enemy, and the remainder marched forward to meet them. Polybius does not tell us with what front Hamilcar was marching; but I think it is clear that he was in column of route and not in battle array (ἐκ παρατάξεως). Thus the deployment of his columns, *while retiring*, *by right* (*or left*) *about wheel* into line by successive συντάγματα, or battalions, would be a very pretty manœuvre, and only such as an able tactician would resort to."

II, 22-23.—SCIPIO AND HASDRUBAL SON OF GESCO

(Vol. ii. p. 67.) Of this passage Dr. Warre has again favoured me with a note and a translation which I append: "The passage in Polybius is very interesting. It is a good tactical example of an attack on both flanks, refusing the centre, the effect being to keep the enemy from moving the troops in his centre to the assistance of his wings. The inversion of order, by which the right became the left in the case of those troops who had first orders 'right turn, left wheel from line into column,' and then 'left wheel into line,' is an ordinary instance of doing what might be called 'clubbing' a battalion or brigade. It is of course on parade a clumsy mistake to make; but Scipio rightly took no notice of it in battle, as Polybius, who sees the matter with a soldier's eye, observes. Scipio's army was inferior in numbers, and so he first moved his Romans *outwards* while still in line, and then formed for attack with the cavalry, light infantry, and three battalions (cohorts) on each flank."



The following is Dr. Warre's translation:—

"Polybius II, 22.—On this occasion Scipio seems to have employed two stratagems. He observed that Hasdrubal was in

the habit of marching out late in the day, of keeping his Libyan troops in the centre, and of posting his elephants in front of each wing. His own custom was to march out at the said hour to oppose him, and to set the Romans in his centre opposite to the Libyans, while he posted his Spanish troops upon his wings. On the day upon which he determined to decide matters he did the reverse of this, and thereby greatly assisted his forces towards gaining a victory, and placed the enemy at no small disadvantage. At daybreak he sent his aides and gave orders to all the tribunes and to the soldiers that they were first to get their breakfast, and then to arm and to parade in front of the ramparts. This was done. The soldiers obeyed eagerly, having an idea of his intention. He sent forward the cavalry and light infantry, giving them joint orders to approach the camp of the enemy, and to skirmish up to it boldly; but he himself took the heavy infantry, and at sunrise advanced, and when he had reached the middle of the plain formed line in just the opposite order to his previous formation. For he proceeded to deploy the Iberians on the centre and the Romans on the flanks."

. . . . . .

"For a while the Romans remained as usual silent, but after the day had worn, and the light infantry engagement was indecisive and on equal terms, since those who were hard pressed retired on their own heavy infantry and (ἐκ μεταβολῆς κινδυνεύειν), after retreating formed again for attack, then it was that Scipio withdrew his skirmishers through the intervals of the troops under the standards, and divided them on either wing in rear of his line, first the velites, and in succession to them his cavalry, and at first made his advance *in line direct.* But when distant (? five) furlongs from the enemy he directed the Iberians to advance in the same formation, but gave orders to the wings to turn outwards (to the right wing for the infantry to turn to their right, and to their left to the left). Then he himself took from the right and Lucius Marcius and Marcus Junius from the left the three leading squadrons of cavalry, and in front of these the usual number of velites, and three cohorts (for this is the Roman term), but the one body wheeled to the left and the other to the right, were led in column against the enemy, advancing at full speed, the troops in succession forming and following as they wheeled. . . .

(They were in line, and the cavalry and velites got the word turn, left wheel, and the infantry right wheel and forward, *i.e.* the

light troops and cavalry wheeled from their outer flank, and the heavy infantry from their inner flank.)

"And when these troops were not far off the enemy, and the Iberians in the line direct were still a considerable distance behind, as they were advancing slowly, they came in contact with either wing of the enemy, the Roman forces being in column according to his original intention.

"The subsequent movements by which the troops in rear of these columns came into line with those leading were exactly the reverse, generally, in the case of the right and the left wings, and particularly, in case of the light troops and cavalry and the heavy infantry. For the cavalry and velites on the right wing forming to the right into line were trying to outflank the enemy, but the infantry formed on the contrary to the left. On the left wing the cavalry and light infantry left formed into line, and the heavy infantry right formed into line. And so it came to pass that on both wings the cavalry and light troops were in inverted order, *i.e.* their proper right had become their left. The general took little heed of this, but cared only for that which was of greater importance, the outflanking of the enemy; and rightly so, for while a general ought to know what has happened, he should use the movements that are suitable to the circumstances."

34, 5, 10.—PYTHEAS

The date of these voyages of Pytheas is uncertain beyond the fact that they were somewhere in the 4th century B.C. His Periplus, or notes of his voyage, was extant until the 5th century A.D. The fragments remaining have been published by Arvesdson, Upsala, 1824. The objection raised by Polybius to the impossibility of a poor man making such voyages is sometimes answered by the supposition that he was sent officially by the Massilian merchants to survey the north of Europe and look out for places suitable for commerce. The northern sea, which he describes as "like a jellyfish through which one can neither walk nor sail," is referred "to the rotten and spongy ice which sometimes fills those waters." This is assuming Thule to be Iceland. Tacitus supposed it to be Shetland (*Agr.* 10), and described the waters there as sluggish, and not subject to the influence of the wind. See Elton (*Origins of English History*, pp. 73-74). Elton quotes Wallace (*Concerning Thule*, 31), who comments on Tacitus by saying, "This agrees with the sea in the north-east of Scotland,

not for the reason given by Tacitus, but because of the contrary tides, which drive several ways, and stop not only boats with oars but ships under sail."

34, 10.—THE SUBTERRANEAN FISH

Schweighaeuser in his note on this passage quotes Aristotle *de Anim.* 6, 15, who states that gudgeon thus hide themselves in the earth; and Seneca, *Nat. Q.*, 3, 17 and 19, who refers to the fact *piscem posse vivere sub terra et effodi*, and quotes an instance as occurring in Caria. See also Livy, 42, 2, who, among other prodigies occurring in B.C. 173, says, *in Gallico agro qua inducere-tus aratrum sub exsistentibus glebis pisces emersisse dicebantur.* Eels and other fish have been found in the mud of ponds long after the ponds have been dried up. The truer account is given in Strabo (4, 1, 6): "There was a lake near Ruscino, and a swampy place a little above the sea, full of salt, and containing mullets (κεστρεῖς), which are dug out; for if a man dig down two or three feet, and drive a trident into the muddy water, he may spear fish which is of considerable size, and which feeds on the mud like the eels."

INDEX

The references are to Books and Chapters, except where the volume and page of this translation are indicated by vol.— p.—; Fr. indicates the minor fragments at the end of vol. ii.

ABBA, town in Africa, **14**, 6, 7
Abia, town in Messenia, **23**, 17
Abila, town in Palestine, **5**, 71 ; **16**, 39
Abilyx, a Spaniard, **3**, 98, 99
Abrupolis, a Thracian prince, **22**, 8
Abydus, town in Asia Minor, on the Hellespont, **4**, 44 ; **5**, 111 ; **16**, 29-35 ; its situation and fall, **18**, 2, 44 ; **34**, 7
Academy, the, **12**, 26*c* ; **16**, 27
Acarnania, **4**, 6, 30, 63, 65, 66 ; **5**, 3-5 ; **9**, 34 ; **28**, 4, 5 ; **30**, 13 ; **32**, 20 ; **39**, 14
Acarnanians, **2**, 6, 10, 45, 65, 66 ; **4**, 5, 9, 15, 25, 30, 63 ; **5**, 3-6, 13, 96 ; **9**, 32, 38-40 ; **10**, 41 ; **16**, 32 ; **21**, 29, 32 ; **24**, 12 ; **28**, 5
Acatides, a Theban runner, **39**, 7
Acerrae, a town of the Insubres, **2**, 34
Acesimbrotus of Rhodes, **18**, 1, 2
Achaeans, the, **1**, 3, passim ; appealed to by the Epirotes, **2**, 6, 9, 10, 12 ; the rise of their league in the Peloponnese, **2**, 37-70 ; assist Messenians against the Aetolians, and call in Philip V., **4**, 1-19, 22 ; proclaim war with Aetolians, **4**, 25-27. *See also* **36**, 59-85 ; agree to furnish Philip with subvention, **5**, 1 ; join Philip in his invasion of Laconia, **5**, 18-24 ; harassed by Aetolians, **5**, 30, 35 ; elect Aratus after the incapable Strategus Eperatus, **5**, 91-95 ; make peace with the Aetolians, **5**, 101-105 ; instructed in military exercises by Philopoemen, **10**, 23 ; at war with Machanidas of Sparta, **11**, 11-18 ; Philopoemen summons a levy at Tegea to invade Laconia, **16**, 36, 37 ; incline to Philip's part against Rome, **16**, 38 ; send envoys to the congress at Nicaea, **18**, 1-8 ; receive back Corinth by the advice of Flamininus, **18**, 45 fin. ; and Triphylia and Heraea, **18**, 47 ; offer to help the Boeotians, who however abandon their alliance, **20**, 4, 5 ; Megara leaves their league, **20**, 6 ; make alliance with Eumenes, **21**, 9 ; Roman legates at the congress at Cleitor, **22**, 2 ; Eumenes offers 120 talents to the congress at Megalopolis, Seleucus 10 ships of war, **22**, 10-12 ; difficulty as to the renewal of a treaty with Ptolemy, **22**, 12 ; Q. Caecilius before the congress at Argos remonstrates on the subject of Sparta, **22**, 13 ; their dealing with Messene after the murder of Philopoemen, **23**, 16-18 ; send an embassy to Rome in regard to Messene, **24**, 1 ; Ptolemy presents the league with 10 ships of war, **24**, 6 ; the league officers condemn Chaeron of Sparta for the murder of Apollonides, **24**, 7 ; debate in the assembly as to the

orders from Rome about the Spartan exiles, **24**, 10-12; attitude towards Rome, **24**, 13-15; ordered to guard Chalcis for Rome, **27**, 2 fin.; Gaius Popilius and Gnaeus Octavius address the congress, **28**, 3; decide to take the side of Rome against Perseus openly, **28**, 12, 13; two embassies at Alexandria, **28**, 19, 20; the two Ptolemies ask their help against Antiochus, **29**, 23-25; Romanising party in Achaia, **30**, 13; embassy to Rome, **31**, 6, 8; **32**, 7, 17; **33**, 1, 3; Cretans ask the Achaeans for help, **33**, 16; Achaean detenus released, **35**, 6; Thessalians ask for help against the pseudo-Philip, **37**, 2; asked to send Polybius to Lilybaeum, **37**, 3; dissolution of the league by the Romans, **38**, 3-11; **39**, 7-17; Achaean assembly or congress, *at Aegium*, **2**, 54; **4**, 7, 26, 82; **5**, 1; **16**, 27; **28**, 3; *at Cleitor*, **22**, 2; *at Corinth*, **29**, 23; **33**, 16; **38**, 10; *at Megalopolis*, **23**, 10, 16; *at Sicyon*, **5**, 1; **23**, 17; **28**, 13; **29**, 24; election of magistrates, **4**, 37, 82; **5**, 1; **30**, 7; soldiers, **29**, 24; arms, **11**, 9; cavalry, **10**, 23; ships, **2**, 10

Achaeus, son of Xuthus, the mythical ancestor of the Achaeans, **39**, 14

Achaeus, son of Andromachus, nephew of Laodice, mother of Antiochus the Great, **4**, 2, 48-91, 51; **5**, 40-42, 57, 58, 61, 66, 67, 72, 78, 87, 107, 111; **7**, 17; **8**, 2; his capture and death, **8**, 17-23

Achaia Phthiotis, **18**, 46; **47**, 7

Achelous, river, **4**, 63; **5**, 6-7, 13

Achradina, a part of Syracuse, **8**, 5, 6

Acilius Glabrio, M'., consul B.C. 191, **20**, 9, 10; **21**, 3-5

Acilus, Gaius, **33**, 2

Acrae, a town in Aetolia, **5**, 13

Acriae, a town in Laconia, **5**, 19

Acrocorinthus, the citadel of Corinth, 1900 feet high, **2**, 43, 45, 50, 51, 52, 54; **4**, 8; **7**, 11; **18**, 45

Acrolissus, citadel of the Illyrican city of Lissus, **8**, 15, 16

Acte, the, east coast of Laconia, **5**, 91

Actium, temple and town in Acarnania, on the narrowest point of the Ambracian gulf, **4**, 63

Acusilochus, an Asiatic ruler, **25**, 2

Adaeus, governor of the town of Bubastus in Egypt, **15**, 27

Adaeus of Beroea, legate of Perseus to Genthius, **28**, 8

Adeiganes, a magistrate at Seleucus on the Tigris, **5**, 54

Adeimantus of Sparta, **4**, 22, 23

Adherbal, a Carthaginian general in the first Punic war, **1**, 44, 46, 49, 50, 52, 53

Admetus, put to death by Philip V., **23**, 10

Adriatic Sea, the, **1**, 2; **2**, 14, 16, 17, 26; **3**, 47, 61, 86-88, 110; **10**, 1; **24**, 3; **32**, 23; **34**, 6, 7

Adrumetum, a city in Africa, **15**, 5, 15

Adua or Addua, the river Adda, a tributary of the Po, **2**, 32; **34**, 10

Adys, a town in Africa, **1**, 30

Aeacidae, descendants of Aeacus (Peleus, Achilles, Telamon, Ajax), **5**, 2

Aecae, a town in Apulia, **3**, 88

Aegae, a town in Aeolis, **5**, 77; **33**, 13

Aegean Sea, **3**, 2; **16**, 34

Aegina, island, **9**, 42; **11**, 5; **22**, 11

Aegira, a town in Achaea, **2**, 41; **4**, 57, 58

Aegitna, a town of the Oxybii, a Ligurian tribe, **33**, 10, 11

Aegium, chief town of the Achaean league, **2**, 41, 55; **4**, 57; **5**, 30, 101, 102; **16**, 38; meetings of the congress at, **2**, 54; **4**, 7, 26, 82; **5**, 1; **16**, 27, 28; territory of, **5**, 94

Aegosagae, a tribe of Gauls invited into Asia by Attalus, **5**, 77, 78, 111

Aegospotami, the Goat's river, on the Hellespont, **1**, 6; **12**, 25*k*

Aegusa, one of the Aegates (*Farignano*), **1**, 60

Aegusae (the Aegates), **1**, 44
Aegys, a town in Laconia, **2**, 54
Aemilia, wife of Scipio Africanus the elder, and sister of Aemilius Paullus, **32**, 12-14
Aemilius Lepidus, M., consul B.C. 232, **2**, 21, 22
Aemilius Lepidus, M., consul B.C. 187, **16**, 34 ; **22**, 3 ; **28**, 1 ; **32**, 21
Aemilius Papus, L., consul B.C. 225, **2**, 23, 26-31
Aemilius Paullus, M., consul B.C. 255, **1**, 36, 37
Aemilius Paullus, L., consul B.C. 219 and 215, **3**, 16, 18, 19, 106, 107, 116, 117 ; **4**, 37, 66 ; **5**, 108 ; **15**, 11
Aemilius Paulus Macedonicus, L., consul B.C. 182 and 168, **18**, 35 ; **29**, 1, 7, 10, 14, 15, 17, 20 ; **30**, 9, 10, 13, 16, 19 ; **31**, 3 ; **32**, 8, 11, 12, 14, 15, 21 ; his wives, **32**, 8
Aemilius Regillus, L., praetor B.C. 190, **21**, 8, 10, 24
Aena, a temple at Ecbatana, **10**, 27
Aeneas Tacticus (middle of 4th cent. B.C.), **10**, 44
Aenianian Gulf (=Sinus Maliacus), so called from the Aenianes, **10**, 42
Aenus, a town in Thrace, mod. *Enos*, **5**, 34 ; **22**, 9, 15 ; **30**, 3
Aeolian Islands. *See* Liparae
Aeolis, a district of Mysia between the rivers Carius and Hermus, **5**, 77 ; **21**, 13, 14
Aeolus, king of the Winds, **34**, 2, 11
Aerenosii, a Spanish tribe, **3**, 35
Aeschrion, a Romanising Acarnanian, **28**, 5
Aethaleia, name of the island of Lemnus, **34**, 11
Aethiopia, **3**, 38 ; **34**, 16
Aetna, Mt., **1**, 55
Aetolians, the, **1**, 3, etc.; attack Medion, **2**, 2-4 ; help the Epirotes against the Illyrians, **2**, 6-12 ; engage in the Social war, **2**, 37 ; make peace with the Achaeans, **2**, 44 ; make alliance with Antigonus Doson, and Cleomenes of Sparta, **2**, 45-49 ; refuse Antigonus passage, **2**, 52 ; joined by Mantinea, **2**, 57, 58 ; intrigue with Antiochus, **3**, 6, 7 ; invade Messenia, **4**, 9-19, 22-27, 29-31, 34-37, 53-59, 61-67, 77-80, 84 ; attacked by Philip V., **5**, 2-14 ; attempt to invade Thessaly, **5**, 17 ; evade peace with Philip, **5**, 29. *See also* 30, 35, 63, 91, 92, 95, 96, 99, 100-103, 105, 107 ; attend a conference at Sparta, **9**, 28-39 ; attack Acarnania, **9**, 40 ; in alliance with Rome against Philip, **10**, 25, 26, 41, 42 ; receive a legation from Rhodes on the subject of peace, **11**, 4-7 ; distress and revolutionary measures, **13**, 1, 2 ; fresh offence with Philip, **15**, 23 ; in alliance with Nabis, **16**, 13 ; at the battle of Panium, **16**, 18 ; addressed by Roman envoys in Naupactus, **16**, 27 ; attend a conference at Nicaea, **18**, 1-10 ; fight on the Roman side in Thessaly, **18**, 19 ; their superiority in cavalry, **18**, 22 ; discontented with their share of spoil after Cynoscephalae, **18**, 27, 34, 38, 39 ; claim Heraea, **18**, 42 ; discontented with the Roman settlement of B.C. 196, **18**, 45 ; claim Pharsalus, **18**, 47 ; addressed by Roman legates, **18**, 48 ; once in league with Achaeans against Boeotia, **20**, 4 ; submit unconditionally to Rome after the battle of Thermopylae, **20**, 9-11 ; the Roman terms with, **21**, 3-4 ; six months' truce allowed them in which to appeal to the Senate, **21**, 5, 8 ; the Romans proclaim war with them, **21**, 25-32 ; sell Aegina to Attalus, **22**, 11 ; Gaius Popilius and Gnaeus Octavius order them to give hostages, **28**, 4 ; their violence and habits of pillage, **30**, 11 ; improvement after the death of Lyciscus, **32**, 19 ; their principle of "spoil from spoil," **18**, 4 ; their character and habits, **2**, 3, 4, 45, 46, 49 ; **4**, 67 ; **9**, 38 ; **18**, 4, 34 ; their officers, **21**, 32
Agathagetus of Rhodes, **27**, 7 ; **28**, 2
Agatharchus, a Syracusan sent as ambassador to Carthage, **7**, 4

Agatharchus, son of Agathocles, king of Syracuse, **7**, 2
Agathinus of Corinth, **5**, 95
Agathoclea, daughter of Aristomenes, **15**, 39
Agathoclea, mistress of Ptolemy Philopator, **14**, 11 ; **15**, 25, 31-33
Agathocles, king of Syracuse, **1**, 7, 82 ; **8**, 12 ; **9**, 23 ; **12**, 15 ; **15**, 35
Agathocles, son of Oenanthe and guardian of Ptolemy Epiphanes, **5**, 63 ; **14**, 11 ; **15**, 25-36
Agathyrna, a city on the north coast of Sicily, **9**, 27
Agelaus of Naupactus, **4**, 16 ; **5**, 3, 103-105, 107
Agema, or guard, in the Macedonian army, **5**, 25 ; in the army of Ptolemy Philopator, **5**, 65, 84 ; in the army of Antiochus Epiphanes, **31**, 3
Agepolis of Rhodes, **28**, 16, 17 ; **29**, 10, 19 ; **30**, 4
Agesarchus of Megalopolis, father of Ptolemy, governor of Cyprus, **15**, 25 ; **18**, 55
Agesias, an Achaean, **30**, 13
Agesilaus II., king of Sparta, **3**, 6 ; **9**, 8, 23 (B.C. 398-361)
Agesilaus, son of Eudamidas, **4**, 53
Agesilochus of Rhodes, **27**, 3 ; **28**, 2, 16 ; **29**, 10
Agesipolis, son of Cleombrotus II., king of Sparta, **4**, 35
Agesipolis III., king of Sparta, son of the last, **4**, 35 ; **23**, 6 (B.C. 221)
Agesipolis of Dyme, **5**, 17
Agetas, Aetolian Strategus, **5**, 91, 96
Agones, a tribe of Cisalpine Gauls, **2**, 15
Agrai, a tribe in Aetolia, **18**, 5
Agrianes, a Thracian tribe, **2**, 65 ; **5**, 79 ; **10**, 42
Agrigentum, in Sicily, **1**, 17-20, 27, 43 ; **2**, 7 ; **9**, 27 ; **12**, 25
Agrigentus, a river, **9**, 27 ; mod. *Fiume di S. Biagio*, which joins the Hypsas (mod. *Drago*)
Agrii, **25**, 4
Agrinium, a city of Aetolia, near the Achelous, **5**, 7
Agron, king of the Illyrians, **2**, 2, 4
Alabanda, city in Caria, **5**, 79 ; **16**, 24 ; **30**, 5
Alba, in Latium, **2**, 18 ; **37**, 2
Alcaeus of Messene, **32**, 6
Alcamenes of Sparta, **4**, 22
Alcamenes of Achaea, friend of Diaeus, **39**, 10
Alcetas, Boeotian Strategus, **22**, 4
Alcibiades, son of Clinias of Athens, **4**, 44
Alcibiades, a Spartan exile, **22**, 1, 15 ; **23**, 4
Alcithus of Aegium, **28**, 12, 19
Aletas, discoverer of the silver mines in Spain, **10**, 10
Alexamenus, an Aetolian Strategus, **18**, 43
Alexander the Great, **2**, 41, 71 ; **3**, 6, 59 ; **4**, 23 ; **5**, 10, 55 ; **8**, 12 ; **9**, 28, 34 ; **10**, 27 ; **12**, 12*b*, 17, 18, 19, 22 ; **18**, 3 ; **22**, 8 ; **29**, 21 ; **38**, 4
Alexander, son of Acmetus, officer of Antigonus Doson, **2**, 66
Alexander, commander of cavalry to Antigonus Doson and a minister of Philip V., **2**, 66, 68 ; **4**, 87 ; **5**, 28 ; **7**, 12
Alexander of Aetolia, friend of Dorimachus, **4**, 57, 58
Alexander, father of Antigonus, the legate from Perseus to Boeotia, **27**, 5
Alexander, ambassador to Rome from Attalus, **18**, 10
Alexander Balas, **33**, 15 ; **18**, 6
Alexander, king of Epirus, **2**, 45 ; **9**, 34
Alexander Isius, an Aetolian, **13**, 1 ; **18**, 3, 4, 10, 36 ; **21**, 25, 26
Alexander, brother of Molo, commander of Persis under Antiochus the Great, **5**, 40, 41, 43, 54
Alexander, tyrant of Pherae in Thessaly, **8**, 1 ; **39**, 2
Alexander, made governor of Phocis by Philip V., **5**, 96
Alexander of Trichonium, **5**, 13
Alexander, tower of, in Thessaly, **18**, 27
Alexandria, capital town of Egypt, **2**,

69; **4**, 51; **5**, 35, 37, 40, 63, 66, 67, 79, 86, 87; **7**, 2; **12**, 25*d*; **13**, 2; **14**, 11; **15**, 25, 26, 30; **16**, 10, 22; **22**, 7, 12; **27**, 19; **28**, 1, 17, 20, 22, 23; **29**, 2, 24, 27; **30**, 9; **31**, 5, 12, 26-28; **34**, 4, 14; **39**, 18; obols of Alexandria, **34**, 8
Alexandria Troas, **5**, 78, 111; **21**, 13, 14
Alexis, captain of Apamea, **5**, 50
Alexo, an Achaean, **1**, 43
Alipheira, a city of Arcadia, **4**, 77, 78
Allaria, a city of Crete, **5**, 63, 65
Allobroges, **3**, 49-51
Alpheus, river in the Peloponnese, **4**, 77, 78; **12**, 4*d*; **16**, 17
Alps, **2**, 14, 15, 16, 18, 21, 22, 28, 32, 34, 35; **3**, 34, 39, 47, 48, 50-56, 60-62, 64, 65; **34**, 10, 15
Altars, the. *See* Philaenus
Althaea, a town in Spain, **3**, 18
Amaeocritus, Boeotian Strategus, **20**, 4
Amanides Pylae, pass between Cilicia and Syria, N.N.E. of Issus, **12**, 17
Ambracian Gulf, the, **4**, 63, 66; **5**, 5, 18
Ambracus, or Ambracia, **4**, 61, 63; **18**, 10; **21**, 26-30. Sometimes Ambracia means the territory, **4**, 61
Ambrysus, a city of Phocis, **4**, 25
Ammonius Barcaeus, an officer of Ptolemy Philopator, **5**, 65
Amphaxitis, a maritime district of Macedonia on the left bank of the Axius, **5**, 97
Amphiaraus, fr. xliii.
Amphictyonic league, **4**, 25; **39**, 12
Amphidamus, Strategus of Elis, **4**, 75, 84, 86
Amphilochians, an Aetolian tribe, **18**, 5; **21**, 25
Amphipolis, a city of Macedonia, **29**, 6
Amphissa, a city of Locris, **21**, 4
Amyce, plain of, near Antioch, **5**, 59
Amyclae, a town in Laconia, **5**, 18-20, 23
Amynander, king of the Athamanes, **4**, 16; **16**, 27; **18**, 1, 10, 36, 47; **20**, 10; **21**, 25, 29
Amyntas, father of Philip II., **2**, 48; **22**, 8
Amyrus, plain of, in Thessaly, **5**, 99
Anacleteria of Ptolemy Epiphanes, **18**, 55; of Philometor, 28, 12
Anadendritis, a vine, **34**, 11
Anamares, or Ananes, or Andres, or Anares, a Cisalpine Gallic tribe, **2**, 17, 32, 34
Anas, a river in Spain (*Guadiana*), **34**, 9, 15
Anaxidamus, an Achaean officer of Philopoemen, **11**, 18
Anaxidamus, an Achaean ambassador to Rome, **31**, 6; **33**, 3
Ancus Marcius, king of Rome, fr. v.
Ancyra, a city of Galatia, **21**, 39
Anda, a city in Libya, **14**, 6
Andania, a city in Messenia, **5**, 92
Andobales (or Indibilis), king of the Ilergetes, **3**, 76; **9**, 11; **10**, 18, 35, 37, 40; **11**, 26, 29, 31, 33; **21**, 11
Andosini, a Spanish tribe, **3**, 35
Andranodorus of Syracuse, **7**, 2, 5
Andreas, physician of Philopator, **5**, 81
Androlochus of Elis, **5**, 94
Andromachus, father of Achaeus, **4**, 51; **8**, 22
Andromachus of Aspendus, an officer of Ptolemy Philopator, **5**, 64, 65, 83, 85, 87
Andromachus, ambassador from Philopator to Rome, **33**, 8
Andronicus, ambassador of Attalus, **32**, 28
Andronidas, a Romanising Achaean, **29**, 25; **30**, 23; **39**, 10, 11
Androsthenes of Cyzicus, **11**, 34
Aneroestes, king of the Gaesatae, **2**, 22, 26, 31
Aniaracae, a tribe in Media, **5**, 44
Anicius Gallus, L., praetor B.C. 168, **30**, 14; **32**, 20; **33**, 9
Anio, river in Latium, **9**, 5, 7
Antalces of Gortyn in Crete, **22**, 19
Antalcidas, **1**, 6; **4**, 27; **6**, 49
Antanor of Elis, **5**, 94
Antenor, ambassador of Perseus to Rhodes, **27**, 4, 14

Anticyra, in Locris, **9**, 39 ; in Phocis, **18**, 45 ; **27**, 16
Antigoneia, a city of Epirus, **2**, 5, 6
Antigoneia, games at Sicyon in honour of Antigonus Doson, **28**, 19 ; **30**, 23
Antigonus the One-eyed, successor of Alexander the Great in Syria, B.C. 323-301, **1**, 63 ; **5**, 67 ; **10**, 27 ; **18**, 3 ; **28**, 20
Antigonus Gonatas, king of Macedonia, son of Demetrius Poliorcetes, B.C. 283-239, **3**, 41, 43-45 ; **9**, 29, 31, 32, 34, 38 ; **18**, 6 ; **20**, 6
Antigonus Doson, grandson of Demetrius Poliorcetes, guardian of Philip V., and really king of Macedonia, B.C. 229-220, **2**, 45, 47-70 ; **3**, 16 ; **4**, 1, 3, 6, 9, 16, 22, 34, 69, 76, 82, 87 ; **5**, 9, 16, 24, 34, 35, 63, 89, 93 ; **7**, 11 ; **9**, 29, 36 ; **20**, 5
Antigonus, son of Alexander, an ambassador from Perseus to Boeotia, **27**, 5
Antilibanus, a mountain in Coele-Syria, the eastern range of Lebanon, **5**, 45, 59
Antimachus, a friend of Perseus, **29**, 6
Antinous of Epirus, a friend of Perseus, **27**, 15 ; **30**, 7
Antioch in Mygdonia, **5**, 51
Antioch on the Orontes, capital of Syria, **5**, 43, 59, 60, 87 ; **31**, 17 ; **32**, 4
Antiochis, sister of Antiochus the Great, **8**, 25
Antiochus I., Soter, king of Syria B.C. 280-261, **31**, 7
Antiochus II., Theos, king of Syria B.C. 261-246
Antiochus Hierax, son of Antiochus II., ob. B.C. 227, **5**, 74
Antiochus III., the Great, king of Syria B.C. 223-187, **1**, 3 ; **2**, 71 ; **3**, 2, 3, 6, 7, 11, 12, 32 ; **4**, 2, 37, 48, 51 ; **5**, 1, 29, 31, 34, 40-71, 73, 79-87, 89, 105, 109 ; **7**, 15-18 ; **8**, 18-23, 25 ; **10**, 27-31, 49 ; **11**, 34 ; **13**, 9 ; **15**, 20, 25, 37 ; **16**, 18, 19, 22, 27, 39 ; **18**, 39, 41, 43, 45, 47-52 ; **20**, 1-3, 7-11 ; **21**, 2, 4, 6, 8-21, 24, 25, 33, 43-48 ; **22**, 4, 5 ; **23**, 14 ; **24**, 12, 15 ; **25**, 4 ; **28**, 1, 4, 20 ; **29**, 6 ; **39**, 14, 19 ; his treaty with Rome, **21**, 45
Antiochus IV., Epiphanes, second son of Antiochus the Great, king of Syria B.C. 175-164, **3**, 3 ; **16**, 18, 19 ; **26**, 1 ; **27**, 7, 19 ; **28**, 1, 17-23 ; **29**, 2, 4, 24, 26, 27 ; **30**, 17 ; **31**, 3-6, 9, 11, 12, 21 ; **33**, 18
Antiochus V., Eupator, son of Epiphanes, king of Syria B.C. 164-162, **31**, 12, 19
Antiochus, another son of Antiochus the Great according to the historian Zeno, **16**, 18, 19
Antipater, guardian of Alexander the Great's son Philip III., and practically king in Macedonia B.C. 323-319, **5**, 10 ; **9**, 29, 30 ; **12**, 13
Antipater, nephew of Antiochus the Great, **5**, 79, 82, 87 ; **16**, 18 ; **21**, 16, 17, 24
Antipatria, a town of the Illyrian Dassaretae, on the River Apsus, **5**, 108
Antiphanes of Berga, a proverbial liar (whence *βεργαΐζειν*), **34**, 6
Antiphatas, of Gortyn in Crete, **33**, 16
Antiphilus, an ambassador of Prusias, **32**, 28
Antipolis, a colony from Marseilles (*Antibes*), **33**, 7
Antisthenes of Rhodes, **16**, 14-15
Antium, in Latium, **3**, 22, 24
Antonius, M., Trib. Pl. B.C. 167, **30**, 4
Aous, a river in Illyria (*Viósa*), **5**, 110 ; **27**, 16
Apameia, a town in Syria (*Kulak-el-Mudik*), **5**, 45, 50, 56, 58, 59
Apameia, a town in Phrygia (*Denair*), **21**, 43-45, 48
Apasiacae, a Nomad tribe between the Oxus and the Asiatic Tanais, **10**, 48
Apaturius Gallus, assassin of Seleucus III., **4**, 48
Apega, wife of Nabis, **13**, 7 ; **18**, 17
Apelaurum, a mountain in Arcadia, **4**, 69

Apelles, guardian and friend of Philip V., **4**, 76, 82, 84-87 ; **5**, 1 ; he conspires against the king, **5**, 2, 4, 14, 16, 26-29
Apelles, another friend of Philip V., **22**, 18 ; **23**, 1
Apennines, the, **2**, 14, 16, 17, 24 ; **3**, 90, 110 ; **33**, 11
Aperantia, a district and city of Thessaly, **20**, 13 ; **21**, 25
Aphrodite of Eryx, **1**, 55 ; **2**, 7 ; temple of, at Pergamum, **18**, 2, 6 ; near Saguntum, **3**, 97
Aphther, a Libyan, **32**, 2
Apia, plain of, a city of Phrygia, **5**, 77
Apis, a harbour in Egypt, **31**, 26, 27
Apocleti, magistrates of the Aetolians, **4**, 5 ; **20**, 1 ; cp. **21**, 4
Apodoti, an Aetolian tribe, **18**, 5
Apollo of the Greeks and Carthaginians, **7**, 9 ; temples of Apollo at Amyclae, **5**, 19 ; at Delphi, **39**, 17 ; at Thermus, **11**, 7 ; near Temnus, **32**, 27 ; statue of, at Sicyon, **18**, 16 ; sacred land of, in Sicyonia, *ib.*, ; mound of, at Tarentum, **8**, 30
Apollodorus, governor of Susiana, **5**, 54
Apollodorus, tyrant of Cassandreia, **7**, 7
Apollodorus, secretary of Philip V., **18**, 1, 8
Apollodorus, Boeotian ambassador, **23**, 16
Apollonia, town in Illyria, **2**, 9, 11 ; **5**, 109, 110 ; **7**, 9 ; **34**, 12
Apollonia, a city of Assyria, **5**, 43, 44, 51, 52
Apollonia, a city of Crete, **28**, 14
Apollonias, wife of Attalus I., **22**, 20
Apollonidas of Sicyon, **22**, 11, 15, 16; **28**, 6
Apollonides of Sparta, **24**, 7
Apollonides of Clazomenae, **28**, 19
Apollonius of Clazomenae, **28**, 19
Apollonius, a friend of Seleucus IV., **31**, 21 ; and his son Apollonius, **31**, 19, 21
Apollophanes of Seleucia, a physician, **5**, 56, 58
Apro, a river in Liguria (some would read Οὔαρος Varus the *Var*), **33**, 11
Aptera, a town in Crete, **4**, 55
Apuleius Saturninus, L., **32**, 28
Apustius, P., **32**, 1
Aquileia, on the Adriatic, **34**, 10, 11
Arabia, **5**, 71 ; Arabians, **5**, 71, 79, 82, 85 ; **13**, 9
Arachosia, district in Asia, **11**, 34
Aradus, an island off the coast of Phoenicia (*Ruad*), **5**, 68
Aratthus, a river in Epirus, **21**, 26
Aratus of Sicyon, son of Clinias, his history, **1**, 3 ; **2**, 40 ; **4**, 2 ; his policy and character, **2**, 40, 43-52, 56-60 ; **4**, 6-12, 14, 19, 24, 37, 67, 76, 82, 84-87 ; **5**, 1, 5, 7, 12, 15, 16, 23, 26-28, 30, 91-103 ; **7**, 11 ; his death, **8**, 14. *See also* **9**, 17, 23 ; **10**, 22 ; **24**, 6 ; **34**, 14. Vol. i. p. 283, note.
Aratus, the younger, son of the last, **2**, 51 ; **4**, 37, 60, 67, 70, 72, 82 ; **5**, 1 ; **7**, 11 ; **24**, 6, 10
Araxus, promontory of Achaia, **4**, 59, 65
Arbo, a city in Illyria, **2**, 11
Arbucala, a city of the Vaccaei in Spain, **3**, 14
Arcades, a city in Crete, **4**, 53
Arcadia and the Arcadians, **2**, 38, 54, 56, 62 ; **4**, 17, 20, 21, 33, 70-77 ; **6**, 2 ; **12**, 4 ; **18**, 14 ; **39**, 7 ; practice of music in, **4**, 20, 21
Arcas, the ancestor of the Arcadians, **4**, 77
Arcesilas of Pitane, academical philosopher, **10**, 22
Arcesilaus, ambassador of the Lacedaemonian exiles, **23**, 6
Arcesilaus of Megalopolis, **28**, 6 ; **29**, 25
Archedamus, an Aetolian, **18**, 21 ; **20**, 9 ; **28**, 4
Archedicus, a comedy writer, **12**, 13
Archias, governor of Cyprus, **33**, 5
Archicrates, an Achaean, **39**, 10
Archidamus V., king of Sparta, ob. B.C. 236-235, **4**, 35-37 ; **8**, 1
Archidamus, son of Pantaleon, an Aetolian, **4**, 57-58

Archimedes of Syracuse, **8**, 5, 7-9
Archippus, an Achaean, **39**, 11
Archon of Aegira, an Achaean Strategus in B.C. 189, 171, 169, **22**, 13, 14; **27**, 2; **28**, 3, 6, 7, 12; **29**, 23, 25
Ardaxanus, a river in Illyria, **8**, 15
Ardea, in Latium, **3**, 22, 24
Ardiaei, an Illyrian tribe, **2**, 11, 12
Ardyes, a Gallic tribe on the Rhone, **3**, 47
Ardys, an officer of Antiochus the Great, **5**, 53, 60
Ares, **7**, 9; **12**, 26; plain of, in Thrace, **13**, 10
Arethusa, a spring in Sicily, **12**, 4
Areus of Sparta, **22**, 1, 15, 16; **23**, 4
Arevaci, a Celtiberian tribe, **35**, 2, 3
Arexidamus, a soldier of Machanidas, **11**, 18
Argennum, promontory in Ionia, **16**, 8
Argolis, **2**, 64; **4**, 36; **5**, 20, 95
Argos, Argives, **2**, 44, 52-54, 59, 64, 70; **4**, 36, 82, 87; **5**, 16-18, 20, 24, 91, 92, 101; **9**, 28, 34; **10**, 26, 41; **16**, 12, 16; **18**, 2, 6, 8, 14, 17; **21**, 24; **22**, 13; **23**, 9, 12, 13; **27**, 2; **30**, 10; **34**, 2; **39**, 8; priestesses at, **12**, 11
Argos, Amphilochian, **21**, 30
Arianus, of Crete, **8**, 18-22
Ariarathes V., king of Cappadocia B.C. 220-163, **3**, 3; **4**, 2; **21**, 47; **24**, 1, 8, 9; **25**, 2; **31**, 12-14
Ariarathes VI., king of Cappadocia B.C. 163-130, **3**, 5; **31**, 14, 17; **32**, 3, 5, 22, 24; **32**, 25; **33**, 6, 12
Aribazus, commandant of Sardis, **7**, 17, 18; **8**, 23
Aricia, in Latium, **3**, 22
Aridices, a Rhodian ambassador, **4**, 52
Ariminum, on the coast of Umbria (*Rimini*), **2**, 21, 23; **3**, 61, 68, 75, 77, 86, 88
Ariobazus of Sardis, **8**, 23
Arisba, town in the Troad, **5**, 111
Aristaenetus of Dyme, **11**, 11
Aristaenus, Achaean Strategus B.C. 198, 195, 187, 185, **18**, 1, 7, 13; **22**, 10, 12, 13; **24**, 13-15
Aristarchus, a Phocaean ambassador, **21**, 6
Aristeides of Athens, **9**, 23; **32**, 8
Aristeides, an ambassador of Ptolemy Epiphanes, **28**, 20
Aristeides, a Theban painter (*flor. circ.* B.C. 350), **39**, 13
Aristocrates, king of Arcadia, **4**, 33
Aristocrates, of Rhodes, **33**, 4
Aristocracy, **6**, 3-8
Aristodamus, an Achaean ambassador, **30**, 13
Aristodemus, tyrant of Megalopolis, **10**, 22
Aristodemus, of Elis, fr. ii.
Aristogeiton, of Elis, **5**, 94
Aristomachus, tyrant of Argos, **2**, 44, 59
Aristomachus, of Corinth, **7**, 5
Aristomenes, guardian of Ptolemy Epiphanes, **15**, 31; **18**, 53, 54
Aristomenes, king of Messenia, **4**, 33
Ariston, Aetolian Strategus B.C. 221, **4**, 5, 9, 17
Ariston of Megalopolis, **28**, 6; **29**, 25
Ariston of Rhodes, **28**, 16
Aristonicus, a eunuch in the Court of Ptolemy Epiphanes, **22**, 7, 22
Aristonicus, a boxer, **27**, 9
Aristophantus of Aearnania, **5**, 6
Aristotle, the philosopher, **12**, 5-8, 11, 23, 24
Aristotle of Argos, **2**, 53
Aristotle, Rhodian ambassador, **31**, 1
Arius, a river in Asia (*Heri Rud*), **10**, 49
Armenas, son of Nabis, **21**, 2
Armenia, **9**, 43; **25**, 2
Armies, necessary accomplishment for commanding, **4**, 12-20
Armosata, a city of Armenia, **8**, 25
Arpani, people of Arpi, in Apulia, **3**, 88, 118
Arretium, a city of Etruria (*Arezzo*), **2**, 16, 19; **3**, 77, 80
Arsaces III., king of the Parthians, **10**, 28
Arsinoe, wife of Ptolemy Philadelphus, **15**, 25
Arsinoe, sister and wife of Ptolemy Philopator, **5**, 83, 84, 87; **15**, 25, 32, 33

Arsinoe, a city of Aetolia, **30**, 11
Artabazanes, an Asian prince, **5**, 55, 57
Artaxerxes II., Mnemon, king of Persia, **1**, 6 ; **12**, 25*f*, B.C. 405-362
Artaxias, a prince in Armenia, **25**, 2 ; **31**, 17
Artemidorus of Syracuse, **1**, 8
Artemis, temples of, near Lusi, **4**, 18, 19, 25 ; **9**, 34 ; at Abydos, **16**, 31 ; near Pergamum, **32**, 27 ; near Elyma, **31**, 11 ; worship of, at Syracuse, **8**, 37 ; image of, at Bargylia, **16**, 12
Artemisium in Elis, **4**, 73
Arunculeius, Gaius, **33**, 1, 9
As, Roman coin, **2**, 15 ; **6**, 39
Asclepius (Aesculapius), temples of, at Agrigentum, **1**, 18 ; at New Carthage, **10**, 10 ; at Ambracia, **21**, 27 ; at Pergamum, **32**, 27
Ascondas of Boeotia, **20**, 5
Asia, one of the three divisions of the world, **2**, 37 ; **3**, 37, 38, 59 ; **34**, 7. This side Taurus, = Asia Minor, **3**, 3 ; **4**, 2, 48 ; **21**, 14, 45 ; cp. **5**, 34, 90.
Asine, a city in Laconia, **5**, 19
Asine, a city in Messenia, **18**, 42
Aspasiacae, a Nomad tribe in Asia, **10**, 48
Aspasianus, a Mede, **5**, 79
Aspasius of Elis, **5**, 94
Aspendus, in Pamphylia, **5**, 73 ; **21**, 35
Aspis, a city in Africa (Clupea), **1**, 29, 34, 36
Ass's Back (*Onei Montes*), **2**, 52
Assyrians, **12**, 28 ; **39**, 6
Astapa, a city in Spain, **11**, 24
Asti, a Thracian tribe, **13**, 10
Astias (Artemis), **16**, 12
Astymedes, of Rhodes, **27**, 7 ; **30**, 4, 5, 22 ; **31**, 6, 7 ; **33**, 15
Atabyrium, mountain and town in Galilee, **5**, 70
Athamanes, a tribe in Epirus, **4**, 16 ; **16**, 27 ; **18**, 36 ; **20**, 10 ; **21**, 25, 31 ; **22**, 9 ; **23**, 1
Athenè, temples of, at Rhodes, **31**, 15 ; at Agrigentum, **9**, 27 ; at Sparta (of the Brazenhouse), **4**, 22, 35 ; at Itone, **4**, 25 ; **25**, 3 ; among the Insubres, **2**, 32 ; statue of, at Alipheira, **4**, 78 ; games of, **4**, 49
Athens, **5**, 27 ; **12**, 13, 25, 26 ; **16**, 25, 27 ; **38**, 4, 11 ; Olympieium at, **26**, 1. Athenians, the, their triremes, **1**, 63 ; assessment of, **2**, 62 ; capture of Chrysopolis, **4**, 44 ; conquered by Philip II., **5**, 10 ; their adulation of Ptolemy IV., **5**, 10 ; relieve Mantinea, **9**, 8 ; their colonies in Thrace, **9**, 28 ; suffer under Antipater, **9**, 29 ; hostility to Sparta, **12**, 6 ; at Aegospotami, 12 ; 25*k* ; their reception of king Attalus, **16**, 25, 26 ; attacked by Philip V., **16**, 34 ; intercede for the Aetolians, **21**, 4, 25, 29-31 ; beaten at Chaeroneia, **22**, 6 ; addressed by Roman Senate, **24**, 12 ; send ambassadors to Alexandria, **28**, 19, 20 ; petition the Senate for Delos and Lemnos, **30**, 21 ; **32**, 17 ; their quarrel with Oropus, **32**, 25 ; their resistance to Xerxes, **38**, 4 ; their republican constitution, **6**, 43, 44, cp. **9**, 23 ; their list of Archons, **12**, 11
Athenaeum, a fortress near Megalopolis, **2**, 46, 54 ; **4**, 37, 60, 81
Athenaeum, a promontory of Campania (*Promontorium Minervae, Punta della Campanella*), **34**, 11
Athenaeus, son of Attalus I., **23**, 1 ; **31**, 9 ; **32**, 28 ; **33**, 1, 13
Athenagoras, a mercenary officer of Philip V., **18**, 22
Athinis, an Egyptian prince, **22**, 7
Athyrnus. *See* Vulturnus
Atilius, Aulus, **27**, 2
Atilius Calatinus, A., consul B.C. 258, 254, **1**, 24, 38
Atilius Regulus, M., consul B.C. 267, 256, **1**, 26, 28-31, 33-35
Atilius Regulus, C., consul B.C. 257, 250, **1**, 25, 39, 41-48
Atilius Regulus, M., consul B.C. 227, 217, **3**, 106, 114, 116
Atilius Regulus, Gaius, consul B.C. 225, **2**, 23, 27, 28
Atilius Serranus, Gaius, praetor B.C. 218, **3**, 40
Atintanes, a tribe in Epirus, **2**, 5, 11 ; **7**, 9

Atis, a Boian chief, **2**, 21
Atlantic Ocean, the, **3**, 37, 57, 59; **16**, 29
Atreus, son of Pelops, **34**, 2
Atropatei, a tribe in Asia, **5**, 44
Attalus I., king of Pergamum B.C. 241-197, **3**, 3; **4**, 48, 49, 65; **5**, 77, 78, 105, 107, 111; **9**, 30; **10**, 41, 42; **11**, 7; **16**, 1-9, 24-28, 30, 34, 40; **18**, 1, 2, 6, 8, 10, 16, 17, 41; **21**, 20, 48; **22**, 11, 20; **32**, 22; the Athenians name a tribe Attalica after him, **16**, 25
Attalus II., succeeds his brother Eumenes II. B.C. 159-138, **3**, 5; **21**, 39, 43; **22**, 20; **23**, 11; **24**, 5, 8; **27**, 18; **28**, 7, 12; **29**, 6; **30**, 1-3; **31**, 9; **32**, 3, 5, 22, 27, 28; **33**, 1, 6, 9, 12; **37**, 6
Attalus III., son of Eumenes II., succeeded his uncle B.C. 138-133, **30**, 2; **33**, 18
Attica, valuation of, **2**, 72; **5**, 29; excellence of its silver, **21**, 32, 45
Attis, priest of Cybele, **21**, 37
Aufidus, river, in Apulia (*Ofanto*), **3**, 110; **4**, 1
Aurelius Orestes, L., consul B.C. 157, **31**, 12; **38**, 7, 8
Ausones, in Italy, **34**, 11
Autaritus, a leader of Gallic mercenaries, **1**, 77-80, 85, 86
Autolychus, of Rhodes, **16**, 5
Autonous, a Thessalian, **7**, 5
Azanis, a district in Arcadia containing 17 towns (*St. Byz.*), **4**, 70
Azorium, a town of Perrhaebia in Thessaly, **28**, 13

Babylon, **5**, 48, 51, 52; **9**, 43
Babyrtas, a Messenian, **4**, 4
Bactra, capital of Bactriana, **29**, 12
Bactriana, **10**, 48, 49; **11**, 34
Baebius, L., praetor B.C. 189, **15**, 1, 4
Baebius Tamphilus, M., consul B.C. 181, **22**, 9
Baecula, a town in Spain, **10**, 38; **11**, 20; battle of, **10**, 39
Baetis, river in Spain (Guadalquivir), **34**, 9
Balacer, father of Pantauchus, **27**, 8
Balacer, son of Pantauchus, **29**, 4
Balearic slingers, **1**, 67; **3**, 33, 72, 83, 113; **15**, 11
Ballistae, **9**, 41
Bantia, town in Illyria, **5**, 108
Barathra, in Egypt, **5**, 80
Barca, a city in Cyrene, **5**, 65
Barcas. *See* Hamilcar
Bardylis, an Illyrian prince, **39**, 2
Bargusii, a Spanish tribe, **3**, 35
Bargylia, a town in Caria, **16**, 12, 24; **18**, 2, 8; **18**, 44, 48, 50; gulf of, **16**, 12
Barmocarus, a Carthaginian, **7**, 9
Barnus, in Macedonia, **34**, 12
Bastarnae, tribe on the Danube, **25**, 6
Batanaea, in Palestine, **16**, 39
Bato, fr. xliii.
Battacus, priest of Cybele, **21**, 37
Beacons. *See* Signals
Belli, a Celtiberian tribe, **35**, 2
Belmina, in Arcadia, **2**, 54
Benacus, lake, **34**, 10
Beneventum, in Samnium, **3**, 90
Berenice, daughter of Ptolemy Philadelphus, wife of Antiochus II., **5**, 58; fr. xxvi.
Berenice, wife of Ptolemy Euergetes, **5**, 36; **15**, 25
Berga, in Macedonia, **34**, 5, 6
Beroea, in Macedonia, **27**, 8; **28**, 8
Berytus, in Phoenicia (*Beirût*), **5**, 61, 68
Bessi, a Thracian tribe, **23**, 8
Bionidas, of Sparta, **4**, 22
Bippus, an Argive, **23**, 18; **24**, 1, 2
Bithynians, **4**, 50, 52; **8**, 24; **37**, 7
Bito, of Argos, **22**, 20
Bodencus, Gallic name of the Po, **2**, 16
Boeae, town in Laconia, **5**, 19
Boei, an Illyrican tribe, **5**, 108
Boeotarch, **18**, 43
Boeotia, Boeotians, **2**, 49, 65; **4**, 9, 15, 25, 67; **9**, 38; **10**, 41; **11**, 5; **13**, 8; **18**, 11, 14, 43; **20**, 2; **21**, 20; **22**, 4; **23**, 16; **24**, 12; **27**, 1, 2, 5, 38; **32**, 20; the decline of Boeotia, **20**, 4-7; Panboeotian congress, **4**, 3; **9**, 34
Boii, Cisalpine Gauls, **2**, 17, 20-24, 28, 30, 31; **3**, 40, 56, 67

Bolax, a city of Triphylia in Elis, **4**, 77, 80
Bolis, of Crete, **8**, 17-22
Bomilcar, a Carthaginian suffes, **3**, 33, 42
Bomilcar, a Carthaginian admiral, **9**, 9
Boodes, of Carthage, **1**, 21
Bosporus, Cimmerian (*Straits of Yeni Kalè*), **4**, 39
Bosporus, Thracian (*Channel of Constantinople*), **4**, 39, 43
Bostarus, Carthaginian general, **1**, 30, 79
Bostor, Carthaginian general, **3**, 98, 99
Botrys, city of Phoenicia, **5**, 68
Botrys, a Messenian writer, **12**, 13
Bottia, in Macedonia, **5**, 97
Brachylles, a Boeotian, **18**, 1, 43 ; **20**, 5, 7 ; **22**, 4
Brazen shields, men with, Macedonians, **2**, 66, 67 ; Megalopolitans, **2**, 65 ; **4**, 69 ; in Syrian army, **31**, 3
Breasts, the, sandbanks at the mouth of Danube, **4**, 41
Brennus, leader of the Gallic invaders, **4**, 46 ; **9**, 30, 35
Britain, **3**, 57 ; **34**, 5, 10
Brochi, in Coele-Syria, **5**, 46, 61
Brundisium, in Calabria, **2**, 11 ; **10**, 1 ; **21**, 24 ; **29**, 6 ; **30**, 20 ; **32**, 20 ; a Brundisian, **3**, 69
Bruttii, or Bruttium, **1**, 56 ; **9**, 7, 25, 27 ; **11**, 6 ; **13**, 10
Bubali, in Africa, **12**, 3
Bubastus, in Egypt, **15**, 27
Buchetus, in Epirus, **21**, 26
Bura, town in Achaia, **2**, 41
Bylazora, town in Paeonia, **5**, 97
Byttachus, a Macedonian, **5**, 79 82
Byzachium, district in Africa, **3** 23 ; **12**, 1
Byzantium and Byzantines, **3**, 2 ; its site and war with Rhodians, **4**, 38, 39, 42-52 ; **5**, 63, 100. *See also* **8**, 24 ; **11**, 4 ; **16**, 2 ; **18**, 2 ; **22**, 18 ; **34**, 12

CADI, a town in Maeonia, **33**, 12
Cadmea, the, citadel of Thebes, **4**, 27
Cadusii, a tribe in Asia, **5**, 44, 79
Caecilius Metellus Denter, L., consul B.C. 284, **2**, 19
Caecilius Metellus, L., consul B.C. 251, **1**, 39
Caecilius Metellus, Q., consul B.C. 206, **22**, 1, 6, 9, 13, 15, 16 ; **23**, 2, 4
Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus, Q., **38**, 10, 11 ; **39**, 7, 10, 11
Caesarea, in Cappadocia, fr. xx.
Calabrians, the, **10**, 1
Calamae, fort in Messenia, **5**, 92
Calamus, a town in Phoenicia, **5**, 68
Calchedon, on the Propontis (*Chalkedon* or *Kadi-Kivi*), **4**, 39, 43, 44 ; **15**, 23
Calena, or Calela, a fort near Larinum, **3**, 101
Cales, in Campania (*Calvi*), **3**, 91
Calicoeni, an Illyrian tribe, **5**, 108
Calleas, of Thespiae, **27**, 1
Callias, a pancratiast of Athens, **28**, 19
Callicrates, of Leontium in Achaia, **24**, 10-12 ; **29**, 23-25 ; **30**, 13, 23; **31**, 8 ; **33**, 16 ; **37**, 5
Callicritus, a Boeotian, **22**, 4
Calligito, of Byzantium, **4**, 52
Callimachus, school of, **12**, 25*d*.
Calliope, a city of the Parthians, **10**, 31
Callipolis, a city of Aetolia, **20**, 13
Callippus, of Ambracia, **21**, 25, 26
Callisthenes, of Olynthus, historian, **4**, 33 ; **6**, 45 ; **12**, 11, 26
Callistratus, of Elis, **20**, 3
Callonitis, district in Mesopotamia, **5**, 54
Calpitus, a city in Galatia, **24**, 8
Calycadnus, promontory in Cilicia, **21**, 45
Calydonia, district of Aetolia, **4**, 65, 95
Calynda, a city of Caria, **31**, 15, 16
Camarina, a city in Sicily, **1**, 24, 37 ; **12**, 25*k*.
Cambylus, a Cretan, **8**, 17-20
Camerinum, a city in Umbria, **2**, 19
Cammani, a tribe in Asia, **31**, 9
Campania, **3**, 90, 91 ; **34**, 11 ; the Campanian Mamertines, **1**, 7, 8. *See also* **2**, 24 ; **3**, 118 ; **7**, 1 ; **24**, 15
Campus Martius, the, **12**, 4*b*.
Camus, town in Palestine, **5**, 70

Candavia, mountain in Illyria, **34**, 12
Cannae, in Apulia, **3**, 107; battle of, **3**, 113-117; **4**, 1; **5**, 105, 110, 111; **6**, 11, 58; **15**, 7, 11
Canobus, or Canopus, town in Egypt, **5**, 39
Canuleius, ambassador to Egypt, **31**, 18
Canusium, town in Apulia, **3**, 107
Caphyae, town in Arcadia, **2**, 52; **4**, 11, 12, 68, 70; plain of, **4**, 11, 13
Capitolium, **1**, 6; **2**, 18, 31; **6**, 19
Cappadocians, **3**, 5; **4**, 2; **5**, 43; **21**, 43; **24**, 8; **31**, 13, 14, 17; **32**, 25; Cappadocia, extent of, fr. xx.
Capros, river in Assyria, **5**, 51
Capua, **2**, 17; **3**, 90, 91; **9**, 3-5; **26**, 2; **34**, 11
Carchi, a tribe in Asia, **5**, 44
Cardaces, Asiatic mercenaries of Antiochus the Great, **5**, 79, 82
Caria, **3**, 2; **5**, 36, 41; **16**, 40; **21**, 24, 48; **22**, 5; **31**, 7, 15; Carian war, **16**, 12; freed from the Rhodians, **30**, 5; as worthless as a Carian, **10**, 32
Carmania, district in Asia, **5**, 79, 82; **11**, 34
Carneades, Academic philosopher, vol. ii. p. 466
Carneium, in Laconia, sacred to Apollo, **5**, 19
Carpetani, a tribe in Spain, **3**, 14; **10**, 7
Carseae (or Caresus), a town in the Troad, **5**, 77
Carsignatus, a Gallic chief in Galatia, **24**, 8
Carthaea, a town in Ceos, **16**, 40
Carthage, its position, **1**, 73, 75; its religion, **3**, 25; **7**, 9; **31**, 20; its government, **1**, 3; **6**, 43, 47, 51, 56; its magistrates, **3**, 33, 42, 51; its senate, **1**, 21, 68; **6**, 51; **10**, 18; **36**, 4; the Hundred, **36**, 4; its dominion, **5**, 39; **9**, 11; its navy, **6**, 52; its cavalry, **3**, 110, 117; its oppressive rule, **1**, 72. *See also* **1**, 19; **6**, 52; **11**, 19; **14**, 1, 5; **15**, 4. Punic cunning, **3**, 78; boys, **15**, 30
Carthage, New, in Spain, **2**, 13; **3**, 13-17, 33, 39, 76, 95; **5**, 1; its situation, **10**, 10; its capture, **10**, 11-16. *See also* **10**, 6, 8; **11**, 31; **34**, 9; **39**, 19
Carthalo, a Carthaginian general, **1**, 53, 54
Caryneia, a city of Achaia, **2**, 41
Carystus, a city of Euboea, **18**, 47
Casius, a mountain on the borders of Egypt and Arabia Petraea (*El Katieh*), **5**, 80
Caspian, the. *See* Hyrcanian Sea
Caspian pass, the, in Media, **5**, 44
Cassander, son of Antipater, successor of Alexander the Great in Macedonia and Greece B.C. 306-296, **2**, 41; **5**, 67; **9**, 29; **12**, 13
Cassander, of Aegina, **22**, 11
Cassander, of Corinth, **5**, 95
Cassander, minister of Philip V., **22**, 17, 18
Cassander, an ambassador from Phocaea, **21**, 6
Cassius Longinus, C., consul B.C. 171, **27**, 6
Castulo, a town in Spain (*Cazlona*), **10**, 38; **11**, 20
Catapults, **1**, 74; **11**, 11
Caucasus (*Hindoo Koosh*), **10**, 48; **11**, 34
Caulonia, a Greek city on the east coast of Bruttium, **2**, 39; **10**, 1
Caunus, a city in Caria, **30**, 5, 9, 22; **31**, 1, 7, 16
Cavarus, king of the Gauls in Thrace, **4**, 46, 52; **8**, 24
Celtiberians, in Spain, **3**, 5, 17; **11**, 31; **14**, 7, 8; **25**, 1; **34**, 1; their horses and swords, fr. xxi., xxii.
Celtici, a tribe in Baetica, **34**, 9
Celts (Polybius seems to use the words Κελτοί and Γαλάται indifferently). *See* Gauls
Cenchreae, the eastern port of Corinth, **2**, 59, 60; **4**, 19; **5**, 29, 101; **18**, 16
Cenomani, a tribe of Cisalpine Gauls, **2**, 17, 23, 24, 32
Censors, the, **6**, 13, 17
Centaurs, the, **8**, 11
Centenius, Gaius, pro-praetor B.C. 217, **3**, 86

Centurions, **6**, 24, 30, 36, 41
Ceos, island in the Aegean, **16**, 26, 40
Cephallenia, the largest island in the Ionian Sea (*Cephalonia*), **3**, 3; **4**, 6; **5**, 3-5, 109, 110; **21**, 26, 30, 32; **27**, 7
Cephalo, a servant of Aratus, **8**, 14
Cephalus, a Molossian, **27**, 15; **30**, 7, 8
Cephisodorus, ambassador from Athens, **18**, 10
Ceraeas, an officer of Ptolemy Philopator, **5**, 70, 71
Ceraunian Mountains, in Epirus, **34**, 6
Cerax, a town in Illyria, **5**, 108
Cercidas, of Megalopolis, **2**, 48, 50, 65
Cercidas, an Arcadian, **18**, 14
Cercina, an island off the lesser Syrtis (*Karkenah*), **3**, 96
Ceretae, a town in Crete, **4**, 53
Cersobleptes, king of the Thracians, **39**, 2
Cesbedium, a temple of Zeus in Pisidia, **5**, 76
Cestros, the, **27**, 11
Chaereas, an historian, **3**, 20
Chaeron, of Sparta, **23**, 4, 18; **24**, 7
Chaeroneia, in Boeotia, **5**, 10; **18**, 14; **22**, 6; **27**, 1
Chalceia, a town in Aetolia, **5**, 94
Chalcidian Mount, in Sicily, **1**, 11
Chalcis, in Euboea, **5**, 2, 26; **9**, 28; **10**, 42, 43; **18**, 11, 45; **20**, 3, 8; **27**, 2, 7; **38**, 5; **39**, 17
Chaldeans, the, **34**, 2
Chalesus, an Aetolian ambassador, **29**, 9
Chalkeia, bronze works in Africa, **12**, 1
Charadra, or -drus, a town in Epirus, **4**, 63; **21**, 26
Chares, an Athenian, **9**, 23
Charimortus, a friend of Scopas, **18**, 55
Charixenus, an Aetolian, **4**, 34
Charmion, of Crete, **22**, 19
Charops, of Epirus, father of Machatas, **20**, 3; **27**, 15
Charops, of Epirus, son of Machatas, **27**, 15; **30**, 12, 13; **31**, 8; **32**, 20, 21
Charybdis, **34**, 3
Chattenia, district in Arabia, **13**, 9
Chersonese, Tauric, **25**, 2
Chersonese, Thracian, **18**, 51; **21**, 15, 22, 48
Chesuphus, an Egyptian, **22**, 7
Chilon, of Sparta, **4**, 81
Chimarus, of Crete, **29**, 6
Chiomara, wife of Ortiago the Gaul, **21**, 38
Chiron's villa, near Messene, **4**, 4
Chius, island of, **5**, 24, 28, 100; **11**, 4; **16**, 5, 6, 8, 14, 40; **18**, 22; **21**, 48; battle at, **16**, 2-14
Chlaeneas, an Aetolian ambassador, **9**, 31, 32, 37; speech of, **9**, 28-31
Chremas, an Acarnanian, **28**, 5; **30**, 13; **32**, 20
Chryseis, wife of Antigonus Doson, **5**, 89
Chrysogonus, an officer of Philip V., **5**, 9, 17, 97; **7**, 12; **9**, 23
Chrysondyon, a city of the Illyrian Dassaretae, **5**, 108
Chrysopolis, on the Bosporus in Bithynia, **4**, 44
Cibyra, a town in Phrygia (*Horzoom*), **21**, 34; **30**, 5, 9
Cilicia, **5**, 59, 79, 82; **12**, 7, 17-20; **21**, 24; **31**, 3
Cilician Gates, the, **12**, 8, 17
Cineas, of Thessaly, **18**, 14
Cineas, a minister of Ptolemy Physcon, **28**, 19
Circeii, in Latium, **3**, 22, 24; **31**, 22, 23
Circus maximus, the, **30**, 14
Cirrha, in Phocis, harbour of Delphi, **5**, 27
Cirta, a town in Numidia, **37**, 10
Cissa, a town in Spain, **3**, 76
Cissii, a tribe in Susiana, **5**, 79, 82
Citadels, dangers of, fr. ix.
Cius, a town of Bithynia, **15**, 21, 23; **16**, 34; **18**, 3-5, 44
Clarium, a fort near Megalopolis, **4**, 6, 25
Clastidium, a town in Cisalpine Gaul (*Casteggio*), **2**, 34; **3**, 69
Claudius Caudex, App., consul B.C. 212, takes Messene and relieves the Mamertines, **1**, 11, 12, 16

Claudius Pulcher, App., consul B.C. 185, as Trib. Mil. B.C. 197 under Flamininus meets Philip V. at Nicaea, **18**, 8, 10; sent as commissioner to Greece B.C. 185, **22**, 16-19; **23**, 4
Claudius Cento, App., legatus of the consul Q. Marcius in Achaia, **28**, 13; sent to Prusias B.C. 154, **33**, 13 (this may be a different man)
Claudius Nero, C., consul B.C. 207, at the battle of the Metaurus, **11**, 1
Claudius Pulcher, C., consul B.C. 177, sent to Istria, **25**, 4; B.C. 167 sent as legatus to Greece, **30**, 13
Claudius Cento, C., sent to Prusias, **33**, 1
Claudius Marcellus, M., five times consul B.C. 222, 215 (suff.), 214, 210, 208, **2**, 34; besieges Syracuse, **8**, 3-9, 37: engaged against Hannibal in Bruttium, **10**, 32; fr. xii.
Claudius Marcellus, M., son of the last, consul B.C. 196, wounded, **10**, 32; opposes treaty with Philip V., **18**, 42
Claudius Marcellus, M., three times consul B.C. 166, 155, 152; engaged in the Celtiberian war, **35**, 2-4 (? fr. xxiii.)
Claudius Pulcher, P., consul B.C. 249, beaten in naval battle off Drepanum, **1**, 49-52
Claudius, Tib., a commissioner to Macedonia, **22**, 9
Claudius Pulcher, Tib., praetor B.C. 178, commissioner to Asia and the islands, **27**, 3
Clazomenae, Ionian city in Asia Minor, **21**, 48; **28**, 19
Cleagoras, of Rhodes, **31**, 15
Cleander, of Mantinea, tutor of Philopoemen, **10**, 22
Clearchus, of Elis, **5**, 94
Clearchus, tyrant of Heracleia, **39**, 2
Cleino, servant and mistress of Ptolemy Philadelphus, **14**, 11
Cleitor, a city of Arcadia, **2**, 55; **4**, 10, 11, 18, 19, 25, 70; **9**, 38; **22**, 2
Cleitomachus, an athlete, **27**, 9
Cleobis, of Argos, **22**, 20
Cleomachus, of Athens, **7**, 9
Cleombrotus I., king of Sparta B.C. 380-371, **9**, 23
Cleombrotus II., king of Sparta B.C. 243-240, **4**, 35
Cleombrotus, of Rhodes, **29**, 10
Cleomenes III., son of Leonidas II., king of Sparta B.C. 236-221, alliance with the Aetolians, **2**, 45; at war with the Achaeans and Antigonus, **2**, 46-70; **3**, 16, 32; **4**, 1, 7, 35; resolute resistance to by the Achaeans, **4**, 76; his residence at Alexandria and death, **5**, 34-39; his destruction of Megalopolis, **5**, 93; **9**, 18; his dealings with Archidamus, **8**, 1. *See also* **1**, 13; **2**, 46, 56; **4**, 5, 6, 37, 60, 69, 81; **5**, 9, 24; **8**, 1; **9**, 23, 29; **15**, 25; **18**, 53; **20**, 5, 6; **39**, 19
Cleomenes, son of Cleombrotus II., **4**, 35
Cleomenes, of Thebes, **39**, 7
Cleon, of Athens, **9**, 23
Cleonae, a city on the road from Argos to Corinth, **2**, 52
Cleonaeus, a Rhodian admiral, **16**, 9
Cleonicus, of Naupactus, **5**, 95, 102; **9**, 37 (? the same)
Cleonymus, tyrant of Phlius, **2**, 44
Cleopatra, wife of Ptolemy Epiphanes, **28**, 20
Cleoptolemus, of Chalcis, **20**, 8
Cleostratus, Athenian ambassador, **28**, 19
Cleoxenus, author of a code of five signals, **10**, 45
Cletis, ambassador from Spartan exiles, **23**, 18
Clupea. *See* Aspis
Clusium, town in Etruria, **2**, 25
Clusius, a river in Gallia Transpadana (*Chiese*), **2**, 32
Cnidus, a city of Doris in Asia Minor, **12**, 25*f*; **30**, 8; **31**, 16
Cnopias, of Allaria in Crete, an officer of Ptolemy Philopator, **5**, 63, 65
Cnossus, in Crete, **4**, 53-55; **22**, 19; **29**, 8; **31**, 1
Cocynthus, a promontory in Bruttium (*Punta di Stilo*), erroneously stated by Polybius to be the southermost point in Italy, **2**, 14

Coele-Syria, Hollow Syria, properly denotes only the plain between Libanus and Antilibanus, but in Polybius includes all Palestine and Phoenicia to the frontier of Egypt. Antiochus the Great contends with Ptolemy Philopator for the possession of it, **5**, 40, 58-87, 105. *See also* **1**, 3; **2**, 71; **3**, 1, 2; **4**, 2, 37; **5**, 1, 29, 31, 34, 42, 48, 49; **14**, 12; **16**, 18, 22; **27**, 19; **28**, 1, 17, 20

Coeranus, ambassador from Smyrna, **18**, 52

Colaeus, in Megalopolis, **2**, 55

Colchians, the, **4**, 39

Colichas, a Spanish chief, **11**, 20; **21**, 11

Colobatus (or Cobulatus), a river in Asia Minor, **21**, 35

Coloneia, in Cappadocia, fr. xx.

Colophon, a town of Ionia, **5**, 77; **21**, 48

Colossus of Rhodes, the, **5**, 88, 89; another in honour of Rome, **31**, 15; at Sicyon, **18**, 16

Comanus, minister of Ptolemy Physcon, **28**, 19; **31**, 28; **32**, 1

Comontorius, king of the Gauls near Byzantium, **4**, 45, 46

Compasium, in Arcadia, **22**, 3, 10

Concolitanus, king of the Gaesatae, **2**, 22, 31

Conii, a Spanish tribe, **10**, 7

Conope, a town in Aetolia, **4**, 64; **5**, 6, 7, 13

Consul, power of, **3**, 87; **6**, 12, 13, 15; army of, **1**, 16; **2**, 24; **3**, 107; **6**, 19, 20, 26; **10**, 16; two consular armies combined, **3**, 72, 110; **6**, 32; **10**, 16

Contoporia, road from Corinth to Cleonae, **16**, 16

Corbilo, a town in Gaul on the Loire (*Coiron*), **34**, 10

Corbrenae, a tribe in Asia, **5**, 44

Corcyra (*Corfu*), **2**, 9-12; **7**, 9; **21**, 32; **34**, 6, 7; **37**, 3

Corduba, in Spain (*Cordova*), **35**, 2

Corinth, **2**, 12, 43, 51, 52, 54; **4**, 6, 13, 19, 22, 24, 25, 66-69, 72; **5**, 2, 17, 18, 24, 26-29, 102; **12**, 26*b*; **16**, 16; **18**, 2, 6, 8, 11, 45-47; **23**, 9; **29**, 12, 23; **30**, 10; **33**, 16; **38**, 5, 10; **39**, 8, 10, 13, 14

Cornelius Cethegus, C., consul B.C. 197, sent to Gaul, **18**, 12

Cornelius Lentulus Caudinus, P., praetor B.C. 203, sent B.C. 196 as one of the ten commissioners to Macedonia, **18**, 48, 50

Cornelius Lentulus, Ser., praetor B.C. 169, placed in command of Chalcis (B.C. 171), **27**, 2

Cornelius Lentulus, P., brother of the last, legatus in Greece, **27**, 2; to Attalus, **32**, 28; **33**, 1

Cornelius Lentulus, L., a commissioner for Greece and Asia, **31**, 23

Cornelius Lentulus, C., ambassador to Ptolemy Physcon, **32**, 1

Cornelius Merula, Cn., twice sent to Egypt to compose matters between the Ptolemies (B.C. 161, 154), **31**, 18, 26-28; **32**, 1; **33**, 8

(Cornelius) Scipio, in the middle of 4th cent. B.C. sent to Marseilles to inquire about trading ports in Britain, **34**, 10

Cornelius Scipio Asina, Cn., consul B.C. 260, 254, made prisoner at Lipara, **1**, 21, 22; **8**, 1; takes Panormus, **1**, 38

Cornelius Scipio, P., the father of Africanus, consul B.C. 218, sent to Spain to oppose Hannibal, **3**, 40; has to enroll a second army, *ib.*; arrives at the mouth of the Rhone, **3**, 41; learning that Hannibal was on the Rhone, he starts in pursuit, **3**, 45; finding himself outstripped, he goes to Italy and sends his brother to Spain, **3**, 49; lands at Pisae and marches to the Po, **3**, 56, 61, 62; wounded at the battle of the Ticinus, **3**, 164-168; his life saved by his son, **10**, 3; dissuades his colleague from giving the enemy battle, **3**, 70; sent (B.C. 217) to join his brother in Spain, **3**, 97; restores the Spanish hostages, **3**, 99; commands the Socii navales, **8**, 3; his fall referred to, **10**, 3, 7, 36

Cornelius Scipio Calvus, Cn., brother of the last, consul B.C. 222, **2**, 34; sent as legatus by Publius to Spain, **3**, 49, 56; lands at Emporium and conquers Hanno and Andobales at Cissa, **3**, 76; winters at Tarraco, *ib.*; defeats Hasdrubal at the mouth of the Ebro, **3**, 95, 96; joined by his brother, **3**, 97-99. *See also* **8**, 3, 38; **10**, 7, 36

Cornelius Scipio Africanus (major), P., his first campaign in B.C. 218, **10**, 3; his campaigns in Spain, **10**, 2-20, 34-40; **11**, 20-33; in Africa, **14**, 1-10; **15**, 1-19; his reception at Rome after the battle of Zama, **16**, 23; in Greece as legatus of his brother, **21**, 4, 5, 8; in the war with Antiochus, **21**, 11-17, 24, 25; his position at Rome, **23**, 14. *See also* **18**, 35; **29**, 14; **32**, 12, 13

Cornelius Scipio Asiaticus, L., brother of Africanus, consul B.C. 190, elected Aedile, **10**, 4; commands in the war against Antiochus, **18**, 49-52; **21**, 4, 5, 8-13, 25, 30, 43; returns to Italy and triumphs, **21**, 24; his accounts of the booty in the Asiatic war demanded, **23**, 14

Cornelius Scipio, P., son of Africanus, **21**, 15; **32**, 12, 13

Corneliae, two daughters of Africanus, **32**, 13

Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus Africanus (minor), son of L. Aemilius Paullus Macedonicus, adopted by the son of Africanus major, consul B.C. 147, 134, his liberality, **18**, 35; his friendship with Polybius and character, **32**, 9-16; **36**, 8; volunteers for the Celtiberian war, **35**, 4, 5; arranges the succession of Massanissa, **37**, 10; besieges Carthage, **38**, 1, 2; destroys Carthage, **39**, 3-6; his simplicity of habits, fr. xxix.

Cornelius Scipio Nasica, son-in-law of Africanus, consul B.C. 162, 155, **29**, 14, 15; **32**, 13

Cornelius, Gnaeus, a commissioner in Greece B.C. 196, **18**, 48 (? Gn. Cornelius Lentulus, consul B.C. 201)

Coroebus (of Mygdon in Phrygia, Paus. 10, 27, 1), a synonym for a fool, **12**, 4*a*. *See* Lucian, *Am.* § 53, Suidas, s.v., Βουταλίων

Coroebus, of Elis, a stadium runner, fr. ii.

Coronea, in Boeotia, **20**, 7; **27**, 1, 5; **29**, 12

Corsica, **12**, 3, 4

Cortona, in Etruria, **3**, 82

Coruncanius, Gaius and Lucius, sent to Queen Teuta, **2**, 8

Coryphaeus, a mountain between Cilicia and Phoenicia, **5**, 59

Cos, island, **16**, 15; **30**, 7

Cosmopolis, a magistrate at Locri Epizephyrii, **12**, 16

Cosmus, a magistrate in Crete, **22**, 19

Cossaei, a hill tribe on the borders of Susiana, **5**, 44

Cossyrus, an island between Sicily and Africa (*Pantellaria*), **3**, 96

Cothon, of Byzantium, **4**, 52

Cotys, king of the Thracian Odrysae, **27**, 12; **30**, 18

Cow, the, a spot on the Asiatic side of the Thracian Bosporus, **4**, 43, 44

Cremona, a Roman colony in Gallia Cisalpina, **3**, 40

Creonium, a town of the Illyrian Dassaretae, **5**, 108

Creta, Island, character of the people, **4**, 53; **6**, 46, 47; **8**, 18, 21; **24**, 4; its government, **6**, 43, 45-47; **22**, 19; its pirates, **13**, 8; the Cretans as mercenaries, **2**, 66; **3**, 75; **5**, 3, 7, 14, 36, 53, 65, 79, 82; **10**, 46; **13**, 6; **31**, 27; **33**, 16; war with Rhodes, **33**, 4, 13, 15, 16; to outwit a Cretan, **8**, 21. *See also* **4**, 8, 20, 54, 55, 61, 67, 71, 80; **7**, 12, 14; **13**, 4, 5; **22**, 19; **28**, 15; **29**, 10; **31**, 26; **33**, 15, 16

Cretan sea, the, **5**, 19

Cretan wine, **6**, 2

Cretopolis, in Mylias, part of Pamphylia, **5**, 72

Crinon, a Macedonian, **5**, 15, 16

Critolaus, a follower of Agathocles of Alexandria, **15**, 26

Critolaus, Achaean Strategus B.C. 146, **38**, 8-11 ; **39**, 7, 8
Critolaus, a Peripatetic philosopher, goes on a mission to Rome, vol. ii. p. 466
Cronus, tumulus of, **10**, 10
Cropius (Nestor), **27**, 16
Croton, a city in Magna Graecia, **2**, 39 ; **7**, 1 ; **10**, 1
Crow, the, a machine for grappling ships, **1**, 22, 27, 28
Crown, mural, **6**, 39 ; **10**, 11 ; *civic*, **6**, 39
Ctesiphon, a city in the south of Assyria, **5**, 45
Cumae, a city in Campania, **1**, 56 ; **3**, 91
Curius Denatus, M., consul B.C. 290, 275, **2**, 19
Cyamosorus, a river in Sicily, **1**, 9
Cyaneae, islands at the mouth of the Thracian Bosporus, **34**, 12
Cybele, **21**, 37
Cyclades, the, **3**, 16 ; **4**, 16 ; **18**, 54
Cycliadas, an Achaean, **18**, 1, 34
Cyclops, the, **35**, 6
Cydas, of Gortyn in Crete, **22**, 19 ; **29**, 6, 7
Cydonia, town in Crete, **4**, 55 ; **22**, 19 ; **28**, 14, 15
Cyllene, seaport town of Elis, **4**, 9 ; **5**, 3
Cyme, a city in Aeolis, **5**, 77 ; **21**, 48 ; **33**, 13
Cynaetha, a town in Arcadia, **4**, 16-21, 25, 29 ; **9**, 17, 38
Cynneus. *See* Apollo
Cynos, seaport of the Opuntian Locrians, **4**, 67
Cynoscephalae, hills in Thessaly, battle of, **18**, 20-27
Cyparissia, a town in Messenia, **5**, 92 ; **11**, 18
Cyphanta, seaport town of Laconia, **4**, 36
Cyprus, island of, **5**, 34, 59 ; **12**, 25*f* ; **18**, 54, 55 ; **29**, 27 ; **31**, 18, 26, 27 ; **32**, 1 ; **33**, 5, 8 ; **34**, 15 ; **39**, 18
Cypsela, a Thracian town on the Hebrus (*Ipsala*), **34**, 12
Cyrene, a Dorian colony in Africa from the island of Thera, founded B.C. 631, and capital of Cyrenaica ; freed by Ecdemus and Demophanes, **10**, 22 ; subject to the Ptolemies, **15**, 25, 33 ; **31**, 18, 26-28 ; **32**, 1
Cyrmasa, a town in Pisidia, **21**, 36
Cyrrhestae, a tribe in Syria, **5**, 50, 57
Cyrtii, slingers of, a robber tribe of Media, **5**, 52
Cythera, island of, **4**, 6
Cyzicus, a town in Mysia on the Propontis (*Bal Kiz*), **4**, 44 ; **5**, 63 ; **16**, 31 ; **22**, 20 ; **25**, 2 ; **33**, 13

Daae, a Scythian tribe, **5**, 79
Dalmatians, **12**, 5 ; **32**, 18, 23
Damasippus, a Macedonian, **31**, 26
Damippus, a Lacedaemonian, **7**, 5
Damis, an Athenian ambassador, **21**, 31
Damon, ambassador from Ptolemy Philometor, **28**, 1
Damon, a Rhodian ambassador, **29**, 18
Damocles, a spy in the service of Philip V., **13**, 5
Damocritus of Calydon, an Aetolian ambassador, **18**, 10 ; **21**, 31
Damocritus, an Achaean, **39**, 10
Damoteles, an Aetolian ambassador, **21**, 25, 26, 29
Damoxenus, of Aegium, an Achaean ambassador, **18**, 42
Damūras, a river in Phoenicia, **5**, 68
Danae, of Alexandria, mother-in-law of Tlepolemus, **15**, 27
Danaus, of Argos, **34**, 2
Daochus, of Thessaly, **18**, 14
Daorsi, a tribe in Illyria, **32**, 18
Daphne, near Antioch in Syria, sacred to Apollo and Artemis, **31**, 3
Dardani, an Illyrian tribe, **2**, 6 ; **4**, 66 ; **5**, 97 ; **25**, 6 ; **28**, 8
Darius, son of Hystaspes, **4**, 43 ; **5**, 43
Darius (Codomanus), **12**, 17-19, 22 ; **18**, 3
Dassaretae, an Illyrian tribe, **5**, 108
Daulium, a town in Phocis, **4**, 25
Daunia, part of Apulia, **3**, 88, 91 ; **5**, 108 ; **9**, 7
Decietae, a Ligurian tribe, **33**, 11

Decius, a Campanian, **1**, 7
Decuriones, **6**, 25
Deep Road, the, at Tarentum, **8**, 31, 35
Deianira, wife of Hercules, **39**, 13
Deigma, the mart at Rhodes, **5**, 88
Deinocrates, an officer of Attalus, **16**, 3
Deinocrates, of Messene, **23**, 5, 16
Deinon, of Alexandria, **15**, 26*a*
Deinon, of Rhodes, **27**, 7; 14; **28**, 2, 17; **29**, 11; **30**, 6-9
Delos, island of, **25**, 3; **26**, 1; **30**, 21; **32**, 17; made a free port, **31**, 7
Delphi, **1**, 6; **2**, 20, 35; **4**, 46; **9**, 33, 35; **22**, 8; **25**, 3; **39**, 17
Delta, the, of the Nile, **3**, 49
Demaratus, of Corinth (**6**, 2), fr. vi.
Demaratus, an Athenian ambassador, **28**, 19, 20
Demeter, temple of, at Alexandria (Thesmophorium), **15**, 27, 29, 33
Demetrias, a city of Magnesia in Thessaly, **3**, 6, 7; **5**, 29, 99; **10**, 42; **18**, 1, 11, 45; **29**, 6
Demetrius I., Poliorcetes, king of Macedonia B.C. 294-283, **1**, 63; **2**, 41; **9**, 29, 34
Demetrius II., king of Macedonia B.C. 239-229, **1**, 3; **2**, 2, 44, 46, 60; **4**, 25, 63; **20**, 5; **37**, 9; **39**, 19
Demetrius, son of Philip V., brother of Perseus, **18**, 39; **21**, 2; **22**, 18; **23**, 1-3, 7
Demetrius I., Soter, king of Syria B.C. 162-150, **3**, 5; **31**, 12; 19-23; **32**, 4, 6, 7, 24; **33**, 5, 18, 19
Demetrius, of Pharos, **2**, 10, 11, 65, 66; **3**, 16, 18; **4**, 16, 19, 37, 66; **5**, 12, 101, 102, 105, 108; **7**, 9, 11, 13, 14; **9**, 23; **32**, 23
Demetrius, of Phalerum, **10**, 24; **12**, 13; **29**, 21; **36**, 2
Demetrius, son of Ariarathes VI. of Cappadocia, **33**, 12, 18
Demetrius, an Athenian, **22**, 3
Demetrius, son of Euthydemus, king of Bactria, **11**, 34
Demetrius, friend of Ptolemy Philometor, **30**, 9
Demiurgi, the, **23**, 5
Demochares, an historian, **12**, 13, 15, 23
Democleitus, inventor of a system of fire signals, **10**, 45
Democracy, **6**, 3, 4; its origin, **6**, 9; its degeneracy, **6**, 4, 10; in Achaia, **2**, 38; in Messene, **7**, 10
Democrates, a Macedonian admiral, **16**, 3
Demodocus, an Achaean, **5**, 95
Demophanes, of Megalopolis, **10**, 22
Demosthenes, the famous orator, **12**, 12*b*, 13; **18**, 14
Demosthenes, of Bithynia, an historian, **12**, 1
Demosthenes, secretary of Philip V., **18**, 1, 8, 34
Dentheleti, a Thracian tribe, **23**, 8
Diaeus, Achaean Strategus B.C. 151, 149, 147, **38**, 8; **39**, 7, 8, 10, 11, 15
Diatonium, a city in Crete, **22**, 19
Dicaearchus, of Trichonium, an Aetolian ambassador, **18**, 10; **20**, 10; **21**, 31
Dicaearchus, an officer of Philip V., **18**, 54
Dicaearchus, of Messene in Sicily, a Peripatetic philosopher, **34**, 5, 6
Dicětas, a Boeotian ambassador, **27**, 1, 2
Dictator, power of, **3**, 87, 103
Didascolondas, of Crete, **16**, 37
Dimale, a city in Illyria, **3**, 18; **7**, 9
Diocles, of Dyme, **5**, 17
Diocles, governor of Parapotamia in Assyria, **5**, 69
Diocles, a Rhodian ambassador, **29**, 10
Diodorus, tutor of Demetrius Soter at Rome, **31**, 20, 21
Diogenes, Stoic Philosopher, vol. ii. p. 466
Diogenes, of Acarnania, **28**, 5
Diogenes, an officer of Antiochus the Great, **5**, 46, 48, 54; **10**, 29, 30
Diogenes, ambassador from Orophernes, **32**, 24
Diognetus, an officer of Antiochus the Great, **5**, 43, 59, 60, 62, 68-70

Diomedon, governor of Seleucia, **5**, 48
Diomedon, of Cos, **30**, 7
Dionysius, theatre of, at Alexandria, **15**, 30; artists in theatre of, **16**, 21; pipers in festival of, in Arcadia, **4**, 20; picture of, by Aristeides, **13**, 2
Dionysius, tyrant of Syracuse B.C. 405-367, **1**, 6; **2**, 39; **12**, 4*a*, 10, 24; **15**, 35
Dionysius, son of the preceding, also tyrant of Syracuse B.C. 367-343, **12**, 4*a*
Dionysius, an officer of Antiochus the Great, **7**, 16-18
Dionysius, secretary of Antiochus Epiphanes, **31**, 3
Dionysius, a Thracian, **5**, 65
Dionysodorus, an officer of Attalus, **16**, 3, 6, 8; **18**, 1, 2
Dionysodorus, ambassador from the Ptolemies, **29**, 23
Diopeithes, of Rhodes, **28**, 7
Diophanes, of Megalopolis, **21**, 9; **22**, 13; **23**, 17; **29**, 23
Diophanes, an ambassador from Perseus, **27**, 7, 14
Dioryctus, the channel between Leucas and Acarnania, **5**, 5
Dioscurium, temple and hamlet of Phlios, **4**, 67, 68, 73
Dipylum, gate at Athens, **16**, 25
Dium, a town in Macedonia, **4**, 62; **5**, 9, 11; **9**, 35; **29**, 4
Dodona, in Epirus, **4**, 67 *note*; **5**, 9, 11; **9**, 35
Dog-star, the, **1**, 37; **2**, 16; **9**, 43
Doliche, a city in Perrhaebia, **28**, 13
Dolopes, the, in Thessaly, **18**, 47; **21**, 25, 31; **22**, 8
Domitius Ahenobarbus, Gnaeus, consul B.C. 192, **21**, 32; **30**, 13
Dorimachus, of Trichonium, Aetolian Strategus B.C. 219, **4**, 3-6, 9, 10, 14, 16, 17, 19, 57, 58, 67, 77; **5**, 1, 3, 5, 6, 11, 17, 61; **9**, 42; **13**, 1; **18**, 54
Dorymenes, an Aetolian, **5**, 61
Drangene, a district in Asia (*Sejestan*), **11**, 34
Drepana, a city in Sicily (*Trapani*), **1**, 41, 46, 49, 55, 56, 59, 61
Dromichaetes, king of the Odrysae, fr. xi.
Drymussa, one of the islands in front of Clazomenae, **21**, 48
Duilius, C., consul B.C. 260, **1**, 22, 23
Dunax, a mountain in Thrace, **34**, 10
Dura, a town in Phoenicia, **5**, 66
Dura, a town on the Euphrates in Mesopotamia, **5**, 48
Dura, a town on the Tigris in Assyria (*Dûr*), **5**, 52
Dyme, an Achaean town, **2**, 41, 51; **4**, 59, 60, 65, 83, 86; **5**, 3, 17, 30, 91, 95

Ecbatana, capital of Media, **10**, 27
Ecdemus, of Megalopolis, **10**, 22
Echecrates, of Thessaly, **5**, 63, 65, 82, 85
Echecrates, of Phlius, philosopher and historian, **12**, 10
Echedemus, Athenian ambassador, **21**, 4, 5
Echetla, a city in Sicily, **1**, 15
Echinus, a city in Thessaly, **9**, 41, 42; **18**, 3, 38
Ecnomus, a hill on the south coast of Sicily between Agrigentum and Gela (*Monte di Licata*), **1**, 25
Edecon, chief of the Edetani in Spain, **10**, 34, 35, 40
Edessa, a town in Macedonia originally the capital, on the via Egnatia, **5**, 97; **34**, 12
Edetani, a Spanish tribe, **10**, 34
Egnatia via, from Apollonia to the Hellespont, **34**, 12
Egypt, its peaceful and prosperous state, **2**, 37; **9**, 44; the conspiracy of Antiochus the Great and Philip against, **3**, 2; succession of Ptolemy Philopator, **4**, 2; **5**, 34; its king in possession of Seleucia, **5**, 58; the savagery of the Egyptians, **15**, 33; revolt of the nobles, **22**, 7; invasion of Antiochus Epiphanes, **3**, 3; **28**, 19, 20; **29**, 2, 27; **30**, 17; **31**, 4; jealousy in Rome of, **31**, 18; visit of Polybius to, **34**, 14; invasion by Iphicrates, **39**, 2. *See also* **5**, 69, 80, 82, 107; **14**, 12; **39**, 18. Idle

character of the Egyptians, **39**, 18; priests of, **34**, 2
Elaea, a city of Aeolis, **21**, 10; **32**, 27; fr. liv.
Elateia, a city of Phocis, **5**, 26; **18**, 43, 45; **27**, 18
Elaus, a fort in the territory of Calydon, **4**, 65
Elephants, used by the Carthaginians, **1**, 18, 19, 30, 32-34, 38, 39, 40, 41, 74, 78, 84, 85; **3**, 13, 42, 45, 46, 53, 55, 74, 79; **11**, 1; **12**, 2; Roman terror of, **1**, 39; African elephants afraid of Indian, **5**, 84. *See also* **31**, 3
Elephas. *See* Nicanor
Eleutherna, a town in Crete, **4**, 53, 55
Elis, the city, **4**, 84; 86; **20**, 3; the country and people, **4**, 5, 9, 19, 36, 59, 68, 69-86, 91-95, 102; **5**, 2, 3, 5, 17, 30, 91, 92, 94, 95; **9**, 30; **16**, 13; **18**, 42; **20**, 3; **39**, 9; its wealth and peacefulness, **4**, 73
Elisphasii, in the Peloponnese, **11**, 11; *Elks*, **34**, 10
Elleporus (*Helorus*, Diodor. Sic. 14, 104), a river in the territory of Caulon in South Italy, **1**, 6
Elpeius, a river in Macedonia, **29**, 4
Elymaei, a tribe living to the north of Mount Zagrus, **5**, 44; **31**, 11
Emathia, a region in Macedonia, **23**, 10
Emporia, a district in Africa near the Lesser Syrtis, **1**, 82; **3**, 23; **32**, 2
Emporium, a city in north Spain, **3**, 39, 76
Enchelanae, a tribe in Illyria, **5**, 108; fr. xliii.
Enipeus, a river in Thessaly, **5**, 99
Eordi, a Macedonian tribe, **18**, 23; **34**, 12
Epaenetus, a Boeotian ambassador, **23**, 16
Epaminondas, of Thebes, **4**, 32, 33; **6**, 43; **8**, 1; **9**, 8; **12**, 25*f*; **32**, 8
Eperatus, of Pharae, Achaean Strategus B.C. 218, **4**, 82; **5**, 1, 5, 30, 91
Epetium, a town of Illyria, **32**, 18
Ephesus, a city of Ionia, **5**, 35; **8**, 17; **12**, 26*c*; **18**, 41; **20**, 11; **21**, 11, 17, 25, 43, 44, 48; **33**, 18
Ephors, the Spartan, **4**, 22, 23, 34, 35, 81; **12**, 11; **23**, 11; of the Messenian, **4**, 4, 31
Ephorus, of Cyme, an historian, **4**, 20; **5**, 33; **6**, 45; **9**, 4; **12**, 4*a*, 22, 23, 25*f*, 27, 28; **34**, 1
Epichares, a Rhodian, **30**, 9
Epicharmus, of Cos, **18**, 40; cp. vol. ii. p. 442
Epicydes, of Syracuse, **7**, 2; **8**, 5, 37
Epidamnus, a city of Illyria, **2**, 9-11; **34**, 7, 12
Epidaurus, in Argolis, **2**, 52; **30**, 10
Epigenes, a friend of Antiochus the Great, **5**, 41, 42, 49-51
Epipolae, a part of Syracuse, **8**, 37
Epirus, **2**, 5-8, 65; **4**, 5, 6, 9, 15, 16, 25, 30, 36, 57, 61, 63, 66, 67; **5**, 3-6; **9**, 38, 40; **10**, 41; **11**, 5; **16**, 27; **18**, 1, 3, 23; **20**, 3; **21**, 26; **22**, 18; **23**, 1; **24**, 12; **27**, 15, 16; **28**, 8, 13; **29**, 4; **30**, 12, 13, 16; **32**, 20, 21, 26
Epistratus, of Acarnania, **4**, 11
Epitalium, a town of Triphylia in Elis, **4**, 80
Eposognatus, a chief in Galatia, **21**, 37
Eratosthenes, of Cyrene, **34**, 2, 4, 5, 7, 13
Eretria, a town in Euboea, **18**, 45, 47
Eretria, a town of Phthiotis in Thessaly, **18**, 20
Eribianus, a mountain pass between Samnium and Campania, **3**, 92
Eridanus, a name of the Po, **2**, 16
Erymanthus, a river of Arcadia, **4**, 70, 71
Erymanthus, a river of Arachosia in Persia, **11**, 34
Erythrae, a city in Ionia, **16**, 6; **21**, 48
Eryx, a mountain and city in Sicily, 1, 55-60, 66, 77; **2**, 7; **3**, 9. *See also* Aphrodite
Etennians, a tribe in Pisidia, **5**, 73
Etesian winds, **4**, 44; **5**, 5

Etruria, **1**, 6 ; **2**, 16, 17, 19, 20, 23-27 ; **3**, 49, 56, 61, 75, 77, 78, 80, 82, 84, 86, 108 ; **5**, 101, 105 ; **12**, 4 ; **15**, 11 ; **34**, 11
Etruscan sea, the. *See* Tyrrhenian sea
Euboea, island of, **2**, 52 ; **4**, 67 ; **10**, 41, 42 ; **11**, 5 ; **18**, 11, 46 ; **20**, 8 ; Euboic talent, **1**, 62 ; **15**, 18 ; **21**, 17, 30, 32
Euboea, daughter of Cleoptolemus, wife of Antiochus the Great, **20**, 8
Eubulidas, of Chalcis, **21**, 17, 45
Eucampidas, of Arcadia, **18**, 14
Euclidas, brother of Cleomenes III., **2**, 65, 67, 68
Eudamidas, of Sparta, **4**, 35
Eudemus, of Rhodes, **21**, 10
Eudemus, an ambassador of Miletus, **28**, 19, 20
Eudoxus, a Greek historian, **34**, 1
Euemerus, of Messene, a writer on religion, **34**, 5, 6
Eulaeus, an Egyptian eunuch, **28**, 20, 21
Eumenes II., king of Pergamum B.C. 197-159, son of Attalus I., **3**, 3 ; **18**, 47 ; **21**, 8-11, 16-22, 24, 43-45, 48 ; **22**, 1, 8-11, 15, 17, 20 ; **23**, 1, 3, 9, 11 ; **24**, 1, 5, 8, 9 ; **25**, 2 ; **27**, 6, 7, 18 ; **28**, 7, 12, 15 ; **29**, 4, 6, 22 ; **30**, 1, 2, 20 ; **31**, 6, 9, 10, 25 ; **32**, 3, 5, 22 ; **33**, 18 ; **39**, 7
Eumenes, an Egyptian ambassador, **29**, 23
Euphanes, of Crete, **20**, 3
Euphrates, the, **5**, 51 ; **8**, 25 ; **9**, 43
Eupolemus, an Aetolian, **18**, 19 ; **28**, 4
Eureas, an Achaean ambassador, **31**, 6, 8
Euripidas, an Aetolian, **4**, 19, 59, 60, 68-72, 83 ; **5**, 94, 95
Euripides, quoted, **1**, 35 ; **5**, 106 ; **12**, 26 ; **31**, 21
Euripus, the, **5**, 29, 101, 109
Euromus, a city in Caria, **18**, 2, 44 ; **30**, 5
Europe, position and size of, **3**, 37 ; **34**, 5-7, 15
Europus, a city in Parapotamia, **5**, 48
Eurotas, river in Laconia, **5**, 21-23 ; **8**, 35 ; **9**, 8 ; **11**, 18 ; **16**, 16
Eurotas, another name of the Galaesus, (q.v.) **8**, 35
Eurycleidas, of Athens, **5**, 106
Euryleon, Achaean Strategus B.C. 210, **10**, 21
Eurylochus, a Cretan, **5**, 79
Eurylochus, a Magnesian, **5**, 63, 65
Eurymedon, of Athens, **12**, 25*k*
Euthydemus, of Magnesia, king of Bactria, **10**, 49 ; **11**, 34
Euxine, the, **3**, 2 ; **4**, 38-44, 46, 47, 50, 52, 56 ; **5**, 43, 44, 55 ; **10**, 27 ; **16**, 29 ; **24**, 3 ; **25**, 2 ; **27**, 7 ; **31**, 24 ; **34**, 7 ; **39**, 2
Evagoras, king of Salamis in Cyprus, **12**, 25*f*
Evagoras, of Aegium, **38**, 11
Evander, fr. iii.
Evanoridas, of Elis, **5**, 94
Evas, a hill in Laconia, **2**, 65, 66 ; **5**, 24
Exile, voluntary, **16**, 14

Fabius Maximus Cunctator, Q., **3**, 87-94, 101, 103, 105, 106; **10**, 1
Fabius, L., **15**, 1
Fabius, Q., **18**, 10
Fabius Labeo, Q., praetor B.C. 189, **21**, 46
Fabius Maximus Aemilianus, Q., elder brother of the younger Africanus, son of Aemilius Paullus, consul B.C. 145, **18**, 35 ; **29**, 14 ; **32**, 9, 10, 14 ; **33**, 9 ; **36**, 5
Fabius Pictor, Q., annalist, **1**, 14, 15, 58 ; **3**, 8, 9
Faesulae, in Etruria, **2**, 25 ; **3**, 82
Fair Plain, the, in Armenia, **8**, 25
Fair Promontory, the, near Carthage, **3**, 22-24
Falernian district, the, in Campania, **3**, 90, 92, 94
Faliscans, the, **1**, 65
Fannius, Gaius, ambassador to Illyria, **32**, 18, 23 ; to Prusias, **33**, 9 ; to the Achaeans, **38**, 10
Flamininus. *See* Quinctius
Flaminius, C., consul B.C. 223, **2**, 21 ; conquers the Insubres, **2**, 32, 33 ; consul II., B.C. 217, enrolls

an army, **3**, 75, 77, 78; encamped at Arretium, **3**, 80; falls at the battle of Thrasymene, **3**, 82-84. *See also* **3**, 86, 106; **15**, 11
Flaminius, commissioner in B.C. 153 to the Ligurians, **33**, 10
Fortune, mutability of, **29**, 21
Frentani, a people of Samnium, **2**, 24; **3**, 88
Fulvius Centumalus, Gn. consul B.C. 229; **2**, 11, 12
Fulvius Centumalus, Gn., consul B.C. 211, **9**, 6, 7
Fulvius Flaccus, Qu., consul B.C. 224, **2**, 31
Fulvius Flaccus, Qu., a legatus under Flamininus, **18**, 10
Fulvius Nobilior, Ser., consul B.C. 255, **1**, 36, 37
Fulvius Nobilior, M., consul B.C. 189, **21**, 25-31, 40; **22**, 13
Furius Pacilus, Gaius, consul B.C. 251, **1**, 39, 40
Furius Philus, P., consul B.C. 223, **2**, 31

GABINIUS, Aulus, legate to the Achaeans, **38**, 10, 11
Gadara, a town in Palestine, **5**, 71; **16**, 39
Gades, a town in Spain (*Cadiz*), **34**, 5, 7, 9, 15; strait of, **34**, 15
Gaesatae, a tribe of Gauls in the valley of the Rhone, **2**, 22, 23, 28, 30, 34
Gaezoloris, a chief in Galatia, **24**, 8
Galadrae, a town in Macedonia, **23**, 18
Galaesus, a river of Calabria flowing into the Gulf of Tarentum **8**, 35
Galatia, a district in Asia Minor occupied by Gauls (Γαλάται), **24**, 8, 9; **25**, 2; **31**, 6
Galatis, a district of Palestine, **5**, 71
Galatus, a chief of the Boii, **2**, 21
Galli, priests of Cybele, **21**, 6, 37
Garsyeris, an officer of Achaeus, **5**, 57, 72-76
Gatalus, a Sarmatian prince, **25**, 2
Gaul, **3**, 59; **7**, 9; Cisalpine Gaul, **2**, 19, 21, 22, 24, 32; **3**, 40, 77, 87, 106, 118; **18**, 12; plains of, **3**, 86
Gauls (or Celts, q.v.)
Take Rome under Brennus, **1**, 6; **2**, 18
Cisalpine Gauls, their country and their wars with Rome, **2**, 13-35. *See also* **3**, 2, 16, 34, 41, 44, 54, 60, 66-75, 78, 79, 83-85, 118; **12**, 4; **18**, 11. *See* Agones, Anares, Boii, Cenomania, Insubres, Lai, Lebecii, Ligures, Lingones, Senones, Veneti
Gauls of the Alps, **2**, 18, 21; **3**, 34. *See* Allobroges, Taurini, Taurisci, Salassi
Transalpine Gauls, **2**, 15, 22; **3**, 37, 39-41, 43, 45, 47, 49, 50; **34**, 7, 10. *See* Allobroges, Ardiges, Decietae, Ligures, Oxybii
Gauls invading Greece and conquered at Delphi, **1**, 6; **2**, 20, 35; **4**, 46; **9**, 34, 35; settled near Macedonia, **18**, 37; **25**, 6; **29**, 9; near Byzantium, **4**, 38, 45, 46, 52. *See* Aegosagae
Gauls in Asia (Gallograeci), **6**, 5; **3**, 3; **5**, 111; **18**, 41; **21**, 33-39, 43, 48; **22**, 21; **25**, 2; **29**, 22; **30**, 1-3, 20; **31**, 2, 6, 9, 12, 13, 23; **32**, 3. *See* Galatia, Tectosages, Tolistobogii, Trocmi
Gallic cavalry in the Roman army, **3**, 65-67; character of the Gauls, **2**, 7, 19, 32, 33, 35; **3**, 70, 79; their arms and mode of fighting, **2**, 33; **3**, 62; the Gallic sword, **2**, 30, 33; **3**, 114
Gallic mercenaries in the service of Carthage, **1**, 43, 67, 77; **2**, 7; **3**, 72, 74, 79, 84, 85, 106, 113-115, 117; **11**, 1, 19; **15**, 11. In the service of Macedonia, **2**, 65; **3**, 2, 17. In the service of Ptolemy Philopator, **5**, 65, 82
Gaza, a city in Palestine, **5**, 68, 80, 86; **16**, 18, 22; **29**, 12
Gela, a town in Sicily, **12**, 25*k*
Gelias, an ambassador from Phocaea, **21**, 6
Gelo, tyrant of Gela and afterwards of Syracuse B.C. 485-478, **12**, 25*k*-26*b*

Gelo, son of Hiero II. of Syracuse, **5**, 88 ; **7**, 7, 8
Genesara, a lake in Palestine, **5**, 70
Genthius, son of Pleuratus, king of Illyria, **28**, 8 ; **29**, 3, 9, 11, 13 ; **30**, 14 ; **32**, 18
Gephrus, a city in Palestine, **5**, 70
Gerrha, a fort in Coele-Syria, **5**, 46, 61
Gertus, a city of the Dassaretae in Illyria, **5**, 108
Gerunium, a town in Apulia near Larinum, **3**, 100-102, 107, 108
Gerus, a town of the Dassaretae in Illyria, **5**, 108
Gesco, a Carthaginian general, **1**, 66, 68-70, 79-81
Gesco Strytanus, a Carthaginian ambassador, **36**, 3
Gillimas, a Carthaginian ambassador, **36**, 3
Gladiators, **32**, 14
Glaucias, ambassador of Perseus, **28**, 8
Glaucides, of Abydus, **16**, 33
Glaucus, of Acarnania, **28**, 5
Glympes, a fort on the frontiers of Argos and Laconia, **4**, 36 ; **5**, 20
Gonni, a town in Thessaly, **18**, 27
Gordium, a town in Phrygia, **21**, 37
Gorgus, of Messene, **5**, 5 ; **7**, 10
Gortyn, a city in Crete, **4**, 53, 55 ; **22**, 19 ; **28**, 15 ; **31**, 1
Gortyna, a town in Arcadia, **4**, 60
Gorza, a town in Africa, **1**, 74
Greeks, history of, **1**, 3 ; **2**, 37 ; **3**, 118 ; **4**, 1, 28 ; **5**, 31, 51, 105, 106, 111 ; **34**, 1 ; **39**, 1 ; their fickleness, **6**, 56 ; amenability to bribes, **18**, 34 ; decreased numbers, **37**, 9 ; military customs, **6**, 25, 42 ; **18**, 18. *See also* **35**, 6 ; **39**, 12
Greeks in Thrace, **9**, 28 ; in Asia, **21**, 43 ; in Italy, **1**, 6 ; **2**, 39 ; **10**, 1
Greek mercenaries, **1**, 32, 48 ; **5**, 79, 82 ; **22**, 7 ; half-bred Greeks (*μιξέλληνες*), **1**, 67
Gulussa, a son of Massanissa, **34**, 16 ; **38**, 1, 2
Gyridas, of Sparta, **4**, 35
Gyrton, a town in Thessaly, **18**, 22
Gythium, the seaport town of Sparta, **2**, 69 ; **5**, 19

HADRIANA, district of Hadria, a town in Picenum, **3**, 88
Haemus, a mountain in Thrace (*Balkan*), **24**, 3 ; **34**, 10
Haliartus, a town in Boeotia, **27**, 1, 5 ; **29**, 12 ; **30**, 21
Halys, a river in Asia Minor (*Kisil Irmak*), **21**, 39 ; **24**, 8
Hamilcar, the elder, general in the first Punic war, **1**, 24, 27, 28, 30, 44
Hamilcar Barcas, son of Hannibal, in the first Punic war, **1**, 13, 56-58, 60, 62, 64, 66 ; in the mercenary war, **1**, 75-88 ; in Spain, **2**, 1 ; **3**, 9-14. *See also* **11**, 2
Hamilcar, a Carthaginian admiral in the second Punic war, **3**, 95 ; **8**, 3
Hamilcar, a legate in the third Punic war, **36**, 3
Hamilcar Phaneas, a Carthaginian officer in the third Punic war, **36**, 8
Hannibal, commandant of Agrigentum in the first Punic war, **1**, 18, 19, 21, 23, 24, 43
Hannibal, son of the last, **1**, 43
Hannibal, son of Hamilcar the elder, **1**, 44, 46, 82, 86
Hannibal Rhodius, **1**, 46, 47
Hannibal, son of Hamilcar Barcas, **1**, 64, 65 ; **2**, 1, 14, 24, 36 ; **3**, 6, 8, 9 ; his oath, **3**, 11, 12 ; succeeds Hasdrubal, **3**, 13 ; his expeditions in Spain, **3**, 14-16; takes Saguntum, **3**, 17 ; his surrender demanded by Rome, **3**, 20 ; winters (B.C. 219-218) at New Carthage, **3**, 33, 34 ; starts for Italy, **3**, 35 ; crosses the Pyrenees, **3**, 40 ; crosses the Rhone, **3**, 42-47 ; the Alps, **3**, 48-56 ; in Gallia Cisalpina, **3**, 60-75 ; in Etruria, **3**, 79-85 ; in Umbria, Picenum, and the south, **3**, 86-90 ; invades Campania, **3**, 90-94 ; in Bruttium, **3**, 100-118. *See also* **4**, 1, 2, 28, 37, 66 ; **5**, 1, 29, 101, 108, 110 ; **6**, 58 ; **7**, 1, 2, 4, 9. Takes Tarentum, **8**, 26-36 ; at Capua and in the neighbourhood of Rome, **9**, 3-9 ; his character, **9**, 21-26 ; **10**, 32, 33 ; **23**, 13 ; con-

fined to Bruttium, **11**, 6; his 16 years in Italy, **11**, 19; recalled to Africa, **14**, 6, 9; **15**, 1-16; his interview with Scipio, **15**, 5-8; persuades the Carthaginians to accept Scipio's terms, **15**, 19; at the court of Antiochus, **21**, 17, 45. *See also* **11**, 2, 3; **13**, 4; **16**, 23, 28, 37; **34**, 10; **39**, 19; his death, **23**, 13
Hannibal, sent by the great Hannibal to Hieronymus, **7**, 2
Hannibal Monomachus, **9**, 24
Hanno, Carthaginian commander at Agrigentum and Ecnomus, **1**, 18, 27, 28; conquered by Lutatius, **1**, 60, 61
Hanno, crucified by the mercenaries in Sardinia, **1**, 79
Hanno (Magnus), commander in the mercenary war, **1**, 67, 72-74, 81, 82, 87, 88
Hanno, left by Hannibal in command of Northern Spain, **3**, 35, 76
Hanno, son of Bomilcar, an officer under Hannibal, **3**, 42, 114
Harmosts, Spartan, **4**, 27
Harpyia, a town in Illyria, fr. xliii.
Hasdrubal, son of Hanno, **1**, 30, 38, 40
Hasdrubal, son-in-law of Hamilcar Barcas, **1**, 13; **2**, 1, 13, 22, 36; **3**, 8, 12, 13, 15, 21, 27, 29; **10**, 10
Hasdrubal, brother of Hannibal, **3**, 33, 56, 76, 95, 96, 98; **9**, 22; **10**, 7, 37-40
Hasdrubal, an officer of Hannibal's army, **3**, 66, 102, 114, 116
Hasdrubal, head of Hannibal's commissariat, **3**, 93
Hasdrubal, son of Gesco, **9**, 11, 22; **10**, 7, 35, 38; **11**, 20-24; **14**, 1-6, 8
Hasdrubal, a naval commander at Utica, **15**, 2
Hasdrubal, a Carthaginian officer in the third Punic war, **38**, 1; **39**, 4
Hastati, **6**, 21, 23, 29, 33; **15**, 9
Hearths, the, on the Thracian Bosporus, **4**, 43
Hebrus, a river in Thrace (*Maritza*), **34**, 12
Hecatodorus, of Byzantium, **4**, 47
Hecatodorus, an artist, **4**, 78
Hecatombaeum, a place in the territory of Dyme, **2**, 51
Hecatompylus, a city in Parthia, **10**, 28, 29
Hecatompylus, a city in Africa, **1**, 73
Hegesianax, ambassador from Antiochus the Great, **18**, 47; **50**, 3
Hegesias, of Rhodes, **28**, 16
Hegias, an ambassador from Phocaea, **21**, 6
Heleia, a district in Laconia, **5**, 19, 20
Helice, a town in Achaia, **2**, 41
Helicranum, a fort in Epirus, **2**, 6
Heliotropium, a place near Thebes in Phthiotis, **5**, 99
Hellespont, the, **4**, 44, 46, 50; **5**, 34, 78, 111; **16**, 29; **18**, 41, 54; **21**, 8, 13, 15, 17, 48; **27**, 7; **33**, 12, 13
Helmantica, a city of the Vaccaei in Spain, **3**, 14
Helvius, Gaius, legatus of Manlius Vulso B.C. 189, **21**, 34
Hephaestia, a city in Lemnus, **18**, 48
Hephaestus, tumulus of, near Carthage, **10**, 10; island of, **34**, 11
Heracleia, a city in Thessaly, **10**, 42; **20**, 9, 11
Heracleia Lyncestis, a town in upper Macedonia, **34**, 12
Heracleium. *See* Heracleia Lyncestis, **28**, 11, 13, 17
Heracleidae, the, **2**, 41; **4**, 34, 35; **12**, 12*a*
Heracleides, an ambassador of Antiochus Epiphanes, **28**, 1, 22; **33**, 15, 18
Heracleides, of Byzantium, **21**, 13-15
Heracleides, of Gyrton, **18**, 22
Heracleides, of Tarentum, **13**, 4; **16**, 15
Heracles, **4**, 35, 59; **6**, 2; **7**, 9; **12**, 26; **29**, 17; picture of, **39**, 13; Temple of, at Gades, **34**, 9
Heracles, columns of, **2**, 1; **3**, 37, 39, 57; **10**, 7, 40; **16**, 29; **34**, 4, 6, 7, 9

Heraclitus, of Ephesus, **4**, 40 ; **12**, 27
Heraea, a city in Arcadia, **2**, 54 ; **4**, 77, 78, 80 ; **18**, 42, 47
Herbesus, a town in Sicily, **1**, 18
Hercte, a mountain between Mt. Eryx and Panormus (*Monte Pellegrino*), **1**, 56
Here, **7**, 9 ; temple and priests of, at Argos, **9**, 43 ; **12**, 11 ; at Lacinium, **34**, 11
Hermaeum, on the Thracian Bosporus, **4**, 43
Hermaeum, a promontory near Carthage, **1**, 29, 36
Hermeias, a Carian, **5**, 41, 45, 49-56
Hermes, **34**, 5
Hermione, a city in Argolis, **2**, 42, 52
Hermippus, of Lysimachia, **30**, 14
Hermocrates, of Syracuse, **12**, 25*k*, 26
Hermogenes, an officer of Antiochus the Great, **5**, 60
Heroes, **4**, 20
Herophilus, followers of, **12**, 25*d*
Herophon, an ambassador from Perseus, **29**, 4, 6
Hesiod, the poet, **5**, 2, 32 ; fr. vi.
Hexapyla, a gate at Syracuse, **8**, 5, 37
Hicesias, vol. ii. p. 288, *note*
Hicesius, of Miletus, **28**, 19
Hiero II., king of Syracuse B.C. 272-216, **1**, 8, 9, 11-18, 62, 83 ; **2**, 1 ; **3**, 2, 75 ; **5**, 88 ; **7**, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8
Hieromnemon, at Byzantium, **4**, 52
Hieron, a fort on the Thracian Bosporus, **4**, 39, 43, 50, 52
Hieronymus, son of Gelo II., king of Syracuse B.C. 216-215, **7**, 2-7 ; **8**, 5
Hieronymus, of Arcadia, **18**, 14
Himeras, a river in Sicily, **7**, 4, 5
Himerean Thermae, in Sicily, **1**, 24
Himilco, commandant of Lilybaeum, **1**, 42, 43, 45
Hippana, a city in Sicily near Panormus, **1**, 24
Hipparchus, an ambassador from Ilium, **22**, 5
Hippias, strategus of the Boeotians, **22**, 4 ; **27**, 1, 2, 6 ; **28**, 9, 10 ; **29**, 3
Hippitas, a friend of Cleomenes III., **5**, 37
Hippocrates, of Cos, **30**, 7
Hippo Regius, in Numidia, **12**, 1
Hippo Zarytos (Diarrhytus), a town in Libya, **1**, 70, 73, 77, 82, 88
Hippocrates, of Syracuse, **7**, 2, 4, 5 ; **8**, 5 ; **9**, 22
Hippodrome, near Seleucia, **5**, 59 ; near Sardis, **7**, 17
Hippolochus, of Aetolia, **27**, 15
Hippolochus, of Thessaly, **5**, 70, 71, 79
Hippomedon, a Spartan, **4**, 35
Hipposthenes, of Syracuse, **7**, 4
Hirpini, a people of Central Italy, **3**, 91
History, value of, **1**, 1, 35 ; **2**, 35 ; **3**, 31 ; **5**, 75 ; truth the eye of, **1**, 14 ; **12**, 7 ; connected with geography, **3**, 36 ; and natural science, **3**, 57 ; compared with tragedy, **2**, 56 ; **15**, 36
Hollows, the, near Naupactus, **5**, 103
Holy Isle, one of the Aegates, **1**, 60, 61 (*Maritima*) ; an Aeolian island sacred to Hephaestus, **34**, 11
Holy Town, in Lydia, **16**, 1 ; **32**, 27
Homarium, the, at Megalopolis, **5**, 93. *See* Zeus
Homer, **9**, 16 ; **12**, 24, 26, 27 ; **30**, 10 ; **34**, 2-4 ; **39**, 5 ; quoted, **3**, 94 ; **5**, 38 ; **12**, 9, 26, 27 ; **15**, 12, 16 ; **18**, 29 ; **34**, 2-4 ; **36**, 8 ; **39**, 6
Hoplites, a river in Laconia, **16**, 16
Horatius Pulvillus, M., consul (suff.) B.C. 509, **3**, 22
Horatius Cocles, P., **6**, 55
Horii, a state in Crete, **4**, 53
Horn, the, gulf at Byzantium, **4**, 43
Horse, sacrifice of, **12**, 4*b*
Hortensius, L., **33**, 1, 9
Hostilius Mancinus, A., consul B.C. 170, **27**, 16 ; **28**, 3
Hostilius Mancinus, A., commissioner in Asia, **37**, 6
Hyacinthus, tomb of, near Tarentum, **8**, 30
Hypana, a town of Triphylia, **4**, 77, 79
Hypata, a town in Thessaly, **20**, 9-11 ; **21**, 4, 5

Hyperbasas, an officer of Antiochus the Great, **10**, 31
Hyperbatus, Achaean Strategus B.C. 179, **24**, 10 ; **29**, 23
Hypsas, a river near Agrigentum, **9**, 27
Hyrcania, a region in Asia on the south of the Caspian, **10**, 29, 31, 48
Hyrcanian sea, **5**, 44, 55 ; **10**, 48
Hyscana, a city in Illyria, **28**, 8

Iapygia (Appulia), **2**, 24 ; **3**, 88
Iapygian promontory, in Calabria (*Capa Sta. Maria di Leuca*), **10**, 1; **34**, 6, 11
Iasus, a city in Caria, **16**, 12 ; **18**, 2, 8, 44
Iberia (Spain), **1**, 10 ; **2**, 13, 36 ; **3**, 3, 8-17, 21, 27, 30, 33-35, 37, 39, 49, 56, 57, 59, 61, 64, 87, 89, 95, 96, 98, 106 ; **5**, 1, 33 ; **11**, 24, 29, 31, 33 ; **12**, 5 ; **32**, 8 ; **34**, 5, 7-9; **35**, 1-5 ; **38**, 8 ; events in, *see* Cornelius Scipio
Iberians, arms of, **3**, 114 ; character of, **3**, 98 ; mercenaries, **1**, 17, 67 ; **3**, 72, 74, 79, 83, 93, 94, 113-115, 117 ; **11**, 1, 19
Iberus, river in Spain (mod. *Ebro*), **2**, 13 ; **3**, 6, 14, 15, 27, 29, 30, 35, 39, 40, 76, 95, 97 ; **4**, 28 ; **5**, 1 ; **10**, 35 ; **11**, 32
Ida, Mt. *See* Zeus
Ilergetes, a tribe of north Spain, **3**, 35; **10**, 18
Ilipa, a town in Spain, **12**, 20
Ilium, a city in the Troad, **5**, 78, 111; **12**, 5 ; **22**, 5 ; **34**, 2 ; **39**, 6
Illeberis, a town and river of Aquitania, **34**, 10
Illyria, **1**, 13 ; **2**, 2, 8, 11, 44 ; **3**, 16, 18, 19 ; **4**, 16, 29, 37, 66 ; **5**, 4, 101, 108, 110 ; **18**, 1, 8 ; **21**, 21 ; **28**, 8 ; **29**, 4 ; **32**, 18, 23, 26 ; **34**, 6, 7, 12 ; **39**, 2
Illyrians, their tactics, **2**, 3 ; their language, **28**, 8. *See also* **2**, 2-12, 65-68, 70 ; **3**, 16, 18, 107 ; **4**, 16, 25, 55 ; **5**, 7, 13, 14, 22, 23, 101, 109 ; **8**, 16 ; **9**, 38 ; **11**, 11, 14, 15 ; **23**, 1 ; **28**, 8 ; **30**, 14 ; **32**, 23 ; **39**, 2
Ilurgia, a city in Spain, **11**, 24
Impiety and Injustice, altar of, **18**, 54
India, **11**, 34 ; **34**, 13
Indian drivers of elephants, **1**, 40 ; **3**, 46 ; **11**, 1
Insubres, a tribe of Cisalpine Gauls, **2**, 17, 22, 23, 28, 30, 32, 34 ; **3**, 40, 56, 60 ; **16**, 40
Intercatia, a town in Spain, **34**, 9
Io, daughter of Inachus, **4**, 43
Iolaus, comrade of Hercules, **7**, 9
Ionia, **18**, 41*a* ; **21**, 13, 14 , **33**, 12
Ionian sea, **2**, 14 ; **5**, 110 ; **34**, 12 ; **38**, 5
Iphiades, of Abydus, **16**, 30
Iphicrates, of Athens, **39**, 2
Irobastus, an Egyptian, **22**, 7
Isara, a river in Gaul (Isère), **3**, 49
Iseas, tyrant of Caryneia, **2**, 41
Isius. *See* Alexander.
Island, the, between the Rhine and Isara, **3**, 49
Ismenias, of Boeotia, **27**, 1, 2
Isocrates, a grammarian, **32**, 4, 6, 7
Issa, an island in the Adriatic on the coast of Illyria (*Lissa*), **2**, 8, 11 ; **32**, 18
Issus, in Cilicia, battle of, **12**, 17, 18
Ister. *See* Danube.
Isthmian games, the, **2**, 12 ; **18**, 44, 46
Isthmus of Corinth, the, **2**, 52 ; **3**, 32 ; **4**, 13 ; **12**, 12 ; **16**, 16 ; **20**, 6 ; **30**, 10 ; **39**, 17, 19 ; ships dragged across, **4**, 19 ; fr. xcviii.
Istri, the, inhabitants of Istria, **25**, 4
Italy, geography and inhabitants of, **2**, 14-24 ; **34**, 15 ; Italians, **2**, 31 ; **3**, 2, 77, 85, 118 ; **5**, 104 ; **11**, 19 ; **18**, 19 ; **34**, 10. *See also* **1**, 3 ; **3**, 118 ; **5**, 105 ; **28**, 16 ; **39**, 19
Ithaca, island of, **34**, 7
Ithomates, citadel of Messene, **7**, 11
Ithoria, a fort in Aetolia, **4**, 64
Itonian Artemis, **4**, 25 ; **25**, 3

Jason, **4**, 39
Jews, the, **16**, 39
Jordan, the, **5**, 70
Julius Caesar, Sex., consul B.C. 157, **32**, 24 ; **38**, 7-10
Junius Brutus, L., consul B.C. 509, **3**, 22

Junius Pullus, L., consul B.C. 249, **1**, 52, 54, 55
Junius Silanus, M., serves in Spain under Scipio, **10**, 6 ; **11**, 20, 23, 26, 33
Junius, Marcus, ambassador to Ariarathes, **31**, 13
Jupiter, Capitolinus, **3**, 23, 26 ; Lapis, **3**, 25

KING'S DYKE, the, **5**, 51

LABAE, a city in Arabia, **13**, 9
Labeatis, a district in Illyria, **29**, 3
Labus, a mountain between Parthia and Hyrcania, **10**, 29, 31
Lacedaemon (or Sparta), its position and extent, **5**, 22 ; **9**, 21. *See also* **2**, 41, 53, 65, 69, 70 ; **4**, 23, 34-36 ; **5**, 9, 17, 19, 20, 23, 24, 37, 92 ; **6**, 48 ; **9**, 8, 9, 18 ; **13**, 6, 8 ; **16**, 13, 16, 37 ; **18**, 17 ; **20**, 5, 12 ; **21**, 1, 41 ; **22**, 1, 3, 10, 13, 15, 16 ; **23**, 5, 6, 9, 11, 17, 18 ; **24**, 1, 2, 7, 10-12
Lacedaemonians (Spartans), their numbers and territory, **2**, 38 ; their constitution, **2**, 62 ; **4**, 81 ; **6**, 3, 10, 43, 45-51 ; **12**, 6, 11, 23 ; their iron money, **6**, 49 ; their use of the tibia in war, **4**, 20 ; admitted to the Achaean league, **23**, 17, 18. *See also* **1**, 6, 63 ; **2**, 39, 45-47, 49, 50, 52, 57, 58, 62, 65, 69, 70 ; **3**, 5 ; **4**, 2, 5, 7, 9, 10, 15, 16, 19-24, 27, 32 34, 36, 54, 80, 81 ; **5**, 2, 9, 19-23, 35, 76, 92, 28, 39 ; **11**, 11, 15-18 ; **12**, 6, 25 ; **13**, 6 ; **18**, 14 ; **20**, 12 ; **21**, 1, 2, 41 ; **22**, 3, 13, 16 ; **23**, 1, 4, 9, 18 ; **31**, 9 ; **37**, 1 ; **38**, 4, 8 ; **39**, 2, 8
Lacinium, a promontory of Bruttium, **3**, 33, 56 ; **15**, 1 ; **34**, 11
Laconia, **2**, 54, 65 ; **5**, 19, 20, 24, 92 ; **16**, 17, 20, 37 ; **38**, 4
Lade, an island off Miletus, **16**, 10, 14, 15
Ladicus, an Acarnanian, **4**, 80
Ladoceia, in the territory of Megalopolis, **2**, 51, 55
Laelius, Gaius, **10**, 3, 9, 12, 18, 19, 37, 39 ; **11**, 32, 33 ; **14**, 4, 9 ; **15**, 9, 12, 14
Laenas. *See* Popilius
Laestrygones, the, **8**, 11
Lagius, an Achaean, **39**, 11
Lagoras, of Crete, an officer of Ptolemy Philopator, **5**, 61 ; **7**, 15-18
Lagus, father of Ptolemy I., **2**, 41 ; **5**, 67
Lai, a tribe of Cisalpine Gauls, **2**, 17
Lamia, a city in Thessaly, **9**, 29 ; **20**, 11
Lamius, of Ambracia, **18**, 10
Lampsacus, a city in Mysia, **5**, 78 ; **18**, 52 ; **21**, 13, 14
Laodice, wife of Seleucus Callinicus, **4**, 51 ; **8**, 22
Laodice, daughter of Mithridates IV., wife of Antiochus the Great, **5**, 43, 55
Laodice, another daughter of Mithridates IV., wife of Achaeus, **5**, 74 ; **8**, 21, 22, 23
Laodicea, a city in Phrygia, **5**, 57
Laodicea by-the-Sea, a city in Syria, **32**, 7
Laodicea, at Libanus, a city in Syria, **5**, 45
Lapateni, fr. xvii
Lapethus, a city in Cyprus, **39**, 18
Lappa, a city in Crete, **4**, 53-55
Larinum, a city in North Apulia, **3**, 101
Larisa, a city in Thessaly, **4**, 66, 67 ; **5**, 97, 99 ; **9**, 18 ; **18**, 19, 27, 33 ; **28**, 5
Larisa Cremaste, in Thessalian Phthiotis, **18**, 3, 8 ; **18**, 38
Larius (Lake of Como), **34**, 10
Larymna, a town in Boeotia, **20**, 5
Lases, an ambassador from Thespiae, **27**, 1
Lasio, a town in Elis, **4**, 72-74 ; **5**, 102
Latin, old, **3**, 22
Latins, the, **1**, 6 ; **2**, 18, 24 ; **3**, 22
Latium, **3**, 22-24 ; **34**, 8
Lattabus, an Aetolian, **9**, 34
Lavina, daughter of Evander, fr. iii.
Laurentines, the, **3**, 22
Lebadeia, a town in Boeotia, **27**, 1
Lebecii, a tribe of Cisalpine Gauls, **2**, 17
Lechaeum, the harbour of Corinth, **5**, 2, 17, 18, 24, 25-28, 101

Legion, the Roman. *See* Roman Army
Lemnus, island of, **30**, 21 ; **34**, 11
Leo, a Macedonian officer, **18**, 22
Leo, an officer of Eumenes I., **28**, 15
Leonidas I., son of Anaxandridas, king of Sparta B.C. 491-480, **9**, 38
Leonidas II., king of Sparta B.C. 257-242, **4**, 35
Leontini, a city in Sicily, **7**, 6 ; **8**, 11
Leontium, a city in Achaia, **2**, 41 ; **5**, 94 ; **24**, 10
Leontius, conspirator against Philip V., **4**, 87 ; **5**, 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 14-16, 25-27, 29, 100
Leontius, governor of Pieria, **5**, 60
Lepreum, a city of Triphylia, **4**, 77-80
Leptines, of Syracuse, **1**, 9
Leptines, assassin of Gn. Octavius, **32**, 4, 6, 7
Leptis, a city of Africa, **1**, 87
Lergetae, an African tribe, **3**, 33
Leucas island, **5**, 5, 16-18, 95, 101, 108, 109 ; **18**, 47 ; **21**, 26 ; **34**, 6
Leuctra (in Boeotia), battle of, **1**, 6 ; **2**, 39, 41 ; **4**, 81 ; **8**, 13 ; **12**, 25*f* ; **20**, 4
Libanus, Mt. (Lebanon), **5**, 45, 59, 69
Libba, a city in Mesopotamia on the Tigris, **5**, 51
Liburnus, Mt. in Apulia, **3**, 100
Libya, **1**, 3, 26, 29, 70, 72 ; **3**, 3, 33, 37-39 ; **5**, 1, 33, 65, 105 ; **12**, 4, 26*a* ; **34**, 6, 7, 15, 16 ; **38**, 8 ; **39**, 11, 19
Libyans, their war with Carthage, **1**, 19, 65, 67, 73, 74, 76, 77, 79, 82, 84-87. *See* also **3**, 33, 56, 72, 74, 79, 83, 87, 113-117 ; **5**, 65, 82 ; **6**, 52 ; **11**, 19, 22, 24 ; **31**, 27. Philammon governor of, **15**, 25
Libyan sea, **1**, 37, 42 ; **4**, 77
Libyophoenicians, **3**, 33
Licinius Crassus, P., consul B.C. 171, **27**, 6, 8 ; **30**, 3
Licinius, Marcus, **37**, 6
Licinius Lucullus, L., **37**, 6
Liger, a river in Gaul (*Loire*), **34**, 10
Ligures, a large tribe of Cisalpine Gauls, **2**, 16 ; **12**, 28 ; **33**, 7, 10-12 ; **34**, 10. Serve the Carthaginians as mercenaries, **1**, 17, 67 ; **3**, 33 ; **11**, 19 ; **15**, 11 ; their shields, **29**, 14
Liguria, **2**, 31 ; **3**, 41 ; **7**, 9
Lilybaeum, in Sicily, **1**, 25, 38-48, 52-56, 59-61, 66 ; **3**, 41, 61, 68, 96, 106, 109, 110 ; **7**, 3 ; **36**, 4, 5 ; **37**, 3
Limnaea, a town of Acarnania, **5**, 5, 6, 14
Limnaeus, a prince in Asia Minor, **5**, 90
Limnasus, a Macedonian, **29**, 4
Lingones, a tribe of Cisalpine Gauls, **2**, 17
Lipara, a city and island, **1**, 21, 24, 39
Liparae Islands, the, **1**, 25 ; **34**, 11
Lissus, a city of Illyria, **2**, 12 ; **3**, 16 ; **4**, 16 ; **8**, 15 ; **28**, 8
Lissus, a river in Sicily (*Fiume Ruina*), **7**, 6
Livius Macatus, Gaius, **8**, 27, 29, 32
Livius Salinator, Marcus, consul B.C. 219, 207, **11**, 1, 3
Livius Salinator, Gaius, consul B.C. 188, **21**, 3, 11
Lochagus, an Aetolian, **27**, 15
Locri, in Greece, the, **11**, 5 ; **12**, 6, 9-11 ; **18**, 11, 46, 47 ; **38**, 5, 10 ; Locris, **18**, 10
Locri Epizephyrii, in Magna Graecia, **1**, 20 ; **10**, 1 ; **12**, 5-12 ; Locris, **1**, 56
Logbasis, of Selge, **5**, 74-76
Longanus, a river in Sicily, **1**, 9
Lotophagi, the, **1**, 39 ; **34**, 3
Lucani, the, **2**, 24 ; **10**, 1
Luceria, in Daunia, **3**, 88, 100
Lucius, fr. xi., l., xvii.
Lucretius Gallus, Gaius, **27**, 7
Lucretius, Spurius, **31**, 12, 13
Lugdunum, a town in Gaul, **34**, 15
Luna, a town in Etruria, **34**, 11
Lusi, a town in Arcadia, **4**, 18, 25 ; **9**, 34
Lusitani, the, **10**, 17 ; **34**, 8 ; **35**, 2
Lusius, a stream in the territory of Megalopolis, **16**, 17
Lutatius Catulus, Gaius, consul B.C. 242, **1**, 59-62 ; **3**, 21 ; **29**, 3
Lutatius Catulus, Gaius, consul B.C. 220, **3**, 40

Lycaeum, a town in the territory of Megalopolis, **2**, 51, 55
Lycaeus, a mountain in Arcadia, **34**, 10
Lycaonia, a district of Asia Minor, **5**, 57 ; **21**, 22, 48
Lycastium, a district of Crete, **22**, 19
Lychnidius, a lake in Illyria, **5**, 108
Lychnis, a town in Illyria, **18**, 47 ; **34**, 12
Lycia, **21**, 24, 48 ; **22**, 5, 24 ; **24**, 9 ; **25**, 4 ; **30**, 5 ; **31**, 7, 15 ; **34**, 4
Lyciscus, an Acarnanian, **9**, 32-39
Lyciscus, an Aetolian, **27**, 15 ; **28**, 4 ; **30**, 13 ; **32**, 19, 20
Lycoa, a town in Arcadia, **16**, 17
Lycon, a Rhodian, **30**, 5
Lycophron, a Rhodian, **25**, 5
Lycopolis, a city in Egypt, **22**, 7
Lycopus, an Aetolian, **21**, 25, 26
Lycortas, of Megalopolis, Achaean Strategus, B.C. 184, 182, father of Polybius, **2**, 40 ; **22**, 3, 10, 12, 13, 16 ; **23**, 12, 16, 17 ; **24**, 6, 10 ; **28**, 3, 6 ; **29**, 23-25 ; **37**, 5
Lyctians, **22**, 18. *See* Lyttus
Lycurgus, the Spartan legislator, **4**, 81 ; **6**, 3, 10-12, 46, 48-50 ; **10**, 2
Lycurgus, king of Sparta, B.C. 220-210, **4**, 2, 35-37, 60, 81 ; **5**, 5, 17, 18, 20-23, 29, 91, 92
Lycus, of Pharae, **5**, 94, 95
Lycus, a river in Mysia, **5**, 77
Lycus, a river of Phoenicia, **5**, 68
Lycus, a river of Assyria, **5**, 51
Lydia, **5**, 57, 79, 82 ; **21**, 16, 48
Lydiadas, tyrant of Megalopolis, **2**, 44, 51 ; **4**, 77
Lydiadas, a citizen of Megalopolis, **24**, 10
Lyncestae, a tribe in Macedonia, **34**, 12
Lysanias, a prince in Asia Minor, **5**, 90
Lysias, an ambassador of Antiochus the Great, **18**, 47, 50
Lysias, guardian of Antiochus V., **31**, 17, 19, 20
Lysimacheia, a city of Aetolia, **5**, 7
Lysimacheia, a city of the Thracian Chersonese, **5**, 34 ; **15**, 23 ; **18**, 3, 4, 50, 51 ; **21**, 15, 48
Lysimachus, successor of Alexander the Great in Thrace, **2**, 41, 71 ; **5**, 67 ; **15**, 25 ; **18**, 51 ; Fr. xi.
Lysimachus, son of Ptolemy Philadelphus, **15**, 25
Lysimachus, a Gaul, **5**, 79
Lysinoe, a town in Pisidia, **21**, 36
Lysis, ambassador from Lacedaemonian exiles, **23**, 4
Lyttus, a town in Crete, **4**, 53, 54 ; **22**, 19

MACARAS, a river near Carthage (*Bagrodas*), **1**, 75, 86 ; **15**, 2
Maccoei, a tribe in Libya, **3**, 33
Macedonia, **2**, 70 ; **3**, 3 ; **4**, 1, 50, 51, 57, 62, 63, 66, 69, 85, 87 ; **5**, 5, 26, 30, 34, 97, 101, 106, 108-110 ; **27**, 4, 5, 8 ; **28**, 8, 10, 13, 17, 20 ; **29**, 1, 4, 22, 24 ; **30**, 8, 9, 13, 16, 18 ; **31**, 3, 12 ; **32**, 8, 11, 15, 23 ; **34**, 12 ; **35**, 4 ; **37**, 1, 2, 8 ; **38**, 5, 10 ; **39**, 2, 19 ; Roman settlement of, vol. ii. p. 434
Macedonian soldiers at Alexandria ; **15**, 26, 28, 29, 31
Macedonians, the, their empire, **1**, 2 ; their government, **4**, 76 ; **5**, 27 ; their freedom of speech, **5**, 27 ; their supremacy in Greece, **9**, 28-36, 39 ; their army, **2**, 65 ; **3**, 6 ; **4**, 8 ; **5**, 2, 65, 79, 82 ; **18**, 28-32. *See* Phalanx ; serving in Egypt, **15**, 26, 28, 31, 32. *See also* **2**, 37, 39, 43, 48-51, 54, 56, 65-71 ; **3**, 5, 6, 16 ; **4**, 2, 3, 5, 8, 9, 11, 16, 22-24, 34, 35, 37, 61, 64, 68-73, 76, 78, 80, 84, 87 ; **5**, 2-8, 13, 17, 18, 25, 29, 35, 97, 100, 109 ; **22**, 4 ; **27**, 2-10, 15 ; **28**, 2, 5, 8 ; **29**, 4, 21, 27 ; **31**, 3, 7, 12 ; **32**, 14 ; **35**, 4, **37**, 2, 9 ; **38**, 5 ; **39**, 6
Macedonians, the Upper, **5**, 97
Macella, a city in Sicily, **1**, 24
Machanidas, tyrant of Sparta, **10**, 41 ; **11**, 11-18 ; **13**, 6
Machatas, an Aetolian, **4**, 34, 36
Machatas, son of Charops, **27**, 15
Maeander, the river, **21**, 24, 48 ; **22**, 5
Maeander, of Alexandria, **15**, 30
Maedi, a Thracian tribe, **10**, 41
Maeotis Palus (Sea of Azov), **4**, 39,

40, 42 ; **5**, 44 ; **10**, 27, 48 ; **34**, 7, 15
Magas, father of Berenice, **15**, 26
Magas, son of Ptolemy Euergetes and Berenice, **5**, 34, 36 ; **15**, 25
Magi, the, **34**, 2
Magilus, a Gallic chief, **3**, 44
Magister equitum, **3**, 87
Magistrates at Rome, **3**, 87; **6**, 12, 19
Magnesia, a district in Thessaly, **5**, 99, 100 ; **18**, 11, 46, 47
Magnesia, a city of Ionia on the Maeander, **5**, 65 ; **16**, 24
Mago, brother of Hannibal, **3**, 71, 79, 85, 114 ; **9**, 22 ; **10**, 7, 38 ; **11**, 21
Mago Samnis, a friend of Hannibal, **9**, 25
Mago, commandant of New Carthage, **10**, 12, 15, 18, 19
Mago, an ambassador from Carthage, **36**, 3
Mago Bruttius, **36**, 5
Magonus, of Carthage, **7**, 9
Magus, the (false Smerdis), **5**, 43
Mahabal, an officer under Hannibal, **3**, 84, 85, 86
Malea, promontory of Laconia (*Malié*), **5**, 95, 101, 109 ; **34**, 4, 7, 12
Malian Gulf, **9**, 41 ; **18**, 1 ; **20**, 10
Mamertines, the, **1**, 7-12, 20 ; **3**, 26
Mamilius Vitulus, Q., consul B.C. 262 ; **1**, 17-19
Mandonius, a Spanish chief, **10**, 18, 35 ; **11**, 29
Manilius, Manius, consul B.C. 145, **36**, 6 ; **37**, 3
Manlius, Lucius, praetor B.C. 218, **3**, 40
Manlius Torquatus, T., consul B.C. 224, **2**, 31
Manlius Torquatus, T., consul B.C. 165, sent to support Ptolemy Physcon, **31**, 18, 26-28 ; **32**, 1
Manlius Vulso Longus, L., consul B.C. 256, 250, **1**, 26, 28, 29, 39, 41-48
Manlius Vulso, Gnaeus, consul B.C. 189, **21**, 24, 34-39, 43, 44, 47, 48
Manlius Vulso, Lucius, brother of the preceding, **21**, 44, 46
Mantinea, a city of Arcadia, **2**, 46, 53, 54, 56, 58, 61 ; **4**, 8, 21, 27, 33 ; **9**, 8, 9, 34 ; **6**, 43 ; **11**, 11, 14 ; **12**, 25*f* ; **38**, 4
Mantua, in Cisalpine Gaul (*Mantua*), **16**, 10
Marathus, a city in Phoenicia, **5**, 68
Marcius, Ancus, fr. v., vi.
Marcius, Lucius, legatus of Scipio, **11**, 23
Marcius Philippus, Quintus, consul B.C. 186, 169, **23**, 4, 8, 9 ; **24**, 11 ; **27** ; **28**, 1, 13, 16, 17 ; **29**, 23-25
Marcius Figulus, Gaius, praetor B.C. 169, consul B.C. 162, 156, **28**, 14, 17 ; **32**, 26
Marcius Censorinus, Lucius, consul B.C. 149, **36**, 6
Margites, **12**, 4*a*, 25
Margus, of Caryneia, first sole Achaean Strategus, B.C. 255, **2**, 10, 41, 43
Maroneia, a city of Thrace, **5**, 34 ; **22**, 1, 15, 17 ; **18**, 3 ; **22**, 9, 17, 18 ; **30**, 3
Marrucini, a tribe in Central Italy, **2**, 24 ; **3**, 88
Mars Quirinus, **3**, 25
Marseilles, **2**, 14, 16 ; **3**, 37, 41, 47, 61, 95 ; **33**, 7, 10, 11 ; **34**, 7, 10
Marsh, the town in the, **21**, 34
Marshes, the (*Barathra*), near Pelusium, **5**, 80
Marsi, a nation in Italy, **2**, 24
Marsyas, plain of, between Libanus and Antilibanus, **5**, 45, 46, 61
Masaesylii, a tribe in Africa, **3**, 33 ; **16**, 23
Massanissa, king of Numidia, **3**, 5 ; **9**, 25 ; **11**, 21 ; **14**, 3, 4, 8, 9 ; **15**, 3-5, 9, 11, 12, 14, 18 ; **21**, 11, 21 ; **32**, 2 ; character of, **37**, 10
Massolii, a Numidian tribe, **3**, 33
Mastia, a town of Africa, **3**, 24
Mastiani, a Spanish tribe, **3**, 33
Magna Mater, **21**, 37
Mathos, a Libyan leader of mercenaries, **1**, 69-73, 75, 77, 79, 82, 84, 86-88
Matiani, a tribe in Media, **5**, 44
Mauretania, **34**, 15
Mauretanians, the, **3**, 33 ; **15**, 11 ; **38**, 1

Medes, the, **5**, 44, 79, 82, 85; **16**, 22*a*; **39**, 6
Media, **5**, 40, 44, 45, 47, 51, 52, 54, 55; **10**, 27
Medicine, Schools of, **12**, 25*d*
Medimnus, an Attic, **6**, 39; *Sicilian*, **2**, 15; **9**, 44
Mediolanum (*Milan*), **2**, 34
Medion, a city of Acarnania, **2**, 2-4; **18**, 40
Mediterranean, the, **3**, 37, 39; **16**, 29
Megaleas, secretary of Philip V., **4**, 87; **5**, 2, 14-16, 25-28
Megalopolis, a city in Arcadia, **2**, 44, 46, 48, 50, 51, 54, 55, 61, 62, 64-66; **4**, 6, 7, 9, 10, 13, 25, 32, 33, 37, 60, 69, 77, 80-82; **5**, 91-93; **9**, 18, 21, 28; **13**, 8; **16**, 17; **18**, 14; **20**, 12; **21**, 9; **22**, 10; **23**, 12, 16; **31**, 9; taken by Cleomenes, **2**, 55
Megara, **2**, 43; **4**, 67; **20**, 6; **39**, 8
Megistus, a river of Mysia, **5**, 77
Melambium, a township in Pelasgic Thessaly, **18**, 20
Melancomas, of Ephesus, **8**, 17-20
Meleager, ambassador from Antiochus Epiphanes, **27**, 19; **28**, 1, 22; **31**, 21
Melitaea, a city of Phthiotis, **5**, 97; **9**, 18
Memphis, a city in Egypt, **5**, 62, 63, 66; **29**, 23
Menalcidas, of Sparta, **30**, 17; **39**, 11
Menecrates, a Macedonian, **29**, 6
Menedemus, of Alabanda, **5**, 69, 79, 82
Menelaium, a hill and shrine in Laconia, **5**, 18, 22
Menestheus, brother of Meleager and Apollonius, **31**, 21
Menestratus, of Epirus, **20**, 10; **21**, 31
Meninx, island of the Lotophagi, **1**, 39; **34**, 3
Menippus, a Macedonian, **10**, 42
Menneas, **5**, 71
Menochares, ambassador from Demetrius Soter, **32**, 4, 6
Menoetius, of Crete, **22**, 19
Menyllus, of Alabanda, **31**, 18, 20, 22; **32**, 1
Merganè, a town of Sicily, **1**, 8
Mesembriani, a Thracian people, **25**, 2
Mesopotamia, **5**, 44, 48
Messapii, a tribe in Apulia, **2**, 24; **3**, 88
Messene, in Sicily, **1**, 7-11, 15, 20, 21, 25, 38, 52; **3**, 26
Messene, in the Peloponnese, **2**, 5, 55, 61, 62, 79, 80; **3**, 19; **4**, 4, 33, 49, 77; **5**, 5, 17, 37, 91, 92; **7**, 10, 11; **8**, 10, 14; **12**, 6*b*; **16**, 13, 16, 17; **18**, 14, 42; **22**, 13; **23**, 5, 9, 12, 16, 17; **24**, 2, 11-13, 15; **39**, 9
Messenians, wars with the Aetolians, **4**, 3-7, 9, 15; their old wars with Sparta, **4**, 33; **6**, 49; endeavour to join Philip V. in his attacks on Sparta, **5**, 20; Lycurgus prepares an invasion of them, **5**, 91, 92; democracy among, **7**, 10; obtain some Spartan territory, **9**, 28, 30; in alliance with Nabis, **16**, 13; quarrel with the Achaeans, **23**, 9; poison Philopoemen, **23**, 12; subdued by Lycortas, **23**, 16; **24**, 2, 11; their attitude in B.C. 146, **39**, 9
Metagonia, a district in Africa, **3**, 33
Metapa, a town in Aetolia, **5**, 7, 13
Metapontium, a city in Magna Graecia, **8**, 36; **10**, 1
Meteon, a city of Labeatis in Illyria, **29**, 3
Methydrium, a town in Arcadia, **4**, 10, 11, 13
Methymna, a city in Lesbos, **33**, 13
Metretes, a, **2**, 15
Metrodorus, an officer of Philip V., **15**, 24; fr. lxxii.
Metrodorus, an ambassador from Perseus, **29**, 4, 11
Metropolis, a city of Acarnania, **4**, 64
Miccus, of Dyme, sub-Strategus of the Achaeans, **4**, 59
Micio, of Athens, **5**, 106
Micipsa, son of Massanissa, **37**, 10
Midon, of Beroea, **27**, 8
Milestones on Roman roads, **3**, 39; **34**, 11

Miletus, **16**, 12, 15; **21**, 48; **28**, 19; **31**, 21
Milo, an officer of Perseus, **29**, 15
Miltiades, ambassador from Demetrius Soter, **32**, 24
Milyas, a district in Asia Minor, **5**, 72, 77; **21**, 48
Mincius, a river in Cisalpine Gaul (*Mincio*), **34**, 10
Minervae promontorium, **34**, 11
Minoa Heracleia, a city in Sicily, **1**, 25
Minucius Rufus, M., **3**, 87, 90, 92, 94, 101-106
Minucius Rufus, Q., consul B.C. 194, **18**, 12
Minucius Thermus, Q., consul B.C. 183, **21**, 46
Minucius Thermus, L., legate in Egypt, **33**, 8
Misdes, a Carthaginian ambassador, **36**, 3
Misenum, a promontory in Campania, **34**, 11
Mithridates IV., king of Cappadocia on the Pontus from about B.C. 242 to about B.C. 190; **4**, 56; **5**, 43, 90; **8**, 22
Mithridates V., son of Pharnaces I., king of Cappadocia *circ.* B.C. 154-120, **25**, 2; **33**, 12
Mithridates, nephew of Antiochus the Great, and grandfather of the preceding, **8**, 25
Mithridates, Satrap of Armenia, **25**, 2
Mitylene, a city in Lesbos, **11**, 4
Mnaseas, of Argos, **18**, 14
Mnasiades, of Argos, an athlete, **5**, 64
Mnasilochus, of Acarnania, **21**, 17, 45
Mnasippus, of Coronea, **30**, 13; **32**, 20
Mnesis, a flute girl, **14**, 11
Moagetes, tyrant of Cibyra, **21**, 34
Mob-rule, **6**, 4; **9**, 5
Mochyrinus, **31**, 27
Mocissus, a town in Cappadocia, **24**, 8
Moeragenes, guardian of Ptolemy Epiphanes, **15**, 27-29
Molon, Satrap of Media, **5**, 40-43, 61
Molossi, a people of Epirus, **27**, 16; **30**, 7, 16
Molpagoras, tyrant of the Ciani, **15**, 21
Molycria, a town in Aetolia, **5**, 94
Monarchy, **6**, 3-6, 8, 9
Monunius, an Illyrian chief, **29**, 13
Mora, a Spartan, Fr. xxiv.
Morcus, an ambassador from Genthius, **29**, 3, 11
Morini, a Gallic tribe, **34**, 15
Morzias, a prince in Paphlagonia, **25**, 2
Mummius, Lucius, consul B.C. 146, **39**, 14, 17
Musaeum, in Macedonia, **37**, 8
Musaeum, at Tarentum, **8**, 27, 29
Musaeus, an ambassador from Antiochus the Great, **21**, 16, 43
Music in Arcadia, **4**, 20, 21
Mutina, in Cisalpine Gaul (*Modena*), **3**, 40
Mycenae, in Argolis, **16**, 16
Mygdonia, a district in Mesopotamia, **5**, 51
Myiscus, an officer of Antiochus the Great, **5**, 82
Mylae, a city in Sicily, **1**, 9, 23
Mylasa, a city in Caria, **16**, 24; **21**, 48; **30**, 5
Myndus, a city in Caria, **16**, 12, 15
Myrcanus, a Carthaginian, **7**, 9
Myrina, a city in Aeolis, **18**, 44
Myrrhicus, a Boeotian, **22**, 4
Myrtis, of Argos, **18**, 14
Myrtium, a courtesan of Alexandria, **14**, 11
Myrton, a friend of Charops, **32**, 20, 21
Mysia, **4**, 50, 52; **5**, 76, 77; **21**, 48
Mysteries, the, **28**, 19
Myttistratum, a town in Sicily, **1**, 24
Myttonus, a Libyan, **9**, 22
Myus, a town of Ionia, **16**, 24

NABIS, tyrant of Sparta, **4**, 81; **13**, 6-8; **16**, 13, 16, 17; **18**, 17; **21**, 2, 9, 11; **33**, 16. *See* Apega
Namnitae, a tribe of Transalpine Gaul, **34**, 10
Naragara, a town in Africa, **15**, 5
Narávas, a Numidian, **1**, 78, 82, 84, 86

Narbo (or Atax), a river in Transalpine Gaul (the *Aude*), **5**, 37, 38; **34**, 10
Narbo (*Narbonne*), **34**, 6, 10
Naucratis, a city in Egypt, **22**, 7; **28**, 20
Naupactus, a city of the Aetolians (*Lepanto*), **4**, 16; **5**, 95, 102, 103; **16**, 27; **20**, 10, 13; **23**, 5; **38**, 11; fr. lxxxiii.; the Hollows of, **5**, 103
Neapolis (*Naples*), **1**, 20; **3**, 91; **6**, 14
Neleus, **16**, 12
Nemean games, **2**, 70; **5**, 101; **10**, 26; **22**, 13
Neocaesareia, fr. xx.
Neocretans, **5**, 3, 65, 79
Neolaidas, an ambassador from Ptolemy Philometor, **33**, 8
Neolaus, brother of Molon, **5**, 53, 54
Neon, a Messenian, **18**, 14
Neon, a Boeotian, father of Brachylles, **20**, 5
Neon, a relation of the preceding, **27**, 1, 2, 6
Neptune, **10**, 11, 14. *See* Poseidon
Nercobrica, a city in Spain, **35**, 2
Nereis, daughter of Pyrrhus, **7**, 4
Nestor Cropius, **27**, 16
Nesus, a town in Acarnania, **9**, 39
Nicaea, a town in Locris, **10**, 42; **18**, 1, 7
Nicagoras, of Messene, **5**, 37, 38
Nicagoras, of Rhodes, **28**, 2, 16
Nicander, Aetolian Strategus B.C. 190, **20**, 10; **21**, 25, 27, 30; **27**, 15; **28**, 4, 6
Nicander, of Rhodes, **18**, 2, 16
Nicanor, assassin of Seleucus III., **4**, 48
Nicanor, an officer of Philip V., **16**, 27
Nicanor Elephantus, **18**, 24
Nicanor, friend of Demetrius Soter, **31**, 22
Nicanor, son of Myrton, **32**, 20, 21
Nicarchus, officer of Antiochus the Great, **5**, 68, 71, 79, 83, 85
Nicasippus, of Elis, **5**, 94
Nicephorium, a temple at Pergamum, **16**, 1; **18**, 2, 6; **32**, 27
Nicias, of Athens, **9**, 19
Nicias, an officer of Ptolemy Philopator, **5**, 71
Nicias, of Epirus, **30**, 13
Nicippus, of Messene, **4**, 31
Nicodemus, of Elis, **22**, 3, 5
Nicodes, tyrant of Sicyon, **10**, 22
Nicolaus, an Aetolian, **5**, 61, 66, 68, 70; **10**, 29
Nicomachus, of Acarnania, **18**, 10
Nicomachus, of Rhodes, **8**, 17-19
Nicomedes, of Cos, **10**, 28
Nicomedes, son of king Prusias, **32**, 28; **37**, 6
Nicon, of Tarentum, **8**, 26, 29, 30
Nicon, connexion of Agathocles, **15**, 25, 33
Nicophanes, of Megalopolis, **2**, 48, 50
Nicostratus, an Aetolian, father of Dorimachus, **4**, 3; **9**, 34; **18**, 54
Nicostratus, a secretary of Agathocles, **15**, 27, 28
Nicostratus, of Rhodes, **16**, 5; **29**, 10
Nicostratus, of Xanthus, **25**, 4
Nile, the, **3**, 37; **34**, 2, 15; canals of, **5**, 62; drinking from, fr. xxvi
Nisaean cavalry, **32**, 3. *See* Herod. **9**, 20
Nola, a city in Campania (*Nola*), **2**, 17; **3**, 91
Nomads, the, a Scythian tribe, **11**, 34. *See also* Apasiacae
Noricum (*Neumark in Styria*), **34**, 10
Nothocrates, of Gortyn, **28**, 15
Notium, harbour of Colophon, **21**, 48
Numenius, ambassador of the Ptolemies, **30**, 17
Numidians, the, **1**, 19, 31, 65, 74, 77, 78; **3**, 33, 44, 45, 65-73, 112, 116, 117; **11**, 21; **14**, 1-9; **15**, 9, 11, 12. *See also* **37**, 10; **38**, 1
Numisius, Titus, commissioner to Egypt, **29**, 5
Nutria, a town in Illyria, **2**, 11

Obols, value of, **2**, 15; **6**, 39
Ocean, the, **3**, 33; **16**, 29; **34**, 15
Octavius, Gnaeus, praetor B.C. 166, **28**, 3-5; **30**, 19; consul B.C. 165, **31**, 12, 13, 19, 20; **32**, 4, 6, 7

Odomantica, a district in Thrace, **37**, 2
Odrysae, a tribe in Thrace, **23**, 8 ; **30**, 18 ; fr. xi.
Oeanthia, a city of the Ozolian Locrians, **4**, 57 ; **5**, 17
Oenanthe, mother of Agathocles, **14**, 11 ; **15**, 25, 29, 33
Oeniadae, a town in Acarnania, **4**, 65 ; **9**, 39 ; **21**, 32
Oenis, of Messene, **4**, 31
Oenus, a river in Laconia, **2**, 65, 66
Ogygus, an ancient king of Achaia, **2**, 41 ; **4**, 1
Olana, a mouth of the Po, **2**, 16
Olenus, a town of Achaia, **2**, 41
Oligarchy, **6**, 3, 4, 8
Olygyrtus, a mountain in Arcadia, **4**, 11, 70
Olympia, **4**, 10, 73, 75, 77, 84, 86 ; Olympic games, **4**, 73 ; **12**, 4*d*, 26 ; **29**, 9 ; **30**, 10 ; **39**, 17
Olympiad, an, 7th, fr. i ; 27th, **6**, 2 ; 124th, **2**, 41, 71 ; 129th, **1**, 5 ; 139th, **2**, 71 ; 140th, **1**, 3 ; **3**, 1 ; **4**, 26, 66 ; **5**, 30, 105 ; 141st, **9**, 1 ; 147th, **21**, 43 ; 148th, **22**, 1 ; 149th, **23**, 1, 9
Olympichus, a prince in Asia Minor, **5**, 90
Olympichus, of Coronea, **27**, 1
Olympieion, at Athens, **26**, 1
Olympiodorus, of Byzantium, **4**, 47
Olympion, an ambassador from Genthius, **29**, 3, 4
Olympus, Mt, in Laconia near Sallasia, **2**, 65, 66, 69 ; **5**, 24
Olympus, Mt., in Thessaly, **12**, 26 ; **34**, 10
Olympus, Mt., in Galatia (*Ala Dagh*), **21**, 37
Olynthus, a city in Macedonia, **9**, 28, 33
Omias, of Sparta, **4**, 23 ; **24**, 8
Onchestus, a river in Thessaly, **18**, 20
Onesigenes of Syracuse, **7**, 4
Onomarchus, a Phocian, **9**, 33
Onomastus, governor of Thrace, **22**, 17, 18
Opheltas, of Boeotia, **20**, 6
Opici, a tribe in Campania, **34**, 11
Opimius, Quintus, consul B.C. 154, **33**, 8, 10, 13
Oppius, Lucius, **33**, 13
Orchomenus, a city of Arcadia, **2**, 46, 54, 55 ; **4**, 6, 11, 12
Oreium, a mountain in Assyria, **5**, 52
Orestae, a tribe in Macedonia, **18**, 47
Orestes. *See* Aurelius
Orestes, father of Tisamenus, **2**, 41 ; **4**, 1
Oretes, a Spanish tribe, **3**, 33
Oreus, a city in Euboea, **10**, 43 ; **11**, 5 ; **18**, 45, 47
Orgyssus, a town in Illyria, **5**, 108
Orion, the rise of, **1**, 37
Oroanda, a town in Pisidia, **21**, 44, 46
Orontes, a river in Syria, **5**, 59
Orontes, a mountain in Media, **10**, 27
Orophernes, usurper of Cappadocia, **3**, 5 ; **32**, 24, 25 ; **33**, 6
Oropus, in Boeotia, **32**, 25 ; **33**, 2
Orthosia, a town in Caria. **30**, 5
Ortiago, a Gallic chief, **21**, 38 ; **22**, 21
Ossa, Mt., in Thessaly, **34**, 10
Ostia, harbour of Rome, fr. v. (**6**, 2) ; **31**, 22 ; **34**, 11
Otacilius Crassus, Manius, consul B.C. 261, **1**, 20
Oxus, a river in Asia, **10**, 48
Oxybii, a tribe of Transalpine Gauls, **33**, 8, 10, 11

PACHYNUS, a promontory of Sicily (*Capo Passaro*), **1**, 25, 42, 54 ; **7**, 3
Padoa, a mouth of the Po, **2**, 16
Padus (the *Po*), **2**, 16, 17, 23, 28, 32, 34, 35 ; **3**, 40, 61, 64, 66, 69, 75, 86 ; **5**, 29 ; **10**, 3 ; **34**, 10 ; the valley or plain of, **2**, 19, 35 ; **3**, 39, 44, 47, 48, 54, 56, 61
Paeanium, a town in Aetolia, **4**, 65
Paeonia, a district near Macedonia, **5**, 97 ; **23**, 10
Palatine, the, fr. iii.
Pale, a town in Cephallenia, **5**, 3, 5, 16, 17, 100
Pallas, son of Hercules and Pallantium, fr. iii.
Pamisus, a river in Messenia, **16**, 16
Pamphia, a hamlet in Aetolia, **5**, 8, 13
Pamphilidas, of Rhodes, **21**, 7, 10
Pamphylia, **5**, 34, 72, 77 ; **21**, 35, 43, 48 ; **32**, 4

Panachaicum, a mountain in Achaia, **5**, 30
Panaetolus, an officer of Antiochus the Great, **5**, 30
Panathenaea, the, **28**, 19
Pan-boeotii, **4**, 3 ; **9**, 34
Panchaea, a fabulous island of Arabia Felix, **34**, 5
Pancrates, of Rhodes, **28**, 16
Pancrates, tyrant of Cibyra, **30**, 9
Pangaeum, a mountain in Thrace, **22**, 8
Panic, a, **5**, 96, 100
Panium, a mountain in Coele-Syria (part of Lebanon), **16**, 18 ; **28**, 1
Panormus, a town in Sicily, **1**, 21, 24, 38-40, 55, 56
Pantacnotus, of Abydus, **16**, 30
Pantaleon, an Aetolian, father of Archidamus, **4**, 57
Pantaleon, an Aetolian ambassador, **20**, 9 ; **28**, 4
Pantauchus, son of Balacrus, **27**, 8 ; **29**, 3, 4
Panteus, of Sparta, **5**, 37
Paphlagonia, **25**, 2
Papiria, wife of Macedonicus, mother of the younger Africanus, **32**, 12, 14
Papirius, Gnaeus, **38**, 10, 11
Parapotamia, a district in Assyria, **5**, 48, 69
Parmenio, of Lampsacus, **18**, 52
Parmenio, ambassador from Genthius, **29**, 3, 11
Parnassus, a mountain in Phocis, **4**, 57 ; **34**, 10
Parnassus, a city in Cappadocia, **24**, 8
Paropus, a town in Sicily, **1**, 24
Parthenius, a mountain in the Peloponnese, **4**, 23
Parthians, the, **5**, 44 ; **10**, 28, 31
Parthus, a city in Illyria, **2**, 11 ; **7**, 9 ; **18**, 47
Pasiadas, an Achaean, **28**, 12, 19
Passum, raisin wine, fr. iv.
Patara, a city in Lycia, **21**, 46
Patrae, a city of Achaia, **2**, 41 ; **4**, 6, 7, 10, 25, 83 ; **5**, 2, 3, 30, 91, 95, 101 ; **28**, 6 ; **39**, 9
Pausiras, an Egyptian prince, **22**, 7
Pausistratus, of Rhodes, **21**, 7
Paxi, islands, near Corcyra, **2**, 10
Pedasa, a town in Caria, **18**, 44
Pednelissus, a city in Pisidia, **5**, 72, 73, 76
Pelagonia, a district in Macedonia, **5**, 108
Pelecas, a mountain in Mysia, **5**, 77
Pelion, a mountain in Thessaly, **8**, 11 ; **34**, 10
Pella, a city in Macedonia, **4**, 66 ; **29**, 4 ; **34**, 12
Pella, a town in Palestine, **5**, 70
Pellene, a city in Achaia, **2**, 41, 52 ; **4**, 8, 13, 72
Pellene, a town in Laconia, **4**, 81 ; **16**, 37
Pelopidas, of Thebes, **6**, 43 ; **8**, 1
Peloponnese, the, **1**, 42 ; **2**, 37, 43, 44, 49, 52, 54, 60, 62 ; **4**, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 13, 14, 22, 32, 57, 61, 62, 65, 66, 70, 73, 77, 84, 87 ; **5**, 1, 3, 17, 36, 102, 106, 110 ; **12**, 4*d* ; **22**, 1, 10, 13, 15 ; **23**, 4, 9 ; **24**, 2 ; **27**, 2, 18 ; **28**, 3, 7, 13 ; **29**, 23 ; **30**, 23 ; **33**, 3 ; **34**, 6, 12 ; **37**, 3 ; **38**, 7 ; **39**, 2, 9, 14
Peloponnesians, the, **2**, 37, 38, 40, 42, 43, 49, 52, 62 ; **3**, 3 ; **4**, 1, 7, 32, 67, 69, 77, 82 ; **5**, 92, 106 ; **6**, 49 ; **10**, 25 ; **11**, 5 ; **12**, 12*a*, 25*i* ; **18**, 11, 14 ; **38**, 5
Pelops, of Alexandria, **15**, 25
Pelorias, a promontory of Sicily, **1**, 11, 42
Pelusium, a city of Egypt, **5**, 62, 80 ; **15**, 25 ; **28**, 18 ; **29**, 27
Penelope, **12**, 26*b*
Peparethus, island of, **10**, 42
Peraea Rhodiorum, a part of Caria, **18**, 2, 6, 8 ; **27**, 7 ; **30**, 24 ; **31**, 26
Pergamum (or Pergamos, **21**, 20), in Mysia, chief city of Attalus, **4**, 48 ; **5**, 78 ; **16**, 1 ; **21**, 10, 20 ; **24**, 5, 9 ; **32**, 27 ; **33**, 9
Perge, in Pamphylia, **5**, 72 ; **21**, 44
Pericles, of Athens, **9**, 23
Perigenes, an officer of Ptolemy Philopator, **5**, 68, 69
Perinthus, a city in Thrace on the Propontis, **18**, 2, 44 ; **34**, 12
Perioeci of Sparta, the, **2**, 65 ; **4**, 34
Perippia (or -ii), **5**, 102
Perrhaebi, a tribe in Thessaly, **5**, 102 ;

18, 46, 47 ; **22**, 1, 9, 15 ; **23**, 1 ; **28**, 13 ; **30**, 7
Perseus, son of Philip V., king of Macedonia B.C. 179-168, **1**, 3 ; **18**, 35 ; **22**, 8 ; intrigues against his brother, **23**, 3, 7, 10 ; beginning of his reign, **25**, 3, 4, 6 ; war with Rome, **27**, 1-11, 14-16 ; **28**, 1, 2, 5, 12, 17 ; defeated at Pydna, **29**, 3-22, 27 ; **30**, 1, 3, 6-8, 10, 13, 16, 18 ; **32**, 20, 21, 23 ; in Alba, **37**, 1-3, 9. *See also* **3**, 3, 5, 32 ; **20**, 11 ; **32**, 11. fr. lxxxi.
Persian Gulf, the, **5**, 46, 48, 54 ; **9**, 43 ; **13**, 9 (Ἐρυθρὰ θάλασσα, cp. Herod. **6**, 20)
Persian Gates, the, at Sardis, **7**, 17, 18
Persians, the, **1**, 2, 6, 63 ; **2**, 35 ; **3**, 6 ; **4**, 31 ; **5**, 10, 43, 55 ; **6**, 49 ; **9**, 34, 39 ; **10**, 28 ; **12**, 8, 20, 25*f* ; **16**, 22 ; **22**, 8 ; **29**, 21 ; **39**, 6
Persis, **5**, 40, 44, 54 ; **31**, 11
Pessinus, a city of Galatia, **21**, 37
Petelia, a town of Bruttium (*Strongoli*), **7**, 1
Petraeus, of Epirus, **4**, 24 ; **5**, 17 ; **21**, 26
Petronius, Gaius, **32**, 28
Phacus, a town in Macedonia, **31**, 26
Phaeacians, the, **34**, 9
Phaeneas, Aetolian Strategus B.C. 198, 192, **18**, 1, 3, 4, 7, 37, 38 ; **20**, 9, 10 ; **21**, 25, 26, 29, 30
Phaestus, a city of Crete, **4**, 55
Phaethon, fall of, **2**, 16
Phalanx, the Macedonian, **2**, 65 ; **12**, 20, 21 ; **18**, 26-28 ; **29**, 17 ; double, **2**, 66 ; quadruple, **12**, 20 ; of Pyrrhus, **18**, 28 ; of Achaeans, **11**, 11, 15
Phalara, a city of Thessaly, **20**, 10, 11
Phalaris, tyrant of Agrigentum, **7**, 7 ; **12**, 25
Phalasarna, a town in Crete, **22**, 19
Phanoteia, a town in Phocis, **5**, 96 ; **27**, 16 ; **29**, 12
Pharae (or Pharaea), a city of Achaia, **2**, 41 ; **4**, 6, 7, 25, 59, 60, 77 ; **5**, 30, 94, 95
Pharae, a town of Messenia, **16**, 16 ; **23**, 17
Pharnaces I., son of Mithridates IV., king of Cappadocia *circ.* B.C. 190-170, **3**, 3 ; **23**, 9 ; **24**, 1, 5, 8, 9 ; **25**, 2 ; **27**, 7, 17
Pharsalus, a city of Thessaly, **5**, 99 ; **18**, 3, 8 ; **18**, 20, 38, 47
Pharus, island and town of, **2**, 11 ; **3**, 18, 19 ; **5**, 108 ; **7**, 9. *See* Demetrius
Pharycus, an Aetolian, **9**, 34
Phaselis, a city of Lycia, **30**, 9
Phasis, a river in Colchis, **4**, 56
Phayllus, an officer of Achaeus, **5**, 72, 73
Pheias, harbour town in Elis, **4**, 9
Pheidias, the Athenian artist, **30**, 10
Pheneus, a town in Arcadia, **2**, 52 ; **4**, 68
Pherae, a city of Thessaly, **5**, 99 ; **18**, 19, 20
Phibotides, a city of Illyria, **5**, 108
Phigaleia, a city in Arcadia, **4**, 3, 6, 31, 79, 80 ; **5**, 4
Philaenus, altars of, in the Greater Syrtis, **3**, 39 ; **10**, 40
Philaenis, **12**, 13
Philammon, governor of Libya, under Ptolemy Epiphanes, **15**, 25, 26*a*, 33
Philemenus, of Tarentum, **8**, 26, 27, 31, 32
Philetaerus, son of Attalus I., **39**, 7
Philiades, of Messene, **18**, 14
Philinus, historian, **1**, 14, 15 ; **3**, 26
Philinus, of Corinth, **39**, 11
Philip II., king of Macedonia, B.C. 360-336, **2**, 41, 48 ; **3**, 6 ; **5**, 10 ; **8**, 11-13 ; **9**, 28, 33 ; **18**, 14 ; **22**, 6, 8
Philip V., son of Demetrius II., king of Macedonia B.C. 229-179, **1**, 3 ; his youth and succession, **2**, 2, 37, 45, 70 ; engages in the social war, **4**, 2, 3, 5, 9, 13, 15, 16, 19, 22-27, 29, 30, 34, 36, 37 ; invades Aetolia, **4**, 55, 57, 61-87 ; renews the war by sea, attack on Thermus, **5**, 1-30, 34, 95, 97-105, 108-110 ; makes a treaty with Hannibal, **7**, 9, cp. **3**, 2 ; conduct at Messene, **7**, 11 ; gets rid of Aratus, **8**, 3, 10-16 ; fails in an attack on Megalopolis, **9**, 18 ; his lawless conduct in

Greece, **9**, 23, 30-32, 35-37, 41, 42; supports Achaeans against Rome, and Attalus, and Aetolians, **10**, 9, 26, 27, 41; second attack on Thermus, **11**, 5-7; **13**, 3-5; his designs against Ptolemy Epiphanes, **15**, 20-25; defeated at Chius, **16**, 1-11, 15, 22; his energy, **16**, 28, 29; war with Rome, **16**, 24-35, 38; attends conference at Nicaea, **18**, 1-12; battle of Cynoscephalae, **18**, 27, 33, 36-39, 41-48, 50, 51, 54; supports the Romans against Antiochus, **20**, 5, 7, 11. *See also* **21**, 2, 11, 23, 25, 31; **22**, 1, 8, 9, 13, 15, 17; **23**, 1-3, 7-10; **24**, 12; **25**, 3; **27**, 15; **32**, 27; **37**, 9; fr. xcviii.-cii. For his change of character *see* **4**, 77, 81; **7**, 12, 14; **9**, 23

Philip, adopted son of Perseus, **37**, 2

Philip, an Achaean, **30**, 13

Philip, an ambassador of Perseus, **27**, 4

Philip, a companion of Antiochus the Great, **5**, 82

Philippopolis, a city in Thessaly, **5**, 100

Phillidas, an Aetolian, **4**, 77-80

Philocles, friend of Philip V., **16**, 24; **22**, 18; **23**, 1, 3

Philocrates, of Rhodes, **30**, 4

Philodemus, of Argos, **7**, 2

Philomelum, a city in Phrygia, **21**, 35

Philomelus, of Phocis, **9**, 32

Philon, of Cnossus, **5**, 65

Philon, friend of Agathocles, **14**, 11; **15**, 30, 33

Philon, of Chalcis, **21**, 17, 45; **28**, 28, 2, 16; **30**, 4, 22

Philon, of Thessaly, **39**, 10

Philophron, of Rhodes, **22**, 5; **27**, 14

Philopoemen, of Megalopolis, Achaean Strategus B.C. 206, 204, 201, 192, 189-188, 183; completes the work of Aratus, **2**, 40; at the battle of Sallasia, **2**, 67-69; his education and reforms, **10**, 21-24; **11**, 9-18; invades Laconia, **16**, 36, 37; goes to defend Megara, **20**, 6; refuses a present from the Spartans, **20**, 12; restores some Spartan exiles, **21**, 41; **22**, 15; accused at Rome, **22**, 3; hostile steps against Boeotia, **22**, 4; his error about the treaty with Ptolemy, **22**, 12; his policy in Sparta blamed by Caecilius, **22**, 13; his conduct to Archon, **22**, 14; his Spartan policy discussed in the Roman Senate, **22**, 16; enmity of Flamininus to, **23**, 5; joins in refusing to summon a meeting of the league, *ib.*; captured by the Messenians and put to death, **23**, 12, 16; his character, **24**, 13-15; his statues spared by Mummius, **39**, 14

Philostratus, of Rhodes, **16**, 5

Philostratus, of Epirus, **27**, 16

Philoteria, a town in Palestine, **5**, 70

Philotis, mother of Charops, **32**, 20

Philoxenus, a poet and musician, **4**, 20

Phlegraean plains, the, **2**, 17; **3**, 91

Phlius, a city in the Peloponnese, **2**, 44, 52, 67; **4**, 67

Phocaea, a city in Ionia, **5**, 77; **21**, 6, 48

Phocis, **4**, 9, 15, 25, 55; **5**, 24, 26, 28, 96; **16**, 32; **18**, 10, 46, 47; **38**, 5; **39**, 9

Phoebidas, of Sparta, **4**, 27

Phoenice, a town in Epirus, **2**, 5, 6, 8; **16**, 27; **32**, 21, 26

Phoenicia, a district in Asia, **3**, 2; **5**, 59, 66, 67, 87; **8**, 19

Phoetiae, a town in Acarnania, **4**, 63

Pholeus, in Megalopolis, **9**, 18

Phoxidas, of Melitaea, **5**, 63, 65, 82, 85

Phrixa, a town in Triphylia, **4**, 77, 80

Phrygia, **5**, 57; on the Hellespont, **21**, 22, 48; the greater, **21**, 48

Phthiotid Thebes. *See* Thebes

Phthiotis, Achaeans of, in Thessaly, **18**, 46, 47. *See also* **18**, 20

Phylarchus, the historian, **2**, 56-63

Phyromachus, a statuary, **32**, 27

Physsias, of Elis, **5**, 94

Phytaeum, a town in Aetolia, **5**, 7

Phyxium, a place in Elis, **5**, 95

Picenus ager, **2**, 21; **3**, 86

Pictones, a tribe of Transalpine Gauls, **34**, 10

Pieria, a region in Macedonia, **4**, 62
Pieria, a region in Syria, **34**, 15
Pinarus, a river in Cilicia, **12**, 17, 18
Pindar, quoted, **4**, 31
Piraeus, the, **16**, 25
Pisae, in Etruria (*Pisa*), **2**, 16, 27, 28; **3**, 41, 56, 96
Pisantini, an Illyrian tribe, **5**, 108
Pisatis, a district in the Peloponnese, **4**, 74
Pisidia, **5**, 57, 72, 73; **21**, 22
Pisistratus, of Boeotia, **18**, 43
Pissaeum, a town in Macedonia, **5**, 108
Plains, the Great (near Carthage), **14**, 7, 8; the Fair, in Armenia, **8**, 25
Placentia (*Piacenza*), **3**, 40, 66, 74; **33**, 11
Platanus, a fortress in Phoenicia, **5**, 68
Plato, **6**, 5, 45, 47; **7**, 13; **12**, 28
Plator, an officer of Philip V., **4**, 55
Plator, brother of Genthius, **29**, 13
Pleiads, the, **3**, 54; **4**, 37; **5**, 1; **9**, 18
Pleuratus, an Illyrian, father of Agron and Scerdilaidas, **2**, 2
Pleuratus, son of Scerdilaidas, father of Genthius, **10**, 41; **18**, 47; **21**, 11, 21; **32**, 18
Pleuratus, an Illyrian exile, **28**, 8
Polemarch, the, in the Peloponnese, **4**, 18; **9**, 17; at Cynaetha, **4**, 18; at Phigaleia, **4**, 79
Polemarchus, of Arsinoe, **18**, 10
Polemocles, of Rhodes, **4**, 52, 53
Polemocrates, a courtier of Perseus, **29**, 4, 8
Poliasium, in Laconia, **16**, 16
Polichna, a town in Laconia, **4**, 36
Polyaenus, of Cyprus, **11**, 18
Polyaenus, an Achaean, **28**, 6
Polyaratus, of Rhodes, **27**, 7, 14; **28**, 2; **29**, 27; **30**, 6, 7, 9
Polybius, of Megalopolis (not the historian), **11**, 15
Polybius, of Megalopolis, son of Lycortas, the historian: writes to instruct the Greeks and of contemporary events or those immediately preceding him, **1**, 3, 4; **4**, 2; extent and scope of his history, **3**, 32; his authorities for the Hannibalian war, **3**, 48; his travels, **3**, 59; interviews with Massanissa, **9**, 25; his code of signals, **10**, 45; his visits to Locri Epizephyrii, **12**, 5; to Sardis, **21**, 38; writes to Zeno of Rhodes, **16**, 20; ambassador to Ptolemy Epiphanes B.C. 181, **24**, 6; accused of hostility to Rome, **28**, 3; hipparch, **28**, 6; speech on the honours of Eumenes, **28**, 7; ambassador to Marcius Philippus, **28**, 13, 14; invited to Alexandria, **29**, 23-26; advice to Demetrius Soter in Rome (B.C. 162), **31**, 19-21; his intimacy with Scipio Aemilianus, **32**, 8-16; visits Alexandria, **34**, 14; tries to influence Cato, **35**, 5; pleads in the Senate, **35**, 6; sent for by the Consul Manius Manilius, **37**, 3; the only man so called, **37**, 4, but *see* **11**, 15; his view of Providence, **37**, 9; at the siege and capture of Carthage, **39**, 3; at the burning of Corinth, **39**, 13; saves the statues of Philopoemen, **39**, 14; refuses confiscated goods, **39**, 15; employed in settlement of Achaia, **39**, 16; his fondness for hunting, **31**, 22; **32**, 15
Polycletus, of Cyrene, **7**, 2
Polycrates, of Argos, **5**, 64, 65, 82, 84; **15**, 29; **18**, 54, 55; **22**, 7
Polycritus, an Aetolian, **9**, 34
Polymedes, of Aegium, **5**, 17
Polyphontes, an officer of Philip V., **10**, 42
Polyphontes, of Sparta, **4**, 22
Polyrrhenii, a city in Crete, **4**, 53, 55, 61
Polyxenidas, of Rhodes, **10**, 29
Pompides, a Theban, **27**, 2
Pontus, the. *See* Euxine; Pontic fish, **31**, 24; Cappadocia on the Pontus, **5**, 43
Popilius Laenas, Gaius, consul B.C. 172, 158, **28**, 3-5; **29**, 2, 27; **30**, 9, 17
Popilius Laenas, Marcus (? consul B.C. 139), **33**, 10
Popilius Laenas, the younger (? consul B.C. 132), **38**, 19

Porcius Cato, M., **31**, 24; **35**, 6; **36**, 8; **37**, 6; **39**, 12
Porphyrion, a town in Phoenicia, **5**, 68
Poseidon, **7**, 9; temple of, at Mantinea, **9**, 8, 34; at Taenarum, **9**, 34; near Miletus, **16**, 12
Postumius Albinus Megellus, L., consul B.C. 262, **1**, 17-19
Postumius Albinus, L., consul B.C. 229, **2**, 11, 12; **3**, 106, 118 (wrongly called Aulus in **2**, 11)
Postumius Albinus, Aulus, consul B.C. 180, **25**, 6; **27**, 3
Postumius Albinus, Aulus, consul B.C. 151, **33**, 1, 13; **35**, 3; **39**, 12
Pothine, a flute girl, **14**, 11
Pothion, of Rhodes, **22**, 5
Pound, weight of a Roman, **21**, 45
Praeneste, in Latium (*Palestrina*), **6**, 14
Praetorium, **6**, 27, 33, 35, 41
Praetutianus ager, in Picenum, **3**, 88
Prasiae, a town in Laconia, **4**, 36
Pration, a Rhodian, **28**, 23
Priene, a city of Ionia, **33**, 6
Prinassus, a city of Caria, **16**, 11
Prion. *See* Saw
Proagoras, of Megalopolis, **13**, 8
Proander, an Aetolian, **28**, 4
Prolaus, of Sicyon, **4**, 72
Pronni, harbour of Cephallenia, **5**, 3
Propontis, the (*Sea of Marmora*), **4**, 39, 43, 44; **16**, 29; **22**, 18
Propus, a place in Arcadia, **4**, 11
Prusias I., king of Bithynia *circ.* B.C. 220-180, **3**, 2; **4**, 47-52; **5**, 77, 90, 111
Prusias II., son of preceding, king of Bithynia B.C. 179-149, **3**, 3, 5; **15**, 23; **18**, 4, 5, 44; **21**, 11; **22**, 11, 20; **23**, 1, 3; **25**, 2; **30**, 19; **31**, 6, 9; **32**, 3, 5, 27, 28; **33**, 1, 9, 12, 13; **37**, 6
Prytanis, a Peripatetic philosopher, **5**, 93
Prytanis, a magistrate at Rhodes, **22**, 5
Pseudo-Philip, **37**, 1, 2, 9
Psophis, a city in Arcadia, **4**, 68-73
Ptolemais, a city in Phoenicia, **4**, 37; **5**, 61, 62, 71
Ptolemy Ceraunus, king of Thrace and Macedonia B.C. 281-280, son of Ptolemy I. of Egypt, **2**, 41; **9**, 35
Ptolemy I., son of Lagus, king of Egypt B.C. 323-285, **1**, 63; **2**, 41, 71, 67
Ptolemy II., Philadelphus, king of Egypt B.C. 286-247, **14**, 11; **15**, 25; **31**, 17; fr. xxvi.
Ptolemy III., Euergetes, king of Egypt B.C. 247-222, **2**, 47, 51, 63, 71; **4**, 1; **5**, 34, 35, 58; **15**, 25; **29**, 24
Ptolemy IV., Philopator, king of Egypt B.C. 222-205, **1**, 3; **2**, 71; **3**, 2; **4**, 2, 30, 37, 51; **5**, 1, 31, 34, 36, 38-40, 42, 45, 55, 57, 58, 61-68, 70, 79-87, 89, 100, 105-107; **8**, 17; **9**, 44; **11**, 4; **14**, 11, 12; **15**, 20, 25, 34; **18**, 1; **27**, 9; **39**, 19
Ptolemy V., Epiphanes, king of Egypt B.C. 205-181, **3**, 2; **15**, 20, 25-32; **16**, 22, 27, 34, 39; **18**, 1, 47, 49-51, 54, 55; **22**, 1, 3, 6, 7, 10, 12, 22; **24**, 6; **28**, 1, 20
Ptolemy VI., Philometor, king of Egypt B.C. 181-146, **27**, 13, 19; **28**, 1, 12, 17, 23; **29**, 23-27; **30**, 9, 17; **31**, 4, 18, 20, 22, 27, 28; **32**, 1; **33**, 8; **39**, 18
Ptolemy VII., Physcon, brother of preceding, joint king B.C. 170-154, king of Cyrene B.C. 154-146, sole king B.C. 146-117, **28**, 19, 20, 21; **29**, 23-25, 27; **30**, 17; **31**, 18, 26-28; **32**, 1; **33**, 8; **34**, 14
Ptolemy, son of Aeropus, an Aetolian, **16**, 18
Ptolemy, son of Agesarchus of Megalopolis, **15**, 25; **18**, 55; **27**, 13
Ptolemy, son of Eumenes, **18**, 53
Ptolemy, a courtier of Philip V., **5**, 25, 26
Ptolemy, commandant of Alexandria, **5**, 39
Ptolemy, a rhetorician, **28**, 19; **31**, 28
Ptolemy, son of Sosibius, **15**, 25; **16**, 22
Ptolemy Sympetesis, **31**, 27

Ptolemy, son of Thraseas, **5**, 61
Publicius Malleolus, Lucius, **37**, 6
Punic army, **1**, 19; **11**, 19; strength and courage compared with Italian, **6**, 52; stratagem, **3**, 78
Pupius, Lucius, **33**, 10
Puteoli (*Dicaearchia*), a city in Campania (*Pozzuoli*), **3**, 91
Pylon, on the Via Egnatia, **34**, 12
Pylus, a town in Messenia, **4**, 16, 25; **9**, 38; **18**, 42
Pyrenees, the, **3**, 35, 37, 39-41; **10**, 39, 40; **34**, 7, 10
Pyrgus, a town of Triphylia, **4**, 77, 80
Pyrrhias, an Aetolian, **5**, 30, 91, 92
Pyrrhicus, put to death by Philip V., **23**, 10
Pyrrhus, palace of, at Ambracia, **21**, 27; camp of, in Laconia, **5**, 19. *See also* **1**, 6, 7, 23; **2**, 20, 41; **3**, 25; **32**, 2; **7**, 4; **8**, 26; **12**, 4, 25*k*; **18**, 3, 28; fr. xi.
Pythagoreans, the, **2**, 39
Pytheas, a traveller and writer, **34**, 5, 10
Pytheas, of Thebes, **39**, 7, 9
Pythia, the, **10**, 2
Pythiades, an officer of Antiochus the Great, **5**, 46
Pythias, of Pellene, **4**, 72
Pythion, a spy, **13**, 5
Pythionicus, tomb of, at Tarentum, **8**, 30
Pytho, an ambassador from Prusias, **31**, 6
Pythodorus, of Lampsacus, **18**, 52

QUAESTOR, the, **6**, 13, 31, 32, 35
Quinctius Crispinus, Titus, consul B.C. 208, **10**, 32
Quinctius Flamininus, T., consul B.C. 198, **18**, 1-12, 18-27, 33, 34, 36-39, 42-47, 50; **20**, 7; **21**, 30; **22**, 4, 13; **23**, 3-5; **27**, 15; declares Greece free, **18**, 46
Quinctius Flamininus, Lucius, consul B.C. 192, **21**, 32
Quinctius Flamininus, Titus (son of Titus above), consul B.C. 150, **33**, 10
Quintus, commissioner to Egypt, **31**, 18; and to Rhodes, **33**, 15
Quirinus, **3**, 25

RABBATAMANA (*Philadelphia*), a town in Palestine, **5**, 71
Rhaeti, an Alpine tribe, **34**, 10
Rhaphia, a town in Palestine, **5**, 80, 85, 86, 107
Rhaucus, a town in Crete, **22**, 19; **31**, 1
Rhegium, a city of Bruttium (*Reggio*), **1**, 6-8, 10; **3**, 26; **5**, 110; **9**, 7, 9, 27; **10**, 1
Rhigosages, mercenary Gauls, **5**, 53
Rhinocolura, a town of Egypt, **5**, 80
Rhium, promontory and harbour of Achaia, **4**, 10, 19, 26; **5**, 28-30; **12**, 12*a*; Aetolian Rhium (*Antirrhium*), **5**, 94
Rhium, the strait between Rhium and Antirrhium, **4**, 64
Rhizon, a city in Illyria, **2**, 11
Rhodes, island of, **4**, 50; **13**, 5; **16**, 34, 35; **22**, 5; **25**, 4-6; **28**, 2, 16, 17, 23; **29**, 3, 4, 11, 19; **30**, 5, 7-9; **32**, 4; earthquake at, **5**, 88-90; Rhodians, **3**, 2, 3; **4**, 19, 37, 47-53, 56; **5**, 24, 28, 63, 88-90, 100; **9**, 27; **11**, 4; **13**, 4, 5; **15**, 22, 23; **16**, 4-10, 14, 15, 24, 26, 28, 30, 31, 34, 35; **18**, 1, 2, 6, 8, 52; **21**, 7, 10, 17, 18, 22, 24, 25, 29-31, 45, 48; **22**, 5; **23**, 9; **25**, 4, 5; **27**, 3, 4, 7; **28**, 2, 16, 23; **29**, 3, 4, 10, 11, 19; **30**, 4-9, 20, 22; **31**, 2, 3, 6, 7, 15, 16, 25, 26; **33**, 4, 6, 13, 15, 16, 17; Rhodian magistrates, navarch, **30**, 5; prytanies, **13**, 5; **15**, 23; **22**, 5; **27**, 7; **29**, 10; their attempts to end the Social War, **5**, 24, 100; **11**, 4; accept money for the cost of education, **31**, 25
Rhodon, of Phocaea, **21**, 6
Rhodope, mountain, Thrace, **34**, 10
Rhodophon, of Rhodes, **27**, 7; **28**, 2; **30**, 5
Rhone, the, **2**, 15, 22, 34; **3**, 35, 37, 39, 41-49, 60, 61, 64, 76; **34**, 10
Rhositeles, of Sicyon, **22**, 3
Rhyncus, in Aetolia, **6**, 59
Romans, their language, **29**, 20; their character, **1**, 20, 55, 59, 64; **8**, 3; **28**, 8; **32**, 9; their treatment of the conquered, **18**, 37; their ceremonies

in proclaiming war, **13**, 3; their *fides*, **20**, 9; **36**, 4; their desire for wealth, **32**, 12, 13; Roman constitution, **6**, 11-42; compared with others, **6**, 43-56. *See also* **1**, 3, 64; **3**, 2, 118; **5**, 111; **6**, 47, 50, 51-58; **8**, 3; **10**, 16; **21**, 13. Their readiness in adopting improvements, **6**, 25; fr. xxvii.; their incorruptibility, **6**, 56; decline in their character, **18**, 35; **32**, 11; cp. **37**, 1; Magistrates, *see* dictator, consul, tribune, aedile

Roman Empire, extent of, **1**, 2; how acquired, **1**, 3, 64; **18**, 28; the first step out of Italy, **1**, 5, 11; effect of their eastern conquests, **18**, 35

Roman Army, **6**, 19-42; the legion, **1**, 16, 26; **2**, 24; **3**, 72, 107; **6**, 19-21, 26, 30; **10**, 16; **28**, 17; enrolment of, **6**, 19, 26; officers of, military tribunes, **6**, 19-21, 27, 33, 37; centurions, **6**, 24, 30, 36, 41; equites in, **3**, 107; **6**, 19, 20, 25, **11**, 21; pedites in, **3**, 107; **6**, 19, 21; velites, **6**, 21, 22, 24, 33, 35; **11**, 22-24, 32; **15**, 9; hastati, **6**, 21, 23, 29, 33; **15**, 9; principes, **6**, 21, 23, 29, 33; triarii, **6**, 21, 23, 29, 33, cp. **1**, 26; socii, **1**, 24; **3**, 72, 107; **6**, 13, 21, 26, 30; **10**, 16; extraordinarii, **6**, 26, 31; maniples, **6**, 24; **11**, 23; arms of, *galea*, **6**, 22, 23; *gladius*, **2**, 30, 33; **6**, 23; *lorica*, **6**, 23, 25; *pilum*, **1**, 40; **6**, 23; *scutum*, **2**, 30; **6**, 23-51; compared with those of the Macedonians, **18**, 28-32. *See also* **2**, 33; **13**, 3. Line of battle compared with the Macedonian, *ib.*; camp, formation of, **6**, 27-37, 41, 42

Roman fleet, the first, **1**, 20; its increase, **1**, 25; rapid building of, **1**, 38, 52; its destruction, **1**, 52; another built, **1**, 59; losses of, in the first Punic war, **1**, 63

Rome, foundation of, fr. i; captured by the Gauls, **1**, 6; **2**, 18; crowns in honour of, **32**, 3, 24; colossal statue to, at Rhodes, **31**, 15

Ruscinus, (or -o), a river in Gaul (*Tet*), **34**, 10

SABINES, the, **2**, 24

Sagalassus, a city in Pisidia, **21**, 36

Saguntum, a city in Spain, **3**, 6, 8, 14-17, 20, 21, 29, 30, 61, 97-99; **4**, 28, 37, 66; **15**, 17

Sais, a city in Egypt, **22**, 7

Salassi, an Alpine tribe (*Val d'Aosta*), **34**, 10

Salii, the, **21**, 13

Sallentini, a tribe in Calabria, **34**, 15

Salutis via, at Tarentum, **8**, 35

Samaria, city and district in Palestine, **5**, 71; **16**, 39

Sambucae, siege engines, **8**, 6-8

Samicum, a town in Triphylia, **4**, 77, 80

Samnites, the, **1**, 6; **2**, 19; **3**, 90-92; **9**, 5

Samos, island of, **3**, 2; **5**, 35; **16**, 2; **21**, 8

Samothrace, an island in the Aegean, **28**, 21; **29**, 8

Samus, a poet, **5**, 9; **23**, 10

Sangarius, a river of Asia Minor (*Sakari*), **21**, 37

Saperda, in Pisidia, **5**, 72

Sarapieium, in Thrace, **4**, 39

Sardanapalus, king of Assyria, **8**, 12; **37**, 7

Sardinia, **1**, 2, 10, 24, 43, 79, 82, 83, 88; **2**, 23, 27; **3**, 10, 13, 15, 22-24, 27, 28, 30, 75, 96; **12**, 4*c*; **34**, 8

Sardinian sea, the, **1**, 10, 42; **2**, 14; **3**, 37, 41, 47; **34**, 6

Sardis, in Lydia, **5**, 77; **7**, 15-18; **8**, 17, 23; **21**, 11, 13, 16, 38; **29**, 12; **31**, 10

Sarissae, Macedonian spears, **12**, 20; **18**, 26, 29

Sarsina, a town in Umbria (*Sarsina*), **2**, 24

Sason, an island off Illyria, **5**, 110

Saspiri, an Asian tribe, **5**, 44

Saticn, a town in Illyria, **5**, 108

Satrapeii, an Asian tribe, **5**, 44

Satyrus, of Ilium, **22**, 5

Satyrus, an Achaean, **31**, 6

Saw, the, a place in Sardis, **7**, 15; another in Libya, **1**, 85

Scardus, a mountain in Illyria, **28**, 8
Scerdilaidas, an Illyrian general, **2**, 5, 6 ; **4**, 16, 29 ; **5**, 3, 4, 95, 101, 108, 110 ; **10**, 41
Science, progress of, **10**, 12
Scipio. *See* Cornelius. Cp. **34**, 10 ; pedigree of, vol. ii. p. 456. *See also* fr. xc-xciii.
Scironian rocks, the, **16**, 16
Scodra, a town in Illyria, **28**, 8
Scopas, an Aetolian, **4**, 5, 6, 9, 14, 16, 19, 27, 37, 62 ; **5**, 3, 11 ; **13**, 1, 2 ; **15**, 25 ; **16**, 18, 19, 39 ; **18**, 53-55
Scopium, near Phthiotid Thebes, **5**, 99
Scorpions, name for cross-bows, **8**, 7
Scotitas, a forest in Laconia, **16**, 37
Scotusa, a town in Thessaly, **10**, 42 ; **18**, 20
Scurvy, the, **3**, 87
Scylla, **34**, 2, 3 ; promontory of (*Scilla*), **34**, 2, 3
Scyron, of Messenia, **4**, 4
Scythian colonnade at Syracuse, **8**, 5
Scythians, the, **4**, 43 ; **9**, 34
Scythopolis, a city in Palestine, **5**, 70
Segesama, a town in Spain, **34**, 9
Segesta, a city in Sicily, **1**, 24
Seleucia Pieria (Seleucia on the sea), a town in Syria, **5**, 58-61, 66, 67 ; **34**, 15
Seleucia, on the Tigris, **5**, 45, 46, 48, 54 ; **13**, 9
Seleucia, in Mesopotamia, **5**, 43
Seleucus I., Nicanor, king of Syria B.C. 306-280, **2**, 41, 71 ; **5**, 67 ; **10**, 27 ; **18**, 51 ; **28**, 20 ; **31**, 7
Seleucus II., Callinicus, son of Antiochus I., king of Syria B.C. 246-226, **2**, 71 ; **4**, 48, 51 ; **5**, 40, 89 ; **8**, 22
Seleucus III., Ceraunus, son of the preceding, king of Syria B.C. 226-223, **2**, 71 ; **4**, 1, 2, 48 ; **5**, 34, 40, 41
Seleucus IV., Philopator, son of Antiochus the Great, king of Syria B.C. 188-175, **18**, 51 ; **21**, 6, 8, 10 ; **22**, 1, 10-13 ; **23**, 5 ; **31**, 12
Selge, a city in Pisidia, **5**, 72-77 ; **31**, 9
Selinus, a city in Sicily, **1**, 39
Sellasia, a town in Laconia, **2**, 65 ; **4**, 69 ; **16**, 16, 37
Selybria, a city in Thrace, **18**, 49
Sempronius Blaesus, Gaius, consul B.C. 253, **1**, 39
Sempronius, Longus, Ti., consul B.C. 218, **3**, 40, 41, 61, 68-75 ; **4**, 66 ; **5**, 1
Sempronius, Gracchus, Ti., consul B.C. 215, 213, **8**, 1
Sempronius, Gracchus, Ti., consul B.C. 177, son-in-law of Africanus, **22**, 9, *note* ; **25**, 1, 4 ; **31**, 5-7, 9, 14, 23 ; **32**, 3-5, 13 ; **35**, 2
Sena, a Roman colony in Cisalpine Gaul (*Sinigaglia*), **2**, 14, 16, 19 ; **34**, 11
Senate, the Roman, **3**, 20 ; **6**, 13, 16, 17 ; the Spartan, **4**, 35 ; **6**, 45
Senones, a tribe of Cisalpine Gauls, **2**, 17, 19, 20
Sentinum, a town in Umbria (*Sentino*), **2**, 19
Serapis, **4**, 39
Sergius, Lucius, **15**, 1, 2
Sergius, Manius, **31**, 9
Serippus, a Lacedaemonian, **23**, 4, 9
Servilius Caepio, Gnaeus, consul B.C. 253, **1**, 39
Servilius Caepio, Gnaeus, consul B.C. 203, **14** 1
Servilius Geminus, Gnaeus, consul B.C. 217, **3**, 75, 77, 86, 88, 96, 97, 106, 107, 114, 116 ;
Servilius Geminus, Gnaeus, consul B.C. 203, **14**, 1
Servilius Glaucia, **31**, 23
Sestus, a city in Thrace, **4**, 44, 50 ; **16**, 29 ; **18**, 2 ; **34**, 7
Sibyrtus, of Epirus, **21**, 26
Sicca, a town near Carthage, **1**, 66, 67
Sicily, the war for, **1**, 13, 63, 83 ; **3**, 3, 9, 21, 22, 25, 27, 32, 37 ; **5**, 33 ; **39**, 19 ; its position, **1**, 42. *See also* **1**, 2, 5, 8, 10, 11, 16-74, 83 ; **2**, 1, 24, 36, 37, 43 ; **3**, 3, 13, 21-29, 32, 75, 96, 108 ; **5**, 33 ; **12**, 4, 25*k*, 26*b* ; **28**, 2 ; **34**, 2-4, 11, 15 ; **36**, 5 ; **39**, 19
Sicilian Strait, the, **1**, 7, 11, 20, 21, 38, 49 ; **10**, 1 ; **5**, 110 ; **34**, 6
Sicilian medimnus, **2**, 15 ; **9**, 44 ; **34**, 8
Sicilian Sea, the, **1**, 42 ; **2**, 14, 16 ; **4**, 63 ; **5**, 3, 5 ; **10**, 1 ; **12**, 4 ; **34**, 11

Sicilians, the, **1**, 16 ; **2**, 20 ; **3**, 2 ; **5**, 104 ; **12**, 5, 6 ; **24**, 15
Sicyon, a city in Achaia, **2**, 43, 52, 54 ; **4**, 8, 13, 57, 67, 68 ; **5**, 1, 27 ; **10**, 22 ; **18**, 16 ; **23**, 17 ; **28**, 13 ; **29**, 24 ; **30**, 10, 23
Sida, a city of Pisidia, **5**, 73 ; **31**, 26
Sidon, a city in Phoenicia, **5**, 69, 70
Signals by fire, **10**, 43-47 ; cp. **1**, 19 ; **8**, 30
Silver, value of, compared with gold, **21**, 32. Attic, **21**, 32, 45 ; mines of, in Spain, **3**, 57 ; **10**, 10 ; **24**, 9
Simias, an Achaean, **11**, 18
Simon, a Boeotian, **22**, 4
Simonides, of Ceos, **29**, 26
Sinda, a town of Pisidia, **21**, 35
Sinope, a city of Paphlagonia, **4**, 56, 57 ; **23**, 9
Sinuessa, a city in Latium (*Mondragone*), **3**, 91
Sipontum, a city in Apulia, on the Adriatic (*Sta. Maria di Siponto*), **10**, 1
Sirynx, a city in Hyrcania, **10**, 31
Six-banked ships, **1**, 26 ; fr. xvii.
Smyrna, a city in Ionia, **5**, 77 ; **18**, 52 ; **21**, 13, 14, 17, 22, 48
Socrates, a Boeotian, **5**, 63, 65, 82
Socrates, a trainer, **27**, 7
Soli, a city in Cilicia, **21**, 24
Solon, a Macedonian, **27**, 6
Sophagasenus, an Indian king, **11**, 34
Sosander, friend of Attalus II., **32**, 27
Sosibius, a friend of Ptolemy Philopator, **5**, 35-38, 63, 65-67, 83, 85, 87 ; **8**, 17-19 ; **15**, 25, 32, 34
Sosibius, son of the preceding, **15**, 32 ; **16**, 22
Sosicrates, Achaean sub-Strategus, **39**, 11
Sosigenes, of Rhodes, **28**, 7
Sosiphanes, ambassador from Antiochus Epiphanes, **28**, 1, 22
Sostratus, a statuary, **4**, 78
Sostratus, of Calchedon, **8**, 24
Sosylus, an historian, **3**, 20
Sparta. *See* Lacedaemon
Spendius, a leader in the mercenary war, **1**, 69, 70, 76-80, 82, 84, 86
Stade, a, **3**, 39 ; **34**, 12 *note*
Stair, the, a pass near Selge in Pisidia, **5**, 72
Stasinus, a poet, **23**, 10
Stephanus, of Athens, **32**, 17
Stertinius, Lucius, **18**, 48
Sthembanus, son of Massanissa, **37**, 10
Sthenelaus, of Sparta, **4**, 22
Stratius, of Tritaea, **28**, 6 ; **32**, 7 ; **38**, 11 ; **39**, 10
Stratius, a physician, **30**, 2
Strato, of Lampsacus, **12**, 25*c*
Stratocles, prytanis of Rhodes, **27**, 7
Stratonicea, a city in Caria, **30**, 22 ; **31**, 7
Stratus, a city in Acarnania, **4**, 63, 64 ; **5**, 6, 7, 13, 14, 96 ; **6**, 59 ; **18**, 10
Stratus, a town in Arcadia, **4**, 73
Strymon, the, river in Thrace, **37**, 2
Stubera, a town in Macedonia, **28**, 8
Stylangium, a town in Triphylia, **4**, 77, 80
Stymphalus, a city in Arcadia, **2**, 55 ; **4**, 68, 69
Sub-strategus, the Achaean, **5**, 94
Suffete, a Carthaginian magistrate, **3**, 33, 42 ; **6**, 51
Sulpicius Paterculus, Gaius, consul B.C. 258, **1**, 24
Sulpicius Galba, Publius, consul B.C. 211, 200, **8**, 3 ; **9**, 6, 7, 42 ; **10**, 41 ; **16**, 24 ; **18**, 23 ; **22**, 11
Sulpicius Gallus, Gaius, **31**, 9, 10
Sunium, promontory of Attica, **34**, 7
Susa, capital of Susiana, **5**, 48 ; Susiana, **5**, 46, 52, 54
Sybaris, a city of Magna Graecia, **2**, 39 ; **7**, 1
Sycurium, a town in Thessaly, **27**, 8
Syleium, a city in Phrygia, **21**, 34
Synes, near Messene in Sicily, **1**, 11
Syphax, king of Numidia, **11**, 24 ; **14**, 1-9 ; **15**, 3-5 ; **16**, 23. His wife Sophanisba, **14**, 1, 7
Syracuse, **1**, 8-12, 15, 16, 43, 52-54, 62 ; **5**, 88 ; **8**, 5-9, 37 ; **9**, 10, 19 ; **12**, 4*d*, 15, 23, 25, 26 ; **15**, 35
Syria, **2**, 71 ; **3**, 5 ; **4**, 2, 48 ; **5**, 36 ; 43, 57, 58, 85, 87 ; **9**, 43 ; **12**, 17 ; **21**, 46 ; **28**, 1, 20 ; **29**, 27 ; **31**, 11, 13, 19-21 ; **32**, 6 ; **33**, 19 ; **34**, 15 ; **39**, 18, 19

Syrinx, a covered way at Alexandria, **15**, 30, 31
Syrinx, a town in Hyrcania, **10**, 31
Syrtes, the, **12**, 1 ; the greater Syrtis, **3**, 39 ; the lesser, **1**, 39 ; **3**, 23 ; **32**, 2 ; **34**, 15

TABAE, a city in Persia, **31**, 11
Taenarum, a promontory of Laconia (*C. Matapan*), **5**, 19 ; **9**, 34
Tagae, a city in Parthia, **10**, 29
Tagus, river in Spain, **3**, 14 ; **10**, **7**, 39 ; **34**, 7
Talent (weight), **4**, 56 ; **5**, 89 ; **9**, 41 ; *See* **34**, 8 *note*
Talent (money), **5**, 89 ; **22**, 12. *See Euboic, Attic*
Tambrax, a town in Hyrcania, **10**, 31
Tanais (the Don), **3**, 37, 38 ; **34**, 5, 7 ; confused with the Jaxartes, **10**, 48
Tannetus, a hamlet in Cisalpine Gaul, **3**, 40
Tantalus, **4**, 45
Tapuri, a Median tribe, **5**, 44 ; Tapuria, **10**, 49
Tarentines, *i.e.* mercenary cavalry, **4**, 77 ; **11**, 12 ; **16**, 18
Tarentum, a city in Italy (*Taranto*), **1**, 6, 20 ; **2**, 24 ; **3**, 75, 118 ; **8**, 26-36 ; **9**, 9 ; **10**, 1 ; **13**, 4 ; **29**, 12
Tarquinius Priscus (**6**, 2), fr. vi.
Tarracina, a city in Latium (*Terracina*), **3**, 22, 24
Tarraco, a city in Spain (*Tarragona*), **3**, 76, 95 ; **10**, 20, 34, 40 ; **11**, 33
Tarseium, a town in Spain (*Tartessus*), **3**, 24, 33
Taurini, a Gallic tribe in the valley of the Po, **3**, 60 ; **34**, 10
Taurion, minister of Philip V., **4**, 6, 10, 19, 80, 87 ; **5**, 27, 92, 95, 103 ; **8**, 14 ; **9**, 23
Taurisci, an Alpine tribe, **2**, 15, 28, 30
Taurisci Norici, a tribe near Aquileia, **34**, 10
Taurus, mountain in Asia Minor, **4**, 48 ; **5**, 40, 41, 107, 109 ; **10**, 28 ; as a boundary of Asia from Syria and other kingdoms, **3**, 3 ; **4**, 2, 48 ; **5**, 40, 77 ; **8**, 22 ; **11**, 34 ; **21**, 14, 17, 21, 24, 43, 48
Taygetus, mountain in the Peloponnese, **34**, 10
Teanum Sidicinum, a city in Campania (*Teano*), **3**, 91
Tectosages, a Gallic tribe in Asia Minor, **21**, 39
Tegea, a city in Arcadia, **2**, 46, 54, 58, 70 ; **4**, 22, 23, 82 ; **5**, 17, 18, 20, 24, 92 ; **9**, 28 ; **11**, 11, 18 ; **16**, 17, 36, 37 ; **18**, 14 ; **38**, 8, 9
Tegean gate at Messene, **16**, 17
Telamon, on the coast of Etruria (*Telamone*), **2**, 27
Teleas, an ambassador of King Euthydemus, **11**, 34
Telecles, of Aegium, **32**, 7 ; **33**, 1
Telecles, of Megalopolis, **33**, 3
Teledamus, of Argos, **18**, 14
Telemnastus, of Crete, **29**, 4 ; **33**, 16
Telephus, of Rhodes, **29**, 10
Telmissus, a city of Lycia, **21**, 48
Telocritus, an Achaean, **28**, 12
Telphusa, a city in Arcadia, **2**, 54 ; **4**, 60, 77
Temenid gates at Tarentum, **8**, 27, 30
Temnus, a city in Aeolis, **5**, 77 ; **32**, 27
Tempe, in Thessaly, **18**, 27, 33, 36, 48 ; **22**, 1
Tenedos, island of, **16**, 34 ; **27**, 7
Teos, a city in Ionia, **5**, 77
Terentius Varro, Gaius, consul B.C. 216, **3**, 106, 110-117 ; **5**, 108
Terentius, Lucius, **18**, 48, 50
Termessus, a city in Pisidia, **21**, 35
Tetrapyrgia, in Cyrene, **31**, 27
Teuta, queen of Illyria, **2**, 4, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12
Thalamae, a town in Laconia, **16**, 16
Thalamae, a fort in Elis, **4**, 75, 84
Thasos, island of, **15**, 24 ; **18**, 44, 48, 50
Theaetetus, of Rhodes, **22**, 5 ; **27**, 14 ; **28**, 2, 16 ; **29**, 11 ; **30**, 5, 22
Thearches, of Cleitor, **2**, 55
Thearidas, an Achaean, **32**, 17 ; **38**, 8
Thebe, a city in Mysia, **16**, 1 ; **21**, 10
Thebes, in Boeotia, **2**, 39, 62 ; **4**, 23, 27, 31 ; **5**, 10, 27, 28 ; **9**, 8, 28, 34, 39 ; **12**, 25 ; **20**, 5, 7 ; **27**, 1,

2, 5; **28**, 3; **38**, 4; **39**, 9, 12; constitution of, **6**, 43
Thebes, Phthiotid, in Thessaly, 5, 99-101; **18**, 3, 8, 19, 38, 47
Themison, an officer of Antiochus the Great, **5**, 79, 82
Themistes, of Alexandria Troas, **5**, 111
Themistocles, of Athens, **6**, 44
Thémistocles, an officer of Achaeus, **5**, 77
Theodectes, an Achaean, **39**, 10
Theodoridas, of Sicyon, **22**, 3; **29**, 23
Theodorus, a Boeotian flute-player, **30**, 14
Theodotus, an Aetolian, **4**, 37; **5**, 40, 46, 61, 62, 66, 67, 79, 81; **7**, 16, 18
Theodotus Hemiolius, **5**, 42, 43, 45, 59, 68, 69, 71, 79, 83, 87
Theodotus, of Epirus, **27**, 16; **30**, 7
Theodotus, of Pherae, **18**, 10
Theogeiton, a Boeotian, **18**, 14
Theognetus, of Abydus, **16**, 33
Theophanes, of Rhodes, **33**, 16
Theophiliscus, of Rhodes, **16**, 2, 4, 5, 9
Theophrastus, a Peripatetic philosopher, **12**, 11, 23
Theopompus, of Chios, historian, **8**, 11-13; **12**, 4*a*, 25, 27; **16**, 12
Theopompus, a flute-player, **30**, 14
Theoprosopon, a promontory in Phoenicia, **5**, 68
Theotimus, a friend of Orophernes, **32**, 25
Theris, ambassador from Antiochus Epiphanes, **28**, 20
Thermae (or Therma), a town in Sicily, **1**, 24, 39
Thermopylae, **2**, 52; **10**, 41
Thermus, capital of the Aetolian League, **5**, 6-9, 13, 18; **7**, 13; **9**, 30; **11**, 7; **28**, 3; assemblies at, **5**, 8; **18**, 48; **28**, 4
Thersitae, a tribe in Spain, **3**, 33
Thersites, **12**, 26*b*
Thesmophoreium, temple of Demeter, **15**, 29, 33
Thespiae, a city in Boeotia, **27**, 1
Thessalians, **4**, 9, 76; **9**, 28, 33, 38; **11**, 5; **16**, 32; **18**, 3, 11, 46, 47; **22**, 1, 9; **23**, 1; **25**, 6; **30**, 7; **37**, 2; Thessalian cavalry, **4**, 8; **18**, 22
Thessalonica, a city in Macedonia, **22**, 1, 15; **29**, 4; **34**, 7, 12
Thessaly, **2**, 49, 52; **4**, 57, 61, 62, 66, 67; **5**, 5, 17, 26, 29, 99, 100; **18**, 3, 14, 27, 38; **20**, 13; **22**, 1; **27**, 16; **28**, 3, 12, 13; **29**, 19; **39**, 2
Thestia (or Thestieis), a town in Aetolia, **5**, 7
Thetis, temple of, at Pharsalus, **18**, 20, 21
Thoas, an Aetolian, **21**, 17, 31, 45; **28**, 4
Thoas, an agent between Perseus and Rhodes, **30**, 8
Thrace, **4**, 39, 44, 45; **5**, 34, 74; **18**, 49; **22**, 15, 17; **23**, 8; **24**, 3; **34**, 7, 10; Greek cities in, **9**, 28; **18**, 48, 51; **22**, 1, 9, 17; **23**, 8
Thracians, the, mercenaries, **5**, 65, 79, 82; **31**, 3. *See also* **4**, 38, 45, 46, 51, 66; **5**, 7; **8**, 24; **10**, 41; **18**, 4, 22, 37; **21**, 49; **22**, 17, 18; **23**, 10; **34**, 7; **39**, 2
Thraseas, an Alexandrian, **5**, 65
Thrason, of Syracuse, **7**, 2
Thrasycrates, of Rhodes, **11**, 4
Thrasylochus of Messene, **18**, 14
Thrasymene Lake, the, **3**, 82, 84, 108; **5**, 101; **15**, 11
Thronium, a city of the Epicnemidian Locrians, **9**, 41; **18**, 9
Thucydides, the historian, **8**, 13
Thule, island of, **34**, 5
Thuria, a town in Messenia, **23**, 17
Thurii, in Magna Graecia, **8**, 26; **10**, 1
Thyateira, a town in Lydia, **16**, 1; **32**, 27
Thyestes, of Sparta, **4**, 22
Thyreum, a town in Arcadia, **4**, 6, 25; **18**, 10; **21**, 29; **28**, 5
Tiber, the, **6**, 2, 55; **31**, 20, 22; **35**, 2
Tiboetes, uncle of Prusias I., **4**, 50-52
Tibur (*Tivoli*), **6**, 14
Ticinus, a river in Cisalpine Gaul, **3**, 64; **34**, 10

Tigris, the, **5**, 45, 46, 48, 51, 52
Timaeus, of Tauromenium in Sicily, the historian, **1**, 5 ; **2**, 16 ; **8**, 12 ; criticism of, **12**, 3-15, 23-28 ; **34**, 10 ; **39**, 19
Timaeus, an Aetolian, **4**, 34 ; **9**, 34
Timagoras, a Rhodian admiral, **27**, 7
Timagoras, another Rhodian, a captain of a vessel, **27**, 7
Timarchus, a Cretan, **4**, 53
Timocrates, of Pellene, **18**, 17
Timolas, of Boeotia, **18**, 14
Timolaus, of Sparta, **20**, 12
Timoleon, of Corinth, **12**, 23, 25, 25*k*, 26
Timotheus, ambassador from Ptolemy Philometor, **28**, 1
Timotheus, ambassador from Orophernes, **32**, 24
Timotheus, of Miletus, **4**, 20
Timoxenus, Achaean Strategus B.C. 216, **2**, 53 ; **4**, 6, 7, 82 ; **5**, 106
Tisaeus, Mt., in Thessaly, **10**, 42
Tisamenus, king of Achaia, **2**, 41 ; **4**, 1
Tisippus, an Aetolian, **30**, 13
Titti, a Spanish tribe, **35**, 2
Tium, a city in Bithynia, **25**, 2
Tlepolemus, commandant of Pelusium, **15**, 25-27, 29 ; **16**, 21, 22
Tlepolemus, ambassador from Ptolemy Physcon, **28**, 19
Tolistobogii, a tribe in Galatia, **21**, 37
Torches. *See* Signals ; used for starting horse races, fr. lxiv.
Torus, a hill near Agrigentum, **1**, 19
Tower, the, **5**, 102. *See* Perippia.
Tragiscus, of Tarentum, **8**, 29, 30
Tragyrium, a city in Illyria, **32**, 18
Tralles, a city in Caria, **21**, 48
Trebia, a river in Cisalpine Gaul, **3**, 67-69, 72 ; battle of, **3**, 72-74, 108 ; **15**, 11
Trench, the, in Messenia, **4**, 33
Triarii. *See* Roman Army
Tribuni militum. *See* Roman Army ; Tribuni plebi, **3**, 87 ; **6**, 12, 16 ; **30**, 4
Trichonium, a town in Aetolia, **5**, 7
Trichonian lake, the, in Aetolia, **5**, 7 ; **11**, 7
Trieres, a town in Phocnicia, **5**, 68
Trigaboli, at the head of the delta of the Po, **2**, 16
Triphylia, a district in the Peloponnese, **4**, 77, 79-81 ; **5**, 27 ; **18**, 42, 47
Triphylus, son of Arcas, **4**, 77
Tripolis, a district of Laconia, **4**, 81
Tritaea, a city of Achaia, **2**, 41 ; **4**, 6, 59 ; **5**, 95
Triton, **7**, 9
Triumph, a, **6**, 15. *See* **3**, 19 (Paullus) ; **4**, 66 ; **11**, 33 (Scipio) ; **21**, 24 (L. and P. Scipio and L. Aemilius) ; **30**, 14 (L. Anicius)
Troas, **5**, 111. *See* Alexandria
Trocmi, a tribe of Galatia, **31**, 13
Troezen, a city of Argolis, **2**, 52
Trojan war, the, **34**, 2 ; Trojans, the, **12**, 4*b*
Tunes, a city in Africa (*Tunis*), **1**, 30, 67, 69, 73, 76, 77, 79, 84-86 ; **14**, 10 ; **15**, 1
Turdetani, a Spanish tribe, **34**, 9
Turduli, a Spanish tribe, **34**, 9
Tychaeus, a Numidian, **15**, 3
Tychon, officer of Antiochus the Great, **5**, 54
Tylis, a town in Thrace, **4**, 46
Tylus, an island in the Arabian Gulf, **13**, 9
Tyndaris, a city in Sicily, **1**, 25, 27
Typaneae, a town in Triphylia, **4**, 77-79
Tyranny, **5**, 11 ; **6**, 3, 7, 8
Tyrrhenian Sea, **1**, 10 ; **2**, 14, 16 ; **3**, 61, 110 ; **34**, 6, 10
Tyre, **3**, 24 ; **4**, 37 ; **5**, 61, 62, 70 ; **16**, 22 ; **31**, 20

ULYSSES, **9**, 16 ; **12**, 27 ; **34**, 2-4 ; **35**, 6
Umbrians, the, **2**, 16, 24 ; **3**, 86
Utica, a city of Africa, 1, 70, 73-76, 82, 83, 88 ; **14**, 1-3, 6-10 ; **15**, 2 ; **36**, 3, 6 ; **38**, 1

VACCAEI, a Spanish tribe, **3**, 5, 14 ; **34**, 9
Vadimonian Lake, the, in Etruria, **2**, 20
Valerius Flaccus, L., consul B.C. 261, **1**, 20
Valerius Flaccus, L., consul B.C. 195, **20**, 9, 10

Valerius Laevinus, M., consul B.C. 210, **8**, 3 ; **9**, 27 ; **21**, 29
Valerius Laevinus, C., son of the preceding, consul suff. B.C. 176, **21**, 29, 31
Valerius Maximus Messala, Manius, consul B.C. 263, **1**, 16, 17
Velia, a city in Lucania, **1**, 20
Velites. *See* Roman Army
Veneti, a tribe of Cisalpine Gauls, **2**, 17, 18, 23, 24
Venusia, a city of Apulia, **3**, 90, 116, 117
Verbanus lacus (*Lago Maggiore*), **34**, 10
Vesta, **5**, 93
Vestini, a people of central Italy, **2**, 24
Vibo, a town in Bruttium (Hipponium, *Bivona*), **3**, 88
Villius Tapulus, P., consul B.C. 199, **18**, 48, 50
Vulturnus, a river in Samnium, **3**, 92

WALL, the, a fort near Dyme, **4**, 59, 83
Walls, the Two, a fort in Mysia, **5**, 77
Walls, scribbling on, **5**, 33
White Rock, the, **3**, 53 ; cp. **10**, 30
World, divisions of, **3**, 37 ; **12**, 25

XANTHIPPUS, of Sparta, **1**, 32-36
Xanthus, Macedonian hero, **23**, 10
Xanthus, a city in Lycia, **25**, 4
Xenarchus, an Achaean, **23**, 4
Xenis, a road near Mantinea, **11**, 11
Xeno, of Aegium, **32**, 7 ; **33**, 1
Xeno, tyrant of Hermione, **2**, 44
Xeno, of Patrae, **28**, 6
Xeno, an officer of Antiochus the Great, **5**, 42, 43, 45
Xenoetas, an Achaean, **5**, 45-48
Xenophanes, of Athens, **7**, 9
Xenophantus, of Rhodes, **4**, 50
Xenophon, the Athenian historian, **3**, 6 ; **6**, 45 ; **10**, 20
Xenophon, of Aegium, **18**, 1, 10 ; **28**, 19
Xerxes, king of Persia, **3**, 22 ; **6**, 11 ; **9**, 38 ; **38**, 4
Xerxes, a prince of Armosata, **8**, 25

ZABDIDELUS, an Arabian, **5**, 79
Zacynthus, island of (*Zante*), **5**, 4, 102
Zagrus, a mountain in Media, **5**, 44, 54, 55
Zaleucus, legislator of the Locrians, **12**, 16
Zama, battle of, **15**, 5-16
Zarax, a town in Laconia, **4**, 36
Zariaspa, a town of Bactriana, **10**, 49
Zarzas, a Libyan, **1**, 84, 85
Zelys, of Gortyn in Crete, **5**, 79
Zeno, of Rhodes, an historian, **16**, 14-17, 20
Zeugma, a bridge of boats across the Euphrates, **5**, 43
Zeus, Homarius, **2**, 39 ; **5**, 93 ; Idaeus, **28**, 14 ; Lycaeus, **4**, 33 ; Olympius, **9**, 27 ; **26**, 1 ; **39**, 17 ; Atabyrius, **9**, 27 ; temple of, at Selge (Cesbedium), **5**, 76 ; precinct of, in Arcadia, **16**, 12 ; statue of, by Pheidias, **30**, 10 ; worshipped by the Carthaginians, **3**, 11 ; **7**, 9. *See also* **4**, 33 ; **7**, 9, 11 ; **12**, 26 ; **30**, 10
Zeuxippus, of Boeotia, **18**, 43 ; **22**, 4
Zeuxis, an officer of Antiochus the Great, **5**, 45-48, 51-54, 60. *See also* **16**, 1, 24 ; **21**, 16, 17, 24
Zodiac, signs of the, **9**, 15
Zoippus, of Syracuse, **7**, 2

THE END

Printed by R. & R. CLARK, *Edinburgh*

MESSRS. MACMILLAN AND CO.'S PUBLICATIONS.

CLASSICAL TEXTS.—Edited by E. S. SHUCKBURGH.

Cicero.—DE SENECTUTE. Edited, with Introduction, Notes, Vocabulary, and Biographical Index. 18mo. 1s. 6d. [*Elementary Classics.*

DE AMICITIA. Edited, with Introduction, Notes, Vocabulary, and Biographical Index. 18mo. 1s. 6d. [*Elementary Classics.*

Ovid.—SELECTIONS. Edited, with Introduction, Notes, and Vocabulary. 18mo. 1s. 6d. [*Elementary Classics.*

Virgil.—SELECTIONS. Edited, with Introduction and Notes. 18mo. 1s. 6d. [*Elementary Classics.*

Ovid.—HEROIDUM EPISTULÆ XIII. With Introduction, Notes, and Indices. Fcap. 8vo. 4s. 6d. [*Classical Series.*

Ovid.—TRISTIA. Edited, with Introduction and Notes. Fcap. 8vo. [*Classical Series. In preparation.*

Lysias.—SELECT ORATIONS. Edited, with Analysis, Notes, Appendices, and Indices. New Edition. Fcap. 8vo. 6s. [*Classical Series.*

Terence.—HAUTON TIMORUMENOS. Edited, with Introduction and Notes. Fcap. 8vo. 3s. With Translation. 4s. 6d. [*Classical Series.*

Demosthenes.—DE CORONA. Edited by B. Drake, M.A., late Fellow of King's College, Cambridge. New and revised Edition, edited by E. S. Shuckburgh, M.A. [*In the press.*

Æschines.—IN CTESIPHONTEM. Edited, with Introduction and Notes, by Rev. T. Gwatkin, M.A., late Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge, and E. S. Shuckburgh, M.A. Fcap. 8vo. [*Classical Series. In the Press.*

Cicero.—THE SECOND PHILIPPIC. Translated with Historical Introduction and Notes. By E. S. Shuckburgh, M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s. 6d.

Passages from Latin Authors for Translation into English.—Selected with a view to the needs of Candidates for the Cambridge Previous, Local and Schools' Examinations. By E. S. Shuckburgh, M.A. Crown 8vo. 2s.

TRANSLATIONS.

Aristotle.—THE POLITICS. Translated, with Analysis and Critical Notes, by Rev. J. E. C. Welldon, M.A., Fellow of King's College, Cambridge, and Head-Master of Harrow School. Second Edition, revised. Crown 8vo. 10s. 6d.

THE RHETORIC. Translated, with an Analysis and Critical Notes, by the same. Crown 8vo. 7s. 6d.

THE ETHICS. Translated, with an Analysis and Critical Notes, by the same. Crown 8vo. [*In preparation.*

Æschylus.—THE "SEVEN AGAINST THEBES." Edited, with Introduction, Commentary, and Translation, by A. W. Verrall, M.A., Litt.D., Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. 8vo. 7s. 6d.

Cicero.—THE ACADEMICS. Translated by J. S. Reid, M.L., Litt.D. 8vo. 5s. 6d.

SELECT LETTERS. After the Edition of Albert Watson, M.A. Translated by G. E. Jeans, M.A. Second Edition. Revised. Crown 8vo. 10s. 6d.

Herodotus.—Translated into English with Introduction, Notes, and Indices. By G. C. Macaulay, M.A. Crown 8vo. [*Just ready.*

Homer.—THE ILIAD. Translated into English Prose, by Andrew Lang, M.A., Walter Leaf, M.A., and Ernest Myers, M.A. Crown 8vo. 12s. 6d.

THE ODYSSEY.—Done into English by Professor S. H. Butcher, M.A., and Andrew Lang, M.A. Seventh and Cheaper Edition, revised and corrected. Crown 8vo. 6s.

Juvenal.—THIRTEEN SATIRES. Translated into English after the Text of J. E. B. Mayor by Alexander Leeper, M.A., Warden of Trinity College in the University of Melbourne. Crown 8vo. 3s. 6d.

Livy.—BOOKS XXI.—XXV. Translated by Alfred John Church, M.A., of Lincoln College, Oxford, Professor of Latin, University College, London, and William Jackson Brodribb, M.A., late Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge. Crown 8vo. 7s. 6d.

Pindar.—THE EXTANT ODES OF PINDAR. Translated into English, with an Introduction and short Notes, by Ernest Myers, M.A. Second Edition. Crown 8vo. 5s.

Plato.—THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO. Translated into English, with an Analysis and Notes, by J. Ll. Davies, M.A., and D. J. Vaughan, M.A. 18mo. 4s. 6d.

EUTHYPHRO, APOLOGY, CRITO, and PHÆDO. Translated by F. J. Church. 18mo. 4s. 6d.

PHÆDRUS, LYSIS, and PROTAGORAS. A New and Literal Translation, mainly from the text of Bekker. By J. Wright, M.A. 18mo. 4s. 6d.

MESSRS. MACMILLAN AND CO.'S PUBLICATIONS

(CONTINUED).

Sallust.—CATILINE AND JUGURTHA. Translated with Introductory Essays, by A. W. POLLARD, B.A. Crown 8vo. 6s. THE CATILINE (separately). Crown 8vo. 3s.
Tacitus.—Translated by A. J. CHURCH, M.A., and W. J. BRODRIBB, M.A. With Notes and Maps. New Edition. Crown 8vo. THE ANNALS, 7s. 6d. THE HISTORY, 6s. THE AGRICOLA AND GERMANY, with the Dialogue on Oratory, 4s. 6d.
Theocritus, Bion, and Moschus.—Rendered into English Prose, with Introductory Essay, by A. LANG, M.A. 18mo. 4s. 6d.
Virgil.—THE ÆNEID. Translated by J. W. MACKAIL, M.A. Crown 8vo. 7s. 6d.
Xenophon.—COMPLETE WORKS. Translated, with Introduction and Essays, by H. G. DAKYNS, M.A. Four Volumes. Crown 8vo. *[In the press.*

TEXTS WITH INTRODUCTIONS, NOTES, ETC.

Æschylus.—THE EUMENIDES. The Greek Text, with Introduction, English Notes, and Verse Translation. By BERNARD DRAKE, M.A. 8vo. 5s.
AGAMEMNON. Edited, with Introduction and Notes, by A. W. VERRALL, Litt.D. 8vo. *[In the press.*
AGAMEMNON, CHOEPHORAE, AND EUMENIDES. Edited, with Introduction and Notes, by A. O. PRICKARD, M.A. 8vo. *[In preparation.*
THE "SEVEN AGAINST THEBES." Edited, with Introduction, Commentary, and Translation, by A. W. VERRALL, Litt.D. 8vo. 7s. 6d.
SUPPLICES. A revised Text, with Introduction, Critical Notes, Commentary, and Translation, by T. G. TUCKER, M.A., Professor of Classical Philology in the University of Melbourne. 8vo. *[In the press.*
Aristotle.—THE POLITICS. Edited, after SUSEMIHL, by R. D. HICKS, M.A., Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. 8vo. *[In the press.*
THE SOPHISTICI ELENCHI. With Translation and Notes by E. POSTE, M.A., Fellow of Oriel College, Oxford. 8vo. 8s. 6d.
Attic Orators.—FROM ANTIPHON TO ISAEOS. By R. C. JEBB, Litt.D., LL.D. 2 vols. 8vo. 25s.
Babrius.—Edited, with Introductory Dissertations, Critical Notes, Commentary, and Lexicon, by Rev. W. GUNION RUTHERFORD, M.A., LL.D. 8vo. 12s. 6d.
Cicero.—THE ACADEMICA. The Text revised and explained by J. S. REID, M.L., Litt.D., Fellow of Caius College, Cambridge. 8vo. 15s.
Euripides.—MEDEA. Edited, with Introduction and Notes, by A. W. VERRALL, Litt.D., Fellow and Lecturer of Trinity College, Cambridge. 7s. 6d.
Herodotus.—BOOKS I.-III. THE ANCIENT EMPIRES OF THE EAST. Edited, with Notes, Introductions, and Appendices, by A. H. SAYCE, LL.D. Demy 8vo. 16s.
BOOKS IV.-XI. Edited by REGINALD W. MACAN, M.A. 8vo. *[In preparation.*
The Iliad.—Edited, with English Notes and Introduction, by WALTER LEAF, Litt.D. In 2 volumes. 8vo. Vol. I. Books I.-XII. 14s. Vol. II. Books XIII.-XXIV. 14s.
Juvenal.—THIRTEEN SATIRES OF JUVENAL. With a Commentary. By Professor JOHN E. B. MAYOR, M.A. Crown 8vo.
Vol. I.—10s. 6d. Vol. II.—10s. 6d.
Ktesias.—THE FRAGMENTS OF THE PERSIKA OF KTESIAS. Edited, with Introduction and Notes, by JOHN GILMORE, M.A. 8vo. 8s. 6d.
Martial.—BOOKS I. AND II. OF THE EPIGRAMS. Edited, with Introduction and Notes, by Professor JOHN E. B. MAYOR, M.A. 8vo. *[In the press.*
Phrynichus.—THE NEW PHRYNICHUS; being a revised Text of the Ecloga of the Grammarian Phrynichus. With Introduction and Commentary by the Rev. W. GUNION RUTHERFORD, M.A., LL.D. 8vo. 18s.
Plato.—PHÆDO. Edited, with Introduction, Notes, and Appendices, by R. D. ARCHER-HIND, M.A., Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. 8vo. 8s. 6d.
TIMAEUS. Edited, with Introduction, Notes, and a Translation, by the same Editor. 8vo. 16s.
PHÆDO. Edited, with Introduction and Notes, by W. D. GEDDES, LL.D., Principal of the University of Aberdeen. Second Edition. 8vo. 8s. 6d.
Pliny.—CORRESPONDENCE WITH TRAJAN. C. Plinii Caecilii Secundi Epistulae ad Traianum Imperatorem cum Eiusdem Responsis. Edited, with Notes and Introductory Essays, by E. G. HARDY, M.A. 8vo. 10s. 6d.
Tacitus.—THE ANNALS. Edited, with Introductions and Notes, by Professor G. O. HOLBROOKE, M.A. With Maps. 8vo. 16s.
THE HISTORIES. Edited, with Introduction and Notes, by Rev. W. A. SPOONER, M.A., Fellow of New College, and H. M. SPOONER, M.A., formerly Fellow of Magdalen College, Oxford. 8vo. *[In preparation.*